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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ
ΗΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS,

WITH

ENGLISH NOTES.

BY

WILLIAM EDWARD JELF, B.D.,

LATE STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH.

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TO THE

REV. ROBERT SCOTT, D.D.,

MASTER OF BALLIOL AND PREBENDARY OF EXETER,

SOMETIME STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH,

These Volumes

ARE INSCRIBED, IN GRATEFUL REMEMBRANCE

OF AN UNBROKEN FRIENDSHIP OF MORE THAN

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.

P R E F A C E.

It is not my purpose in this edition to set forth a complete system of moral philosophy, or to compare and reconcile different views, but simply to assist the student of the *Ethica* in understanding Aristotle's meaning, and in following his arguments in the book before us. There is, indeed, scarcely a page of the work which might not have served as a peg on which to hang a dissertation on some point of the theory and practice of morals; but to do so would have interfered with, rather than furthered, my main aim: and I have therefore abstained from general disquisitions, and have neither referred to ancient systems of philosophy, except where Aristotle's meaning would have been obscure without such reference; nor to modern views, except where they directly illustrate, in more familiar language, and thus enable us more completely to apprehend what Aristotle meant to say. And this was the less necessary, as I believe what I have left undone will be performed by able hands. I wish rather to guide students, as far as I am able, to an understanding of what Aristotle says, before they proceed to compare him with, or judge him by, what has been advanced by those who went before or came after him. I am sure that he who carefully and patiently studies his ethical writings, (in which I would include the *Rhetoric*.) will gain a knowledge of many of the secrets of man's nature, as it practically exists, and of men as they practically act, which will be found of great service, as well in the abstract study of the subject, as in practical dealing with, or guidance of, men. For Aristotle, looking with a curious and careful eye on the realities of human life, saw the elements of man's nature, the motives and springs of action,

and the manner of their working, far more distinctly and accurately than any other philosopher, ancient or modern. He may not have had the brilliant imagination of Plato; but his wonderful powers of discernment, of analysis, of comparison, of combination, of distinction, of sifting the wheat from the chaff, enabled him to arrive at conclusions which, as far as they go, are wonderfully in harmony with the fuller and deeper knowledge which is vouchsafed to us. If I were called upon to rest Aristotle's fame on one part of his manifold wisdom, it would be on the patient confidence with which he believes that nature has worked, and does work, for the best; and that true moral philosophy consists, not in dogmatising on what man ought to be, or what he would be, had he been created otherwise than he is, but in seeing what he was intended to be as he is; on the patient skill with which, in accordance with this principle, taking man as he is, and the world as it is, he has worked out the nature, the functions, the perfection, the true happiness of such a being placed in such a world. If it may with truth be said that Socrates drew morality from heaven, it is not less true to say that Aristotle found it on earth.

Aristotle's fame undoubtedly rests rather on his logical and moral writings than on his physical, though it is hardly fair to form an unfavourable judgment of his whole natural philosophy from what remains to us. The names of several of his lost works might lead us to suppose that he treated the subject more completely and truly than is sometimes supposed; but without taking this into account, physical science was then undoubtedly in its infancy. Observations and experiment could not, in the nature of things, have given the same variety of data as the moderns possess; and, it may be, our treasury of facts will seem to future enquirers to be but scantily filled. Physical science is always cradled in time, the giant of one generation is but the infant of the next; so that it is no detraction from Aristotle's powers as a philosopher, if his physical science seems a dwarf by the side of our own: but in whatever regards that on which time has nothing new to reveal,—the powers and laws of thought and

action,—Aristotle's data were as ample as, though not more so than, our own, and therefore his logical, ethical, and political writings maintain the place which was assigned them two thousand years ago: they have informed and guided the wisest men in succeeding generations; and especially in our own language, the arms of the truest and deepest philosophers bear undoubted marks of the armoury in which they were forged.

The keystone of Aristotle's philosophy, which enabled him thus to construct a stable system out of the shifting materials he had, is *οὐθὲν ἡ φύσις μάτην ποιεῖ*: while in *Ethics* he was led to truth by taking a true view of man as a compound being, made up of reason and passions, each of which had their function in the formation of his moral character and the development of moral action. This view of man as a compound being is discernible in his *Rhetoric* as well as his *Ethics*.

The data which Aristotle uses will be found to be either the opinions of men, expressed or implied, or the facts of nature, as seen either in the general laws and principles which philosophy had been able to detect, or common sense to recognise; or in the facts of daily life, as discernible by our senses or reason. Most philosophers of his age rejected the one, while they asserted the claims of the other. Aristotle uses the one or the other as they come most readily to hand, (see bk. i. notes 58, 61,) and, if possible, both, so as to shew the agreement which ought to exist, and, when both are carefully examined, does exist, between them.

Again, in the examination of philosophic or popular opinions, and he does not throw aside a dogma, or even a proverb, without care: he extracts from the very dross whatever gold may be in it; and pointing out where each has fallen short of, or exceeded the limits of truth, confirms his own opinion by shewing how it agrees with the truth, while he corrects the errors of others. And thus one great lesson to be learnt from the study of Aristotle is, that where contrary opinions are held by honest men, with a fair show of argument on each side, or have obtained in popular opinion of different ages or

countries, each is true with limitations or additions: where one says "it is wholly this," and another, "it is wholly that," the truth lies hid in the fact that both are partially, neither wholly, right.

As for the treatise itself, enough is said from time to time in the notes on the general object and nature of its several parts and of it as a whole, to render it unnecessary to go over the same ground here. I had some thoughts, at one time, of prefixing an Analysis or Conspectus, such as that of Michelet's; but on consideration, I think there is sufficient help given in the notes to enable the student to do it for himself, with far more benefit than if he had it ready made to his hands; and I should be doing more harm than good if I superseded useful labour, instead of merely guiding and assisting it. I have directed some blank pages to be left in the beginning of the first volume for this purpose, and I subjoin an analysis of one chapter very much on Michelet's plan, as a specimen of the way in which I should recommend such work to be done. Suffice it to say, that I believe the *Ethics* to have been written by Aristotle as a scientific proof that moral virtue was the perfection of man, a compound being, placed in the world in which we find him; and hence that his happiness, the production and preservation of which ought to be the aim of the science of social life, is to be found in the faithful discharge of his duties as a citizen and a man. Of course there is much practical information and explanation given throughout, but I do not agree with those who cannot see in the *Ethics* a distinct point to be proved, and a distinct line of argument to prove it. It is a scientific enquiry into and proof of the practical nature of human virtue and happiness, — not merely a barren speculation into its abstract nature, with no aim or result beyond speculation, but with a view to practice, and the attainment of something beyond itself. (See bk. ii. note 13.)

The reading given is almost invariably that of Bekker's. The duodecimo text has been printed in an octavo page, so as to leave room for a running abstract or observations which may strike the student as he reads; thus giving all the ad-

vantage of an interleaved book, without being interleaved. And I have not loaded the text or notes with various readings, but have contented myself with merely giving those which seemed to affect the sense. Not that I would be supposed to undervalue various readings; they afford scope for the exercise and development of a very useful mental faculty; but I think they belong rather to the poets than to the philosophers. In the former the taste is chiefly called into play, and therefore it is right that scope should be found for the occasional exercise of the critical faculties side by side with the other, in comparing and judging of authorities and probabilities. In the latter there is sufficient scope for the critical faculty in the subject and the arguments, and the introduction of unimportant and formal points of criticism would rather call off the judgment from its more important sphere in the contents of the book itself.

In some, if not many passages, the conciseness of the style, so different from that of Plato, renders the reasoning at first sight obscure and difficult; but these, even where the general line and conclusion of the argument are clear enough, may not be neglected or slurred over. It is no fruitless mental exercise to follow such a mind as Aristotle's even where the path is rugged, and where we think we see a short cut. Whoever declines this labour will fail to master many forms of thought and argument which would have made his own powers of thought and argument more varied and available. This important result will be obtained, and the treatise more thoroughly mastered, by following out the connection and arguments as closely as possible,—searching into the force of illative conjunctions, (such as *γὰρ*, *οὖν*, &c.), and the way in which one clause is connected with another. This requires much labour and patience,—but it will not be labour and patience mispent; and I would warn beginners against supposing that they have got all that the *Ethics* has to offer when they have read it once over, or when they have mastered the details. These, of course, must be mastered first, but these are not all. The *Ethics* is an inexhaustible mine;—I am afraid to say how often I have read it over, but I am not

afraid to say that every time I have read it I have found something worth knowing which had not struck me before.

I would warn the student also against careless construing of Greek words into inadequate English ; such, for instance, as always construing *καλόν* “honourable,” or *αἰσχρόν* “disgraceful ;” or, what is still more common, rendering a whole sentence into English words without mastering the notion which the Greek is meant to convey.

It is not necessary for me to bring forward here the leading and essential points in the book ; but among the points which occur incidentally, I would call especial attention to Aristotle’s opinion of, and use of, induction,—to the way in which he speaks of the gods, —and the reverential and even affectionate way in which he speaks of Plato ; these being some among the many points in which Aristotle has been misrepresented and misused.

Those who are acquainted with Michelet’s Commentary will not fail to observe that I am occasionally indebted to him for explanations or references, which I have not hesitated to adopt without acknowledging them in each case.

There are, of course, a few trifling misprints : those which I have myself detected are in the accents ; one especially, of the class which, to use a forcible expression of the late Dean of Christ Church, sets one’s teeth on edge,—a *pro-proparoxyton*, *ἄοριστος*. But I must add, that this arose from my correcting the press at a distance, which made me, sometimes, in order to save time, let the sheets be printed off without seeing with my own eyes that the final corrections had been made.


I will only add, that I shall be much gratified if it should turn out that my labours assist others in the study of a work from which I feel that I have myself obtained much, and of which, the more thoroughly it is studied, the more will the value and benefits be felt.

CAERDEON, *Jan.* 1856.

Specimen of Analysis.

Book i. ch. 6.—Plato's notion of the *ιδέα* does not give us the true nature of good.

1. Apology for opposing Plato, 1.
2. Why his doctrine wrong, 2 to the end.
 - a. Good is predicated in Priority and Posteriority, 2.
 - β. Goods are predicated in different categories, 3.
 - γ. There is no one science of good, 4.
 - δ. The doctrine unintelligible and unpractical, 5—7.
 - a. No real difference between the supposed *ιδέα* and concrete goods, 5.
 - b. Supposed eternity of abstract *ιδέα* no argument to the contrary, 6.
 - c. Testimony of Speusippus, 7.
 - ε. The doctrine not tenable on the theory of distinction between goods dependent and independent, 8, 12.
 - aa. Supposed division of goods, 8, 9.
 - bb. Difficulty of distinguishing between them, 10.
 - cc. Dilemma arising from different notions of dependent and independent goods.
 - aa. If only the *ιδέα* independent, then no reality in concrete, 10.
 - ββ. If others also, then all should fall under one definition, 11.
 - dd. Why called by common name of "good," 12.
 - ζ. Even if true, not practical or attainable, 13—16.
1. Argument of Platonists that it would serve as a model, 14.
2. Disproved by practice of men in general, 15.
3. By the practical sciences.






































ἡδονῇ, διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικὸν. Τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρη-
 μένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικὸς. Οἱ μὲν 3
 οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδῶδεις φαίνονται βησκη-
 μάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ
 πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδανα-
 πάλλῃ. Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμὴν τοῦ γὰρ 4
 πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. Φαίνεται δ' ἐπι-
 πολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
 τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τὰγαθὸν δὲ
 οἰκείον τι καὶ δισαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. Ἔτι δ' 5
 εἰκόσκει τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν, ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγα-
 θοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι,
 καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι
 κατὰ γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. Τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον 6
 ἂν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. Φαί-
 νεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ
 καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπραγεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ
 πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ'
 οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν δια-
 φυλάττων. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλῃ· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίαις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν· τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν 7
 ὁ θεωρητικὸς, περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις
 ποιησόμεθα. Ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστὶν, καὶ ὁ 8
 πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθὸν χρήσιμον
 γὰρ καὶ ἄλλον χάριν. Διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχ-
 θέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται.
 Φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἑκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ
 ἐκ. ἀταξίβηται.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον (6) 4
 ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπιρῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ



ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ

Α.

ΠΑΣΑ τέχνη καὶ πῦσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξις 1
τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ
καλῶς ἀπεφώνησαντο τὰγαθὸν, οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται. Διαφορὰ 2
δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι,
τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά. Ὡν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ
παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνερ-
γειῶν τὰ ἔργα. Πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχ- 3
νῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρι-
κῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς
δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. Ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν 4
τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν
ἵππικὴν ἢ χαλινοποιϊκὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἵππικῶν
ὀργάνων εἰσὶν· αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρῆξις
ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ'
ἐτέρας· ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη
πάντων ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ
χάριν κακεῖνα διώκεται. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνερ- 5
γείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας
ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, (2)
τάλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα

(πρύεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν
καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὕρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰγαθὸν
2 καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις
αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπὴν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν
3 ἔχοντες, μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ'
οὕτω, πειρατέον τύφῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ
4 καὶ τίνας τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. Δόξειε δ' ἂν
5 τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. Τοιαύτη
δ' ἢ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. Τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους μαρτυρεῖν
6 καὶ μέχρι τίνας, αὕτη διατάσσει. Ὀρώμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς
ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἷον στρα-
7 τηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικὴν. Χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης
ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομο-
θετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ
ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ'
8 ἂν εἴη τὰνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν
ἐνὶ καὶ πύλει, μείζον γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως
φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ
ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κύλλιον δὲ καὶ θειώτερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν.
9 Ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα.
(3) Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην
διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν
τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργ-
2 γουμένοις. Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολι-
τικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην
3 ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. Τοιαύτην
δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμ-
βαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο
4 διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. Ἀγαπητὸν οὖν
περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ

τύπῳ τᾷληθές ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι.

Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδεχέσθαι χρεῶν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τούτων τὰκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος. ἐφ' ὅσον ἢ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῖ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. Ἐκαστος δὲ 5 κρίνει καλῶς ἢ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἔστιν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. Καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οἷκ' ἔστιν οἰκείος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἡπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πηκίξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. Ἔτι 6 δὲ τοῖς παθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἔστιν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις. Διαφέρει δ' αὖθεν νεὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος 7 νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. Τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνύστης ἢ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατεσιν· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὁρεξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πωλυαφελές ἄν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἶδέναι. Καὶ 8 περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτεῖν, καὶ τί προτιβέμεθα, πεφροσιμήσθω τοσαῦτα.

Λεγόμεν δ' ἀνυλαβάντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσι γνῶσις καὶ προ- (4) 2 αἴρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἀρέγεται, τί ἔστιν οὐ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. Ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπο τῶν πλείστων 2 ὁμολογεῖται τὴν γὰρ εἰδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦτον ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εἰδαιμονεῖν. Περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰδαιμονίας, τί ἔστιν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὁμοίως οἱ

3 πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδοῦσιν. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν
 ἐναιργῶν τι καὶ φινερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ
 τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον
 νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον· συνει-
 δότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς
 λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. Ἐνιοὶ δ' ᾤοντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ
 ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε
 4 πᾶσιν αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθόν. Ἀπίστας μὲν οὖν
 ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ἡμῶν ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ
 τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ
 + 5 λόγον. Μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμῶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ
 τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. Εὐ γὰρ καὶ
 Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτην, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρ-
 χῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδὸς, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. Ἀρκτέον
 μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν
 γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. Ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ
 6 τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι καλῶς
 τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν
 7 ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι καὶ εἰ τοῦτο
 φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. Ὁ
 δὲ τοιοῦτος ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. Ὡ δὲ μη-
 δέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·

Οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος δὲ αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
 Εσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακὲῖνος δὲ εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.
 Ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
 Ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήσιος ἀνὴρ.

3 (5) Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. Τὸ γὰρ ἀγα-
 θὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰόκασιν ἐκ τῶν
 2 βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν

ἡδονὴν, διὰ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν.
 Τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προίχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρη-
 μικός καὶ ὁ πολιτικός καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. Οἱ μὲν 3
 οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδωθεὶς φαινεται βησκη-
 μτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγον διὰ τὸ
 πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδανα-
 πάλλω. Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρᾶκτικοὶ τιμὴν τοῖ γὰρ 4
 πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. Φαίνεται δ' ἐπι-
 πολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
 τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τὰγαθὸν δὲ
 οἰκείον τι καὶ δυσσφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. Ἔτι δ' 5
 εὐόκησι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν, ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγα-
 θοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι,
 καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δηλον οὖν ὅτι
 κατὰ γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. Τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον 6
 ἢν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβῃ. Φαί-
 νεται δὲ ἀτελεστερα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδεχεσθαι καὶ
 καθευθεῖν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ
 πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ αἰτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ'
 οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εἰδαιμοινοίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θεοὶ δια-
 φυλάττων. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλως· ἰσαίῳς γὰρ καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίαις εἴρηται περὶ αἰτῶν· τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν 7
 ὁ θεωρητικός, περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις
 ποιησόμεθα. Ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ 8
 πλοῖτος δηλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον
 γὰρ καὶ ἄλλον χάριν. Διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχ-
 θέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβῃ· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται.
 Φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ
 καταβεβληνται.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφεισθῶ· τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον (6) 4
 ὥς ἐπισκεψασθαι καὶ διατηρῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ

προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. Δύξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἅλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοι φίλοι ὕσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

2 Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ιδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ιδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος,

3 ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινὴ τις ἐπὶ τούτων ιδέα. Ἔτι ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῶ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρὸς, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ διαταγὰ καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθύλου καὶ ἐν οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν

4 μιᾷ μόνῃ. Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον· καιροῦ ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρικὴ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις

5 δὲ γυμναστικὴ. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· ἢ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, βούδ' ἢ ἀγαθόν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίῳ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μὴδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον

7 τοῦ ἐφήμερου. Πιθανώτερον δ' εἰόκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ

τὸ ἐν οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθήσῃ δοκεῖ.
 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος, τοῖς δὲ λεχ- 8
 θείσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ
 παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρησθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ'
 ἐν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ
 παιητικά τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυ-
 τικά διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τροπον ἄλλον. Δῆλον οὖν 9
 ὅτι διττῶς λέγοντ' ἂν τὰγαθὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ,
 βύτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. Χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελί-
 μων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν
 ἰδέαν. Καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θεῖη τις ἂν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μο- 10
 νούμενα διωκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί
 τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκουμεν,
 ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θεῖη τις ἂν. Ἡ οὐδ' ἄλλο
 οὐδενὲν πλὴν τῆς ιδέας; ὥστε ματαιὸν ἔσται τὸ εἶδος
 Εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ, τὸν τὰγαθοῖ λόγον 11
 ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθί-
 περ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμμιθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. Τιμῆς
 δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφεροντες οἱ
 λόγοι ταύτῃ ἢ ἀγαθῷ. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν
 τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γάρ 12
 ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τέχης ὁμωνύμοις. Ἀλλ' ὅρα γε τῷ
 ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι, ἢ πρὸς ἐν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν; ἢ μᾶλλον
 κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὥς γὰρ ἐν σωματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῖς,
 καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἡφαιέειν
 τὸ νῦν ἐξηκριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλο-
 σοφίας οἰκειότερον. Ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ιδέας εἰ
 γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τι το κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ
 χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, δῆλον ὡς οἷα ἂν εἴη
 πρακτὸν οἷδε κτητὸν ἀνθρώπων· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖ-
 ται. Τάχα δὲ τῷ δοξεῖεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν 13

αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν οἷον γὰρ
 παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν
 15 ἀγαθὰ, κὰν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. Πιθανότητα
 μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις
 διαφωνεῖν· πῦσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφείεμεναι καὶ τὸ
 ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ.
 Καίτοι βοήθημα τῆλικούτων ἀπαντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ἀγ-
 16 νοεῖν καὶ μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλόγόν· Ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί
 ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην
 εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τὰγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἱατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώ-
 τερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ιδίαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. Φαίνεται
 μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἱατρός,
 ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ'
 ἕκαστον γὰρ ἱατρεύει.

- 5 (7) Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δ'
 ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ' ἂν
 εἴη. Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ·
 ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἱατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς
 ὁμοίως. Τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν τὰ
 λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἱατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν
 στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῃ
 δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος·
 τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. Ὡστ'
 εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη
 2 τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. Μεταβαίνων
 δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν ἀφίκται. Τοῦτο δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον
 3 διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη,
 τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον πλοῦτον,
 αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὥς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα
 τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἀριστον τελειόν τι φαίνεται. Ὡστ' εἰ μὲν
 ἐστὶν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον,

εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειώτατον τούτων. Τελειώτερον δὲ 4
λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ
μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ
τοιαῦτα αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τελειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ
αἰρετὸν αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. Τοιοῦτον δ' ἢ εἶδαι- 5
μονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα αἰεὶ
δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ
νοῦν καὶ πῦσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά
(μηδενὸς γὰρ ἀπειβαινοντος εἰλοίμεθ' ἂν ἑκαπτον αὐτῶν.)
αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων
ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. Τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ-
δεὶς αἰρεται τούτων χάριν, οἷδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. Φαί- 6
νεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν τὸ
γὰρ τελειὸν ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. Τὸ δ' αὐταρ-
κες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην,
ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς
φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος.
Τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις ἐπεκτείνειν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς 7
γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους
εἰς ἄπειρον πρόκεισιν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῖθις ἐπι-
σκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὐταρκες τὸ θεμεν ὁ μανοῦμενον αἰρετὸν
ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαι-
μονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. Ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην, μὴ 8
συναριθμουμένην, συναριθμουμένην δὲ ὅλην ὡς αἰρετω-
τέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἱπεροχὴ γὰρ
ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μείζον
αἰρετώτερον αἰεὶ. Τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκες
ἢ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος.
Ἄλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν 9 8
ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐνηργέστερον
τὸ τί ἐστὶν εἴ τι λεχθῆναι. Ταχὺ δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ 10

αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν οἷον γὰρ
 παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν
 15 ἀγαθὰ, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτειξόμεθα αὐτῶν. Πιθανότητα
 μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμας
 διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφείμεναι καὶ τὸ
 ἐνδεές ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνώσιν αὐτῶν.
 Καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικούτον ἅπαντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ἀγ-
 16 νοεῖν καὶ μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. Ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί
 ὠφελήσεται ὑφαντῆς ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην
 εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώ-
 τερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῆς τεθεσμένος. Φαίνεται
 μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός,
 ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ'
 ἑκάστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει.

- 5 (7) Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δ'
 ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ' ἂν
 εἴη. Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πρύξει καὶ τέχνῃ·
 ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς
 ὁμοίως. Τί οὖν ἐκάστης τἀγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν τὰ
 λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν
 στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῃ
 δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πρύξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος
 τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. Ὡστ'
 εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη
 2 τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. Μεταβαίνων
 δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν ἀφίκται. Τοῦτο δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον
 2 διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τελεῖα,
 τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἑτέρα, οἷον πλοῦτον,
 υἱλοῦς καὶ ὄλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὅς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα
 τελεῖα· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τελειόν τι φαίνεται. Ὡστ' εἰ μὲν
 ἐστὶν ἐν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον,

εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειώτατον τούτων. Τελειώτερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διακτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. Τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα αἰεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὴν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηδενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντός· ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν,) αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. Τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκές εἶναι δοκεῖ. Τὸ δ' αὐταρκές λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μόνότην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλοις τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος. Τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἀπειρον πρόεισιν. Ἀλλὰ, τρίτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὐταρκές τίθειμεν ὁ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιῇ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. Ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην, μὴ συναριθμουμένην, συναριθμουμένην δὲ δηλοῦν ὡς αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπεροχὴ· γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μείζον αἰρετώτερον αἰεὶ. Τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκές ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος.

Ἄλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁ ὁμολογούμενός τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί τί ἐστίν· ἐτι λεχθῆναι. Τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ

- ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Ὡς περ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὅν ἐστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πράξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτως δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι
- 11 ἔργον αὐτοῦ. Πότερον οὖν τέκτυκτος μὲν καὶ σκυτεὺς ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἄργον πεφικεν; ἢ καθυπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργον, οὕτως καὶ ἀνθρώπου πᾶρά πάντα ταῦτα θεῇ τις
- 12 ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. Ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρησκευτικὴν καὶ πῖξτικὴν ζωὴν. Ἐπεμένῃ δὲ αἰσθητικῇ τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ
- 13 καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῷ. Δεῖπεται δὲ πρακτικῆς τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. Ταύτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον. Διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν
- 14 θετικὴν κριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. Εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φάμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γινεῖ τοῖδε καὶ τοῖδε σπουδαῖον, ὥς περ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον. Κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαιοῦ δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τιθεμεν ἔργον ζῶντι τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπου-
- 15 δαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται· εἰ δ' αὐτῶν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ὑρίστην καὶ τελειω-
- 16 τάτην. Ἐτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείωξ'. Μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἱερ

οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτως δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγοι χρόνοι.

Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰγαθὸν ταύτῃ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως 17 ἵποτυπῶσαι, πρῶτον, εἰδ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. Δόξει δ' ἂν παρὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθεῖναι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρε-
της ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι. Ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐκιδόσεις· πάντες γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλ-
λείπον. Μιμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ 18
τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν
ἐκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκείμενην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσούτων
ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκίειον τῇ μέθοδῳ. Καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεω- 19
μέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν
τι θεατῆς γὰρ τὰληθεύς. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν
τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητίον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πᾶντ' ἔργων
πλείω γίνωται. Οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν 20
ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἰκανόν ἐν τῇσι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι
καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' εἶναι πρῶτον καὶ
ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ' 21
αἰσθηταί, αἱ δ' ἐκιδόμαί τινα, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. Με-
τιμίαι δὲ πειρατίον ἐκάστας ἢ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπαιδα-
στίον ὅπως ὀρίσθωσι· καλῶς μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι
ῥοπήν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. Δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείον ἢ ἡμῖν
παντὸς εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῇ γίνεσθαι δι'
αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

Σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσ-
ματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων
περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρ-
χοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰληθεῖς. Νενεμη-
μένων δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων

τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα
 λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ. Τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐν-
 εργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. Ὅστε καλῶς
 ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ
 3 ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. Ὅρθως δὲ καὶ
 ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω
 γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός.
 4 Συνῴδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν
 εἰδαιμόνα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία.
 5 Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὴ ἐπισητορμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαι-
 6 μονίαν ἀπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθῆντι. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
 ἀρετῇ, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δο-
 κεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ μεθ' ἀνεν
 ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτός εὐτηρίαν συμπαράλαμ-
 7 βάουσιν. Τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγου-
 σιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἑνδοξοὶ ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ
 τούτων εἰλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν γέ τι ἢ
 8 καὶ τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν
 ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα· συνῴδους ἔστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης
 9 γὰρ ἔστιν ἢ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. Διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ
 μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν,
 καὶ ἐν ἔξει, ἢ ἐν ἐργείᾳ. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδεχεται
 μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀπατελεῖν ὑπαρχούσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεῖδοντι
 ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηγηκóτι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οἷον
 τε πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. Ὅσπερ δ'
 Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφα-
 νοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (ταύτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν),
 οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν καγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες
 10 ὁρθῶς ἐπήβρολοι γίνονται. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν
 κατ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδισθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν,
 ἐκίστη δ' ἔστιν ἡδὺ πρὸς δὲ λέγεται φιλοποιοῦτες, οἷον

ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θήμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ, καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς 11 τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα. Τοιαῦτα δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδέαι καὶ καθ' αὐτάς. Οὐδὲν δὲ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος 12 αὐτῶν ὥσπερ ^{ἀνθρώπου} ~~ἀνθρώπου~~ τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημέτοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων· ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν οὐτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὐτ' ἐλευθέρῳ τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὐτάς 13 ἂν εἴεν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδέαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἥσαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὥς εἵπομεν. Ἀριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδιστον ἢ 14 εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώριστα ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·

Κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῦστον δ' ὀγκαίνειν·
Ἡδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίστοις ἐνεργείαις ταύτας δὲ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φημὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. Φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν 15 προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἵπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ βῆ-διον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ὑχορήγητον ὄντα. Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι 16 μὴ παύουσι τὸ μακίριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κή-λους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδίαν παναί-

- ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Ὡσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὁλως ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πράξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι
- 11 ἔργον αὐτοῦ. Πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἐστὶν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὁλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θεῖη τις
- 12 ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κρινόν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. Ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν. Ἐπόμενη δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ
- 13 καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῷ. Λείπεται δὲ ἡ πρακτικὴ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. Τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπείθεός λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον. Διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν
- 14 θετίον κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φησὶ ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γενεῖ τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προ-
στιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπερόχης πρὸς τὸ ἔργον κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζῆν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπου-
15 δαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται· εἰ δ' οὕτως, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειώ-
16 τάτην. Ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείω. Μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ

οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οἶδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.

Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰ γὰρ ταύτη· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως 17 ἵποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἰθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι, Δόξειε δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εἰρε-
της ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι. Ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγύνασιν αἱ ἐπιδύσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλ-
λείπον. Μεμνησθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ 18 τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐκ ὅσων ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκείμενην ἔλθην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκτεῖον τῇ μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ. Καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεω- 19 μέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῖσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἡ ποιοῦν-
τι θεῖατης γὰρ τὰ ληθαῖα. Τον αὐτὸν δὲ τρίπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητεῖον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πύρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίνηται. Οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν 20 ἁπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἑκατὸν ἐν τῷ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή· τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ' 21 αἰσθηταί, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῶ τινι, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. Με-
τιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκίστασθαι ἢ πεφίκασιν, καὶ σπουδα-
στιον ὅπως ὁμολογήσῃ καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι
ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα· δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείων ἢ ἡμισυ
παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ σιμφανῇ γίνεσθαι δι'
αὐτῆς τῶν ζητούμενων

Σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπράσ- 8
ματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων 9
περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα σιμνάδει τὰ ὑπαρ-
χοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθεῖς. Νενεμη- 2
μινων δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων

τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα
 λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ. Τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐν-
 εργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. Ὡστε καλῶς
 ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ
 3 ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. Ὅρθως δὲ καὶ
 ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω
 γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός.
 4 Συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν
 εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία.
 5 Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαι-
 6 μονίαν ἀπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λέχθεντι. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
 ἀρετῇ, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δο-
 κεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τί μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ
 ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπάραλαμ-
 7 βάνουσιν. Τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγου-
 σιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ
 τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν γέ τι ἢ
 8 καὶ τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν
 ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινὰ συνφεδρῶς εἶναι τὸν λόγον· ταύτης
 9 γὰρ εἶστιν ἢ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. Διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ
 μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν,
 καὶ ἐν ἑξεί ἢ ἐν ἐνέργειᾳ. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἑξὶν ἐνδέχεται
 μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀπατελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι
 ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πῶς ἐξηγήσασθαι τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷον
 τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. Ὡσπερ δ'
 Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφα-
 νοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν),
 οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν ἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες
 10 ὁρθῶς ἐπήβρολοι γίνονται. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν
 κατ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν,
 ἐκύστω δ' εἶστιν ἡδὺ πρὸς δὲ λέγεται φιλοτιμούτος, οἷον

ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέημα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικίῳ, καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς 11 τὰ ἡδία μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῖτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκαλοῖς ἐστὶν ἡδία τὰ φύσει ἡδία. Τοιαῦτα δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ' αὐτάς. Οἷδεν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος 12 αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιήπτου τινὸς, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημίοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων· γαῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὔδεῖς ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ' ἐλευθέριον τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Ἐἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὐτάς 13 ἂν εἶναι αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαὶ γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕναστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς εἵπομεν. Ἀριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδιστον ἢ 14 εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώριστα ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·

Κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῦστον δ' ὀγιάειν·
Ἡδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τίς ἐρά τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας δὲ, ἥ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμέν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. Φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν 15 προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἵπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ βῆ-διον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πρᾶττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνῶν δὲ τητῶμενοι 16 μυστανοοῦσι τὸ μακρυον, οἷον εἰ γενεῖας εὐτεκνίας καλλοῖς· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναί-

- σχης ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως
 ἦττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἴεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοί
 17 ὄντες τεθνήσιν. Καθάπερ οὖν εἵπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι
 καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν
 ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν.
- 10 (9) Ὅθεν καὶ ὑπορεῖται πρότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθισ-
 τὸν ἢ ἄλλως πῶς ἀσκήτῳ, ἢ κατὰ τινα θείαν μοί-
 2 ραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλ- α.
 λο τι ἐστὶ θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὐλογον καὶ τὴν
 εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρω-
 3 πίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης
 ἂν εἴῃ σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ
 θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἢ
 ἡσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς
 ἀρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῶν
 4 τι καὶ μακάριον. Εἴῃ δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον δυνατόν ...
 γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ κῆπηρῶμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν
 5 διὰ τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω c.
 βέλτιον ἢ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν οὕτως,
 εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὥς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω
 6 πέφυκεν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν
 αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον
 καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμέλεις ἂν εἴῃ.
- 7 Συμφανὲς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον
 εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. Τῶν
 δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ
 8 συνέργα καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. Ὁμολογού-
 μενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴῃ καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς
 πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην
 ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινος καὶ ἀγαθοῦς τοὺς
 9 πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικούς τῶν καλῶν. Εἰκότως

οὐν οὔτε βοῖν οὔτε ἵππων οὔτε ἄλλα τῶν ζώων οὐδεν
 εὐδαιμον λεγόμεν· οὐδεν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι
 τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. Διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οἷδ' ἐπαις 10
 εὐδαιμόνων ἐστίν· οὐπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ
 τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμεναι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρί-
 ζονται. Δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ
 βίου τελείου. Πολλὰ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παν- 11
 τοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστα
 εὐθνηοῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρῳ,
 καθυπερ ἐν τοῖς ἥρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὰν
 δὲ τοιαύταις χρησαμένον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἄθλι-
 ως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

Πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονισ- (10) 11
 γούν εἰς ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σούωνα δὲ χρεῶν τέλος ὁρᾶν; Εἰ δὲ 2
 δὴ καὶ θετερον οὕτως, ἀρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαιμόνων τότε ἐπει-
 δαν ἀποθνήσκει· ἢ τοῦτο γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ
 τοῖς λίγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνεργείαν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ 3
 μὴ λεγόμεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαιμόνα, μηδὲ Σούων τοῦτο
 βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῆνικαῦτα ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν
 ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυ-
 χημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα· δοκεῖ
 γὰρ εἶναι ὅτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ
 τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δε, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμιαί καὶ
 τεκνῶν καὶ ὧλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι.
 Ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως με- 4
 βιωκότι μέχρι γήρῳ καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον
 ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκ-
 γόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν
 βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας. Δῆλον δ' ὅτι
 καὶ τοῖς ἀπιστημασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν
 αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. Ἄτοπον δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ συμμετα- 5

- βάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς καὶ γίνοιτο ὅτε μὲν εὐδαίμων
 πάλιν δ' ἄθλιος. Ἄποπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ
 τινα χρόνον συνᾶκνέϊσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦ-
 6 σιν. Ἄλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν τάχα, 2 ὅτι εἰς οὗτο
 γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθεῖη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. shall be
 7 Εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον
 οὐχ ὥς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ
 ἄποπον, εἰ ὅτι ἔστιν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ'
 αἰτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον, διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας
 εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τῆς μεταβολᾶς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τε
 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον,
 τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλύκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ;
 8 δῆλον γὰρ ὥς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν
 αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις,
 χαμαιλέοντά τινα τῶν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σα-
 9 θρῶς ἰδρυμένον. Ἡ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν
 οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ
 προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἶπαμεν,
 κυριαὶ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας,
 10 αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῇ λόγῳ καὶ
 τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν. Περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν
 ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὥς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς
 κατ' ἀρετὴν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται
 δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονι-
 μώταται διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν
 αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους, τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ
 11 γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰ λήθην. Ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον
 τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἢ
 μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν,
 καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κύλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμε-
 λῶς ὁ γ' ὥς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἀνευ

ψόγου. Πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφε- 12
 ρόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυ-
 χημίτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς
 οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπήν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ
 γιγνόμενα μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσκει (καὶ
 γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικόσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν
 καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίγνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα
 θλίβει καὶ λυμαινεται τὸ μακύριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπι-
 φέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. Ὅμως δὲ καὶ
 ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὴν φέρη τις εὐ-
 κύλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν,
 ἀλλὰ γενναῖας ὧν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. Εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ 13
 ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν
 γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πρύξει τὰ
 μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. Τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ
 ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν,
 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰετὰ καλλίστα πράττειν,
 καθὼς καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ
 χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα, καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων
 σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. Εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος 14
 μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακυρίως
 γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. Οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος
 γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινη-
 θήσεται ῥαδίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων
 ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ
 ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ,
 ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ
 γενόμενος ἐπήβολος. Τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα 15
 τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγα-
 θοῖς ἱκανῶς κέχορηγημένον, μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον

· ἄλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετίον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν
 16 πάντα πάντως. Εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους.

(11) Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω· τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἡφίλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς
 2 δόξαις ἐναντίον πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων, τῶν δ' ἥττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύφ
 3 τάχ' ἂν ἱκανῶς ἔχοι. Εἰ δὲ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρίθος καὶ ῥοπήν πρὸς τὸν βίον, τὰ δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ
 4 περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἀπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν
 5 ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἢ πρῶττεσθαι· συλλογιστέον δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων· ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διῴκνεται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοῦναντίον, ἀφανρύν τ
 καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοιοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας
 6 μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. Συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐ- 12
 δαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν
 τιμίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν.
 Φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποίῳ τι εἶναι καὶ 2
 πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν
 ἀνδρείον καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦ-
 μεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ
 τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῷ ποίῳ τινα πε-
 φυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον.
 Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· 3
 γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο
 δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφο-
 ρᾶς, ὥσπερ εἶπαμεν. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων, 4
 δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μείζον
 τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς
 μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς
 θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον,
 ἀλλ' ὥς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. Δοκεῖ δὲ 5
 καὶ Εὐδοξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ
 ἡδυνῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐσαν μη-
 νίειν ᾤετο ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ'
 εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τᾶλλα
 ἀναφέρεσθαι. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτι- 6
 κὸν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν
 ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν.
 Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς 7
 περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις, ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
 εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τε-
 λείων. Ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· 8
 ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πρίττομεν,

τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἷτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ
θεῖον τίθεμεν.

- 13 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ'
ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον τάχα γὰρ
οὕτως ἢν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν.
2 Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην
μύλιστα πεπονῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγα-
3 θοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. Παράδειγμα δὲ
τούτων ἔχ·μεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομο-
4 θέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγένηνται. Εἰ δὲ τῆς
πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γένοισ' ἂν ἡ
5 ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν. Περὶ ἀρετῆς
δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τὰγαθὸν
ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην.
6 Ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην, οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος
ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς
7 ἐνέργειαν λέγ·μεν. Εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι
δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν, ὥσπερ καὶ
τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύουσιν καὶ πᾶν σῶμα, καὶ μῦλλον
ὅσφ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἢ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἱατρικῆς.
Τῶν δ' ἱατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ
8 τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. Θεωρητέον δὲ καὶ τῷ πολι-
τικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ'
ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλείον
ἐξακριβοῦν ἔργῳδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων.
9 Λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις
ἀρκούντως ἐνῖα, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. Οἷον τὸ μὲν
10 ἰλλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. Ταῦτα δὲ πότερον
διώριστα καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ
μεριστὸν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα
καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον,

οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. Τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν 11
 ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἷτιον τοῦ τρέφε-
 σθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς
 ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τρεφομένοις θεῖη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν
 τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις·
 εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. Ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινῇ 12
 τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οἷα ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν
 τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ
 δύναμις αὕτη, ὃ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι
 καθ' ὕπνον, ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἡμῖν τοῦ
 βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων. Συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο 13
 εἰκότως· ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ λέγεται
 σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν εἴ πῃ κατὰ μικρὸν δικνύονται
 τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαν-
 τίσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. Ἀλλὰ περὶ 14
 μὲν τούτων ἄλλοις, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἑατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς
 ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἁμοῖρον πέφυκεν. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ 15
 ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα
 μέντοι πῃ λόγου. Τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν
 λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὀρθῶς
 γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ' ἐν
 αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκὸς, ὃ μάχεταί
 τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. Ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ 16
 παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μύρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαι-
 ρουμένων κινήσας τοῦναντίον εἰς τὰ ἰριστερὰ παραφέρε-
 ται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ
 ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. Ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν
 τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν·
 Ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἥττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναί τι
 παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαίνον.
 Πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο 17

1. φυτικόν
 2. ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ
 3. οὐκ

ταύτην γὰρ

φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς. Ἔτι δ' ἴσως εἰηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. Φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πῶς, ἢ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φασὶν εἶναι λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. Ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πῶς ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις τε καὶ παράκλησις. Εἰ δὲ χρή καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον εἶναι, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον εἶχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. Διαρίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς, τὰς δὲ ἠθικὰς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἐλευθεριώτητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικὰς. Λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἡθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετός· ἀλλ' ὅτι πρῖος ἢ σώφρων, ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἑξίν· τῶν ἑξῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

B.

1 Διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.

Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει 2
 ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθέν γάρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως
 ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν
 ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίζη
 τις ἄνω ρίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν
 ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. Οὗτ' ἄρα φύσει 3
 οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι
 μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αἰτὰς, τελειούμενοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ
 ἔθους. Ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυ- 4
 νάμεις τούτων πρότερον κόμιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς
 ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν. Ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον·
 οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τῆς
 αἰσθήσεως ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησά-
 μεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν. Τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβά- 5
 νομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιῶντες
 μινθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ
 κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια
 πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες,
 τὰ δ' ἀνδρεία ἀνδρεῖοι. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον 6
 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθεῖται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθί-
 ζοντες ποιῶσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς
 νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιῶσιν
 ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας
 ἀγαθῇ φαύλης. Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν 7
 καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ
 γίνονται κιθαρισταί. Ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἱ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ
 οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ
 οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ 7

οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἴδῃ τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες
 ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συνᾶλλαγμασι
 τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ
 ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι
 φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί.
 Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ
 τὰς ὀργαίς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ
 δ' ἀκήλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐ-
 τοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. Καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ
 8 λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. Διὸ
 δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποίας ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τού-
 των διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. Οὐ μικρὸν οὖν
 διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι,
 ἀλλὰ πάμπλου, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

2 Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἐνεκά
 ἐστίν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἴν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστίν ἡ
 ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἴν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν
 ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι σκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ
 τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γὰρ εἰσι κύριαι
 καὶ τοῦ ποίας γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν.

2 Τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ
 ὑποκείμενον, ῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί
 ἐστίν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἡλλας
 3 ἀρεταίς. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογήσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ
 τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέ-
 γεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἶπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν
 ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητοί· τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ
 συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά.

† Τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθύλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ

τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ
 τέχνην οὐδ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ'
 αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν ^{ἐκείνῳ}καίρον σκοπεῖν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.
 Ἄλλὰ καίπερ ὅντος τιοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πει- 5
 ρατίον βοηθεῖν. Πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ 6
 τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι,
 (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις
 χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὁρῶμεν
 τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα
 φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία
 πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ
 σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὖξει καὶ σώζει. Οὕτως οὖν 7
 καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἀρετῶν ὅ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ
 μηδὲν ὑπομίνων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὅ τε μηδὲν ὁλως φοβού-
 μενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς. Ὅμοίως δὲ
 καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχό-
 μενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροί-
 κοι, ἀναίσθητός τις· φθείρεται γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ
 ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ
 τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται. Ἄλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις 8
 καὶ αἱ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ
 τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς
 ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων
 οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ
 πολλὴν τροφήν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομέ-
 νειν, καὶ μάλιστα δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. Οὕτω 9
 δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι
 τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα
 δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς

βοηθείαν καὶ αὐτοῦ
 καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν.

- ἀνδρείας· ἐπιζύμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα
- (3) δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά. Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκύλιστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. Περὶ ἡδονῆς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν
- 2 καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. Διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὥς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς
- 3 δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. Ἔτι δ' εἰ ἀρεταὶ εἰσι περὶ πρῆξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ
- 4 ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπης. Μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολλάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γὰρ τινὲς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασιν γίνεσθαι.
- 5 Ἔτι, ὥς καὶ πρότερον εἵπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἔξις, ὑψ' οἷων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονῆς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλαι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἂν μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὥς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. Διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δὲ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ
- 6 ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. Ὑπύκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτικῇ,
- 7 ἢ δὲ κακία τοῦναντίον. Γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν εἶτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγὰς, καλοῦ,

συμφέροντος, ἡδέος, καὶ τριῶν τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ, βλαβεροῦ, λυπηροῦ, περὶ πάντα μὲν ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν κοινὴ τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. Ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου 8 πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. Κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἥττον, ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. Διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα 9 τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. Ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον 10 ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετὴ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. Ὡστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας, 11 καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τριῶν καὶ αἰσθάνεται, καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν (4) 3 δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. Ἡ οὐδ' ἐπὶ 2 τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθέμενου. Τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, εἴαν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ

- 3 γραμματικήν. Ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ δὲ ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχη, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πως ἔχων πράττη, πρῶτον μὲν εἰδὼς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτὰ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ ἐὰν βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττη. Ταῦτα δὲ, πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετῶν τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις
- 4 πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται. Τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἢ τοιαῦτα οἶα ἦν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτω πράττων ὥς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ σώφρονες πράττουσιν.
- 5 Εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γενέσθαι
- 6 ἀγαθός, ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἷονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὁμοίον τι ποιῶντες τοῖς κύμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἱατρῶν ἀκοίουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιῶσι δ' οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. Ὡς περ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.
- 4 (5) Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστὶ, πάθη, δυνάμεις, ἔξεις, τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ. Λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν, ὀργὴν, φόβον, θρῖσος, φθόνον, χαρὰν, φι-

λίαν, μῖσος, πόθον, ^{ἐλπίδα} ζῆλον, ^{ἐλπίδα} ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονή
ἢ λύπη, δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα,
οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι,
ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς ^{πρὸς} τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον
πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν ^{εὐφροδῶς} ἢ ἀναιμένως,
κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μίσως, εὖ. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς
τᾶλλα. Πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' αἱ ἀρεταί, οὐθ' 3
αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ
φυῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ
ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα, οὔτε ψεγόμεθα
(οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φιβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος,
οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὅπως.) κατὰ
δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα.
Ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' 4
ἀρεταί προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. Πρὸς
δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ
δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακρί-
σθαί πως. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν οὔτε γὰρ 5
ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοὶ,
οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. Καὶ ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν
ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἴ-
πομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν 6
αἱ ἀρεταί μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἔξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι.

Ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀρετῇ, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ (θ) 5
μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποῖα τίς.
Ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετῇ, οὐ ἂν ἢ ἀρετῇ, αὐτό τε εὖ 2
ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἢ
τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμόν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ
καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ
ὁρῶμεν. Ὅμοίως ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετῇ ἵππον τε σπου-
δαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν τὸν ἐπι-

3. χίτην καὶ μῆναι τοὺς πολεμίους. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ 4 εἰκτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. Πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τις ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. Ἐν παντὶ δὴ 5 συνεχεῖ καὶ διαίρετόν ἐστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον, τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψ 6 ψεως. Λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἁκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε 7 ἐλλείπει. Τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἐν, οὐδὲ ταῦτόν πᾶσιν, οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἐξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι 8 καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται, τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τῷ δέκα 9 μναί φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτῃς ἐξ μναῖς προστίξει· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλῳ γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν 10 γυμνασίων πολὺ. Ὀμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. Οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἐλλείψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται, μέσον δὲ 11 οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Εἰ δὴ πῦσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὥς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψ 12 ψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης), οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὥς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται, ἢ δ' ἀοετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα

καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη
στοχαστική. Λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ 10
πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Οἶον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρ-
ρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ
ὄλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον,
καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς 11
οὓς καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ
ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐστὶν 12
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ
πάνθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστὶν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάν-
νεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται
καὶ καυορροῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. Μεσότης 13
τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, στοχαστικὴ γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου.
Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστὶν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν 14
τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν
τοῦ πεπερασμένου,) τὸ δὲ κατ' ὁρθεοῦν μοναχῶς· διὸ καὶ
τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν
τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. Καὶ διὰ ταῦτ'
οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ'
ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ, ἕξις, προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι 15 6
οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρό-
νιμος ὀρίσσειεν. Μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ'
ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν 16
ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε τοῖς
πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ
εὕρισκιν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι. Διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ 17
τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ

- 18 ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. Οὐ πῦσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρῆξις οὐδὲ πῦν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἓνια γὰρ εἰθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαν-
 λότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία, ἀναισχυντία, φθόνος, καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία, κλοπή, ἀνδροφονία· πάντα
 γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ψέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι,
 ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. Οὐκ
 ἔστιν οὖν οἰδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἀμαρ-
 τάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ
 ἧν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν
- 19 ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἔστιν. Ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν
 καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν
 εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ
 εὖτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερ-
 20 βολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. Ὡσπερ δὲ
 σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλ-
 λειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδὲ
 ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὥς
 ἂν πράττηται ἀμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς
 καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἔστιν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ
 καὶ ἔλλειψις.
- 7 Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς
 πρῆξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενώτεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ'
 ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ
 πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. Δηπτέον οὖν
 2 ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. Περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ
 θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν
 τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἔστιν ἀνώνυμα,) ὁ δ' ἐν
 τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλον θρασὺς, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι
 3 ὑπερβάλλον τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός. Περὶ

ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ πάσας, ἥττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς
 λύπας, μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία.
 Ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πανυ γίνονται·
 διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι,
 ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀκίεστοι. Περὶ δὲ πόσιν χρημίων καὶ 4
 λήψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλ-
 λειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. Ἐναντίως δ' ἑαυταῖς
 ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσωτος ἐν
 μὲν προΐσει ὑπερβάλλει, ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δ'
 ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει, ἐν δὲ προΐσει
 ἐλλείπει. Νῦν μὲν οὖν τύφω καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν, 5
 ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ
 αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. Περὶ δὲ τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι 6 κ
 διαθίσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ
 μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ
 μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά.) ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ
 βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ'
 αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν,
 ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. Περὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ ἀτιμίας μεσότης 7
 μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χανυρότης τις λεγομένη,
 ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· ὥς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς 8
 τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ δια- 8
 φέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν,
 περὶ τιμὴν οὔσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὔσα· ἔστι
 γὰρ ὥς δεῖ ὀρεγέσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον,
 λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ
 δ' ἐλλειπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. Ἀνω-
 μοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθίσεις, πλήν ἢ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλο-
 τιμία. Ὅθεν ἐπιδικύζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας.
 Καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν
 ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν

- 9 τὸν φιλύτιμον, ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. Διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιούμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑψηλῆς τρόπον.
- 10 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης. σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν, τὸν μέσον πρῶτον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσομεν· τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβύλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία.
- 11 Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μὲν τίνα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων· πῦσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ τᾶληθές τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τοῦτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ, τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. Ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετὸν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὐτ' ὀρθὰ οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτιά. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατίον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἔνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρά-
 12 γουλουθήτου. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθές ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις, καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζυνεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἰρωνύτης.
- 13 Περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδύ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀγροϊκός τις καὶ ἡ ἔξις ἀγροικία. Περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδύ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδύς ὢν, φίλος, καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβύλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν
 14 ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς

ἡ μὲν καὶ διατρεφὴ
 ἐκείνου καὶ.

καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
 καὶ αἰσθητικὰς.

ἐν τῷ βίῳ
 καὶ τῷ

πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδώς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβύλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ, ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἢ ὁ μηδὲ ὅλως ἀναίσχυτος· ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. Νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας. Εἰσὶ δὲ 15 περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πελάς γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβύλων τούτων ἐπὶ πύσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρεκακὸς τοσούτων ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. Ἄλλα περὶ 16 μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλαθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκάτερας ἐροῖμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.

Τριῶν δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν 8 ἐκτ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἐλλείψιν, μίας δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πᾶσαι ἀντίκεινται· πῶς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ 2 ἔλαττον μείζον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μείζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν. Ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρείος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθεριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελείθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελείθερος. Διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκραι 3 ἑκάτερος πρὸς ἑκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρείον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν, ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων

- † ἀνύλογον. Οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τοίτων, πλείων ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μέ-
5 γάλου ἢ ἡμῶν τοῦ ἴσου. Ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὥς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν, καὶ τῇ ὑσώτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης. Τὰ δὲ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον
6 ἐναντία τὰ πλείον ἀπέχοντα. Πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὐσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὐσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνη οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἐνδεia οὐσα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὐσα.
7 Διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλείον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι.
8 Μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκα-
μέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. Οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς, διὸ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσ-
μώτητα. Ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία
✱ ὑπερβολὴ οὐσα ἐναντιώτερα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνη.
9 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἡθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν

τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στο-
 χαστική τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς
 πράξεσιν, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. Διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπου- 2
 δαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἐκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον
 κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδύτος. Οὕτω δὲ
 καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ θοῦναι
 ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ὅφ' καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ
 οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὧς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διόπερ τὸ
 εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν. Διὸ δεῖ τὸν
 στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ
 μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεί

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔργου
 νῆα

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δ' ἦτ- 4
 τον· ἐπεὶ οὐκ τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπὸν, κατὰ
 τὸν δευτέρον φασὶ πλεονεχῆν τὰ εἰλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν
 κακῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν
 λέγομεν. Σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί
 ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν. Τοῦτο δ'
 ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινο-
 μένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. Εἰς τοῦναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν 5
 δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπαγαγόντες τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον
 ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστράμμένα τῶν ἐξυλῶν ὀρθοῦντες
 ποιοῦσιν. Ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ 6
 τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. Ὅπερ
 οὖν οἱ δημόγεροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο
 δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν
 ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπό-
 μενοι ἦττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα. Ταῦτ' οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὥς ἐν 7
 κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγ-

χάνειν. Χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς
καθ' ἕκαστον οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ
ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς
ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν,
ὅτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦμεν.
8 Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται,
οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον, ὁ δὲ πλέον ^{αὐτοῦ} ^{ἐν τῇ}
γὰρ οὐ λανθάνει. Ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκ-
τὸς οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφόρτισαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν
τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ
9 ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δῆλον
ὅτι ἡ μέση ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετὴ, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ
ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ὅτε δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν
οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾶστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.

Γ.

- 1 Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὕσης, καὶ
ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαινῶν καὶ ψόγων γινομένων,
ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου,
τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς
περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομο-
2 θετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. Δοκεῖ δὲ
3 ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα. Βίαιον δὲ
οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ἧ' μηδὲν συμβάλ-
λεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι
4 ποι ἢ ἰνθρώποι κύριοι ὄντες. Ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μει-
ζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος
προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πράξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ

τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σάζουιντο, μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκειεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἐκούσιαι. Τοιοῦτον δέ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν 5 τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἐκὼν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. Μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ τοι- 6 αῦται πράξεις, εἰκόασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκουσίοις· αἴρεται γὰρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πρίξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐστιν. Καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον. Πράττει δὲ ἐκὼν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή. Ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αἰτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. Ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύ- 7 ταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχροῦν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. Ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομεῖναι. Ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ 8 μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι. Ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι ποῖον 9 ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρὰ, ἃ δ' ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχροῦ, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψύγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. Τὰ ὃν ποῖα φατέον βίαια; 10 Ἡ ἀπλῶς μὲν, ὅπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾗ καὶ ὁ

- πρίττων μηδὲν συμβάλλεται; Ἄ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἵρετὰ, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πρίττουντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. Μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκουσίοις αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια. Ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποιῶν αἵρετέον, οὐ ράδιον ὑποδοῦναι. πολ-
- 11 λαι γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. Εἰ δέ τις † τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἶη οὕτω βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πρίττουσιν. Καὶ οἱ μὲν βία καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς. Γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιῶσθαι τὰ ἐκτὸς, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθήμερον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτὸν,
- 12 τῶν δ' αἰσχυρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. Ἔοικε δὲ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὐ + ἔξωθεν ἢ ἀρχῇ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.
- 2 13 Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὑποκρινόμενος, μηδὲν δὲ δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐκ ἐπύραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. Τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελούμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος ἔστω, οὐχ ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον.
- 14 Ἄλλοτε δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἄλλ' ἀγνοῶν. Ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ὃς δὲ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν
- 15 ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται. Τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρήσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἢ καθύλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) ἀλλ'

"Οὗτος δ' ἀκουσίον τοῦ βία καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκού- 20
 σιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ'
 ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις. Ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται 21
 ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. Πρῶτον 22
 μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πράξει,
 οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· εἰτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν 23
 τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως
 τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ἀκουσίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἐνὺς γε αἰτίου ὄντος;
 ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι. 24

Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον
 25 ὑγείας καὶ μαθήσεως. Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ
 26 εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα. Ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει
 τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἀμαρτη-
 27 θέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἅμφω, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἥττον
 ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη. Αἱ δὲ πράξεις τοῦ
 ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. Ἀτοπον δὲ τὸ
 τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

- 4 (2) Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου,
 περὶ προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων.
 2 Ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτ' οὖν δέ,
 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλεον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίου καὶ
 παῖδες καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ
 τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ'
 οὐ. Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βού-
 λησιν ἢ τινα δύξαν οὐκ εὐκασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. Οὐ γὰρ
 κοινὸν ἢ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ
 4 θυμός. Καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαι-
 ρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος
 5 μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. Καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία
 ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. Καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπι-
 θυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ
 6 οὔθ' ἡδέος. Θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἥττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυ-
 7 μὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ
 βούλησις γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις
 μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαι-
 8 ρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἔστι τῶν
 ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. Καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἔστι
 καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν, οἷον

ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητὴν προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἶεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ.
 Ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ θ
 προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα,
 προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν
 βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φασκέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οἷχ
 ἀρμόζει· ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 εἶναι. Οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ 10
 πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύ-
 νητα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεὶ καὶ ἀληθεὶ διαιρεῖται,
 οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον.
 Ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξη ταύτων ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς. Ἄλλ' 11
 οὐδὲ τις· τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ προκί-
 τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ. Καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν 12
 λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστὶν
 ἢ τίτις συμφέρει ἢ πῶς· λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάν-
 δοξάζομεν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὐ 13
 δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. Καὶ
 προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξά-
 ζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάντῃ ἴσμεν. Δοκοῦσί τε οἷχ οἱ αὐτοὶ 14
 προαιρεῖσθαι τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοι δοξαζέιν
 μὲν ἡμεινόν, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οἷχ ἃ δεῖ. Εἰ 15
 δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ,
 οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταύτων
 ἐστὶ δόξη τι. Τί οὖν ἢ παῖόν τι ἐστὶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν 16
 εἰρημινῶν οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἐκού-
 σιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. Ἄλλ' ἄρα γε τὸ προβεβου- 17
 λευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας.
 Ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τυγχίνα ὥς ἐν πρὸ ἐτέρων
 αἰρετόν.

Βουλευόνται δὲ πότερα περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βου- (3) 5

2 λευτόν ἐστίν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτίον δ'
 ἴσως βουλευτόν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσασθαι· ἂν τις ἡλίθιος
 3 ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. Περὶ δὲ τῶν
 αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς
 4 διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ
 περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα γινομένων, εἴτ'
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον
 5 τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως,
 οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης,
 6 οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρω-
 πικῶν πάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοντο
 οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται. Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν
 7 τούτων οὐθέν δι' ἡμῶν. Βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. Αἷτια γὰρ
 δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς
 καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. Τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι
 8 βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. Καὶ περὶ
 μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι
 βουλή, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς
 γραπτέον) ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ'
 αἰεὶ, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατὰ ἰα-
 τρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικὴν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον
 9 ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὅσῳ ἥττον διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ
 τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ
 τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰς διστάζομεν.
 10 Τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἀδήλοις δὲ
 πῶς ὑποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον. Συμβούλους δὲ
 παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐ-
 11 τοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι. Βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ
 τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. Οὔτε γὰρ
 ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει,

οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥῆστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἐνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κακείνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα. (Φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα 12 εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαί, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις,) καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. Κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῃ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατόν φαίνεται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. Δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πῶς ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. Ζητεῖται δ' ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὄργανα, ὅτε δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι' οὐ, ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος. Ἔοικε δὴ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ 13 τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλή περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα. Οἶκ' ἔνι οὖν εἶη βουλευτὸν 16 τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη. Οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὥς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα. Εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει. Βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτὸ, πλὴν ἀφω- 17 ρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετὸν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκριθὲν προαιρετὸν ἐστίν. Παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγύγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ἥς 18 Ὅμηρος ἐμίμειτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἃ προέλοιτο ἀνήγ-

19· γελλον τῷ δήμῳ. Ὅντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὁρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτική ὁρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὁρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.

20 Ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῃ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποῦν ἐστι, καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

6 (4) Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἶρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ. Συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλευτὸν ἀγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν ὃ βούλεται ὃ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλευτὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ βουλευτὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλευτὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ' ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τάναντία. Εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ὑρέσκει, ἄρα φάτεον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλευτὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινὰ ἐστὶ τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ' ἐπικύσοις ἕτερα. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τῶν ἀληθῆς αὐτῷ φαίνεται. 5 Καθ' ἐκύστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἰδιά ἐστὶ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλείστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τῶν ἀληθῆς ἐν ἐκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν. Τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν εἵκει γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὕσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. Αἰροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

(5) Ὅντος δὲ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πρά-

ξεις κατὰ προαί, εἰν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. Αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. Ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὑμετῆρ, 2 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. Ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ καί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὺν ὂν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὺν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχροῖα, 3 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικίσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὥς 4

οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ποιεῖ οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ,

ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ, τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον. * Ἡ τοῖς γε εἰν 5 εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. Εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται, καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας 6 ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὡν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αἱ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσια. Τούτοις δ' ἔοικε 7 + μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρώντας μοχθηρὰ, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢς μὴ αὐτοὶ οὔτις, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὥς τοῖς μὲν προτρέψοντες τοῖς δὲ κωλύσοιτες. Καίτοι ὅσα μὴτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ, μὴθ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν. 8 ὥς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὂν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθεν γὰρ ἥττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἄγνοεῖν 8 κολάζουσιν, εἰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλῶν τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύ-

ριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἷτιον τῆς ἀγ-
 νίας. Καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ
 9 δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστί, κολάζουσιν. Ὅμοίως
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν,
 ὥς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὅν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τοῦ, γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι
 10 κύριοι. Ἄλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμελη-
 θῆναι. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἷτιοι ζῶντες
 ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν
 κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐκ πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διά-
 γοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστά ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιου-
 11 σιν. Τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν
 12 ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργῶντες. Τὸ μὲν
 οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἑξεῖς
 13 γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου. Ἔτι δ' ἄλογον, τὸν ἀδι-
 κοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα
 14 ἀκόλαστον. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει, ἐξ ὧν
 ἔσται ἀδικος, ἐκὼν ἀδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἔαν γε βού-
 ληται, ἀδικος ὧν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής. Καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρα-
 τῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπεμθὼν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. Τότε μὲν οὖν
 ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ'
 ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατόν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως
 ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ῥίψαι· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ.
 Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν
 ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἐκύντες εἰσὶν γενομέ-
 15 νοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστι μὴ εἶναι. Οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς
 ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ
 σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν
 αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ
 ἀμέλειαν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πῆρυσιν
 οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὑνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ

πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰλεῖσθαι τῷ δ' ἐξ οὐνοφλύγιαις ἢ
 ἄλλης ἀκυλασίας πῶς ἂν ἐπιτιμῆσαι. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ 16
 σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 οὐ. Εἰ δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμῶμεναι τῶν
 κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες 17
 ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ
 κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστος ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ
 τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἐαυτῷ τῆς
 ἕξεως ἐστὶ πως αἷτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως
 αὐτὸς αἷτιος· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ αἷτιος τοῦ κακὰ
 ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ
 τοιῶτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι· Ἡ δὲ τοῦ
 τέλους ἔφεσις οἷα αἰθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύναι δεῖ ὥσπερ
 ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἢ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγα-
 θὸν αἰρήσεται. Καὶ ἔστιν εὐφύης ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυ-
 κεν· τὰ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἐτέρου
 μὴ οἶόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἔφυ, τοιοῦτον
 ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία
 καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφύα. Εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, 18
 τί μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιόν; ἀμφοῖν
 γὰρ ὁμοίως. τῷ ἰγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φυσεὶ ἢ
 ὕψωσθήποτε φαίνεται καὶ κείται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ'
 ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὕψωσθήποτε. Εἴτε δὲ τὸ τέλος 19
 μὴ φύσει ἐκάστῳ φαίνεται οἶονδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ'
 αὐτὸν ἐστίν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ
 πράττειν ἐκούσιως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιον
 ἐστίν, οὐθὲν ἦττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως
 γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι
 καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. Εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκού- 20
 σιοὶ εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί
 πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοὶ τινεὶ εἴκει τὸ τέλος

τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἴεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.

- 8 21 Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τὸ τε γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἔξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε γίνονται, καὶ ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὕρθος λόγος προστάξῃ. Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἔξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἑκάσταν, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ ἢ πρὸςθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρῆσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι.
- 9 23 Ἀναλαμβάνοντες δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης, εἰπώμεν τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσὶν.
- 2 Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ (6) περὶ φόβου καὶ θάρρης, ἤδη καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται· φοβούμεθα δὴ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσ- 3 δίκιαν κακοῦ. Φοβοῦμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀφιλίαν, θάνατον· ἀλλ' οἱ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὸν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπικεικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυτος. 1 Λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν. Ἀλλ' οἷδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. Λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοί εἰσι καὶ 5 πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. Οὐδὲ δὴ

εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον
ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων
μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρείος. Περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ
ἀνδρείος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οἴθεις γὰρ ὑπομενετι-
κώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. Φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας
γὰρ, καὶ οὐδέν ἐτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε
κακὸν εἶναι. Δόξεις δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν
παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος εἶναι, οἷον εἰ ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ ἐν νόσοις.
Ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ β
ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. Ἡ
ὁμολογοῖ δὲ τοῖς τοῖσι καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι 9
καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. Κυρίως δὲ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρείος 10
ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεῆς, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπι-
φέρει ὑπὸ γυναικὶ οὕτως τοιαῦτα δὲ μαλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλε-
μον. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεῆς 11
ὁ ἀνδρείος, οἷχ' οἷτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἀπεγνωκασὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον
δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐελπίδες εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.
Ἄμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀπο- 12
θανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐθέτερον ὑπάρχει.
Τὸ δὲ φοβερόν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ, λέγομεν δὲ τι (7) 13
καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπου. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ
γε νοῦν ἔχοντι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀνθρώπου διαφέρει μεγέθει
καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλῆα.
Ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἀνθρώπος. Φοβήσεται 14
μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπο-
μενεῖ, τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς.
Ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ 15
μὴ φοβερά ὡς τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι. Γίνεται δὲ τῶν
ἀμαρτιῶν ἢ μὲν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ἢ δὲ ὅτι οἷχ' ὡς δεῖ, ἢ δὲ
ὅτι οὐχ' ὅτε, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ

5 θαρραλία. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ
 φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν,
 ἀνδρείος· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει
 6 καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος. Τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ
 τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. Καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν.
 Τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ
 τέλει. Καλοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει
 7 τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. Τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ
 ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμός (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι
 πολλά ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ' ἂν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάλ-
 γητος, εἰ μὴθὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε τὰ κύματα,
 καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς. Ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερ-
 8 βάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερά θρασύς. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζῶν
 εἶναι ὁ θρασύς καὶ πρόσποιήτικὸς ἀνδρείας. Ὡς οὖν
 ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερά ἔχει, οὕτως οὗτος βούλεται
 9 φαίνεσθαι ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται. Διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν
 οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασυδείλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνό-
 10 μενοι τὰ φοβερά οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. Ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι
 ὑπερβάλλον δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ,
 καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. Ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ
 τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλον μᾶλλον
 11 καταφανής ἐστίν. Δύσελπις δὴ τις ὁ δειλός· πάντα
 γὰρ φοβεῖται. Ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρ-
 12 ρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. Περὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ τε δειλὸς
 καὶ ὁ θρασύς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος, διαφύρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς
 αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέ-
 σως ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ
 βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων, ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται,
 οἱ δ' ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.
 11 Καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ
 13 θαρραλία καὶ φοβερά, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται καὶ ὅτι καλόν

αίρεϊται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. Τὸ δ' ἀπο-
 θνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρὸν οἷκ
 ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν
 τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων
 κακόν. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται (8) .
 δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολι-
 τική· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς
 κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ
 τὰ ὀνειδῆ καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι 2
 δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι
 ἔντιμοι. Τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διο-
 μήδην καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα.

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·
 καὶ Διομήδης,

Ἑκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων
 "Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο."

Ὁμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη, ὅτι δι'
 ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὀρεξιν
 (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδούς, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. Τίξαι δ'
 ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους
 εἰς ταῦτό· χείρους δ', ὅσφ' οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον
 αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες· οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυ-
 πηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἑκτωρ

ὅν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω.
 οὐ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνης.

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες τὸ 5
 αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων
 παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. Δεῖ δ' οὐ δι'
 ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ 6
 ἡ ἐμπειρία ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι ὅθεν καὶ
 ὁ Σωκράτης φήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. Τοι-

οὔτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ
στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου,
ἢ μάλιστα συνέωράκασιν οὔτοι· φαίνονται δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι,
7 ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷα ἐστίν. Εἴτα ποιῆσαι καὶ
μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι
χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὅποια ἂν εἴη
καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα.
8 Ὡς περ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὀπλισμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθλήται
ιδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀν-
δρεϊότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύον-
9 τες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. Οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ
δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπέρτεϊνῇ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται
τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρὰσκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύ-
γυνσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ καὶ
τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν
καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος· οἱ δὲ
καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γινόντες δὲ
φείγονσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι·
10 ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος. Καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τῇ
ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιφέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ
οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ὥς περ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φε-
ρόμενοι, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς ἰητικώτατον
γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος

καὶ σφεινὸς ἔμβαλε θυμῷ
καὶ μεινὸς καὶ θυμὸν ἔχειρε
καὶ θυμὸν δ' ἀνὰ βῆτας μεῖος
καὶ ἔλκεν ἄλκιμα

καὶ τὰ γὰρ τὰ γενναῖα εἶναι σημαίνει τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ
11 ἔφεσιν καὶ αἰσίν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν

πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ
 διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ εἴν
 γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ ἐν ἔλει ἢ, οὐ προσέρχονται. Οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν
 ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδύνης καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
 πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προσρῶντα,
 ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρείοι εἰεν πεινῶντες· τυπ-
 τόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς· καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ
 δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. Οὐ δὴ 12
 ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία τὰ δι' ἀλγηδύνης ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
 πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. Φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν
 θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβούσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ
 ἔνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. Καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι
 μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδονταί· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα
 μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρείοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ
 καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάθος· παραπλή-
 σιον δ' ἔχουσί τι. Οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀν- 13
 δρείοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι
 θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις. Παρόμοιοι δὲ, ὅτι ἄμφω
 θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα
 θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ
 μηθὲν ἀντιπαθεῖν. Τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῖσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκό- 14
 μενοι· εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. Ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ
 συμβῇ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ
 ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ
 αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ. Διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ 15
 ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφρονον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι
 ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ἔξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ ὅτι
 ἦντον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐκ
 λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ
 τὴν ἔξιν. Ἀνδρείοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, 16
 καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χεῖρους δ' ὕψω

ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. Διὸ καὶ μένουσί
 τινα χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἠπατημένοι, εἰάν γινώσκῃ ἕτερον
 ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον
 17 περιπεσόντες τοῖς Λύκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. Οἳ τε δὴ
 ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηνται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.

2 (9) Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὔσα οὐχ
 ὁμοίως περὶ ἅμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά·
 ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ
 ἔχων ἀνδρείος μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. Τῷ δὴ
 τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται.

2 Διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται·
 χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ἢ τῶν ἡδέων
 ἀπέχεσθαι. Οὐ μὲν ἄλλα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ
 τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδὺ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι,
 οἷον καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις
 τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδὺ, οὐ ἔνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ,
 τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν δὲ

3 τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν. Εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν
 ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ τὰ
 τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται, ὑπομένει

4 δὲ αὐτὰ, ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. Καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν
 μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος
 ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπηθήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ
 μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστε-

5 ρεῖται εἰδώς· λυπηρόν δὲ τοῦτο. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον
 ἀνδρείος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
 καλὸν ἀντ' ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. Οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς
 ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ
 6 τέλους ἐφάπτεται. Στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ
 τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἦττον μὲν

ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἔταιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσούτου εἰρήσθαι· τί δ' ἔστιν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύφῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

Μετὰ δε ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αἴται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς ἢ σωφροσύνης, εἴρηται ἡμῶν ἦττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ' ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. Περὶ 2 ποίῃς οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ὑφορίσωμεν. Διηρησθῶσαν δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία, φιλομαθία· ἐκάτερος γὰρ τοῦτων χαίρει, οὐ φιλητικός ἐστιν, οἷθεν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. Ὅμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς 3 ἡλλας ὄσαι μὴ σωματικαὶ εἰσιν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδουλίσχας, ἀκόλαστους δ' οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυποιομένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φιλοῖς. Περὶ δε τῆς 4 σωματικῆς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πύσπερ δὲ οἰδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον χρωμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σωφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δοξίαν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χεῖρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἑλλειψιν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς 5 γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένους χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίνται οἷθις ἀκόλαστους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. Οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὕσμην, πλὴν κατὰ συμπερίεργον· 6 ταῖς γὰρ χαίροντας μέλων ἢ ῥύδων ἢ θειμαμάτων ὁσμίαις οὐ λέγομεν ἀκόλαστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς

μύρων καὶ ὄψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι,
 ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνύμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυ-
 7 μητῶν. Ἴδοι δ' αὖν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πει-
 νῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς. Τὸ δὲ
 τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκυλάστου· τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ
 8 ταῦτα. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις κατὰ ταύτας
 ταῖς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ
 βρώσει· τὴν δ' αἰσθῆσιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν. οὐδ' ὁ λέων
 τῇ φωτὶ τοῦ βούου, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι,
 διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἤσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται.
 Ὅμοίως δ' οἱ δ' ἰδὼν ἢ εὐρὼν ἑλάφον ἢ ἵγριον αἶγα,
 9 ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. Περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δὴ ἡδονὰς ἢ
 σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα
 κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται·
 10 αἵται δ' εἰσὶν ἀφή· καὶ γεῦσις. Φαίνονται δὴ καὶ τῇ
 γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οἰθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως
 ἐστὶν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῖσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους
 δοκιμίζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἰρτίοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαί-
 ρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἷ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπο-
 λαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν
 ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. Διὸ καὶ ἡϋ-
 ξιυτοῖς τις ὀψοφάγος ὧν τὸν φάριγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον
 11 γεμῖνον γενέσθαι, ὥς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ. Κοινοτάτη δὲ
 τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· καὶ δόξειεν αὖ
 δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οἱ χ' ἢ ἄνθρωποι ἐσμεν
 ἐπιρχει, ἀλλ' ἢ ζῶα. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῖτοις χαίρειν καὶ
 12 μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν ἐθιμῶδες. Καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται
 τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφῆρηται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς
 γεμυστοῖς διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι·
 αἱ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ τοῖς ἀκυλάστοι ἀφή, ἀλλὰ

-1

γινεῖ
 εἰς τὴν ἀφῆν

περί τινα μέρη. Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοινὰ δοκοῦσιν (11)

εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν οἷον ἢ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς

φυσικῇ· πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρῆς ἢ ὑγρῆς τρο-

φῆς, ὅτε δ' ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὀμηρος, ὁ νῖος καὶ

ἀκμυζῶν· τὸ δὲ τοιαῦτ' ἢ τοιῶνδε, οἰκεῖτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν

αὐτῶν. Διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. Οὐ μὲν ἄλλ' 2

ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικῶν ἑτέρα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδία,

καὶ ἑνία πᾶσιν ἡδία τῶν τυχόντων. Ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς 3

φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἀμαρτάνουσιν καὶ ἐφ' ἐν,

ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ὥς

ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβυλλεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ

πλήθει· ἀναπληρῶσε· γὰρ τῆς ἐνδεείας ἢ φυσικῇ ἐπι-

θυμία. Διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὥς παρὰ τὸ

δείον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. Τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν

ἀνδραποδωδεῖς. Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ 4

καὶ πολλαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσιν· τῶν γὰρ φιλοστοιούτων

λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ὥς οἱ

πολλοὶ, ἢ μὴ ὥς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι

ὑπερβυλλανσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ

(μισητὰ γὰρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων,

μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν 5

περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν,

δηλοῖ· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας

τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων ἀκόλαστος δὲ τῷ μὴ,

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι

τῶν ἡδίων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ πὶ τῷ ἢ

ἡδονῇ), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ

τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδίων πάντων ἢ 14

τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ 6

τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀπο-

τυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν μετὰ λήπης γὰρ ἢ ἐπιθυμία
 ἡ ἀπόψῃ δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι. Ἐλλείποντες
 δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἦττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ
 γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία·
 καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς
 μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δὲ τῇ μὴδὲν ἐστὶν ἡδὺ μὴδὲ
 διαφέρει ἕτερον ἐτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
 εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ μὴ
 8 πάνυ γίνεσθαι. Ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως περὶ ταῖτ' ἔχει·
 οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκολαστος, ἀλλὰ μάλ-
 λον δυσχεραίνει, οὔθ' ὕλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὔτε σφόδρα
 τοιούτῃ οἰδενί, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ,
 ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ'
 ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οἰθέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐστὶν
 ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὁρέξεται μετρίως καὶ
 ὥς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίωσιν τούτοις ὄντων
 ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. Ὁ γὰρ οὕτως
 ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ
 δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὥς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

5'12) Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας.

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὣν τὸ μὲν αἶρε-
 2 τὸν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ
 φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοι-
 οῦτον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐκούσιον διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστύ-
 τερον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾶον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ
 ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι. Ἐπὶ
 3 δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. Δύξειε δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως
 ἐκούσιον ἢ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ μὲν
 γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ
 τὰ ὄπλα ρίπτειν καὶ τᾶλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ
 4 βίαια εἶναι. Τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ'

ἕκαστα ἐκούσια, ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένοι, τὸ δ' ὅλον ἦττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκολαστος εἶναι. Τὰ δ' ὀνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν ἔχουσι γὰρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. Πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθέν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. Οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσchrῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὐξήσιν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παῖδια, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῦτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὕρεξις. Εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἥρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἤξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὕρεξις καὶ πανταχούθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὖξει τὸ συγγενές, καὶ μεγαλὰ καὶ σφοδρὰ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. Διὸ δεῖ μετρίως εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιωῖσθαι. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. (ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰ-
ρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.

Δ.

Λέγωμεν δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος, δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινέεται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ'

αὐτὸ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δύοσιν χρημάτων καὶ
 2 λήψιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δύοσει. Χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν *πολλὰ*
 3 πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ *ἐπὶ*
 ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ
 καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν
 αἰ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ'
 ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρουμεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ *ἐν αὐτῇ*
 ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦ-
 4 μεν. Διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· πολλὰς γὰρ
 ἄμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. Οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται·
 5 βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἐν τι κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθεί-
 ρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμενος,
 δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά,
 ὥς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. Οὕτω δὲ τὴν ἀσωτίαν
 6 ἐκδεχόμεθα. Ὡν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι
 καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς· ὁ πλούτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων·
 ἐκάστω δ' ἄριστα χρῆται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν·
 καὶ πλούτῳ δὲ χρήσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ
 7 χρήματα ἀρετήν. Οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. Χρήσις
 δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δύοσι· ἡ δὲ λήψις
 καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτήσις μᾶλλον. Διὸ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τοῦ
 ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ
 μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. Τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον
 τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν
 8 μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχροὰ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ
 μὲν δύοσει ἔπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν,
 τῇ δὲ λήψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. Καὶ
 ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι· καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος
 9 δὲ μᾶλλον. Καὶ ῥῆον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ
 γὰρ οἰκείον ἡττον προίενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ
 10 ἀλλότριον. Καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες·

οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται,
 ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡγτον εἰς δικαιοσύνην· οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' 11
 ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ. Φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ
 ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γὰρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν
 τῇ δόσει. Αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ 12
 καλοῦ ἔνεκα. Καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ
 ἔνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ
 τᾶλλα ὅσα ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. Καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως 13
 ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἡκιστα
 δὲ λυπηρόν. Ὁ δὲ διδούς οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ 14
 ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ'
 ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. Οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς μᾶλλον γὰρ
 ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ
 ἐλευθερίου. Οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· οὐδὲ γάρ 15
 ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη λήψις.
 Οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ 16
 ποιούντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι. Ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψε- 17
 ται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὥς καλὸν ἀλλ'
 ὥς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι. Οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν
 ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. Οὐδὲ
 τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ
 οὗ καλόν. Ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερ- 18
 βάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω·
 τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου. Κατὰ 19
 τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ
 πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ
 διδόντος ἔξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. Οὐθὲν
 δὴ κωλύει ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα,
 εἰάν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων διδῷ. Ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι 20
 δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν
 οὐσίαν ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείης, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι

- μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί.
 Πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν
 ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικὸν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι'
 21 αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τῆς δόσεως. Διὸ καὶ ἐγκα-
 λείται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα
 πλουτοῦσιν. Συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ
 οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχη,
 22 ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Οὐ μὲν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ
 δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ
 ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα
 23 ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. Ὡσπερ
 γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθερίος ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δα-
 πανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἄσματος. Διὸ
 τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος
 τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς
 24 δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. Τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ μεσό-
 τητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέ-
 ριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσῃ εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ,
 ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλαις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως καὶ
 λήψεται ὃ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. Τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ
 ἁμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφοτέρω ὥς δεῖ· ἔπε-
 ται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δώσει ἢ τοιαύτῃ λήψις, ἢ δὲ μὴ
 τοιαύτῃ ἐναντία ἐστίν. Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπόμεναι γίνονται
 25 ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὥς οὐ. Ἐὰν δὲ
 παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίῃ αὐτῷ ἀνα-
 λίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὥς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς
 γὰρ καὶ ἡδесθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ.
 26 Καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα·
 δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ
 27 μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνύλωσεν ἢ λυπού-
 μενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσε, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ

ἀρεσκόμενος. Ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· 28 3
οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, οὔδ' ὥς δεῖ, οὔτε λυπεῖται·
ἔσται δὲ προῖοῦσι φανερώτερον. Εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ὅτι 29
ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἄσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευ-
θερία, καὶ ἐν δυσὶν, ἐν δύοσι καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπά-
νην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. Ἢ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτία τῷ
διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν
ἐλλείπει, ἢ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ δίδοναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ
λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. Τὰ μὲν 30 *but only*
οὖν τῆς ἄσωτίας οὐ πᾶν συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ρᾶδιον *handy*
μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι δίδοναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπι-
λείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας δίδοντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσι
ἄσωτοι εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ 31
βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. Εὐίατός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ
καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ
μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. Ἐχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου·
καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὥς δεῖ
οὐδ' εὖ. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη, ἢ πως ἄλλως μεταβάλαι,
εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται
ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. Διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἥθος· 32
οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβῆλιν δίδοντα
καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δέ. Ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρό-
πον ἄσωτος πρὸς δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι
διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλοὺς, ὁ δὲ
οὐθέν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν. Ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἄσώτων, 33
καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ
κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. Ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ 34
βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ
δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα·
Ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν πορίζειν. Ἀμα δὲ καὶ διὰ
τὸ μηθὲν τοῦ κυλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ πάντοθεν

λαμβάνουσιν· διδύμῃ γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ
 35 πύθεν οἷθ' ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. Διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέρῳ
 αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου αὐ-
 τοῦ ἔνεκα, οὐδὲ ὥς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὐς δεῖ πένεσθαι,
 τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη
 οἷθ' ἐν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πο-
 ρίζουσι πολλά. Διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολ-
 λοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας
 δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς
 36 τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδα-
 γώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπι-
 37 μελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δύν ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν. Ἡ δ'
 ἀνελευθερία ἀνιάτ' ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα
 ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. Καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι
 38 μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. Καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πο-
 λυειδὲς ἐστίν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευ-
 θερίας εἶναι. Ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὔσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς
 δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλό-
 κληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν
 τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν.
 39 Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδε-
 λοί, γλίσχροι, κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι,
 τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμ-
 βάνειν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν
 αἰσχυρῶν. Δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο
 φυλάττειν, ἵνα μή ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχυρόν τι πρά-
 ξαι. Τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμνοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος
 ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθενὶ ἄν δοῦναι.
 40 Οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὥς οὐ
 ῥάδιον τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ

αλλ. αὐτὸν αὐτὸν

αὐτὸν αὐτὸν
αὐτὸν αὐτὸν

ἑτέρον μὴ ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μῆτε λαμβάνειν μῆτε
 διδόναι. Οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ
 πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους
 ἐργασίαις ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνικοῖς καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦ-
 τοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ. Πάντες γὰρ
 οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὅπου οὐ δεῖ. Καί- 41
 νὺν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκερδία φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ
 ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνειδῆ ὑπομινουσιν.
 Τοῖς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδε 42
 ἂν δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους
 πώλεις πορθεύοντας καὶ ἱερὰ στυλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς
 μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. Ὁ μὲνται κυβευτῆς καὶ 43
 ὁ λοποδύτης καὶ ὁ ληστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσὶν·
 αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. Κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἀμφότεροι πραγ-
 ματεύονται καὶ ὀνειδῆ ὑπομινουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν κινδύνους
 τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν
 φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. Ἀμφότεροι δὲ
 ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλούμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς, καὶ
 πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. Εἰκότως δὲ 44
 τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μείζων
 τε γὰρ ἐστὶ κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην
 ἀμαρτανουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων 45
 κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.

Δόξεις δ' ἂν ἀκολουθοῦν εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρε- (2) 4
 πείας διελθεῖν· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη περὶ χρήματά τις
 ἀρετὴ εἶναι. Οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει
 περὶ πύσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς
 δαπανηρὰς μόνον ἐν τοῖς τοῖς δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριό-
 τητος μεγεθαι. Καθάπερ γὰρ τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει,
 ἐν μεγέθει πρόπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. Τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς 2

τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ.
 3 Τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν. καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ α. Ὁ δ'
 ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται
 μεγαλοπρεπῆς, οἷον τὸ “πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτην” ἀλλ'
 ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐλευ-
 θέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐθὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπῆς.
 4 Τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἢ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια
 καλεῖται, ἢ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ
 ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσai τῷ μεγέθει περὶ α
 δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι·
 5 ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπῆς
 ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ
 6 δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. Ὡς περ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴ-
 πομεν, ἢ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν.
 Αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέ-
 πουσai. Τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα
 δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. Ὡστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς
 δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ
 7 καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. Δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλο-
 πρεπῆς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς.
 8 Καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μι-
 9 κροπρεπές. Καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον,
 σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου.
 10 Ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι·
 καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει α δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ. Ἐν
 τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος,
 περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης
 δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. Οὐ γὰρ
 ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου· κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ
 πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ
 μέγα καὶ καλόν. Τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή,

τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν. Καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ
μεγαλοπρεπεία ἐν μεγέθει.

Ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, 11 5-1-1-1-1
οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς
τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χρηγεῖν
οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστίαν τὴν
πόλιν. Ἐν ἅπασιν δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρὸς τὸν πρῶτον 12
τοῦτα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων ἄξια
γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ
τῷ ποιοῦντι πρίπειν. Διὰ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλο- 13
πρεπὴς· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἂφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόν-
τως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἄξιαν γὰρ καὶ
τὸ δέον· κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. Πρέπει δὲ καὶ οἷς 14
τὰ τοιαῦτα προὔπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν προγόνων
ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις
καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθ' ἔχει καὶ
ἀξίωμα. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς, 15
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρεπεία,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμώτατα τῶν δὲ
ιδίῳ ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον,
καὶ εἰ περὶ τι πᾶσα ἡ πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ αἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι,
καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολὰς, καὶ δωρεὰς
καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλο-
πρεπὴς, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά· τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν 16
ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. Μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατα-
σκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ κόσμῳ γίγναι τις καὶ
οὗτος. Καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανῶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια
τῶν ἔργων κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. Καὶ ἐν ἐκάσταις
τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, 17
οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων

- ἔκτιστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῖθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα.
- 18 Καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι· σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἢ λήκυθος ἢ καλλίστη ἔχει μεγαλοπρέπειαν παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἢ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ
- 19 ἀνελεύθερον. Διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένοι, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οἶκ' εὐυπέμβλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος.
- 20 Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάνανσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
- Ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρίνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοὶς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. Καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῖτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὐ δ'
- 21 ὀλίγα, πολλά. Ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλῶσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων, καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλῶσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος
- 22 μίξω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. Εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἔξεις αὗται κακίαι, οἱ μὲν ὑπερίδῃ γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι, μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.
- 7 (3) Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν. Διαφέρει δ' οἷθ' ἐν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. Δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αἰτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὢν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν οἰδεῖς ἡλίθιος οἱ δ' ἀνόητος.

Μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. Ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν⁴
 ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος
 δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ⁵
 κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ
 σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. Ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν⁶
 ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζύνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς
 χαῦνος. Ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, εἴαν⁷
 τε μεγάλων εἴαν τε μετρίων, εἴαν τε καὶ μικρῶν
 ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. Καὶ μάλιστα
 ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ
 μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὲ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος⁸
 τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ
 κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. Οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλ-
 λείπουσιν. Εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὢν,⁹
 καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη.
 Ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. Μέγιστον δὲ¹⁰
 τοῦτ' ἂν θεΐημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμεμεν, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ'
 ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις
 ἄθλον. Τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν
 ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. Περὶ τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγα-
 λόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. Καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται¹¹
 οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλισθ'
 οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς, κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. Ὁ δὲ¹²
 μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ
 μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. Ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν¹³
 ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον. Ὁ δὲ μεγα-¹⁴
 λόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη·
 μείζονος γὰρ αἰὲς ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄρι-
 στος. Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι. Καὶ δόξειε δ' ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη
 ἀρετῇ μέγα. Οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ¹⁵

- φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα
 πρίξει αἰσχρὰ, ᾧ οὐθέν μέγα; καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκο-
 ποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἢν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ
 ἀγαθὸς ᾖν. Οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος
 ᾖν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἢ τιμὴ, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς
 16 ἀγαθοῖς. Ἐοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος
 τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ
 γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. Διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
 μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.
- 17 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός
 ἐστι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων
 μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὥς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ
 ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄξια
 τιμὴ· οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῦς
 μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν. Τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ
 ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος.
 Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ
 18 αὐτόν. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγα- +
 λόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτος
 καὶ δυναστείας καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως
 ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὐτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς
 ἔσται, οὐτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν
 οὕτως ἔχει ὥς μέγιστον ὄν. Αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ
 πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες
 αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται. Ὡ δὴ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ
 μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τᾷλλα. Διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν
 8 εἶναι. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς
 19 μεγαλοψυχίαν. Οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ
 δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γὰρ, τὸ
 δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. Διὸ καὶ τὰ
 20 τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ

τινῶν. Κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητέος· ὃ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. Οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες, οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν, οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. Ὑπερύπται 21 δὲ καὶ ὑβρίζονται καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίγνονται. Ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥάδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυναμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. Μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οἱ χ' ὅμοιοι ἄνθρωποι, τοῦτο δὲ ὁρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ 22 (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. Οὐκ 23 ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δὲ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου, ὥς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν πάντως ζῆν. Καὶ οἷος εὐ 24 ποιῶν, εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντας, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένους. Καὶ ἀντιεργητικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτως γὰρ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὐ πεπονθὼς. Δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὐκ ἂν ποιή- 25 σωσιν εὐ, ὡς δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὐ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὐ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν θείαν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διὶ· οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὅλλ' ἂν πεπόθισαν εὐ. Μεγαλοψύχου δὲ 26 καὶ τὸ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίᾳ μίγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορ-

μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. Πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικὸν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι'

21 αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τῆς δόσεως. Διὸ καὶ ἐγκα-
λεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα
πλουτοῦσιν. Συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ
οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχη.

22 ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ
δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ
ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα

23 ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. Ὡσπερ
γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθερίος ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δα-
πανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἄσματος. Διὸ
τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος
τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς

24 δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. Τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ μεσό-
τητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέ-
ριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσῃ εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ,
ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλαις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ
λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. Τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ
ἁμφω οὔσης μεστότητος, ποιήσῃ ἀμφοτέρα ὥς δεῖ· ἔπε-
ται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δώσει ἢ τοιαύτῃ λήψις, ἢ δὲ μὴ
τοιαύτῃ ἐναντία ἐστίν. Ἐἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπόμεναι γίνονται

25 ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐνανταὶ δῆλον ὥς οὐ. Ἐὰν δὲ
παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίῃ αὐτῷ ἀνα-
λίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὥς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς
γὰρ καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ.

26 Καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα·
δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ
27 μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπού-
μενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσε, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ

ἀρεσκόμενος. Ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· 28 3
οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, οὔδ' ὥς δεῖ, οὔτε λυπεῖται·
ἔσται δὲ προῖοῦσι φανερώτερον. Εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ὅτι 29
ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἢ ἄσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευ-
θερία, καὶ ἐν δυσὶν, ἐν δύοσι καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπά-
νην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτία τῷ
διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν
ἐλλείπει, ἢ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ
λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. Τὰ μὲν 30 *but only*
οὖν τῆς ἄσωτίας οὐ πᾶν συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ράδιον *is not*
μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπι-
λείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ιδιώτας διδόντας, οὔτε καὶ δοκοῦσι
ἄσωτοι εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος δύξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῶ 31
βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. Εὐίατός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ
καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ
μέσον δύναται εἰσεῖναι. Ἐχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου·
καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὔδέτερον δ' ὥς δεῖ
οὐδ' εὔ. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθεῖν, ἢ πως ἄλλως μεταβάλοι,
εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται
ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. Διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἥθος· 32
οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβῦλλειν διδόντα
καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δέ. Ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρό- 32
πον ἄσωτος πρὸς δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι
διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλοὺς, ὁ δὲ
οὐθέν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν. Ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἄσώτων, 33
καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ
κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. Ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ 34
βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ
δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα·
Ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν πορίζειν. Ἀμα δὲ καὶ διὰ
τὸ μηθεὶν τοῦ κυλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ πάντοθεν

λαμβάνουσιν· διδύναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ
 35 πόθεν οὐθὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. Διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι
 αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου αὐ-
 τοῦ ἔνεκα, οὐδὲ ὥς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὐς δεῖ πένεσθαι,
 τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη
 οὐδὲν ἂν δοίεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πο-
 ρίζουσι πολλά. Διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολ-
 λοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας
 36 δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς
 τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδα-
 γώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπι-
 37 μελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δέυν ἀφίκοιτ' ἂν. Ἡ δ'
 ἀνελευθερία ἀνιάτός ἐστιν· δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα
 ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. Καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι
 38 μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. Καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πο-
 λυειδές ἐστιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευ-
 θερίας εἶναι. Ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς
 δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλό-
 κληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν
 τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν.
 39 Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδα-
 λοὶ, γλίσχροι, κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι,
 τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμ-
 βάνειν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν
 αἰσχυρῶν. Δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο
 φυλάττειν, ἵνα μὴ ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχυρόν τι πρᾶ-
 ξαι. Τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμνοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος
 ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθενὶ ἂν δοῦναι.
 40 Οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὥς οὐ
 ῥᾶδιον τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ

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ἐτέρων μὴ ἄρίσκει οὐκ αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε
 δίδοναι. Οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν ὑπερβαλλουσι τῷ
 πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελυθέρους
 ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πηροβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦ-
 τοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ. Πᾶτες γὰρ
 οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβανουσι, καὶ ὅπουσιν οὐ δεῖ. Κοι- 41
 νὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ
 ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνειδῆ ὑπομνούσιν.
 Τοῖς γὰρ τα μεγυλα μὴ ὅθεν δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδε 42
 ἢ δεῖ, οἱ λεγόμεν ἀνελυθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυραννοὺς
 πύλεις πορβοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ ποιηροὺς
 μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. Ὁ μέντοι κιβεωτής καὶ 43
 ὁ λοποδύτης καὶ ὁ ληστής τῶν ἀνελυθέρων εἰσιν·
 αἰσχροκερδεῖς γὰρ. Κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἀμφότεροι πραγ-
 ματεύονται καὶ ὀνειδῆ ὑπομνούσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν κινδύνους
 τοῖς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν
 φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ δίδοναι. Ἀμφότεροι δὲ
 ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς, καὶ
 πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ τοιαῖται λήψεις ἀνελείθεροι. Εἰκότως δὲ 44
 τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελυθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μείζον
 τε γὰρ ἔστι κακὸν τῆς ἄσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην
 ἀμυπτανουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεχθείσαν ἄσωτιαν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων 45
 κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.

Δόξεις δ' ἂν ἀκολουθοῦν εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρε- (2) 4
 πείας διελθεῖν· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη περὶ χρήματά τις
 ἀρετὴ εἶναι. Οἷχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει
 περὶ πᾶσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς
 δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν τοιούτοις δ' ὑπερῆχει τῆς ἐλευθερι-
 ῆτος μεγαθει. Καθάπερ γὰρ ταῦτομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει,
 ἐν μεγαθει πρόπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. Τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς 2

- τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ.
 3 Τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ. Ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπὴς, οἷον τὸ “πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη·” ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐθὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπὴς.
 4 Τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσai τῷ μεγέθει περὶ αὐτὸ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι.
 5 Ὑστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ
 6 δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. Ὡς περ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἰσπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν. Αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. Τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. Ὡστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἡ
 7 καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. Δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς.
 8 Καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπὴς. Καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου.
 10 Ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει αὐτὸ δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ. Ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος, περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὐσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσῃ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὕτη ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου· κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσὸς, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν. Τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή,

τὸ δὲ μεγαλυπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν. Καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ
μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει.

Ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, 11 5-1
οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς
τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ πού τις χορηγεῖν
οἶονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν
πόλιν. Ἐν ἅπασιν δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρὸς τὸν πρῶτον 12
τοῦτον ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὧν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια
γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ
τῷ ποιῶντι πρέπειν. Διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλο- 13
πρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσῃ πρεπόν-
τως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ
τὸ δέον· καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. Πρέπει δὲ καὶ οἷς 14
τὰ τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν προγόνων
ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις
καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ
ἀξίωμα. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, 15
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἢ μεγαλοπρέπεια,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότερα· τῶν δὲ
ιδίῳ ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιούτου,
καὶ εἰ περὶ τι πᾶσα ἢ πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι,
καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολὰς, καὶ δωρεὰς
καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλο-
πρεπής, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά· τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν 16
ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. Μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατα-
σκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ· κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ
οὗτος. Καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια
τῶν ἔργων· κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. Καὶ ἐν ἐκάσταις
τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, 17
οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων

- ἑκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα.
- 18 Καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι· σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἢ λήκυθος ἢ καλλίστη ἔχει μεγαλοπρέπειαν παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἢ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ
- 19 ἀνελεύθερον. Διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος.
- 6 20 Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπῆς, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάνανσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
- Ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοὶς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. Καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσῃ οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὐ δ'
- 21 ὀλίγα, πολλά. Ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπῆς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλῶσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων, καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλῶσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος
- 22 μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. Εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἔξεις αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὲν ὑνεῖδη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι, μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.
- 7 (3) Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν. Διαφέρει δ' οἰθὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν
- 2 ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. Δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὢν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος.

Μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. Ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν⁴
 ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος
 δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ⁵
 κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ
 σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. Ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν⁶
 ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς
 χαῦνος. Ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, εἴν⁷
 τε μεγάλων εἴν τε μετρίων, εἴν τε καὶ μικρῶν
 ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. Καὶ μάλιστα
 ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ
 μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὲ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος⁸
 τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ
 κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. Οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλ-
 λείπουσιν. Εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὢν,⁹
 καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη.
 Ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. Μέγιστον δὲ¹⁰
 τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ'
 ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις
 ἄθλον. Τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν
 ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. Περὶ τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγα-
 λόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. Καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται¹¹
 οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλισθ'
 οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς, κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. Ὁ δὲ¹²
 μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ
 μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. Ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν¹³
 ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὴν γε μεγαλόψυχον. Ὁ δὲ μεγα-¹⁴
 λόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη·
 μείζονος γὰρ αἰὲν ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄρι-
 στος. Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι. Καὶ δόξειε δ' ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη
 ἀρετῇ μέγα. Οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ¹⁵

- φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα
 πρίξει αἰσχροῦ, ᾧ οὐθέν μέγα; καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκο-
 ποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ
 ἀγαθὸς ὢν. Οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος
 ὢν τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἢ τιμὴν, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς
 16 ἀγαθοῖς. Ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος
 τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ
 γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. Διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
 μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.
 17 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός
 ἐστι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων
 μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὥς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ
 ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄξια
 τιμὴ· οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς
 μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν. Τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ
 ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος.
 Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ
 18 αὐτόν. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγα-
 λόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον +
 καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως
 ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὐτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς
 ἔσται, οὐτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν
 οὕτως ἔχει ὥς μέγιστον ὄν. Αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ
 πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες
 αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται. Ὡ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ
 μικρὸν ἐστὶ, τούτῳ καὶ τᾶλλα. Διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν
 8 εἶναι. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς
 19 μεγαλοψυχίαν. Οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ
 δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γὰρ, τὸ
 δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. Διὸ καὶ τὰ
 20 τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ

των. Κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ὃ δ' ἀμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιούται τιμῆς. Οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες, οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιούσιν, οὔτε ὁρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. Ὑπερύπται 21 δὲ καὶ ὑβρίζονται καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. Ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥάδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι πράττουσιν. Μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύναται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ 22 (δυξάσει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. Οὐκ 23 ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δὲ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου, ὥς οὐκ ἤξιον ἂν πάντως ζῆν. Καὶ οἷος εὐ 24 ποιῶν, εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. Καὶ ἀντενεργητικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γὰρ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὐ πεπονθώς. Δακοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὐκ ἂν ποιή- 25 σωσιν εὐ, ὡς δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὐ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὐ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδῶς ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὴν εὐεργεσίας τῇ Διὶ· οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἂν πεπόνθισαν εὐ. Μεγαλοψύχου δὲ 26 καὶ τὸ μνηστὴρ δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίᾳ μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μίσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνὸν, τῶν δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἄγενές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορ-

27 τικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. Καὶ εἰς τὰ
 ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν
 εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν, ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον.
 Καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν.
 28 Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον·
 τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου. Καὶ μέλειν τῆς ἀληθείας
 μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερώς·
 παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν. Διὸ καὶ ἀλη-
 θευτικός, πλήν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν· εἰρωνα δὲ πρὸς
 29 τοὺς πολλούς. Καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἄλλ'
 ἢ πρὸς φίλον· δουλικόν γὰρ, διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες
 θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. Οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός·
 30 οὐθὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. Οὐδὲ μνησικάκος· οὐ γὰρ
 μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακὰ,
 31 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. Οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ
 περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἐτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῇ-
 ται μέλει αὐτῷ, οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ' αὖ
 ἐπαινετικός ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν
 32 ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. Καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν
 ἤκιστα ὀλοφυρτικός καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ
 33 οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. Καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ
 καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρ-
 34 κους γὰρ μᾶλλον. Καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλο-
 ψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξεις στάσι-
 μος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων,
 οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηθὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἢ δ' ὀξύφωνία
 καὶ ἡ ταχυτῆς διὰ τούτων. Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλό-
 ψυχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων
 35 χαῦνος. Οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὔτοι· οὐ
 γὰρ κακοποιοὶ εἰσιν· ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 μικρόψυχος, ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν, ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὢν

ἐπαινετικός

ἡμῶν τὸ ἴδιον
 fruitless

ἀξίως ἐστὶ, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν
 ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγεται γὰρ
 ἢν ὢν ἀξίως ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. Οὐ μὲν ἡλίθιοί γε
 οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί. Ἡ
 τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χεῖρον ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ
 ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων
 τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. Οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλίθιοι 36
 καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς· ὡς γὰρ
 ἀξιοὶ ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἴτα ἐξελεγχον-
 ται καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις,
 καὶ βοῖλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερά εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ
 λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι.
 Ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον 37
 τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίγνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρον
 ἐστίν.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμὴν ἐστὶ μεγάλην, 38
 ὥσπερ εἴρηται· ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετὴ τις, (4) 10
 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἡ δόξειεν ἂν παρα-
 πλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ
 ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. Ἀμφω γὰρ
 αἵται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ
 τὰ μικρὰ διατιθίσιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ. Ὡσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει 2
 καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπερβολὴ τε καὶ
 ἔλλειψις, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τιμῇ ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ
 ἦττον, καὶ τὸ ὀθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. Τὸν τε γὰρ φιλότι- 3
 μον ψείγομεν ὡς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ὀθεν οὐ δεῖ, τῆς
 τιμῆς ἐφίεμετον, τὸν τε ἀφιλότιμον, ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς
 καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. Ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φι-
 λότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δὲ
 ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς

πρώτοις εἶπομεν. Δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλο-
 τοιούτου λεγομένου, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ φέρουμεν τὸν
 φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν, ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ
 πολλοὶ, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. Ἄνωνύμου
 δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν
 τὰ ἄκρα· ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ
 5 μέσον. Ὁρέγονται δὲ τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ
 ἥττον, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται γοῦν ἡ ἕξις
 αὕτη, μεσότης οὔσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. Φαίνεται δὲ
 πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφι-
 λοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρωθεν δὲ ἀμφοτέρωθεν πως.
 6 Ἐοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. Ἀντι-
 κείσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ' οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνο-
 μάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

- II (5) Πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μὲν μεσότης περὶ ὀργὰς, ἀνωνύμου
 δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸν
 μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκ-
 2 λίνουσιν, ἀνώνυμον οὔσαν. Ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης
 τις λέγοιτ' ἂν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ'
 3 ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς
 δεῖ, καὶ οἷς δεῖ, ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε,
 καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται· πρῶτος δὲ οὗτος ἂν εἴη,
 εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται. Βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρῶτος
 ἀτάραχος εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ'
 ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦ-
 4 τον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. Ἀμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον
 5 ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρῶτος, ἀλλὰ
 6 μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός. Ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία
 τίς ἐστίν, εἴθ' ὅ τι δὴ ποτε, ψέγεται. Οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζό-
 μενοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἡλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ,
 6 μὴδ' ὅτε, μὴδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οἷδε

λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός. Τὸ δὲ
 προπηλακίζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιαρᾶν
 ἀνδραποδῶδες. Ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται· ἢ
 καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ,
 καὶ θυττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον· οὐ μὴν ὅπαντά γε τῷ
 αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναται εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν
 καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφύρητον γίνεται.
 Οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται, καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, 8
 καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ
 ταχέως· ὁ καὶ βελτιστον ἔχουσιν. Συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς
 τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόασιν
 ἢ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἴτ' ἀπαύωνται.
 Ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχοιοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργί- 9
 λοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσ- 11
 διάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ
 τὸν θυμόν. Παῦλα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἢ γὰρ
 τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἢ δυνάμει ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποι-
 οῦσα. Τοῦτου δὲ μὴ γινόμενου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ
 γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπίθεται αὐτοὺς οὐδεὶς,
 ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέναι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. Εἰσὶ δ' οἱ
 τιμοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς σκληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις.
 Χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαί- 11
 νοντας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ δια-
 λαττομένοις ἀνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κυλάσεως. Τῇ πραύτητι 12
 δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον
 γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι. Καὶ
 πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χεῖρους. Ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 13
 πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δηλόν· οὐ γὰρ
 ῥύδιον διαρίσσει τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ
 πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστίαν, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιῇ
 τις ἢ ἀμαρτάνει. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ

ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον· ἐνιοσε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. Ὁ δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτὸς, οὐ ράδιον τῷ λόγῳ ὑποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῇ αἰσ-
 14 θήσει ἡ κρίσις. Ἀλλὰ τὸ γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση ἔξις ἐπαινετὴ, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταὶ, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι ἡρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφύδρα.

— 12 (6) Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἔξεως ἀνθεκτέον. Αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἔξεις εἰρήσθωσαν· Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἅλ-
 2 ποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν
 3 φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἔξεις ψεκταὶ εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετὴ, καθ' ἣν ἀποδέχεται ἃ
 4 δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ. Ὅνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ· τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἔξιν οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπικτὴ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα.
 5 Διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. Ὅμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ὡς ἀρμόζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὁθνείων
 6 φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται

ὅτι ὥς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάζεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. Ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας, τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν. Κὰν τῷ ποιῶντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικρὰν, ἢ βλάβην, ἢ δ' ἐναντίωσις μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέχεται, ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. Διαφερόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τιχαῦσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τῆς ἄλλας διαφορας, ἐκύστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρεπον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἰρούμενος τὰ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, εἴαν ᾧ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. Καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰ-9 σαυθὺς μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. Ὁ μὲν οὖν μίσας τοιοῦ-τις ἐστίν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δὲ, τοῦ δὲ συνηδύναντος ὁ μὲν τοῖ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι ἥρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίγνηται εἰς χρήματι καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. Ἀντικείμεναι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δι' σχεδὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας (7) 13 μεσότης ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. Οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλον τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἥθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τῆς ἀρετᾶς πιστεύσαιμεν ἂν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. Ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἶπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. Δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποι- 2 τικός τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζό- 3

4 νων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρ-
 χοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὢν
 5 ἀληθευτικός καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα
 ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω.
 6 Ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηθε-
 νός. Ἐκαστος δ' οἷος ἔστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει
 καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, εἴαν μὴ τινος ἕνεκα πράττη. Καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ
 τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτὸν, τὸ δ' ἀληθές καλὸν
 καὶ ἐπαινετόν. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικός μέσος
 7 ὢν ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοὶ,
 μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών. Περὶ ἐκατέρου δ' εἵπωμεν, πρότε-
 ρον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. Οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς
 ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ
 δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς),
 8 ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηθενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ
 καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἔξιν τοιούτος εἶναι. Δόξειε
 δ' ἂν ὁ τοιούτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. Ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ
 ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθείων, ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς δια-
 φέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὥς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβή-
 9 σεται, ὃ γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἠυλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιούτος
 ἐπαινετός. Ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλάττω δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
 10 ἀποκλίνει· ἐμμελίστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς
 τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι. Ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσ-
 ποιούμενος μηθενὸς ἕνεκα φαῦλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 11 ἔχαιρε τῷ ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κα-
 κός. Εἰ δ' ἕνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίσαν
 12 ψεκτός, ὥς ὁ ἀλαζών, ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύ-
 ριον, ἀσχημονέστερος. Οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ
 ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν γὰρ καὶ
 τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ
 μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ

κέρδους. Οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονεύμενοι τὰ 13
 τοιαῦτα προσποιῦνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός.
 οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἔστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ ἂ
 διαλαβεῖν ἔστι μὴ ἄτα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἢ ἱατρὸν.
 Διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλείστοι προσποιῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
 ἀλαζονεύονται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. Οἱ δ' 14
 εἰρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ
 ἥθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν,
 ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν· μαλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ
 ἐνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἔποιε. Οἱ δὲ 15
 καὶ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ φανερά προσποιούμενοι βαυκοπα-
 νοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητοί εἰσιν. Καὶ ἐνίοτε
 ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἢ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ
 γὰρ ἢ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἢ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. Οἱ 16
 δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν
 ἐμποδῶν καὶ φανερά εἰρωνευόμενοι χαριέστεροι φαίνονται.
 Ἀντικείμενον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χεῖ- 17
 ρων γάρ.

Οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἀναπαίσειως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ (8) 14
 διαγωγῇ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλί-
 ας ἐμμελῆς, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ἄς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 ἀκούειν. Διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοι-
 οῦτων ἀκούειν. Δῆλον δ' ὅς τε καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν 2
 ὑπερβολὴ τε καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ μέσου. Οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ 3
 γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ
 φορτικοὶ, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον
 στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχή-
 μονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτὰ
 ἂν εἰπόντες μὴτεν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνον-
 τες ἄγριοι, καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς
 παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὐτροποί-

- μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. Πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν αὐτὰ μήτε φυλακτικὸν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τῆς δόσεως. Διὸ καὶ ἐγκα-
 21 λείτται τῇ τέχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. Συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ.
 22 ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Οὐ μὲν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἀλλὰ τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα
 23 ἀναλώσει οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. Ὡσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθερίας ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δα-
 πανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ ὁ δ' ὑπερβαλλὼν ἄσματος. Διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλήθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς
 24 δαπάναις ὑπερβαλλεῖν. Τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ μεσό-
 τητος οἴσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέ-
 ριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσῃ εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλαις, καὶ τὰντα ἡδέως καὶ
 λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. Τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ
 ἁμφω οὔσης μεστότητος, ποιήσῃ ἁμφοτέρα ὥς δεῖ· ἔπε-
 25 ται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δώσει ἢ τοιαύτη λῆψις, ἢ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπάμεναι γίνονται
 25 ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὥς οὐ. Ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίῃ αὐτῷ ἀνα-
 λίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὥς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ.
 26 Καὶ εἰκοινώητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθεριος εἰς χρήματα· δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ
 27 μᾶλλον ἠχθόμενος εἰ τι δέον μὴ ἀναλώσει ἢ λυπού-
 μενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσε, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ

ἄρεσκόμενος. Ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διμαρτάνει 28 3
οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται εἰς οἷς δεῖ, οὔδ' ὥς δεῖ, οὔτε λυπεῖται
ἔσται δὲ προῖοισι φανερώτερον. Εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ὅτι 29
ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἢ ἄσωτία καὶ ἢ ἀνελευ-
θερία, καὶ ἐν δυσὶν, ἐν δύσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν διαπά-
νην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δύσει τίθεμεν. Ἢ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτία τῷ
διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν
ἐλλείπει, ἢ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ
λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. Τὰ μὲν 30
οὖν τῆς ἄσωτίας οὐ πᾶν συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον
μηδ' αὖθεν λαμβανόμενα πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπι-
λείπει ἢ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσι
ἄσωτοι εἶναι· ἐπεὶ δ' γε τοιοῦτος δύξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῶ 31
βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. Εὐίατός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ
καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ
μῆσαν δύναται εἰλθεῖν. Ἐχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου
καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὔδέτερον δ' ὥς δεῖ
οὐδ' εὖ. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐθισθεῖη, ἢ πως ἄλλως μεταβαλοῖ,
εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οὔτε δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται
ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. Διὰ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἥθους·
οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὰ ὑπερβαλλεῖν διδόντα
καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δέ. Ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρό- 32
πον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι
διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλοὺς, ὁ δὲ
οὐθίνα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν. Ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἄσώτων, 33
καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰς
κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. Ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ 34
βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ
δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα.
Ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν πορίζειν. Ἀμα δὲ καὶ διὰ
τὸ μηθεὶν τοῦ κυλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ πάντοθεν

λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ
 35 πόθεν οὐθέν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. Διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι
 αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδέ τούτου αὐ-
 τοῦ ἔνεκα, οὐδέ ὥς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε αὖτε δεῖ πένεσθαι,
 τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη
 οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πα-
 ρίξουσιν πολλά. Διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ παλ-
 λοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας
 δαπανηροὶ εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς
 36 τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδα-
 γώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπι-
 37 μελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δύναν ἀφίκοιτ' ἂν. Ἡ δ'
 ἀνελευθερία ἀνιάτος ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα
 ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. Καὶ συμφνέστεραν τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι
 38 μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. Καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πο-
 λυεῖδες ἐστίν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευ-
 θερίας εἶναι. Ἐν δυσι γὰρ αὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς
 δύσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλό-
 κληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν
 τῇ λήψει ὑπερβαλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν.
 39 Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδι-
 λοί, γλίσχροι, κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι,
 τῶν δ' ἄλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδέ βούλονται λαμ-
 βάνειν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν
 αἰσchrῶν. Δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο
 φυλάττειν, ἵνα μὴ ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσchrόν τι πρά-
 ξαι. Τοιούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμικοπρίστης καὶ πῶς ὁ τοιοῦτος
 ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθενὶ ὄν δοῦναι.
 40 Οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἐπέχονται τῶν ἄλλοτρίων, ὥς οὐ
 ῥᾶδιον τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ

ἐτίμωται μή· ἀρίσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε
 δίδοναι. Οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῇ
 πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρων
 ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβασκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦ-
 τοι, καὶ τοκιστὰι κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῶν. Πάντες γὰρ
 οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὅπῃ οὐ δεῖ. Κοι- 41
 νὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ
 ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνειδῆ ὑπομένουσιν.
 Τοῦτε γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ 42
 ὅ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους
 πόλεις πορνοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ ποτηροὺς
 μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. Ὁ μὲντοι κυβευτὴς καὶ 43
 ὁ λοποδύτης καὶ ὁ ληστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσὶν·
 αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. Κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκα ἀμφοτέρωι πραγ-
 ματεύονται καὶ ὀνειδῆ ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν κινδύνους
 τοῦτε μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν
 φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ δίδοναι. Ἀμφοτέρωι δὲ
 ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς, καὶ
 πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. Εἰκότως δὲ 44
 τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μείζων
 γὰρ ἴσθι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην
 ἀμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων 45
 κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.

Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἀκολουθοῦν εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρε- (2) 4
 πείας διελθεῖν· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη περὶ χρήματά τις
 ἀρετὴ εἶναι. Οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει
 περὶ πᾶσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς
 δαπανηρὰς μόνον ἐν τοῖτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριό-
 τητος μεγέθει. Καθάπερ γὰρ τοῦτομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει,
 ἐν μεγέθει πρίπουσα δαπάνη ἴσθιν. Τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς 2

the kind of money in the
 sense of the word 'wealth'

- τι· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῃ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ.
- 3 Τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ δ. Ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπῆς, οἷον τὰ "πολλάκι δύσκον ἀλήτην" ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐθέν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπῆς.
- 4 Τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἔξωσεν ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβαλλουσai τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι.
- 5 Ὑστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐπιστήμονι ἵσκειν τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ
- 6 δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. Ὡς περ γὰρ ἐν ὕρχῃ εἰ-
 πομεν, ἡ ἔξις τῆς ἐνεργείας ὁρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν.
 Αἱ δὲ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. Τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. Ὡς τε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἡ
- 7 καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. Δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπῆς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς.
- 8 Καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προστικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπείς. Καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πύσσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου.
- 10 Ἀνεγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ. Ἐν ταύτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος, περὶ ταῦτά τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὐσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου κτήμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσοῦς, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν. Τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή.

τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν. Καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετῇ
μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει.

Ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμα, 11
οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς
τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ πῃ χρηγείν
οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἰστιάν τὴν
πόλιν. Ἐν δὲ πᾶσι δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρὸς τὸν πρῶτ- 12
τοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὦν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων ἀξία
γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ
τῷ ποιῶντι πρέπειν. Διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλο- 13
πρεπὲς· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσῃ προπόν-
τως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ
τὸ δέον· κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. Πρέπει δὲ καὶ οἷς 14
τὰ τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν προγόνων
ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδοξοῖς
καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ
ἀξίωμα. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς, 15
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μίγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότεστα· τῶν δὲ
ιδίῶν ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον,
καὶ εἰ περὶ τι πᾶσα ἡ πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ αἰ ἐν ἀξιώματι,
καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολὰς, καὶ δωρεὰς
καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλο-
πρεπὴς, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά· τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν 16
ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. Μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατα-
σκευάσασθαι προπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ· πόσις γὰρ τις καὶ
οἶκος. Καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾷ ὅσα πολυχρόνια
τῶν ἔργων· κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. Καὶ ἐν ἐκάσταις
τὸ πρέπον οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, 17
οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ
ἐν τῷ αἵματι

τοῦ γὰρ ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσ-
 περ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ
 4 τὰ ἤθη. Ἐπιπολάζοντες δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείσ-
 των χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ,
 καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσπαγορεύονται ὥς χαρί-
 εντες. Ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρὸν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρη-
 5 μένων δῆλον. Τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἔξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιό-
 της ἐστίν· τοῦ, δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀ-
 κοῦειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει· ἔστι γάρ
 τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾷ μέρει καὶ
 ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ
 ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύ-
 6 του. Ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν
 καὶ τῶν καινῶν τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία,
 τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα
 7 πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. Πότερον οὖν τὸν εὐ σκώπτοντα
 ὀριστεῖον τῷ λέγειν ἢ πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν
 τὸν ἀκούοντα, ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιούτου ἀόρι-
 8 στον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῃ μισητὸν τε καὶ ἡδύ. Τοιαῦτα δὲ
 καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἃ γὰρ ὑπρμένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν
 9 δοκεῖ. Οὐ δὲ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λαιδόρημά τι
 ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια λαιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ'
 ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. Ὁ δὲ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως
 10 ἔξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ. Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐσ-
 τίν, εἴτ' ἐπιδεξίος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται· ὁ δὲ βωμολό-
 χος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλ-
 λων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλῳτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων
 ὧν οὐθέν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οἷδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι. Ὁ
 δ' ἄγριος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οἷθ' ἐν γὰρ
 11 συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαν-
 12 σις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. Τρεῖς οὖν

αἱ εἰρημῖναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι πε-
ρὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαι. Διαφέρουσι δ'
ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειαν ἐστίν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. Τῶν
δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς
κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.

Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν· (9) 15
παθεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει. Ὅρίζεται γοῦν φόβος
τις ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ 2
παραπλήσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ αἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ
τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχρίῳσιν. Σωματικὰ δὲ φαί-
νεται πως εἶναι ἀμφοτέρω, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ
ἔξεως εἶναι. Οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ 3
τῇ νέᾳ· οἴομεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας
εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς
αἰδοῦς δὲ καλύεσθαι. Καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς
αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινίσειεν ὅτι
αἰσχυνηλός· οὐθὲν γὰρ οἴομεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν
ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνῃ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ 4
αἰσχύνῃ, εἴπερ γίγνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαῖλοις· οὐ γὰρ
πρακτίον τὰ τοιαῦτα. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν 5
αἰσχυρὰ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐθὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερον γὰρ
πρακτίον, ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον. Φαύλου δὲ καὶ τὸ 6
εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν. Τὸ δ'
οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξειε τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσ-
θαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἶεσθαι ἐπιεικὴ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ
τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε
πράξει τὰ φαῖλα. Εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδώς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως 7
ἐπιεικής· εἰ γὰρ πράξει, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. Εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον
καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχυρὰ πράττειν, οὐθὲν μᾶλλον
τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικής. Οὐκ ἔστι 8

δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τις μικτὴ· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. Νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἰπώμεν.

Ε.

1 Περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ
 ποίας τε τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης
 2 ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. Ἡ δὲ
 σκέψις ἡμῖν ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προει-
 3 ρημένοις. Ὅρῳμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλο-
 μένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων
 εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ
 δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς
 ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. Διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον
 4 ὥς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει
 τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἔξεων. Δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναν-
 τίων ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξις δ' ἢ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ,
 οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ
 ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν
 5 βαδίζῃ ὥς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. Πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται
 ἡ ἐναντία ἔξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἔξεις
 ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· εἴαν τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ἢ φανερά,
 καὶ ἡ καχεξία φανερά γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἢ
 εὐεξία καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. Εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ
 εὐεξία πυκνότης σαρκὸς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι
 6 τητὸς ἐν σαρκί. Ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, εἴαν

θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, καὶ θάτερα πλεοναχῶς
λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. Ἐπικε δὲ 7 2
πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ
διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λαμβάνει
καὶ οἷχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δηλῇ μᾶλλον· ἢ γὰρ
διαφορὰ πολλή ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν, οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται
κλειεῖς ὁμωνύμως ἢ τε ὑπὸ τὸν αἰχένα τῶν ζώων καὶ ἢ
τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν. Εἰλήφθω δὲ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς 8
λέγεται. Δοκεῖ δὲ ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ
πλεονέκτης καὶ ὁ ἄνιστος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος
ἔσται ὁ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ ἴσος. Τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ
νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ
ἄνιστον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ 9
τάγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία,
καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθὰ, τινὲ δ' οὐκ
ἀεὶ. (Οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὐχονται καὶ διώκουσιν·
δεῖ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐ-
τοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ.) Ὁ δ' 10
ἄδικος οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ πλεόν αἰρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μείον κακὸν
ἀγαθὸν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ
τοῦτο δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι. Ἔστι δ' ἄνιστος· τοῦτο 11
γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν, 12 3
ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστὶ
πως δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ ὁρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς
νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φασί.
Οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ πάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ 13
τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς
κυρίοις, κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον·
ὥστε εἶνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ
φυλακτικὰ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μαρίων αὐτῆς τῇ

- 14 πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. Προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥίπτειν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων, τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἐφῶς οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν

ὅν δὲ δικαιοσύνη σολλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετὴ ἐνι.

- Καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετὴ, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρήσις ἐστίν. Τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύναται 16 χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἀνδρα δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ 17 ἀρχων. Διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλω γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ 18 ἀρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ. Κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτόν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο 19 γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία 20 ἀδικία μέρος κακίας, ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. Τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ

ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὕτη, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν
πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἢ δὲ τοιῶδε ἕξις, ἀπλῶς
ἀρετή.

Ζητοῦμεν δὲ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετὴς δικαιοσύνην (2) 4
ἔστι γὰρ τις, ὥς φαμέν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας
τῆς κατὰ μέρος. Σημῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ
τῆς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ
δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν, ἢ κικῶς
εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα, ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνε-
λευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν
τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονη-
ρίαν δὲ γε τινά (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. Ἔστιν δ'
ἄρα γε ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὥς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἀδικόν τι
ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. Ἔτι εἰ δ' ἂν
μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβάνων, ὁ
δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν
ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖ-
νος δ' ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' αὖ· δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ
κερδαίνειν. Ἔτι περὶ μὲν τᾶλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνε- 5
ται ἢ ἐπινοηφόρᾳ ἐπὶ τινι μοχθηρίᾳ αἰεὶ, οἷον εἰ ἐμώ-
χευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλειπε τὸν παραστάτην,
ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν,
ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. Ὡστε 6
φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν
μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γίνε-
ται· ἡμῶν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ'
ἢ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχοι-
μεν ἐνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' ἡδονῆς
τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἢ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ
σπουδαῖος.

- 5 7 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσι δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις
καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ
8 ὁποία τις, ληπτέον. Διωρίσται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ τε πα-
ράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ τε νόμιμον καὶ
τὸ ἴσον. Κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἢ πρότερον εἰρη-
9 μένη ἀδικία ἐστίν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλεον οὐ
ταύτῃν ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ
πλεον ἅπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δ' ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλεον), καὶ τὸ
ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταύτῃ, ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν
ὡς μέρη, τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης
ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης.
Ἄσπε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν
μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου ὡ-
10 σαύτως. Ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη
δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἡ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὕσα χρή-
σις πρὸς ἄλλαν, ἡ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. Καὶ τὸ
δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερόν ὡς διο-
ριζτέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς
ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν
προστάττει (ἢ καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ
11 νόμος. Τὰ δὲ πονητικά τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομί-
μων ὅσα νενομοθέτῃται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν.
Περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἑκάστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ
ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶ, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρας, ὅσ-
τερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταύτων ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ
12 εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί. Τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης
καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς
διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ
τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τοῦτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ
ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέροις), ἐν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς
13 συναλλήγημασι διορθωτικόν. Τοῦτοι δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ

συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσιά ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἀκούσια, ἐκού-
σια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷον πρᾶσις, ὦνῃ, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη,
χρήσις, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις· ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι
ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος. Τῶν δ'
ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ, μοιχεῖα, φαρμακεία,
προαγωγεία, δουλαπυτία, δολοφονία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ
δε βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἄρπαγῇ, πῆρωσις,
κακηγορία, προπηλακισμός. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τ' ἄδικος ἄνιστος (3) 6
καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνιστον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τι ἐστὶ τοῦ
ἄνιστου. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποῖα γὰρ πράξει 2
ἔστι τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἴσον. Εἰ οὖν 3
τὸ ἄδικον ἄνιστον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου
δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον
τι ἂν εἴη. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν· ἀνάγ- 4
κη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι [καὶ πρὸς
τι] καὶ τισὶν, καὶ ἡ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ
πλεόν καὶ ἔλαττον), ἡ δ' ἴσον ἐστὶ, δυοῖν, ἡ δὲ δίκαιον,
τισὶν. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τιτ- 5
ταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ἓν, δύο ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν
οἷς τὰ πράγματα, δύο. Καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ 6
ἐν οἷς· ὥς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει·
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι
καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχ-
ωσι καὶ νέμονται. Ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· το 7
γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ'
ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέ-
γουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ελευ-
θερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ'
ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετὴν. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνιλογόν 8
τι· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ
ἴσην, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ· ἡ γὰρ ἀνιλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ

9 λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. Ἡ μὲν οὖν διηρη-
 μένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, δῆλον. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχὴς τῷ
 γὰρ ἐνὶ ὧς δυσὶ χρήται καὶ δις λέγει, οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ α
 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ β, οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γ. Δις
 οὖν ἡ τοῦ β εἴρηται· ὥστ' ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ β τεθῇ δις, τέτταρα
 10 ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν
 ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός· διήρηνται γὰρ ὁμοίως,
 11 οἷς τε καὶ α. Ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ α ὅρος πρὸς τὴν β, οὕτως
 ὁ γ πρὸς τὴν δ, καὶ ἐναλλάξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ α πρὸς τὸν γ,
 ὁ β πρὸς τὸν δ. Ὡστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ὅπερ ἡ
 νομὴ συνδυάζει· κἂν οὕτω συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει.
 7 12 Ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν
 διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστὶ
 τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ
 13 δίκαιον ἀνάλογον. Καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν
 γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμ-
 βαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς
 14 ἐκάτερον. Ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ
 γίνεται εἰς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, φ' καὶ θ'. Τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον
 τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλογον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλο-
 γον. Γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλεόν, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον. Ὅπερ
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλεόν
 15 ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἐπὶ δὲ
 τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ
 16 ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μείζον κακόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ
 ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ δ' αἰ-
 (4)ρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μείζον. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν
 εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τὸ διορ-
 θωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς
 ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δίκαιον
 2 ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητι-

κὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν εἴαν γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὥνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δίκαιῳ τούτῳ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. Τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν. Οὐθέν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῇ, οἷδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ φαῖλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ δ' μὲν ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δ' ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν, ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. Ὡστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον ἢ ἰσοῖζειν πειρά- 4 ται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ, ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ, ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διηρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειράται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσαίνειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. Λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία, τὸ δὲ κέρδος. Ὡστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττωτος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεον, τὸ δ' ἐλάττω ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλεον, τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἐλάττω κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὥν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἱπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. Διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστής βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἐμψυχον καὶ, ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἐνικε μεσιδίους, ὡς εἴαν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δίκαιου τευ-

- 8 ξόμενοι. Μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικασ-
 τής. Ὁ δὲ δικαστής ἐπανισοί, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἀνι-
 σα τετμημένης, ᾧ τὸ μείζον τμήμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέ-
 χει, τοῦτ' ἀφείλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν.
 Ὅταν δὲ δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὰ αὐ-
 9 τῶν, ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. Τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς
 μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν.
 Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ
 10 ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστής διχαστής. Ἐπὺν
 γὰρ δύο ἴσων ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ
 προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφη-
 ρέθη μὲν, μὴ προστετέθη δὲ ἐνὶ αὐτῷ μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. Τοῦ
 11 μέσου ἄρα ἐνὶ, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη, ἐνὶ. Τοῦ-
 τῷ ἄρα γνωριούμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον
 ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι· ᾧ μὲν
 γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι δεῖ τῷ ἔλατ-
 τον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου.
 12 Ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ ΒΒ ΓΓ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ ἀφη-
 ρήσθω τὸ ΑΕ, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ' ὧν ΓΔ,
 ὥστε ὅλη ἡ ΔΓΓ τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ·
 τῆς ἄρα ΒΒ τῷ ΓΔ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν
 τοῦτο· ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ αὐτὰ, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ
 ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦ-
 13 τον καὶ τοιοῦτον. Ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα; ἢ τε
 ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ τῆς ἐκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ'
 ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι, οἶον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι
 καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος.
 14 Ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἄλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν
 γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε
 κερδαίνειν· ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δι-

κινῶν ἴσται τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρό-
τερον καὶ ὕστερον.

Δοκεῖ δὲ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἀπλῶς (5) 8
δίκαιον, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὁρίζοντο γὰρ
ἀπλῶς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῃ. Τὸ δ' ἀντι- 2
πεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διανεμητικὸν
δίκαιον, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν· καίτοι βούλονται γὰρ 3
τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ 'Ραδαμάνθυος δίκαιον'

εἴ κε πάθοι τὰ κ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεὺς γένετο.

πολλαχῶ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, 4
οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἀρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πλη-
γῆναι μόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. *Εἰ τὸ ἐκούσιον 5
καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολὺ. Ἄλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινω- 6
νίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον τὸ
ἀντιπεπονθὸς, κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα· τῷ
ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. *Ἢ γὰρ τὸ
κακῶς ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ. δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ
ἀντιποιήσῃ· ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται,
τῇ μετάδοσι δὲ συμμένουσιν. Διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν 7
ἐμποδῶν ποιῶνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις ᾗ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον
χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαί τε γὰρ δεῖ τῷ χαρισαμένῳ, 8
καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον. Ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντί-
δοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις,
οἷον οἰκοδύμος ἐφ' ᾧ Α, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ Β, οἰκία ἐφ'
ᾧ Γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ᾧ Δ. Δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκο-
δύμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν
ἐκείνῳ μεταδίδόμην τὸ αὐτοῦ. Ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ᾗ τὸ
κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, εἴτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται,
ἴσται τὸ λεγόμενον. Εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει

οὐθέν γὰρ καλύνει κρείττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ
9 θατέρου, δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει
τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο
καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἱατρῶν γίνε-
ται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἱατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ, καὶ ὅλως ἐτέ-
10 ρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι. Διὸ
πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγὴ. Ἐφ'
ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον· πάντα
γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν,
πόσα ἅττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκία ἢ τροφῇ. Δεῖ τοίνυν
ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς
οἰκίαν ἢ τροφήν. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ
οὐδὲ κοινωνία. Τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται.
11 Δεῖ ἄρα ἐνὶ τινὶ πάντα μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρό-
τερον. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἢ χρειᾷ, ἢ πάντα
συνέχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴθὲν δέοιντο ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσ-
ται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτῇ. Οἶον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς
χρειᾶς τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
τοῦνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμφ ἐστὶ,
12 καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. Ἔσται
δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς
σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ
γεωργοῦ. Εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν, ὅταν
ἀλλάξωνται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀμφοτέρας ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς
τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον. Ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν, οὕτως
ἴσοι καὶ κοιωνοὶ, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν
γίνεσθαι. Γεωργὸς Α, τροφὴ Γ, σκυτοτόμος Β, τὸ ἔργον
αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ. Εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπον-
13 θῆναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. Ὅτι δ' ἡ χρειᾷ συνέχει ὥσ-
περ ἐν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρειᾷ ὦσιν ἀλλήλων,

ἢ ἀμφοτέρωι ἢ ἑτέρωι, οὐκ ἀλλύττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν οὐ
ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἷον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτον ἐξαγω-
γῆς. Δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλού- 14
σης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται εἰάν δεθῇ,
τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἐγγυητῆς ἐστ' ἡμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέ-
ροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. Πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ·
οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἴσων δύναται· ὁμοίως δὲ βούλεται μῆναι μάλ-
λον. Διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἔσται
ἀλλαγή, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία. Τὸ δὲ νόμισμα ὥσπερ
μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῶσαν ἰσάζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ
οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, αὐτ' ἀλλαγὴ ἰσότητος μὴ
οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. Τῇ μὲν οὖν 15
ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα
γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τῇν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς. Ἐν δὲ
τι δεῖ εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα κα-
λεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιῇ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται
γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. Οἰκία Α, μυαὶ δεκα Β, κλίνη Γ.
Το δὲ Α τοῦ Β ἥμισυ, εἰ πέντε μυῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἡ ἴσων·
ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος τὸ Γ τοῦ Β· δῆλον τοίνυν πύ-
σαι κλίνει ἴσον οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι πέντε. Ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγή 16
ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ
κλίνει πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλίνει.

Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται. 17 9
διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐῴηλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μίσην
ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεον ἔχειν,
τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐστίν. Ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὐ
τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον ταῖς προτερον ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου
ἐστίν· ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. Καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη
ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαί-
ρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον
καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἑτερον, οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἵματος

- 18 πλέον αὐτῷ, ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τὸναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. Διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐστίν, ἐφ' αὐτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὑποτέρως ἔτυχεν. Τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ μείζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
- 19 Περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἐκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ
 10(6) καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἐκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτῃς ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ ληστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ἦ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως
 2 ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. Ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ' οὐκ ἐστίν, οἷον οὐδὲ κλέπτῃς, ἔκλεψε δὲ, οὐδὲ μοιχὸς, ἐμοί-
 3 χευσε δέ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον
 4 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν· ὥστε ὅσοις μή ἐστὶ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐστὶ τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. Ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς· νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. Ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις, ἐν

οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐκ πᾶσιν ἀδικία· ταῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλεον
 πύτφ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς
 κακῶν. Διὸ οὐκ ἐῷμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λό- 5
 γον, ὅτι ἐαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. Ἔστι δ'
 ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ
 ἴσου. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθέν αὐτῷ πλεον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δί- 6
 καιος· οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλεον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ
 μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ· καὶ
 διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην,
 καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. Μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτίος, γ
 τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτφ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα,
 οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. Τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ 8
 τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτοισ ἀλλ' ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν
 ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτήμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον,
 ὥς ἂν ἢ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ,
 αὐτὸν δ' αὐτεῖς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἐστὶν 9
 ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἀδικον οἷδὲ δίκαιον τὸ
 πολιτικόν· κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι
 νόμοι· οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ
 ἄρχεσθαι. Διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ
 πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκονομ-
 κὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ ταῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ. Τοῦ (7)
 δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ νομικόν,
 φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν, καὶ
 οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὔθεν δια-
 φέρει αὐτῶς ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶπται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ
 μῆλ' ἀνθρώπου θύειν ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα,
 ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν
 Βρασίδα, καὶ τα ψηφισματώδη. Δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι 2
 πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ
 τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν

- 3 Πέρσαις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ορωσιν. Τοῦτο
 δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς. Καίτοι παρά
 γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς· παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μὲν τι
 καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι πᾶν. Ἄλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ
 4 μὲν φύσει, τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. Ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδε-
 χομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὐ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν
 καὶ συνθήκη, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δῆλον. Καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ
 ἢ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεταιί τινες ἀμφιδεξίους γε-
 5 νέσθαι. Τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν
 δικαίων ὁμοιά ἐστι τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα
 τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω,
 οὐ δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ
 ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταῦτα πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ
 πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη.
 6 Τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὥς τὰ καθόλου
 πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα
 7 πολλὰ, ἐκείνων δ' ἕκαστον ἓν· καθόλου γάρ. Διαφέρει
 δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δί-
 καιον· ἄδικον μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· τὸ αὐτὸ
 δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχ-
 θῆναι, οὐπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα.
 Καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα
 δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος. Καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ
 αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἶδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει
 (8) ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. Ὅντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ
 ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ, ὅταν
 ἐκῶν τις αὐτὰ πράττη· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὔτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε
 δικαιοπραγεῖ ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέ-
 2 βηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους, πράττουσιν. Ἀδίκημα
 δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὄρισται τῷ ἐκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκου-

σίφ' ὅταν γὰρ ἐκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τοῦτ' ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν, ἀδίκημα δ' οὐπω, εἰν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῇ. Λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἂν τις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδῶς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ μήτε ὅν μήτε ᾗ μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα, οἷον τίνα τίπτει καὶ τίμι καὶ τίνος ἔνεκα, ἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βία, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτει ἕτερον, οὐχ ἰκῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. Ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκῃ, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν. Ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διαρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην. Τὸ δὲ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὅν, ἢ βία, ἀκούσιον· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθέν οὐθ' ἐκούσιον οὐτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. Ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίῃ τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν οὔτε δικαία πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν. Τῶν δὲ ἐκούσιων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν, τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσα ἀπροβούλευτα. Τριῶν δὲ οὕτων βλαβῶν θ τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἁμαρτημάτων ἐστίν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾗ μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βαλεῖν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα ᾤήθη, ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα ᾤήθη, οἷον οὐχ ὥς τρώσῃ ἀλλ' ὥς κενθήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὃν, ἢ οὐχ

- 7 ὥς. Ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύ-
 χημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἀμάρτημα·
 ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ τῆς αἰτίας,
 8 ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἐξωθεν. Ὅταν δὲ εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβου-
 λεύσας δὲ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα
 πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
 ποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι
 μὲν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πῶς ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα
 9 οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη· ὅταν δ'
 ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. Διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ
 θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ
 10 ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. Ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι
 ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινο-
 μένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. Οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς
 συναλλάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡν
 ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρὸν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ
 δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ
 τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. Ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύ-
 σας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ, ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ.
 11 ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ. Καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ'
 ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλο-
 γον ἢ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν
 προελύμενος δικαιοπραγῇ. Δικαιοπραγεῖ δὲ, ἂν μόνον
 12 ἐκὼν πράττῃ. Τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγγνωμο-
 νικά, τὰ δ' οὐ συγγνωμονικά· ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγ-
 νοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά,
 ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ
 μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.
- 11 (9) Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώριστα περὶ τοῦ
 ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐρι-
 πίδης εἶρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

μητέρα κατέκτα τὴν ἐμὴν, βραχὺς λόγος,
ἐκὼν ἐκούσαν, ἢ θέλουσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν·

πότερον γὰρ ὥς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὐ·
ἀλλ' ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον;
καὶ ἄρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν
ἐκούσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὁμοίως δὲ 2
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιουῖσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἐκού-
σιον, ὥστ' εὐλογον ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἐκάτερον τό-
τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ δικαιουῖσθαι ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον
εἶναι. Ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιουῖσθαι, εἰ
πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἐκόντες. Ἐπεὶ 3
καὶ τότε διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπον-
θὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ
τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπ'
ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων. Ὅμοίως δὲ
δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν τὸ τᾷδικο
πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικο πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσ-
θαι. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιουῖσ-
θαι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικούντος ἢ δικαιο-
οῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγούντος. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀδι- 4
κεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα τινὰ, τὸ δ' ἐκόντα εἰδύτα καὶ ὄν
καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὧς, ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἐκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτόν,
ἐκὼν τ' ἂν ἀδικοῖτο καὶ ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτόν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν.
Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν τι τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται
αὐτόν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν. Ἔτι ἐκὼν ἂν τις δι' ἀκρασίαν ὑπ' 5
ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἐκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἐκόντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι.
Ἡ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμὸς, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ βλάπτειν
εἰδύτα καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὧς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλη-
σιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἐκὼν καὶ τᾷδικο πάσχει, 6
ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς ἐκὼν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ
ἀκρατὴς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ

βούλεται οὐθείς ὃ μὴ οἶεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὃ τε ἀκρα-
 7 τῆς οὐχ ἃ οἶεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. Ὁ δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ
 διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὁμηρός φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ
 Διομήδει

χρύσεια χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων,

οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ δίδοναι, τὸ δ' ἀδι-
 κείσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν.

- 8 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον, δῆλον.
 12 Ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δύο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ'
 ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλείον ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ
 9 εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν· εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρό-
 τερον λεχθὲν, καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ
 πλέον, εἴ τις πλέον ἐτέρῳ ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἐκὼν,
 οὗτος αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ. Ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι
 ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. Ἡ οὐδὲ
 τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν; ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἐπλεο-
 νέκτει, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ. Ἔτι λύεται
 καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐθέν γὰρ παρὰ
 τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διὰ γε
 10 τοῦτο, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ
 ὅτι ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλέον ἔχων ἀεί-
 οὐ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ἀδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ἐκόντα
 τοῦτο ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἢ
 ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι.
 11 Ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ
 ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ
 12 ἀδικεῖ μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα. Ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρι-
 νεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον, οὐδ' ἄδικος ἢ
 κρίσις ἐστὶν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν
 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως,

πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. Ὡσπερ 13
 οὖν κἂν εἴ τις μερίσαιοτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα
 κρίνας ἀδίκως πλέον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων ὁ τὸν
 ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν, ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. Οἱ δ' 14 13
 ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, διὸ καὶ τὸ
 δίκαιον εἶναι ῥάδιον. Τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν
 γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι
 τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ῥάδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδὶ
 ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς.
 Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γινῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδέν 15
 οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ
 χαλεπὸν συνιέναι. Ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ'
 ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, ἀλλὰ πῶς πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς
 νεμόμενα δίκαια· τοῦτο δὲ πλέον ἔργον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ
 εἰδέναι, ἐπεὶ κακεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἐλλέβορον καὶ
 καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥάδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νεῖμαι
 πρὸς ὑγίειαν, καὶ τίνι, καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον
 ἱατρὸν εἶναι. Δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται 16
 εἶναι οὐθέν ἡττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐθέν ἡττον ὁ δίκαιος
 ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναται ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων·
 καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος
 τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ' ὅποτεραοῦν τρέ-
 χειν. Ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα
 ποιεῖν ἐστὶ, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδὶ ἔχοντα
 ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἱατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ
 τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμα-
 κεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδὶ. Ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τού- 17
 τοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερ-
 βολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν
 ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐθέν
 μόριον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα

βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρι τοῦ· διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.

- 14(10) Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν ἐπιεικεία πρὸς δικαιοσύνην, τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταῦτόν ἀπλῶς, οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπούμενοις· καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὅτε δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὃν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ 2 ἄλλο· ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταῦτόν ἐστιν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐθὲν ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου τινὸς ὃν βέλτιον ἔστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὃν βελτιόν ἐστὶ τοῦ δικαίου. Ταῦτόν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ἀμ- 3 φοῖν σπουδαῖοιν ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικὲς. Ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μὲν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δὲ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου. 4 Αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. Ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον. Καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἥττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη 5 ἐστίν. Ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν, ἐπανορθοῦν

τὸ ἐλλειφθὲν, ὃ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς οὕτως ἂν εἴποι
ἐκεῖ παρῶν, καὶ εἰ ᾗδαι, ἐνομοθετήσεν ἂν. Διὸ δίκαιον 6
μὲν ἔστι, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δέ,
ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος. Καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη
ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ᾗ ἐλλείπει
διὰ τὸ καθυλόν. Τοῦτο γὰρ αἶτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα
κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον,
ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. Τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος 7
καὶ ὁ κανὼν ἔστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς ὁ
μολίβδινος κανὼν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετα-
κινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανὼν, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ
πράγματα. Τί μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἐπεικὲς, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον, 8
καὶ τίνος βέλτιον δικαίου, δῆλον. Φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτου
καὶ ὁ ἐπεικὲς τίς ἔστιν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρε-
τικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖ-
ρον, ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικὸς, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν,
ἐπεικὲς ἔστι, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπεικεία, δικαιοσύνη τις
οὔσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.

Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὐ, φανερόν ἐκ (11) 15
τῶν εἰρημένων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ
πάνσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον σὺ κελεύει
ἀποκτινύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγο-
ρεῖ· ἔτι ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάβη μὴ ἀντιβλάβη 2
τῶν, ἐκῶν, ἀδικεῖ, ἐκῶν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ. Ὁ δὲ
δὲ ὕργην ἑαυτὸν σφάττων ἐκῶν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν
ἑρθὺν λόγον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. Ἀλλὰ 3
τινα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δ' οὐ; ἐκῶν γὰρ πάσχει,
ἀδικεῖται δ' οἵθεις ἐκῶν. Διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις ζημιῶι, καί
τις ἀτιμία πρύσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὥς τὴν
πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. Ἐτι καθ' ὃ ἀδικῶς ὁ μόνον ἀδικῶν καὶ 4
μὴ ὧς φαῖλος, οἷκ' ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτὸν. Τοῦτο

γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου. Ἔστι γὰρ πῶς ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω ποιη-
 ρὸς ὥσπερ ὁ δειλὸς, οὐχ ὥς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν,
 ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη
 ἀφηρῆσθαι καὶ προσκείσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύ-
 νατον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ
 5 τὸ ἄδικον. Ἔτι δὲ ἐκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ
 πρότερον. Ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν
 οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' ἑαυτὸν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ πύσ-
 6 χει καὶ ποιεῖ. Ἔτι εἴη ἂν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. Πρὸς δὲ
 τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων οὐθεὶς ἀδικεῖ,
 μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ τὸν ἑαυ-
 τοῦ τοίχον, οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. Ὅλως δὲ λύεται
 τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἐκου-
 7 σίως ἀδικεῖσθαι. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα,
 καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον,
 τὸ δὲ πλεόν ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου· καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν
 μὲν ἐν ἱατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ· ἀλλ' ὅμως
 χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ
 ψεκτὸν, καὶ κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ
 γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι
 8 ἄνευ κακίας καὶ ἀδικίας. Καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσ-
 θαι ἥττον φαῦλον, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐθὲν κωλύει μεί-
 ζον εἶναι κακόν. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευ-
 ρίτῳ λέγει μείζω νόσον προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ'
 ἂν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, εἰ προσπταίσαντα
 διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίῃ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι καὶ
 9 ἀποθανεῖν. Κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητά ἐστιν
 οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν· οὐ
 πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν· ἐν
 τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος
 τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον. Εἰς ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δο-

κεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτὸν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἐαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ τούτοις.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

Ζ.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ 1 μέσον αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἑλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν. Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καὶ τις ἔστιν ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξὺ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἑλλείψεως, οὕσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σα- 2 φές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἑλάττω δεῖ ποιεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἂν τις οὐθὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεισθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἱατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. Διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔξεις μὴ μόνον 3 ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὁρος.

Τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι 4 2 τοῦ ἡθους ἔφαμεν, τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπύοντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. Πρότερον μὲν ὅ

οὖν ἐλέχθη δὺ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον. Καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἐκάτερον πεφυκὸς, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἢ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. Λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικόν, τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταῦτον, οὐθεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. Ὡστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστὶν ἐν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. Ληπτέον ἄρ' ἐκατέρου τούτων τίς ἢ βελτίστη ἔξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρου, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον. Τρία δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἰσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις. Τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. Ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει διώξις καὶ φυγὴ· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἔξις προαιρετικῇ, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτικῇ, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι, τὴν δὲ διώκειν. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτικῇ. Τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τ' ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον, τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἡ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ. Πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις, ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα, προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος· διὸ οὗτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ

διανοίας, οὐτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἔξωθεν ἢ προαίρεσις·
 εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας
 καὶ ἡθους οὐκ ἔστιν. Διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' 5
 ἢ ἐνεκά του καὶ πρακτικῆ· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς
 ἄρχει· ἐνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος
 ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ τινὸς τὸ ποιητὸν, ἄλλὰ τὸ
 πρακτὺν· ἢ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἢ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου· διὸ
 ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἢ προαίρεσις, ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητικῇ, καὶ
 ἢ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐ- 6
 θὲν γεγονὸς, οἷον οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι·
 οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλευέται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ
 ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
 μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων

μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
 ἀγέννητα ποιεῖν ἄσπ' ἂν ᾗ πεπραγμένα.

Ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔρ-
 γον. Καθ' ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἔξεις ἀληθεύσει ἐκάτερον,
 αὐταὶ ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

Ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν, λέγωμεν. (3)
 Ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφά-
 ναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη,
 φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δύξῃ ἐνδέχε-
 ται διαψεύδεσθαι. Ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν 2
 φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς
 ὁμοιότησιν. Πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα,
 μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως,
 ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή.
 Ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. Αἰδῖον ἄρα· τὰ
 γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἀπλῶς πάντα αἰδῖα, τὰ δ' αἰδῖα

3 ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. Ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δο-
κεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητὸν. Ἐκ προγινωσκομέ-
νων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς
λέγομεν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἢ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. Ἡ
μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλ-
λογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. Εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ
συλλογισμὸς, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς· ἐπαγωγή ἄρα.

4 Ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτικὴ, καὶ ὅσα
ἄλλα προσδιορίζομεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γάρ
πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὧσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίστα-
ται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης
διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

(4) Τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ
2 πρακτὸν, ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πράξις· πιστεύομεν
δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. Ὡστε καὶ ἡ
μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου
ποιητικῆς ἕξεως. Διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχονται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων·
οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πράξις ποίησις, οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πράξις
3 ἐστίν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅπερ
ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχ-
νη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν,
οὔτε τοιαύτη ἢ οὐ τέχνη, ταῦτόν ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ
4 ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικῆς. Ἔστι δὲ τέχνη
πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν, καὶ θεωρεῖν
ὅπως ἂν γένηται τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ
εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ
ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων
ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ
5 ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πράξις
ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως

εἶναι. Καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ

τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου β ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ ἐστὶν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοῦναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλ- λως ἔχειν.

Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες (δ) τίνες λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. Δοκεῖ δὲ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ ἰσχὺν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ 2 τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη. Ὡστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. Βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς 3 περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πράξαι· ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων), οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ', ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. Λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτι- 4 κήν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. Διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ 5 τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτι-

- 3 Πέρσαις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. Τοῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς. Καίτοι παρὶ γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς· παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι πᾶν. Ἄλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ 4 μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. Ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὐ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκη, εἴπερ ὁμφῶ κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δῖλον. Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ ἢ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται τινες ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι. Τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν 5 δικαίων ὁμοιά ἐστι τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὐ δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταῦτα πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ 6 πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη.
- 6 Τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὥς τὸ καθύλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα 7 πολλὰ, ἐκείνων δ' ἕκαστον ἓν· καθύλου γάρ. Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὕτω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα. Καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος. Καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἶδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει 8 ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. Ὅντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ, ὅταν ἐκὼν τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὔτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέ- 2 βηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους, πράττουσιν. Ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ῥίσκεται τῷ ἐκονσίῳ καὶ ἀκον-

σίφ· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότ' ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν, ἀδίκημα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῇ. Λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον 3 μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἂν τις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ μήτε ὃν μήτε φ' μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνα καὶ τίνος ἔνεκα, κακίων ἑκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βίῃ, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτῃ ἕτερον, οὐχ ἰκῶν οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. Ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκῃ, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν. Ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἄλλην. Τὸ δὴ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὃν, ἢ βίῃ, ἀκούσιον· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὃν οὐθὲν οὐθ' ἐκούσιον οὐθ' ἀκούσιον ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. Ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίῃ τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν οὐτε δίκαια πράττειν οὐτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν. Τῶν δὲ 5 ἐκούσιων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν, τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλεύσασθαι, ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσα ἀπροβούλευτα. Τριῶν δὲ οὕτων βλαβῶν 6 τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτημάτων ἐστίν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε φ' μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βαλεῖν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα φήθῃ, ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα φήθῃ, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὃν, ἢ οὐχ

πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ
 5 κόσμος συνέστηκεν. Ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ
 σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ
 φύσει. Διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους
 σοφοὺς μὲν, φρονίμους δ' οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν
 ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέρονθ' ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ
 θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτοὺς φασιν,
 8 6 ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν. Ἡ
 δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βου-
 λεύσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον
 εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, βουλεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς
 περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι
 ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. Ὁ δ' ἀπλῶς εὐβουλος
 ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπου τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ
 7 τὸν λογισμόν. Οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου
 μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ
 γὰρ, ἡ δὲ πρῆξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι
 οἱ κ' εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδότες πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα
 κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσῃ ὑγι-
 εῖαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ,
 ποιήσῃ μᾶλλον. Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ· ὥστε δεῖ
 ἅμφω ἔχειν, ἡ ταύτην μᾶλλον. Εἴη δ' ἂν τις καὶ
 (8) ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ
 φρόνησις ἡ αὕτη μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταῦτόν
 2 αὐταῖς. Τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρό-
 νησις νομοθετικὴ, ἡ δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει
 ὄνομα, πολιτικὴ· αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτικὴ· τὸ
 γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. Διὸ πολιτεύεσ-
 θαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν· μόνοι γὰρ πράττουσιν
 3 οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις

μάλιστα εἶναι ἢ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἓνα. Καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· (ἐκείνων δὲ ἢ μὲν, οἰκονομία· ἢ δὲ, νομοθεσία· ἢ δὲ, πολιτική· καὶ ταύτης ἢ μὲν, βουλευτική, ἢ δὲ, δικαστική.) Εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώ- 4 θ
σεως τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν· καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρό-
νιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμυες· διὰ Εὐρι-
πίδης

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοῖην, ᾧ παρῇν ἀπραγμόνῃ
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖσι ἡριθμημένῳ στρατοῦ
ἴσους μετασχεῖν·
τοὺς γὰρ περισσοῦς καὶ τι πράσσοντας πλέον . .

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἶονται τοῦτο θεῖν
πράττειν. Ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τού-
τους φρονίμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶ-
πεν οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας. Ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ
πῶς θεῖ διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτικόν. Σημεῖον δ' ἔστι 5
τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νῆοι καὶ μαθη-
ματικὰ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρονιμος δ' οὐ
δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. Αἴτιον δ', ὅτι τῶν καθ' ἑκαστά ἐστίν ἡ
φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νῆος δ'
ἐμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν
ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν τις σκίψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθη- 6
ματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἂν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ.
Ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρίσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ
ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νῆοι, ἀλλὰ
λέγουσιν· τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστίν οὐκ ἄδηλον. Ἔτι ἢ 7
ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευέσασθαι ἢ περὶ
τὸ καθ' ἑκάστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα
ἔδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον. Ὅτι δ' ἢ φρό- 8

νησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, 9 ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. Ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἰσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον στήσεται γὰρ κακεῖ. Ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἰσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

- 10 (9) Τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. Δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα, ἢ 2 εὐστοχία, ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος. Ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία· ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἢ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα, βουλευέσθαι δὲ 3 βραδέως. Ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια. Οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἢ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἀμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἢ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης· ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία), δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισταί ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβουλία. Διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὕπω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, εἴαν τε εὖ εἴαν τε κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ 4 λογίζεται. Ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τις ἐστίν ἢ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλή ζητητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς

καὶ ὁ φαῦλος δὲ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξε-
ται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα
εἰληφώς. Δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τὸ εὖ βεβουλευσθαι·
ἢ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἢ ἀγαθοῦ τευκ-
τική. Ἄλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεὶς συλλογισμὸς δ
τυχεῖν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ
ψευδῇ τὸν μισον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οἱ δ' αὕτη πῶς εὐβου-
λία, καθ' ἣν οὐ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι' οὗ ἔδει.
Ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν, τὸν δὲ ταχύ. 6
Οὐκ αὖν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πῶς εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθότης ἢ κατὰ
τὸ ὠφελιμον, καὶ οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ὥς, καὶ ὅτε. Ἔτι ἔστι 7
καὶ ἀπλῶς εὖ βεβουλευσθαι, καὶ πρὸς τι τέλος. Ἡ μὲν
δὲ ἀπλῶς, ἢ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς καταρθούσα, ἢ δέ
τις, ἢ πρὸς τι τέλος. Εἰ δὲ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ
βεβουλευσθαι, ἢ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἢ κατὰ τὸ
συμφέρον πρὸς τι τέλος, οἷ ἢ φρόνησις ἀληθοῦς ὑπολη-
ψίς ἐστιν.

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ ἀσυνεσία, καθ' ἧς λέγο- (10, 11
μεν συνετοὺς καὶ ἀσυνέτους, οὗθ' ὅλως τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιστή-
μη ἢ ὁρμη (πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί) οὔτε τις μία
τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν,
ἢ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθους· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ ὄντων
καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσις ἐστίν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων
ὄντων, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπαρήσειεν ἂν τις καὶ βουλευ-
σαιτο. Διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ
ἔστι δὲ ταῦτόν σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις· ἢ μὲν γὰρ φρόνη- 2
σις ἐπιστακτική ἐστίν· τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μὴ, τὰ τέλας
αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἢ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον· ταῦτόν γάρ
σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι. Ἔστι 3
δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἢ σύ-
νεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μαθᾶν λέγεται συνίναι, ὅταν

χρήται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρησθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστίν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς ταῦ-
 4 τόν. Καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοῦνομα ἡ σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μαρθάνειν· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μαρ-
 θάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

(11) Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν εὐγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φαμέν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή. Ση-
 μείον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπεικῇ μάλιστα φαμεν εἶναι συγγνω-
 μονικὸν, καὶ ἐπεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἕνια συγγνώμην. Ἡ
 δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς ὀρθή.
 Ὅρθῃ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

12 2 Εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταῦτό τείνουσαι·
 λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν,
 ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη
 καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐ-
 ται τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐν μὲν
 τῷ κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ εὐ-
 γνώμων ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπεικῇ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 3 ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. Ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ'
 ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων πάντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν
 φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτὰ, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη
 4 περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. Καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχά-
 των ἐπ' ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὄρων καὶ τῶν
 ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀπο-
 δείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὄρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς
 πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας
 προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα αὐται· ἐκ τῶν καθ'
 5 ἕκαστα γὰρ τὸ καθόλου. Τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθησιν,
 αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. Διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα,
 καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδεὶς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν

καὶ νοῦν. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις αἰόμεθα ἀκο-
λουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὥς τῆς
φύσεως αἰτίας οὕσης. Διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῖς· ἐκ
τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων. Ὡστε δεῖ
προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων
ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φασεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἥττον τῶν
ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα
ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς.

Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ 7
τίνα ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς
μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται· διαπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις (12) 3
περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοι εἰσιν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν
θεωρεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων αἰθρῶπος (οἰδεμῶς γὰρ
ἐστὶ γενέσεως), ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ
τίνας ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ
τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπου, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν
ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὺς πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώ-
τεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἔξεῖς αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσιν,
ὥσπερ οἰδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικὰ, ὅσα μὴ τῷ
ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι λέγεται· οὐθεν γὰρ
πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν
ἐσμεν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον θετέον ἄλλα 2
τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθέν ἂν εἴη χρήσι-
μος, ἔτι δ' οὐδέ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐθέν γὰρ διοίσει αὐ-
τοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν
ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαί-
νειν ὁμῶς οὐ μανθάνομεν ἱατρικὴν. Προς δὲ τοῖς αἰσ- 3
πον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὕσα κυριώ-
τερα αὐτῆς ἔσται· ἡ γὰρ ποιούσα ἀρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει
περὶ ἕκαστον. Περὶ δὲ τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ
ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον. Πρώτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν 4

ὅτι καθ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετὰς γ' οὕσας ἐκατέραν ἐκπέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι δ μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. Ἐπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίεια, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὕσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχουσιν 6 ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. Ἐτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. Τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· οὐθέν γάρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθέν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. Ὡς περ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὕτω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκουσας, ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἢ δι' ἑτερόν τι, καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτὰ (καίτοι πράττουσιν γε ἃ δεῖ, καὶ ὅσα χρή τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὔτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν. λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν, καὶ αὐτῶν 8 ἔνεκα τῶν πραττομένων. Τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετὴ, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. 9 Δεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αἰτῶν. Ἔστι δὴ τις δύναμις, ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότης· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν. Ἄν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾗ καλὸς ἐπαινετὴ ἔστιν, ἂν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους 10 φημὲν εἶναι. Ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δεινότης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. Ἡ δ' ἔξις τῷ ὁμῶς τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς εἴρηται τε

καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιούδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἀριστον, ὅτιδήποτε ὂν· ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν. Τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. Ὡστε φανερον ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν. Σκεπτέον δὲ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ (13) ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὥς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα· οὐ ταύτην μὲν, ὁμοιον δέ· οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. Πῶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τάλλα ἔχομεν εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν· καὶ γὰρ παῖσι καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἔξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι. Πλὴν τοσούτου ἵσκειν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὀψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφαιλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει. Ἡ 2 δ' ἔξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ' ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετὴ. Ὡστε καθόπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡθικοῦ δύο ἐστὶ, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ, τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. Διόπερ τινὲς φασὶ πάσας τὰς 3 ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐξήτει, τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. Σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, 4 ὅταν ὁρίζονται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προσπιθίσαι τὴν ἔξιν, εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐστὶ, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. Ὑποκρίσας δὲ μαντεύεσθαι πως

ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ἀρετῆ ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρό-
 νησιν. Δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ κατὰ
 τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἔξις ἀρε-
 τῆ ἐστὶν. Ὁρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνη-
 σίς ἐστὶν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς φέρετο
 εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου.
 6 Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι
 κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς
 ἀρετῆς. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἂν, ὅτι διαλεχθείη
 τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐ-
 τὸς εὐφύεστατος πρὸς ἀπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη, τὴν δ'
 οὐπω εἰληφώς ἔσται· τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς
 ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἧς δὲ ἀπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθὸς, οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ οὔση πᾶσαι ὑπάρ-
 7 ξουσιν. Δῆλον δὲ, καὶ εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν
 αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται
 ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ
 μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος, ἡ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν.
 8 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτί-
 ονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγείας ἡ ἰατρική· οὐ γὰρ
 χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα
 ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη. Ἔτι ὁμοιον καὶ εἴ τις τὴν
 πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ
 πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

Η.

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, 1
ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἶδη, κακία, ἀκ-
ρασία, θηριότης. Τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ
μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν, τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν
θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἀν ἀρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς
ἀρετὴν, ἥρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ
Ἑκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν
ἀγαθός,

οὐδὲ ἐφ' ἑκείνῳ

ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάϊς ἔμμεναι, ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.

Ὡστ' εἰ, καθάπερ φασὶν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' 2
ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἀν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἢ τῇ θη-
ριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἔξισ· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου
ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἀρετὴ, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν τι-
μιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἢ δ' ἑτερόν τι γένος κακίας. Ἐπεὶ δὲ 3
σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες
εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του
(σεῖος ἀνὴρ φασιν), οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
ποις σπάνιος. Μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστὶν,
γίνεται δ' ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις· καὶ τοὺς
διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβύλλοντας οὕτως ἐπι-
δυσφημοῦμεν. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως 4
ὑστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται
πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς
λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ ὥς

περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἐκατέβραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὐθ' ὥς ἕτερον γένος. Δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα, καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας, οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰ πλείστα καὶ κυριώτατα· εἰ γὰρ λύηται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.

2 6 Δοκεῖ δὴ ἢ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν φαύλων τε καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα, πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς, εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. Καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῇ καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα, οἱ δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῇ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἱ δ' ἑτέρους εἶναι 7 φασιν. Τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὅτε μὲν οὐ φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῇ, ὅτε δ' ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινούς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. Ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους.

3 (2) Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεται τις. Ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὐ φασὶ τινες οἶόν τε εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὥς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὥς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, 2 ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δεῖον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας. Ὅτι

γὰρ οὐκ οἶταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος, πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει
γενέσθαι, φανερόν. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες, οἱ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦ- 3
σι, τὰ δ' οὐ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μὴθὲν εἶναι κρείττον
ὁμολογοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μὴθὲνα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δοῖαν βελ-
τιον οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν
οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλὰ
δοῖαν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶγε δοῖα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μὴδ' ἰσ- 4
χυρὰ ὑποληψίς ἢ ἀντιτείνουσα ἄλλ' ἡρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν
τοῖς διαταξάνσι, συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μινεῖν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς
ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυρίε· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ
τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. Φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντι- 5
τεινούσης· αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. Ἀλλ' ἄτοπον ἔσται
γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἄμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσεις δ' οἱδ'
ἂν εἶς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἐκόντα τὰ φαιλότατα.
Πρὸς δὲ τοῖτοις διδρακται πρῶτερον ὅτι πρακτικὸς γε ὁ
φρόνιμος· τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων
ἀρετας. Ἐτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ 6
φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατής, οὐδ'
ὁ ἐγκρατής σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρωνες, οὔτε
τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ
αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἢ κωλύουσα ἔστι μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν,
ὥσθ' ἡ ἐγκρατεία οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαία· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ
μὴ φαῖλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' εἰ φαῖλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς,
οὐθὲν μέγα. Ἐτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιῇ ἡ ἐγ- 7
κράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ
ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον
ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτολεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς
γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπέσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεως διὰ τὸ
λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος. Ἐτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ψευ- 8
δόμενος ἀπορία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παρὰδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγ-
χειν, ἵνα δεινὸν ᾖσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλ-

λογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὲν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθὲν, προΐεναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λύσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. Συμβαίνει δ' ἔκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετὰ ἀκρασίας ἀρετῇ· τὰναντία γὰρ πράττει ὢν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τὰγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τὰγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει. Ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεισθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδία καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἂν. Ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ἣ

11 φαμέν "ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγη, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο ἂ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· ἵν' οὖν δὲ πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἥττον ἄλλα πράττει. Ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμέν δ' εἶναι τινὰς ἀπλῶς.

- 4 12 Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ, τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις (3) τῆς ἀπορίας εὗρεσις ἐστίν. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες, εἴτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῇ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, ἢ περὶ τινὰς ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῇ καὶ τὸν καρτερικὸν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα 2 συγγενῇ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. Ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἃ, ἢ τῷ πῶς, ἔχοντες τὴν διαφορὰν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταῦτα εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡς, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ἢ οὐ· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ

πάντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπλῶς ἔχειν (ταῦτόν γάρ ἦν ἡ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὠδὶ ἔχειν. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, τομίζων αἰεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἢδὺ διώκειν 3 5 ὁ δ' οἷα οἶεται μὲν, διώκει δέ. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δοξαῖν ἀληθῆ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι παρ' ἡν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἐνιοὶ γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διατάξουσιν, ἀλλ' οἷονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. Εἰ 4 οὖν διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξαζόντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐδὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δοξης· ἐνιοὶ γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἥττον οἷε δοξαζουσιν, ἢ ἕτεροι οἷε ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπιστασθαι (καὶ 5 γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν, οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν, μὴ θεωροῦντα δε, ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οἷα εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. Ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφα- 6 τέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μίνοι τῇ καθύλου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι οὗτος ἀνθρώπος· ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οἷα ἔχει, ἢ οἷα ἐνεργεῖ. Κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηθεν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν· Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν 7 τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν, μὴ χρῆσθαι δε, διαφέρουσιν ὁρώμεν τὴν ἔξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ

οίνωμένον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πά-
 θεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ
 ἕνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν,
 ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως
 8 ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς
 λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ
 οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέ-
 γουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνεί-
 ρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὕπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦ-
 ναι, τούτῳ δὲ χρόνῳ δεῖ· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινο-
 μένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομέ-
 9 νους. Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἂν τις ἐπιβλέψειε τὴν
 αἰτίαν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν
 καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἰσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία
 γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φά-
 ναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εἰθὺς,
 οἶον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς
 ἔν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ
 10 κωλύόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. Ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν
 καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γένεσθαι, ἡ δὲ, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γλυκὺ
 ἡδὺ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχη δ' ἐπιθυμία
 ἐνοῦσα, ἡ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει·
 κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει
 ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ
 11 καθ' αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία
 ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα, τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῇ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου
 ὑπόληψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνή-
 12 μην. Πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια, καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστή-
 μων ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ
 καθεύδοντος, καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ

παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία 13
προτάσις δοῖα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πραξεῶν, ταύ-
την ἡ οὐκ ἔχει ἂν ἐν τῇ πάθει ὡς, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ
ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ λέγειν, ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμέ-
νος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μὴδ'
ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἰσχα-
τον ὄρον. Καὶ ὅμοιος δ' ἐξήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ 14
γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρουσίας
γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλεται διὰ τὸ παθος,
ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μὴ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέ- (4) 6
χεται ἀκρατεῦσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω· πρότερον δ' ἐστὶ
τις ἀπλῶς ἀκρατῆς, ἢ πάντες κατὰ μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι,
περὶ ποία ἐστὶ, λεκτίον ἐφεξῆς. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ
ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἱ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ
καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ 2
μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν
καθ' αὐτὰ, ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σω-
ματικά (λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τί τε περὶ τὴν τροφήν καὶ
τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωμα-
τικῶν, περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύ-
νην), τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐ, αἰρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτά (λέγω
δ' οἷον νίκην, τιμὴν, πλοῦτον, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν
ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων), τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν
ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβαλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ
λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρα-
τεις, καὶ κέρδους, καὶ τιμῆς, καὶ θυμοῦ, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ὥς
ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος
ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ
ἰδίου μικρῷ διάφερεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν. Σημεῖον
δὲ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψεύγεται, οὐχ ὥς ἀμωμία μόνον,

νησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. Ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῦν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ποῦς τῶν ὄρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λίγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἰσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἐσχάτον τρίγωνον στήσεται γὰρ κακεῖ. Ἄλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἰσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

- 10 (9) Τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. Δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας τί ἐστὶ, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα, ἢ 2 εὐστοχία, ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος. Ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δ' εὐβουλία βουλὴ τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία· ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἢ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχύ τὰ βουλευθέντα, βουλευέσθαι δὲ 3 βραδύως. Ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια. Οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἢ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἀμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἢ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὗτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε θυξῆς· ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία), θυξῆς δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὄριστα ἤδη πᾶν οὐ δοξα ἐστίν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβουλία. Διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὕτω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, εἴαν τε εὖ εἴαν τε κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ 4 λογίζεται. Ἄλλ' ὀρθότης τις ἐστίν ἢ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής

καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλύμμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἔδουκε μωραίνειν. Μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημίνον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἰρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὐτὰ φαῖλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβυλαί. Ὁ- 6 μοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκρασία· ἢ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν. Δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπιτιθέιντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἑκάστου λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν λατρῶν, καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτῆν, ὃν ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν κακόν· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἑκαστὴν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κακεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκαρίτειαν εἶναι, ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταῦτά τῃ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμὸν καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν διὸ καὶ προστιθέιντες ἀκρατῇ θυμοῦ, ὥσπερ τιμῇ καὶ κέρδους, φαμέν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἓνα μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ (5) μὲν ἀπλῶς, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζῶων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄθῃ γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα παραπλησίως ἰδεῖν ἔξεις. Λέγω δὲ τῆς 2 θηριώδεις, οἷον τὴν ἀνθρώπου, ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυούσας ἀνασχίζουσιν τὰ παῖδια κατεσθίειν, ἢ οἷοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίοις τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοῖς μὲν ὥμοις, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παῖδια δανίζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν, ἢ τὸ περὶ Φαλαριν λεγόμενον. Αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ τε νόσους γί- 3 νονται καὶ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγὼν, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου τὸ ἥπαρ. Αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τῖλσεις καὶ ὀνύ-

χων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθρώκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
 ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει,
 τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις
 4 ἐκ παιίδων. Ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν
 οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι
 οὐκ ὑπνίουσιν ἀλλ' ὕπνιονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς νο-
 5 σηματοδῶς ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα
 τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ
 θηριότης· τὸ δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι, οὐχ ἡ
 ἀπλῇ ἀκρασία, ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν
 περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους,
 ἀκρατῇ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. Πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ
 ἀφροσύνη, καὶ δειλία, καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ χαλεπότης, αἱ
 6 μὲν θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ νοσηματοδῶς εἰσὶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει
 τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδῃ
 δειλίαν δειλὸς, ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίδει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν
 ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθή-
 σει ζῶντες, θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἓνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρ-
 βάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικὰς, ἢ μανίας
 7 νοσηματοδῶς. Τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μό-
 νον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δὲ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν
 ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν, ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον
 8 ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον ἔχειν. Ὅσ-
 περ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρία ἢ μὲν κατ' ἀνθρώπον ἀπλῶς λέ-
 γεται μοχθηρία, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ
 νοσηματοδῆς, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι
 καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν θηριώδης, ἢ δὲ νοσηματοδῆς,
 ἀπλῶς δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη.
 7 9 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ
 ἄπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφοράν

καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, δῆλον· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἦττον αἰσχροὶ ἀκρασία (6)
 ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἢ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. Ἔοικε
 γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δὲ,
 καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ
 λεγόμενον ἐκθίουσιν, εἴτα ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως,
 καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψο-
 φήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ
 ταχυτήτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ'
 ἀκούσας, ὁρμῇ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἢ
 φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ', ὥσπερ
 συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν, χαλεπαί-
 νει δὴ εὐθύς· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, εἰ μόνον εἶπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ
 λόγος ἢ ἢ αἰσθησις, ὁρμῇ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. Ὡσθ'
 ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ.
 Αἰσχίων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου
 πως ἡττᾶται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου. Ἔτι 2
 ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμῃ ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν,
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ
 πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ
 ἢ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν
 μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα
 τύπτοι. “Καὶ γὰρ οὗτος” ἔφη “τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, κακείνος
 τὸν ἄνωθεν,” καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας “καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ”
 ἔφη, “ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν.” Καὶ ὁ
 ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς
 θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐν-
 ταῦθα. Ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. Ὁ μὲν οὖν 3
 θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμὸς, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἢ
 δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φισίν· δολοπλόκου
 γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς· καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὀμηροῦ·
 πάρφασις, ἢ τ' ἐκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντις.

- ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχύων ἢ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς
 περὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία πως.
- 4 Ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς
 ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. Εἰ οὖν
 οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ
 ἀκρασία ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις.
- 5 Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχύων ἢ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς
 περὶ τὸν θυμὸν, καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία
- 6 περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικὰς, δῆλον. Αὐτῶν δὲ
 τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον. Ὡς περ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ'
 ἀρχὰς, αἱ μὲν ἀνθρωπικαὶ εἰσι καὶ φυσικαί, καὶ τῷ γένει
 καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ
 νοσήματα. Τούτων δὲ περὶ τῆς πρώτης σωφροσύνης
 καὶ ἀκολασίας μόνον ἐστὶν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρο-
 νι οὔτ' ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφοράν,
 καὶ εἴ τινα ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν
 ζώων ὕβρι καὶ σιναμωρία καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ
 γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμὸν, ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς
- 7 φύσεως, ὥς περ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Ἐλαττον
 δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται
 τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥς περ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει.
 Ὅμοιον οὖν ὥς περ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον,
 πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἢ φαυλότης αἰεὶ ἢ τοῦ
 μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. Παραπλήσιον οὖν
 τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἀδικον· ἔστι γὰρ
 ὡς ἐκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν
 ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.
- 8 (7) Περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας
 καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγὰς, περὶ ἧς ἢ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ
 σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν,
 ὥστε ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρα-

τείν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἤττους· τούτων δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ
 ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μα-
 λακός, ὁ δὲ καρτερικός. Μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείσ-
 των ἔξις, καὶ εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χεῖρους.
 Ἐπεὶ δ' εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν, αἱ δ' οὐδ, καὶ 2
 μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὐ, οὐδ' οἱ ἐλλείψεις,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς
 ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων, ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς ἢ διὰ
 προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαίνον,
 ἀκύλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τούτων μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν,
 ὥστ' ἀνίστατο· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμελητος ἀνίστατο. Ὁ δ' ἐλ-
 λείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. Ὅμοίως
 δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας, μὴ δι' ἤτταν,
 ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν. Τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν 3
 ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην
 τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων.
 Παντὶ δ' ἂν δοξοίεν χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ
 ἡμέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφύδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ
 μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι, ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν
 ἐποίει ἐν παθεῖ ὧν; διὸ ὁ ἀκύλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρα-
 τοῦς. Τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον,
 ὁ δ' ἀκύλαστος· Ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρα- 4
 τής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν
 ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἢ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν,
 ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡτ-
 τῆσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἰρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρ-
 τερίας ἐστίν. Ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς δ' οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀν- 5
 τιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, αὐτοὶ μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ
 γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τις ἐστίν· ὅς τ' ἔλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα
 μὴ παύσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος
 τὸν καίμνοντα οὐκ οἶεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίος ὁμοίως ὧν.

- λογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὲν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθὲν, προΐεναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λύσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. Συμβαίνει δ' ἔκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετὰ ἀκρασίας ἀρετῇ· τὰναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τὰγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τὰγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει. Ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεισθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἂν. Ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ἣ
- 11 φαμέν "ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγη, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο ἂ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἤττον ἄλλα πράττει. Ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμέν δ' εἶναί τινας ἀπλῶς.
- 4 12 Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ, τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις (3) τῆς ἀπορίας εὗρεσίς ἐστιν. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες, εἴτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῇ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, ἢ περὶ τινας ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῇ καὶ τὸν καρτερικὸν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα 2 συγγενῇ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. Ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἃ, ἢ τῷ πῶς, ἔχοντες τὴν διαφορὰν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὧς, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ἢ οὐ· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ

πάντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκούσ-
τος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπλῶς ἔχειν (ταῦτόν γάρ ἦν ἡ
τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὠδὶ ἔχειν. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται
προαιρούμενος, νομίζων αἰεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἢδὲ διώκειν 3 5
ὁ δ' οὐκ οἶεται μὲν, διώκει δέ. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν
ἐληθῆ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται,
οὐθέν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόν-
των οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἷονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. Εἰ 4
οὖν διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξαζόντες μᾶλλον τῶν
ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πραξουσιν, οὐθέν δι-
οίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἥττον
οἷς δοξαζουσιν, ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡρά-
κλειτος. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ 5
γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν, οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, καὶ ὁ
χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν, μὴ
θεωροῦντα δέ, ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεω-
ροῦντα· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν.
Ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφη- 6
τέρας οὐθέν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώ-
μενον μὲντοι τῇ καθόλου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακ-
τὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ καθόλου· τὸ
μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, οἷον
ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι οὗτος ἄν-
θρωπος· ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ
οὐκ ἔχει, ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. Κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει
τοῖς τρόποις ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰ-
δέναι μὴδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν. Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν 7
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρ-
χει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν, μὴ χρῆσθαι
δε, διαφέρονσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἔξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως
καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ

οἰνωμένον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πά-
 θεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ
 ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν,
 ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως
 8 ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς
 λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ
 οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέ-
 γουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνεί-
 ρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὐπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦ-
 ναι, τούτῳ δὲ χρόνῳ δεῖ· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινο-
 μένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομέ-
 9 νους. Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἂν τις ἐπιβλέψειε τὴν
 αἰτίαν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἥ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν
 καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία
 γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φά-
 ναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εἰθὺς,
 οἶον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς
 10 ἔν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ
 κωλυόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. Ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν
 καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γένεσθαι, ἡ δὲ, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γλυκὺ
 ἡδὺ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχῃ δ' ἐπιθυμία
 ἐνοῦσα, ἡ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει·
 κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύνатаι τῶν μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει
 ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δύξεως ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ
 11 καθ' αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία
 ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα, τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῇ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου
 ὑπόληψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνή-
 12 μην. Πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια, καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστή-
 μων ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ
 καθεύδοντος, καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ

παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία 13
πρότασις δοξᾷ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύ-
την ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ὁ ἐν τῇ πάθει ὢν, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὥς οὐκ
ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ λέγειν, ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμέ-
νος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλείους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθύλου μὴδ'
ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δεκτὸν τῷ καθύλου τὸν ἰσχα-
τον ὄρον. Καὶ ἔοικεν δ' ἐξήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν οὐ 14
γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης
γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλεται διὰ τὸ πάθος,
ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδῶτα καὶ μὴ, καὶ πῶς εἰδῶτα ἐνδέ- (4) 6
χεται ἀκρατεῦσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω· πότερον δ' ἐστὶ
τις ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής, ἢ πάντες κατὰ μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι,
περὶ ποιά ἐστι, λεκτίον ἐφεξῆς. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ
ἡδονῶν καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν αἱ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ
καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοὶ, φανερόν· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ 2
μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιοούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν
καθ' αὐτὰ, ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σω-
ματικά (λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὰ τε περὶ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ
τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωμα-
τικῶν, περὶ δ' τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύ-
νην), τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐ, αἰρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ (λέγω
δ' οἷον νίκην, τιμὴν, πλοῦτον, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν
ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων), τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν
ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ
λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὰ χρημάτων ἀκρα-
τεῖς, καὶ κέρδους, καὶ τιμῆς, καὶ θυμοῦ, ἀπλῶς δ' αὖ, ὡς
ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος
ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ
ιδίου μικρῶς διέφερεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν. Σημεῖον
δὲ ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψεύγεται, οὐχ ὡς ἀμαρτία μόνον,

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις, ἢ ἀπλῶς οὐσα, ἢ κατὰ τι μέρος,
 3 τούτων δ' οὐθείς. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύ-
 σεις, περὶ ἧς λέγομεν τὸν σῶφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ
 τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς
 καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας
 καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἀφῆν καὶ γεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ
 παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται,
 οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τὰδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ'
 4 ἀπλῶς μόνον. Σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται
 περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεμίαν. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτ'
 εἰς ταῦτόν τὸν ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν, καὶ
 ἐγκρατῇ καὶ σῶφρονα, (ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα,) διὰ τὸ
 περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι· οἱ δ' εἰσὶ
 μὲν περὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν
 προαιροῦνται, οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. Διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκό-
 λαστον ἂν εἵπομεν, ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα διώκει
 τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον,
 ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιή-
 σειεν, εἰ προσγένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανικῇ, καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν
 5 ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν
 καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπου-
 δαίων· (τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἰρετά) τὰ δ' ἐναν-
 τία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον,
 οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ· πρὸς ἅπαντα
 δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιωῦτα, καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ, οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ
 ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πως ὑπερβάλ-
 λειν. Διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται, ἢ
 διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ
 τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες, ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ
 γονεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ
 περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες· ἀλλ' ὁμῶς ἔστι τις ὑπερβολή

καὶ ἐν ταύτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτα καὶ πρός
τοὺς θεοὺς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλού-
μενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραίνειν.
Μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρη-
μενον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἵρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὐτό·
φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. Ὅ· 6
μοίως δὲ οἱδὲ ἀκρασία· ἢ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκ-
τόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν. Δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ
παθους προσεπιτιθεντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἐκάστου
λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν ἱατρόν, καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτὴν, ὃν
ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν κακόν· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῖθα,
διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλο-
γον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κακεῖ ὑποληπτέον μοιην
ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι, ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταῦτά τῇ
σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμὸν καθ' ὁμοι-
τητα λεγόμεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθεντες ἀκρατῇ θυμοῦ,
ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους, φημέν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἓν μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ (5)
μὲν ἀπλῶς, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τὰ
δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις, τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθνη
γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τού-
των ἕκαστα παραπλησίως ἰδεῖν ἔξεις. Λέγω δὲ τὰς 2
θηριώδεις, οἷον τὴν ἀνθρωπον, ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυούσας
ἀνασχίζουσιν τὰ παιδία κατεσθίειν, ἢ οἷοις χαίρειν φα-
σὶν ἐνίοις τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν
ῥαυτοὺς, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέαςιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία
δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν, ἢ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λε-
γόμενον. Αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ τε νόσους γί- 3
νονται καὶ μανίας ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ δὲ τὴν μητέρα καθιερέ-
σας καὶ φαγῶν, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδοίλου τὸ ἥπαρ. Αἱ δὲ
νυσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύ-

χων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθρώκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
 ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει,
 τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις
 4 ἐκ παίδων. Ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν
 οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι
 οὐκ ὑπνίουσιν ἀλλ' ὕπνιονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς νο-
 5 σηματοδῶς ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα
 τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ
 θηριότης· τὸ δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι, οὐχ ἡ
 ἀπλῇ ἀκρασία, ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν
 περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους,
 ἀκρατῇ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. Πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ
 ἀφροσύνη, καὶ δειλία, καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ χαλεπότης, αἱ
 6 μὲν θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ νοσηματοδῆς εἰσὶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει
 τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κὰν ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδῃ
 δειλίαν δειλὸς, ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν
 ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθή-
 σει ζῶντες, θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἓνα γένος τῶν πόρρω βαρ-
 βάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικὰς, ἢ μανίας
 7 νοσηματοδῆς. Τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινα ἐνίοτε μό-
 νον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δὲ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν
 ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν, ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον
 8 ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον ἔχειν. Ὅσ-
 περ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρία ἢ μὲν κατ' ἀνθρώπον ἀπλῶς λέ-
 γεται μοχθηρία, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ
 νοσηματοδῆς, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι
 καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν θηριώδης, ἢ δὲ νοσηματοδῆς,
 ἀπλῶς δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη.
 7 9 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ
 ἄπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφοράν

καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, δῆλον· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἦττον αἰσχροὶ ἀκρασία (6)
 ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. Ἐοικε
 γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δὲ,
 καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ
 λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν, εἶτα ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως,
 καὶ οἱ κύντες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψο-
 φήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ
 ταχυτήτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ'
 ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ
 φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ', ὥσπερ
 συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν, χαλεπαί-
 νει δὴ εὐθύς· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, εἰ μόνον εἶπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ
 λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. Ὡσθ'
 ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ.
 Αἰσχίῳ οὖν ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου
 πως ἡττᾶται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου. Ἐτι 2
 ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμῃ ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν,
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ
 πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ
 ἢ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν
 μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα
 τύπτοι. “Καὶ γὰρ οὗτος” ἔφη “τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, κακείνος
 τὸν ἄνωθεν,” καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας “καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ”
 ἔφη, “ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν.” Καὶ ὁ
 ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς
 θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐν-
 ταῦθα. Ἐτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. Ὁ μὲν οὖν 3
 θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμὸς, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἢ
 δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φισίν· δολοπλόκου
 γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς· καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος·

πάρφασις, ἢ τ' ἐκλεψε νόοι· πύκα περ φρονέοντις.

ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχύων ἢ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς
 περὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία πως.
 4 Ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς
 ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. Εἰ οὖν
 οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ
 ἀκρασία ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις.
 5 Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχύων ἢ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς
 περὶ τὸν θυμὸν, καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία
 6 περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικὰς, δῆλον. Αὐτῶν δὲ
 τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον. Ὡς περ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ'
 ἀρχὰς, αἱ μὲν ἀνθρωπικαὶ εἰσι καὶ φυσικαί, καὶ τῷ γένει
 καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ
 νοσήματα. Τούτων δὲ περὶ τῆς πρώτης σωφροσύνης
 καὶ ἀκολασίας μόνον ἐστὶν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρο-
 νι οὔτ' ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν,
 καὶ εἴ τιτι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν
 ζώων ὕβρι καὶ σιναμωρία καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ
 γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμὸν, ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς
 7 φύσεως, ὥς περ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Ἐλαττον
 δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται
 τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥς περ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει.
 Ὅμοιον οὖν ὥς περ αἴψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἑμψυχον,
 πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἢ φαυλότης αἰεὶ ἢ τοῦ
 μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. Παραπλήσιον οὖν
 τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἀδικον· ἔστι γὰρ
 ὡς ἐκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν
 ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.

- 8 (7) Περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας
 καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγὰς, περὶ ἧς ἢ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ
 σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν,
 ὥστε ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρα-

τείν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἤττους· τοῦτων δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ
 ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μα-
 λακός, ὁ δὲ καρτερικός. Μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείσ-
 των ἔξις, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χεῖρους.
 Ἐπεὶ δ' εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν, αἱ δ' οὐ, καὶ 2
 μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὐ, αὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς
 ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδίων, ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς ἢ διὰ
 προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον,
 ἀκύλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν,
 ὥστ' ἀνιάτος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμελητος ἀνιάτος. Ὁ δ' ἐλ-
 λείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σωφρων. Ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας, μὴ δι' ἤτταν,
 ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν. Τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν 3
 ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην
 τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων.
 Παντὶ δ' ἂν δοξείε χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ
 ἡρέμα πράττει τι αἰσχροῦ, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ
 μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτει, ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν
 ἐπαίει ἐν πυθεί ὦν; διὸ ὁ ἀκύλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρα-
 τοῦς. Τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον,
 ὁ δ' ἀκύλαστος. Ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρα- 4
 τής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν
 ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντεχεῖν, ἢ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν.
 ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡ-
 τῶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἰρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρ-
 τερίας ἐστίν. Ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς δ' οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀν- 5
 τιτείνουσιν καὶ δύνανται, οἷτος μαλακός καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ
 γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τις ἐστίν· δεῖ ἔλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα
 μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος
 τὸν καμνοντα οἷα οἶεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ὑθλίφ' ὁμοιος ὧν.

6 Ὅμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμαστὸν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμοικὸν, εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος, ἢ ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους, ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν.

7 Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός· ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσις ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν. Ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια, τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια· οἱ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι γὰρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προῖδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμόν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὐτ' ἂν ἡδὺ ᾖ, οὐτ' ἂν λυπηρόν· μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῇ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

- ι) (8) Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικός· διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνίατος, ὁ δ' ἰατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς, ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς, ἡ δ' οὐ

συνεχῆς πονηρία. Καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρα-
 σίας καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία
 οὐ λανθάνει. (Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ 2
 ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ' ἐλάτ-
 τονος γὰρ πάθους ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι,
 ὥσπερ ἄγεροι·) ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐστὶ τοῖς ταχὺ
 μεθυσκομένοις, καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου αἵνου, καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ
 ὡς οἱ πολλοί. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἢ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, 3
 φανερόν. Ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν,
 τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐστίν. Οὐ μὲν ἄλλ' ὁμοίον γε
 κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους
 "Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσι δ' ὅλκιπερ οἱ
 ἀξύνετοι." Καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἀδικοὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδι-
 κοῖσι δέ. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἶος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖ- 4
 σθαι διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
 λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος
 εἶναι οἶος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος,
 ὁ δ' οὐ· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχήν, ἡ μὲν
 φθείρει, ἡ δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὐ πνεκα
 ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· αὐτὴ
 δὲ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν, οὔτε ἐνταῦθα,
 ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν
 ἀρχήν. Σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναν-
 τίος. Ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν 5
 λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον,
 κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἶον πεπεῖσθαι
 διώκειν ἀνίδην δεινὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός
 ἐστὶν ὁ ἀκρατὴς, βελτίων τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἀπ-
 λῶς· σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή. Ἄλλος δ' ἐναν-
 τίος, ὁ ἐμμεντικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διὰ γε τὸ πάθος. Φα-
 νερόν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία ἔξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.

- 10 (9)** Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατὴς ἐστὶν ὁ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὁποιοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων, ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς δὲ ὁ ὁποιοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ, ἢ ὁ τῷ ψευδεὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ ἡπορήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιοῦν, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τυδὶ αἰρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἰρεῖται, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. Ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιοῦν δόξῃ ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει, ὁ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ τῇ
- 2** ἀληθεῖ. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες καὶ ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἷον δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἱ ὅμοιον μὲν τι ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ, καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει, ὁ ἐγκρατὴς, ἐπεὶ εὐπείστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατὴς· ὁ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν
- 3** ἡδονῶν. Εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες, καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς, καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες, εἴαν μὴ μεταπείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται, εἴαν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ εἰκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγ-
- 4** κρατεῖ. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλείους ὁ Νεοπτόλεμος. Καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αἰτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπείσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύος ψεύδεσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονὴν τι πράττων οὗτ' ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε φαῦλος, οὗτ' ἀκρατὴς, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχροῦ.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἦττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς 5 11
σωματικοῖς χαίρων, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ ἢ τοιοῦ-
τος, τοῦτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατὴς· ὁ μὲν
γὰρ ἀκρατὴς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι,
οὗτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἥττον τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ἐμμένει καὶ
οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει. Δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγαράτεια
σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέρως τῆς ἐναντίας ἔξεις φαύλας εἶναι,
ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐτέραν ἐν ὀλί-
γοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ
ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκρά-
τεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγε- 6
ται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκρίτεια ἡ τοῦ σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἡκο-
λασίθηκεν· ὁ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον
διὰ τας σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὁ
μὲν ἔχων, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων φαίλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν
τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἡδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος
ἡδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι. Ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ 7
ὁ ἀκολαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες, ἀμφοτέροι δὲ τὰ σωματι-
κὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ'
οὐκ οἰόμενος. Οὐδ' ἄμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατὴ ἐνδέχεται (10)
εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ἄμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ
ἥθος δέδεικται ὢν. Ἐτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος, 2
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικόν· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός.
Τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οἰδέν κωλύει ἀκρατὴ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦ-
σιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναί τινες, ἀκρατεῖς δὲ, διὰ τὸ
τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον
τρόπον ἐν ταῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον
ἐγγὺς εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. Οὐδὲ δὴ 3
ὥς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ' ὥς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος.
Καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν (τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ
ἐνεκῇ), πονηρὸς δ' οὐ· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ'

ἡμιπόνηρος. Καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικός οἷς ἂν βουλευέσῃται, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός οὐδὲ βουλευτικός ὅλως. Καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἢ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα, καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν

ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ἥ νόμων οὐδέν μέλει·

ἡ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένη μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένη. Ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλ-
λον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἥττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. Εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δὲ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμού ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾶον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινήσῃ φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπὸν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐηνος λέγει

φημί πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δὴ ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

5 Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρ-
τερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται
12(11) πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται. Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεω-
ρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ
τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν
2 κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς λέγομεν. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν
ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρε-
τὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονῶν
ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλείστοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς
εἶναί φασιν, διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ

χαίρειν. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, 3
οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ, οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι
ταῦτόν ἀγαθόν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔναιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ
πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. Ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι
ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν.
Ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐσ- 4
τιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητῇ, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενῆς τοῖς
τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία. Ἔτι ὁ σώ-
φρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. Ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ πλυπον
διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. Ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί,
καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τὴν τῶν ἀφροδι-
σίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαί τι ἐν αὐτῇ. Ἔτι
τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον.
Ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς. Τοῦ δὲ μὴ πύ- 5
σας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι,
καὶ ἔτι βλαβεραί· νοσώδη γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων. Ὅτι δ'
οὐκ ἄριστον ἢ ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος, ἀλλὰ γένεσις.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ὅτι δ' οὐ (12) 13
συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον,
ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ
μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ τινί,) καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἔξεις
ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ
αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ δ' οὐ
ἀλλ' αἴρεται τῷδε, ἔναιαι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ
ὀλίγον χρόνον, αἴρεται δ' οὐ· αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ
φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἔνεκεν, οἷον
αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. Ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέρ- 2
γεια, τὸ δ' ἔξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς
τὴν φυσικὴν ἔξιν ἡδεῖαι εἰσὶν. Ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν
ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἔξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ
καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ

θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ χαίρουσιν ἡδεῖ ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ, οὔθ' ἀπλῶς ἡδύ. Ὡστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὥς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλληλα συνέστηκεν, οὕτω
3 καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. Ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν, οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. Διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπύδιστον. Δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἷονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον.
4 Τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας, ὅτι νυσώδη ἔνια ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν. Ταύτη οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ
5 θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν. Ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσκει, οὔθ' ἔξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἢ ἀφ' ἐκάστης ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μαρθάνειν
6 μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μαρθάνειν. Τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψο-
7 ποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ τὸν σῶφρονι φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδιὰ καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα.

Ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ
 πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παῖδια
 διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυσίαν ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ'
 ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς (τοιαῦται γὰρ
 αὐταὶ) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολὰς, καθ' ὧς ὁ ἀκόλαστος.
 Διὸ δ' σῶφρων φεύγει ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ
 σώφρωνος.

Ἀλλὰ μὲν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ (13) 14
 φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πᾶσι ἐμποδισ-
 τική. Τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον, ἢ φευκτόν τε καὶ 9. 10
 κακόν, ἀγαθόν. Ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὴν τι εἶναι.
 Ὡς γὰρ Σπέρσιππος ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσ-
 περ τὸ μείζον τῷ ἐλάττω καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ
 ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. Ἀριστόν τ' 2
 οὐδέν κωλύει ἡδονὴν τινα εἶναι, εἰ εἶναι φαίλιμ ἡδοται,
 ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. Ἰσως
 δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἐκάστης ἑξέως εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι
 ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργεια ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία,
 εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ἢ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἰρετωτάτην εἶ-
 ναι· ταῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. Ὡστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ
 ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν,
 ἀπλῶς. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἶον-
 ται βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν, εὐλόγως· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τελείως ἐμποδι-
 ζομένη, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ
 εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῇ
 τύχῃ, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζεται ταῦτα. Οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζό- 3
 μενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαί-
 μονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἔαν ἢ ἀγαθὸς, ἢ ἐκάντες ἢ ἄκοντες
 οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. Διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης 4
 δοκεῖ τισὶ ταῦτόν εἶναι ἢ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ

οὔσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπύδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. Καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημείον τι τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν·

φήμη δ' οὐτι γε πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦν τινα λαοὶ πολλοί.

- 6 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις, οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη, οὔτ' ἔστιν, οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. Ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἦν οἶονται οὐδ' ἦν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν. Πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. Ἄλλ' εἰλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκως τε παραβιάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας
7 οἶονται εἶναι. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαιμόνα· τίς γὰρ ἔνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ, οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ λύπη, εἴπερ μὴδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.
- (14) Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔναιά γε ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ σφύδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαί, καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ ἀκόλαστος.
2 Διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ἐναντίαι λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. Ἡ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ἢ μέχρι τοῦ ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων μὴ ἐστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων δ' ἔστι, καὶ τῆς ἡδο-

νῆς ἔστιν. Τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἴστιν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῖλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσιν πως καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ὀφρυδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς δεῖ. Ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὕλως· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία, ἀλλ' ἡ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθές εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ 3 15 αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν· ὅταν γὰρ εἰλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθές οὐκ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον ὥστε λεκτίον διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἰρετώτεραι. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὴ, ὅτι ἐκκροῖται τὴν λύπην 4 καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὥς οὖσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβύλλονσαν, καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικὴν. Σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατρείαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι. Καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεως εἰσι πράξεις, ἡ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἡ δὲ ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων. Αἱ δ' ἰατρείαι, ὅτι ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι. Αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελευτουμένων κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν σπουδαῖαι. Ἐτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφο- 5 δραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δίψας τινας παρασκευάζουσιν. Ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαίλον· οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἑφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρόν διὰ τὴν φύσιν· αἶψά γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσικοὶ λόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθειε ἰσμέν, ὥς φασίν. Ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι 6

διὰ τὴν αὐξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἢ νεότης. Οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν αἰεὶ δέονται ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν. Ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχούσα, ἐὰν ἢ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται. Αἱ δ' 7
 ἄνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν. Αὗται δὲ αἱ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρούοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρούεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένουτος ὑγιоῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν 8
 τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως. Οὐκ αἰεὶ δ' οὐθέν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλὴν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναι τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτὰ, ὥστε ἂν τι θάτερον πράττη, τοῦτο τῇ ἐτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ, οὔθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἢ φύσις ἀπλὴ εἴη, αἰεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. Διὸ ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιας, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. Μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρὸς, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἢ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλὴ οὐδ' ἐπι-
 εικής.

9 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.

Θ.

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι 1
 γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς
 τὸν βίον· ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἔλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων
 τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς
 καὶ θυσιασθείας κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστα εἶναι
 χρεια· τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας, ἀφαιρεθεί-
 σης εὐεργεσίας, ἢ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη
 πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθεῖ καὶ σώζοιτ' ἄνευ φί-
 λων; ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτῳ ἐπισφαλεστέρα. Ἐν 2
 πενίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην οἶονται κα-
 ταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. Καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀνα-
 μάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεί-
 πον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοηθεῖ, τοῖς τ' ἐν ὑκμῇ
 πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις·

σύν τε δὲ ἐρχομένῳ·

καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πράξαι δυνατότεροι. Φύσει τ' ἐν- 3
 πάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ
 πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων, καὶ
 τοῖς ὁμοεθνεῖσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
 ποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. Ἴδοι δ' ἂν
 τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις, ὥς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀν-
 θρώπῳ καὶ φίλον. Ἐοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἢ 4
 φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ
 τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἢ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοίον τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν

εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται, καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν. Καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.
 5 Οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἥ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἐν τι εἶναι, καὶ ἔνιοι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.

2 6 Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν, καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους, ὅθεν τὸν ὁμοῖόν φασιν ὡς τὸν ὁμοιον, καὶ κολιοῖον ποτὶ κολιοῖον, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κεραιμεῖς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλοις φασὶν εἶναι. Καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν εἰς γαῖαν, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον, καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι.

7 Τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)· ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ, καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἡθῆ καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία, ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν ἢ πλείω. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπιστεύκασι σημείῳ. Δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. Εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.

(2) Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ φι-

λητὸν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν, ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον. Δό-
 ξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι, δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ
 ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τὰγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς
 τέλη. Πότερον οὖν τὰγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν, ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγα- 2
 θόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ εἰς ὅτε ταῦτα. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ
 τὸ ἡδύ. Δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ
 εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰγαθὸν φιλητὸν, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ ἐκάσ-
 τω. Φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
 φαινόμενον. Διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν
 φαινόμενον. Τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ 3
 τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν
 ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων ἀγαθοῦ· γελοῖον γὰρ
 ἴσως τῷ οὐκ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ· ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σώζεσθαι
 βούλεται αὐτὸν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχη. Τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν
 βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. Τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους
 οὕτω τὰγαθὰ εὖνους λέγουσιν, εἰ μὴ ταῦτό καὶ παρ'
 ἐκείνου γίγνηται· εὖνοϊαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθούσι φιλίαν
 εἶναι. *Ἡ προσθετίον μὴ λανθάνουσιν; πολλοὶ γάρ 4
 εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἐωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιει-
 κεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν κ' ἐκείνων τις
 πάθοι πρὸς τοῦτον. Εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται ἀλ-
 λήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς
 ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὖνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλε-
 σθαι τὰγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἑν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις 5
 ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. Τρία δὲ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἶδη, ἰσάριθ-
 μα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις
 οὐ λανθάνουσα. Οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται
 τὰγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ
 χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους, οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν,
 ἀλλ' ἢ γίγνεται τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν. Ὅμοι-

ως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούσιν εἶναι
 2 ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὐτοῖς. Οἷ
 τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες, διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν
 πτέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ, καὶ οὐχ
 ἢ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. Κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταὶ εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐστὶν
 ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ πορί-
 3 ζουσιν, οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι, οἱ δ' ἡδονήν. Εὐδιάλυτοι δὲ
 αἱ τοιαῦταί εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ
 μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ᾖσι, παύονται φιλοῦντες. Τὸ
 δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίνεται.
 Ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὁ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φι-
 4 λία, ὥς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. Μάλιστα δ' ἐν
 τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἢ τοιαύτῃ δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ
 τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικούτοι διώκουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ
 τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. Οὐ
 πάνυ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε
 γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης
 ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ᾖσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ εἰσιν
 ἡδεῖς, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. Εἰς ταύτας δὲ
 5 καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν. Ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδο-
 νὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὔτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα
 διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ με-
 ταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. Διὸ ταχέως
 γίνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἢ φιλία
 μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἢ μεταβολή.
 Καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν
 τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως
 παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες.
 Συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὔτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ
 αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φιλίαν οὕτως.

Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν 6 4
 ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τὰγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ
 ἀγαθοὶ, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτούς. Οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τὰ-
 γαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δι' αὐ-
 τοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· διαμένει
 οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾖσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνι-
 μον. Καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάτερος ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ
 γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι.
 Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ
 ἀλλήλοις· ἐκάστῳ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσιν εἰ οἰκεῖαι πρά-
 ξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι.
 Ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει 7
 γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. Πᾶσα
 γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ ἀπλῶς, ἢ
 τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ' ἐμοιότητά τινα· ταύτη δὲ πάνθ'
 ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὐτούς· ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ
 τὰ λοιπὰ, τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς ἐστίν.
 Μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητὰ, καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία
 ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. Σπανίας δ' εἰκὸς τὰς 8
 τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. Ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖ-
 ται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ
 ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλλας συν-
 αναλῶσαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι
 φίλους, πρὶν ἂν ἐκάτερος ἐκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ
 πιστευθῇ. Οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποι- 9
 οῦντες βούλονται μὲν φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ, εἰ μὴ καὶ
 φιλητοὶ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασιν· βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φι-
 λίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὐ.

Αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ 5
 τελεία ἐστὶ, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια
 ἐκατέρῳ παρ' ἐκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν.

- (4) Ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. Μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι διαμένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίγνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρώμενφ· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονται οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὀρών ἐκείνον, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει· τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ ὄψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία. Πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἥθη
2 στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες. Οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι, ἀλλὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς, καὶ εἰσὶν ἥττον φίλοι καὶ διαμένουσιν. Οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσι-
μον ὄντες φίλοι, ἅμα τῷ συμφέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. Δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἐπικεῖς φαύλοις, καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιοῦν, δι' αὐτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθούς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μὴ τις ὠφέ-
3 λεια γίγνοιτο. Καὶ μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία ἀϊάβλητός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑπ' αὐτῶν δεδοκιμασμένου. Καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς ὠληθῶς φιλία ἀξιοῦται. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς
4 ἐτέραις οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ σύμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἶδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας

πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθοῖ, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τι καὶ ὁμοιον, ταύτῃ φίλοι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. Οὐ πάνυ δ' αὐταὶ συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται 5 οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

Εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης, οἱ μὲν 6 φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοί. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, καὶ τῷ ὁμοιωσθαι τούτοις. Ὡσπερ δ' ἐπὶ (5) τῶν ἀρετῶν οἱ μὲν καθ' ἑξίν, οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσι τὰγαθὰ, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν, ὥστ' ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται

πολλὰς δὲ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.

Οὐ φαίνονται δ' οὐθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται, οὐθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ, 2 φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. Οἱ δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι 3 ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δὲ, εὖνοις εἰκόασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. Οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὥς τὸ συζῆν· ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει. Συνδιάγειν δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ

ἔστι, μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας, μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρική δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

- 7 4 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ
πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἰρετὸν τὸ
ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ'
5 ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα. Ἔοικε δ' ἡ μὲν φί-
λησις πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἔξει· ἡ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἦττον
πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως,
ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἑξέως. Καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται
τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος, ἀλλὰ
καθ' ἑξιν. Καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγυθὸν
φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται
ᾧ φίλος. Ἐκάτερος οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ
τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ· λέγεται
γὰρ φιλότης ἢ ἰσότης. Μάλιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
(6) ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς
ἦττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, ὅσῳ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ
ἦττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ'
εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας. Διὸ νέοι μὲν γίνον-
ται φίλοι ταχὺ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὐ· οὐ γὰρ γίνονται
φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυ-
φνοί. Ἄλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βού-
λονται γὰρ τὰγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι
δ' οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν
2 ἀλλήλοις, ἃ δὲ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικὰ. Πολλοῖς δ'
εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσ-
περ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα. Ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ
τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα
τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥάδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγα-
3 θοὺς εἶναι. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνη-
θείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. Διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ

τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν εἰδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ
 τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι. Τούτων δὲ 4
 μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλία ἢ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ, ὅταν ταῦτα ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν
 γίγνηται, καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν
 νεων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εἰλεν-
 θερικόν. Ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων. Καὶ οἱ μακά-
 ριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ· συζῆν
 μὲν γὰρ βούλονταί τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρό-
 νον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐθεὶς ἂν ὑπομεῖναι, οἷδ'
 αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὰ τοῖς φίλους
 ἡδεῖς ζητοῦσιν. Δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιοῦτους
 ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ
 τοῖς φίλοις. Οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διηρημένους φαί- 5
 νονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρή-
 σιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἀμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐ πάντ' οὔτε
 γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν, οὔτε χρησίμους εἰς τὰ
 καλὰ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφίεμενοι,
 τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πράξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν· ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάντ'
 γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Ἡδὺν δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται 6
 ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος· ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος
 φίλος, ἂν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχῃται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ
 ἰσάζει ἀναλογῶν ὑπερέχ·μενος. Οὐ πάντ' δ' εἰώθασι τοι-
 οῦτοι γίνεσθαι.

Εἰσι δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ 7 8
 αὐτὰ γίγνεται ἅπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ
 ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ἀντικαταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ'
 ὠφελείας. Ὅτι δ' ἦττον εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ φιλίαι καὶ μέ-
 νουσιν, εἴρηται. Δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δεῖ ὁμοιότητα καὶ
 ἀνομοιότητα ταύτου εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ'
 ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἢ μὲν
 γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει, ἢ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει

- κακείνη), τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως μεταπίπτειν, ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίας δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης. Ἐτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱόν, καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρὶ τε πρὸς γυναῖκα, καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. Διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ ἀλλήλων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα, καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱόν, καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα, καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. Ἐτέρα γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν ἕτεραι οὖν
- 2 καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίας. Ταῦτά μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίγνεται ἐκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου, οὔτε δεῖ ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ υἱέσιν ἃ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. Ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὖσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως· ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίγνηται, τότε γίγνεται πῶς ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.
- 9 3 Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρῶτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ, τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρῶτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν
- 4 δευτέρως. Δῆλον δ', ἐὰν πολὺ διάστημα γίγνηται ἀρετῆς, ἢ κακίας, ἢ εὐπορίας, ἢ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. Ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλείστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ

τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ μηδενὸς ἄξιοι. Ἀκριβὴς 5
 μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμὸς, ἕως τίνος οἱ
 φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι μένει, πολὺ δὲ
 χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. Ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖ- 6
 ται, μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέ-
 γιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι
 ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθὰ· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθὰ. Εἰ
 δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται, ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τὰγα-
 θὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος·
 ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ. Ἴσως
 δ' οὐ πάντα· αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τὰγαθὰ.
 Οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσ- (8)
 θαι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν, διὸ φιλοκύλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερεχό-
 μενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος εἶναι
 καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι. Τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς
 εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται. Οὐ 2
 δι' αὐτὸ δ' εἰκόσιν αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
 συμβεβηκὺς· χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν
 ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα· οἷονται γὰρ
 τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἃν του δέωνται· ὥς δὴ σημείῳ
 τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ. Οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεικῶν
 καὶ εἰδότην ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκίαν δόξ-
 αν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι δὴ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ,
 πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει. Τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ
 καθ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ
 τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ εἶναι. Δοκεῖ 3
 δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι. Σημεῖ-
 ον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔναι γὰρ διδόασιν
 τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι, ἀντιφι-
 λεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, εἰς ἀμφοτέρω μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ'
 ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι, εἰς ὁρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας,

καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὡς μητρὶ
 10 4 προσήκει ὑπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἡγνοίαν. Μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς
 φιλίας οὐσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινου-
 μένων, φίλων ἀρετῇ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο
 γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων
 5 φιλία. Οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνιστοι μάλιστ' εἴεν φίλοι·
 ἰσάζονται γὰρ ἄν. Ἡ δ' ἰσότης, καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης,
 καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ
 ὄντες καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε
 δέονται φαύλων, οὐθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ὥς εἰ-
 πεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μήτ' αὐτοὺς
 ἀμαρτάνειν, μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἱπιτρέπειν. Οἱ δὲ μοχ-
 6 θηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς
 διαμένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίγνον-
 ται φίλοι, χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. Οἱ χρήσι-
 μοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πο-
 ρίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. Ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ
 μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία,
 οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὲς εἰδότη· οὐ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις
 ἐνδεὴς ὢν, τούτου ἐφίεμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. Ἐνταῦ-
 7 θα δ' ἂν τις ἔλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν
 καὶ αἰσχροῦ. Διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνί-
 στε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὥς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ φιλη-
 τοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιοτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας
 7 γελοῖον. Ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου
 καθ' αὐτὸ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἡ δ' ὁρεξις τοῦ μέ-
 σου ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ
 γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ
 τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γάρ
 ἐστὶν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

11 (9) Ἐοικε δὲ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν

τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἢ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἐν ἀπάσῃ γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δὲ προσ-
 αγορεύουσι γοῦν ὥς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς
 συστρατιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινω-
 νίαις. Καθ' ὅσον δὲ κοινοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι
 φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. Καὶ ἡ παροιμία "κοινὰ τὰ
 φίλων," ὁρθῶς· ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. "Ἔστι δ' 2
 ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἐταίροις πάντα κοινὰ, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις
 ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείω, τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ
 γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον, αἱ δ' ἥττον. Διαφέρει
 δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα, καὶ
 ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐδ' ἐταίροις καὶ πολίταις,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων φιλιῶν. Ἔτερα δὲ καὶ 3
 τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἐκάστον τούτων, καὶ αἷξουσιν λαμβάνει
 τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα ἀποστερῆσαι
 ἐταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ
 ἢ ὑφείψ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὄντινόν ἄλλον. Αὕξεσ-
 θαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ὥς ἐν τοῖς
 αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα. Αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶ- 4
 σαι μορίως εἰκόασι τῆς πολιτικῆς· συμπορεύονται γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζόμεναί τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον·
 καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ
 καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου γὰρ καὶ
 οἱ νομοθεταὶ στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι τὸ
 κοινῇ συμφέρον. Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ 5
 μέρος τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίστανται, οἷον πλοῦτῆρες μὲν
 τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοι-
 οῦτον, συστρατιώται δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρη-
 μάτων, εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 φυλέται καὶ δημόται. Ἔναι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδο-
 νην δυκοῦσι γίγνεσθαι, θιασωτῶν καὶ ἱραμιστῶν· αὗται

γὰρ θυσίας ἕνεκα καὶ συνουσίας. Πᾶσαι δ' αὖται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν εἰκασιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἢ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον, θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους, τιμὰς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. Αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ σῖνδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς, οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχό-
6 λάζον τοῖς καιροῖς. Πᾶσαι δὲ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μύρια τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τυαῖται φιλίαι ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις.

- 12(10)** Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβά-
σεις, οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων. Εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι, βασιλεία τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' 2 αὐτὴν εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι καλεῖν. Τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν ἡ βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. Παρέκβασις δὲ βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλείστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ ἐαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφελίμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ' ἀρχο-
3 μένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεὺς. Ἡ δὲ τυραννίς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτῃ· τὸ γὰρ ἐαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. Καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χει-
ρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ. Μετα-
βαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότης γὰρ ἐστὶ μοναρχίας ἢ τυραννίς· ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραννος γίνεται. Ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακία τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμονται τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ

τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς,
καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστον ποιοῦμενοι
τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄρχουσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν
ἐπιεικιστάτων. Ἐκ δὲ δὴ τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν·
σύνοροι γὰρ εἰσιν αὗται· πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ
τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι.
Ἡκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν
γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος. Μεταβάλλουσι
μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι· εἰς ἁπλοῦς γὰρ οὕτω
καὶ ῥᾶστα μεταβαίνουσιν. Ὁμοιώματα δ' αὐτῶν καὶ 4
οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. Ἡ
μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱέως κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει
σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ
καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πατρικὴ γὰρ
ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. Ἐν Πέρσῃσι δ' ἡ
τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννικὴ· χρώνται γὰρ ὡς δοῦλοις τοῖς
υἱέσιν. Τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς δούλους· τὸ
γὰρ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πρίττεται. Αὕτη
μὲν οὖν ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν
διαφερόντων γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. Ἄνδρες δὲ καὶ 5
γυναῖκες ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ
ἄρχει, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ
ἄρμόζει, ἐκείνη ἀποδίδωσιν. Ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ
ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ
αὐτὸ παιεῖ, καὶ οἷον ἢ ἀμείνων. Ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ
γυναῖκες ἐπὶ κληροῖσιν οὖσαι· οὐ δὲ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ
ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς
ὀλιγαρχίαις. Τιμοκρατικὴ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· 6
ἴσοι γὰρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν·
διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελ-
φικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. Δημοκρατία δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν

- ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενὴς ὁ ἄρχων, καὶ ἐκάστῳ ἐξουσία.
- 13 (11)** Καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὐ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὁθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος
- 2 τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. Τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρικὴ, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας· καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν, καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων, καὶ
- 3 βασιλεὺς βασιλευμένων. Ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς. Καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταῦτό, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ
- 4 φιλία. Καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ' ἀρετὴν γὰρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλεον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἐκάστῳ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.
- 5 Ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἐταιρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιῶται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμόηθεις ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. Ἐοικε δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικὴν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικέεις εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὲ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία.
- 6 Ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐστὶ, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἡ μικρόν φιλίας. Ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οἷον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον, καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δούλον· ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. Ἀλλ'

οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δαῦλον ἢ δαῦλος. Οὐδέν γάρ, κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δαῦλος ἑμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δαῦλος. Ἡ μὲν οὖν δαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φίλια πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλίας δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. Ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλείστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν.

Ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ εἶ- (12) 14
σεται· ἀφορίσεις δ' ἂν τις τὴν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν
ἐταιρικὴν. Αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλαῖ-
και, καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς εἰκόασι μᾶλλον· οἷον
γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. Εἰς ταῦτα δὲ
τάξιεν ἂν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν. Καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαί- 2
νεται πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρι-
κῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι
ὄντα, τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα.
Μᾶλλον δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα
ὅτι ἐκ τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συμφεέωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ
γεννηθῆντι, ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ
αἰτοῦ οἰκείου τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οἷον ὁδοῖς ἢ θρίξ ἢ ὀτιοῦν τῷ
ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐθέν τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἦττον. Καὶ τῷ πλή-
θει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργου-
σιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις τοὺς γονεῖς, σίνεσιν
ἢ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα. Ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δι' ἃ φι-
λοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. Γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦ- 3
σιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ
κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα,
ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι· ἢ γὰρ
πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταῦτοποιεῖ· ὅθεν φασὶ

ταῦτόν αἷμα καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Εἰσὶ δὴ ταῦτό
 4 πως καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις. Μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ
 σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἤλιξ γὰρ ἤλικα, καὶ οἱ
 συνήθεις ἐταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἐταιρικῇ ὁμοιοῦ-
 ται. Ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων
 συμφκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. Γίνονται
 δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι, οἱ δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι, τῷ σύγγενυς
 5 ἢ πόρρω τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι. Ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς
 φιλία τέκνοις, καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεοὺς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν
 καὶ ὑπερέχον· εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασιν τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ
 εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἷτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆ-
 6 ναι. Ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τοιαύτη φι-
 λία μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων, ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐ-
 τοῖς ἐστίν. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀδελφικῇ ἄπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ
 ἐταιρικῇ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς
 ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέρ-
 γοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοηθέστεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν
 καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν
 7 χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ βεβαιωτάτη. Ἀνάλογον
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν τὰ φιλικά. Ἄνδρὶ
 δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄν-
 θρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν,
 ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ τεκ-
 νοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζώοις. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ
 τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς
 τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν
 βίον· εὐθὺς γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀν-
 δρὸς καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοι-
 νὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι
 δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. Εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι'
 ἀρετὴν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐκατέρου ἀρετὴ, καὶ

χαίρουεν ἂν τῷ τοιαύτῳ. Σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὰ θάττον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. Τὸ δὲ πῶς 8 συμβιωτέον ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα, καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν φαίνεται τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον, καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον, καὶ τὸν ἐταῖρον, καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.

Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, (13) 15 καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων, τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χεῖρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητά δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. Γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μίμψεις ἐν 2 τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνῃ, ἢ μάλιστα, εὐλόγως. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὐ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται· τοῦτα γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας. Πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἀμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οἷδ' ἐμύχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ᾗ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὐ δρῶν. Ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὐ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοῖη τῷ φίλῳ· ἑκάτερος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται. Οὐ πάντῃ δ' οὐδ' ἐν 3 τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὐ δρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν. Γελοῖως δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ γέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ συνδιημερεύειν. Ἡ 4 δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἶονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μίμφονται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ

- ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενῆς ὁ ἄρχων, καὶ ἐκάστω ἐξουσία.
- 13(II) Καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιῇ τοὺς βασιλευμένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ὥς εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομὲς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὁμηρος 2 τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. Τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἷτις γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας· καὶ τοῖς προγόνους δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν, καὶ πρόγονοι ἐγγόνων, καὶ 3 βασιλεὺς βασιλευμένων. Ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς. Καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταῦτόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ 4 φιλία. Καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ' ἀρετὴν γὰρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνω πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἐκάστω· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. 5 Ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἐταιρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιωταί, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. Ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικὴν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὲ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία. 6 Ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐστὶ, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. Ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οἷον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον, καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δούλον· ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. Ἄλλ'

οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δοῦλος. Οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἑμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος. Ἡ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλίας δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. Ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν.

Ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ εἶ- (12) 14
σεται· ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις τὴν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν
ἐταιρικὴν. Αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊ-
καί, καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς εἰκόασι μᾶλλον· οἷον
γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. Εἰς ταύτας δὲ
τάξειεν ἂν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν. Καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαί- 2
νεται πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρι-
κῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσιν τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι
ὄντα, τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα.
Μᾶλλον δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα
ὅτι ἐκ τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συμφκείωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ
γεννηθέντι, ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ
αὐτοῦ οἰκείον τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οἷον ὁδοὺς ἢ θρίξ ἢ ὀτιοῦν τῷ
ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐθὲν τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἦττον. Καὶ τῷ πλή-
θει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργου-
σιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν
ἢ αἰσθήσιν λαβόντα. Ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δι' αὐτῶν φι-
λοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. Γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦ- 3
σιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ
κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα,
ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι· ἡ γὰρ
πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταύτοποιεῖ· ὅθεν φασὶ

ταύτων αἷμα καὶ ρίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Εἰσὶ δὲ ταῦτό
 4 πως καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις. Μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ
 σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἡλιξ γὰρ ἤλικα, καὶ οἱ
 συνήθεις ἐταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἐταιρικῇ ὁμοιού-
 ται. Ἀντιψιὼ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων
 συνωκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. Γίνονται
 δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι, οἱ δ' ἄλλοτριώτεροι, τῷ σύντρω
 5 ἢ πόρρω τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι. Ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς
 φιλία τέκνοις, καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεοὺς, ὥς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν
 καὶ ὑπερέχον· εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασιν τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ
 εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἵτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆ-
 6 ναι. Ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τοιαύτη φι-
 λία μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων, ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐ-
 τοῖς ἐστίν. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀδελφικῇ ἄπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ
 ἐταιρικῇ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπικεικίσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς
 ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέρ-
 γοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοθεϊότεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν
 καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν
 7 χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ βεβαιωτάτη. Ἀνάλογον
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν τὰ φιλικά. Ἄνδρι
 δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄν-
 θρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν,
 ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλει, καὶ τεκ-
 νοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζώοις. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ
 τασούτων ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς
 τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν
 βίον εὐθὺς γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἄν-
 δρὸς καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκάουσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοι-
 νὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι
 δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. Εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι'
 ἀρετῇ, εἰ ἐπικεικίς εἴεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐκατέρου ἀρετῇ, καὶ

χαίροικεν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ. Σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θᾶπτον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. Τὸ δὲ πῶς 8 συμβιωτέον ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα, καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν φαίνεται τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον, καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον, καὶ τὸν ἐταῖρον, καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.

Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, (13) 15 καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων, τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χεῖρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. Γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν 2 τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνῃ, ἢ μάλιστα, εὐλόγως. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται· τοῦτα γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας. Πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἀμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἢ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν. Ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὐ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοίη τῷ φίλῳ· ἐκάτερος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται. Οὐ πάνυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν 3 τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὐ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν. Γελοῖος δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ συνδιημερεύειν. Ἡ 4 δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ

5 πᾶσχοιτες δίδονται. Ἐοικε δὲ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι
 διπλόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς
 κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίας ἢ μὲν ἠθικῆ, ἢ δὲ νομικῆ εἶναι.
 Γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ', ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν
 6 αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλέωνται. Ἐστὶ δὲ νομικὴ
 μὲν ἢ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἢ μὲν πάνπαν ἀγοραία, ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς
 χεῖρα, ἢ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ
 τί ἀντὶ τίνος. Δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφειλόμενον καὶ ἀμ-
 φιλογον, φιλικὴν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· δια παρ' ἐνίοις
 οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἰοῦνται δεῖν στίργειν τοὺς
 7 κατὰ πίστιν συναλλύζοντας. Ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς,
 ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται ἢ ὅτιδήποτε ἄλλο. Κομίζεσθαι
 δὲ ἀξιοῦ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλεόν, ὡς οὐ δεδοκώς, ἀλλὰ χρήσας.
 8 Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει.
 Τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς
 πλείστους τὰ καλὰ, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφελίμα. Καλὸν
 δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπύθῃ, ὠφελίμον δὲ τὸ εὐερ-
 9 γεῖσθαι. Δυναμένῳ δὲ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν
 ἔπαθεν, καὶ ἐκόντι ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον. Ὡς
 δὲ διαμαρτύοντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ, καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ
 ἔδει· οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρώντας·
 καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα διαλυτέον. Καὶ
 ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἀδυνατοῦντα δ'
 οὐδ' ὁ δοὺς ἡξίωσεν ἄν' ὥστ' εἰ δυνατός, ἀποδοτέον.
 Ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ' οὗ εὐεργετῆται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι,
 10 ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένη ἢ μή. Ἀμφισβήτησιν δ' ἔχει
 πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ πρὸς
 ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος
 εὐεργεσίᾳ. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν
 παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν, ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις, καὶ ἔξῃ παρ'
 ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέ-

γιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἂ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν
κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρεῖαις. Ἄρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρή- 11
σιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἢ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον
ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κοι-
νόμενος τὴν ἴσην τοσαύτη οὖν γεγέννηται ἢ ἐπικουρία ὅσον
οὗτος ὠφέληται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρατο,
ἢ καὶ πλέον· κάλλιον γάρ. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐγ-
κλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, μέτρον δ' ἔοικεν ἢ τοῦ δράσαντος
προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἡθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέ-
σει τὸ κῆριον.

Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις (14) 16
ἀξιοὶ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, ὅταν δε τοῦτο γίγνηται,
διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. Οἶεται γὰρ ὃ τε βελτίων προσήκειν
αὐτῷ πλέον ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον ὁμοί-
ως δὲ καὶ ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὐ φασὶ
δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φι-
λίαν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλί-
ας· οἶονται γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλείον
λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλείον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν
τῇ φιλίᾳ. Ὁ δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιον φίλου
γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσι· τί γὰρ, φασίν,
ὠφέλος σπουδαίῳ ἢ δυνάστη φίλον εἶναι, μῆτιν γε μέλ-
λοντα ἀπολαύειν; ἔοικε δὲ ἑκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιόειν, καὶ 2
δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλέον νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οἱ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
δὲ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς, τῷ δ' ἐνδεεὶ κέρδους·
τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς
δ' ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία τὸ κέρδος. Οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ 3
ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μῆδέν
ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ διδοται τῷ τὸ
κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινῷ. Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄμα
χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. Ἐν πᾶσι

γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει· τῷ δὲ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουνσι καὶ τῷ δωροδύκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίστοις ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀνταποδιδόντα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. Τὸ δυνατόν ¹ γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοῖς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοίῃ, εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ. Διὸ κἂν δόξειεν οἷκ' ἐξεῖναι νιῷ πατέρα ἀπείρασθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν· ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον· οὐθὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν ὑπεργμένων δεδρακεν, ὥστ' αἰεὶ ὀφείλει. Οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται, ἐξουσία ἀφείναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δὴ. Ἄμα δ' ἴσως οὐδεὶς πατ' ἂν ἀποστήναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίας· χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι. Τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ, ἢ σὺ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὥς ἀλυσιτελέες. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τασαύτων εἰρήσθω.

I.

- ¹ Ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιωειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ, τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβὴ ² γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς. Ἐν ταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπóρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ

πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ, ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οἷθὲν ἔχων φίλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος, ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐθέν ἐπιτελεῖ. Συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει. Διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὐσῆς διαλύσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὴν μὴ γίνηται ὥν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστερναν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. Ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν καθ' αὐτὴν οὕσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται. Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα γίγνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὥν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μὴθὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν οὐ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, ὅλον καὶ τῷ καθαρωδῶ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ᾔσκειν, τοσούτῳ πλείω· εἰς ἧν δ' ἀπαιτοῦνται τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν, ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει, ὁ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὥν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσίχει, καὶ κείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. Τὴν ἡμίαντα δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἰστί, τοῦ προΐεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προΐεμενος δοικ' ἐπιτρίπτει ἐκείνῳ. Ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδῆποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσον δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. Ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἄρίσκει τὸ "μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί." Οἱ δὲ προλαβόντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἴτα μὴθὲν ποιοῦντες ὥν ἔφασαν, διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὁμολόγησαν. Τούτο δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μὴθὲνα

ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν
 ἔλαβον τὸν μισθὸν, μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν
 εἰσιν· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίγνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας,
 οἱ μὲν δι' αὐτοὺς προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι· τοι-
 αύτη γὰρ ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλία. Τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιη-
 τέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν· αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς
 ἀρετῆς. Οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν·
 οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ' ἢ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμὴ τ' ἰσόρρο-
 πος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱκανὸν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς
 8 θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. Μὴ τοιαύτης δ'
 οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινι, μάλισκα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ
 τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίγνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν
 εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον
 δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον·
 ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη. ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου τὴν ἡδονὴν εἴλετ'
 ἂν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἔξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν· καὶ
 9 γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον· ἐνιαχοῦ τ'
 εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι ὡς
 δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθάπερ
 ἐκοινωνήσεν. ὦ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἶται δικαιο-
 τερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. Τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ
 τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν·
 τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδῶσιν ἐκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ
 ἄξια. Ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον
 ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ λαβόντες. Δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσοῦτου τιμᾶν
 ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν
 ἐτίμα.

2 Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πότερα δεῖ πάντα
 τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κἀμνοντα μὲν ἱατρῷ
 πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικόν·
 ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ

εὐεργίτη ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρω δοτέον, εἰαν ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδεχῆται. Ἄρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα 2 ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥάδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. Ὅτι δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ 3 ἄδηλον. Καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις, καὶ ὥσπερ δάνειον, ᾧ ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρω δοτέον. Ἰσως δ' 4 οἶδε τοῦτ' αἰεὶ, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ ληστῶν πότερον τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὁστισοῦν ᾧ, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἐαλωκότι ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. Ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθύλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, 5 εἰαν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἢ δόσῃ τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προὔπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἢ ἀνταπόδοσις γίγνηται, ὃν οἶεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. Οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανιστέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομμεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομμεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. Εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως, οἷονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δοξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. Ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη 6 καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὠρισμένον τοῖς περὶ ἃ εἰσιν. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταῦτ' ἀπαν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταί- 7 ροις καὶ εὐεργίταις, ἐκίστοις τὰ οἰκεία καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον. Οὕτως δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῖσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς

τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ' οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαν-
 8 τῶν διὰ ταῦτά. Δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν
 μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ἀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ
 εἶναι κάλλιον ὢν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν. Καὶ τι-
 μὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ
 τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί· οὐδ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τοῦ
 στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικὴν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν μητ-
 9 ρικὴν. Καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν τὴν καθ'
 ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις.
 Πρὸς ἐταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν καὶ ἀπάν-
 των κοινοῦτητα. Καὶ συγγενέσι δὴ καὶ φυλῆταις καὶ
 πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἀπασιν ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκείον
 ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἐκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ'
 10 οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. Τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογε-
 νῶν ῥᾶν ἢ κρίσεις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα.
 Οὐ μὴν διὰ γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν ἐνδέχη-
 ται, οὕτω διοριστέον.

3 Ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας
 ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. Ἡ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ
 τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ'
 ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν
 φίλοι· ὢν ἀπολιπόντων εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. Ἐγκα-
 λίσσει δ' ἂν τις, εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν
 προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἥθος· ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν,
 πλείστα διαφοράι γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ
 2 ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ᾧσι φίλοι. Ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευ-
 σθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἥθος, μὴθὲν τοι-
 οῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῶτ' ἂν· ὅταν δ'
 ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκα-
 λεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβ-
 3 δηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ κακουργία. Ἐὰν

δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γίνηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἄρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν, ἀλλὰ τὰγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον ποιηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρή εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. Ἄρ' οὖν εὐθύς διαλυτέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἡθὸς ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιῇν· τὸν γὰρ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ φίλος ἦν ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. Εἰ δ' 4 ὁ μὲν διαμένει, ὁ δ' ἐπικειότερος γένοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἄρα χρηστὸν φίλῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται; ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένει τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς, ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κρατιστὺς, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι, μὴτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς, μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἀνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε. Εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τοιούτων. Ἄρ' 5 οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὁθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ὑπομιμητέον τε διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας ἢ διάλυσιν γίνηται;

Τὰ φίλικά δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι 4 ὀρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. Τιθίασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς

τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. Οἱ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταῦτ' αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. Τούτων δέ τινι καὶ
2 τὴν φιλίαν ὀρίζονται. Πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι. Ἔοικε γάρ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον
3 ἑκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαντῷ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τὰγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ. Καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ
4 σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. Ἐκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν ἐκείνο τὸ γενόμενον· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τὰγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὧν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ
5 μάλιστα. Συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπείς αἱ μνήμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί· αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. Καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδὺ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὥς εἰπεῖν. Τῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς
6 ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. Πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ἢ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων,

καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιοῦται.
 φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καί- 7
 περ οὔσι φαῦλοισι. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡ ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ
 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπικεικῆς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐ-
 τῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐ-
 θενὶ ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οἷδ' φαίνεται. Σχεδὸν δὲ 8
 οἷδ' τοῖς φαίλοισι διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων
 μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς·
 αἰροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι
 τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερά ὄντα· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν
 ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἷονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα
 εἶναι· οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται διὰ τὴν μοχ-
 θηρίαν, μισοῦσί τε καὶ φεύγουσι τὰ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν
 ἑαυτοὺς. Ζητοῦσιν τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνδιημερεύ- 9
 σουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ
 πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ'
 ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθανονται.
 Οὐθέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐθεν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς
 ἑαυτοὺς. Οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ
 τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ
 μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενον τινῶν, τὸ δ' ἡδεται,
 καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο, τὸ δ' ἐκείσε ἔλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα.
 Εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ 10
 μικρὸν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἦσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα
 ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμου-
 σιν. Οὐ δὲ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλι-
 κῶς διακείσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητὸν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ
 οὔτως ἔχειν λανθάνειν ἀθλίον, φεικτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν
 διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέως ἐπικεικῆ εἶναι· οὔτως γὰρ καὶ
 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

Ἡ δ' εὐνοια φιλίῃ μὲν ὅμοια, οὐ μὴν ἴστί γε φιλία· 5

γίνεται γὰρ εὖνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φιλία δ' οὐ. Καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἶρηται. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ φιλησίς ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διήκασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, 2 τῇ φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκαλοῖται. Καὶ ἡ μὲν φιλησις μετὰ συνήθειας, ἡ δ' εὖνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς τιμβαίνει· εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμπράττειν δ' ἂν οἴθην· ὅπερ γὰρ εἶπο- 3 μιν, προσπαίως εὖνοι γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργου- σιν. Ἔοικε δὲ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρῶν, ἡ διὰ τῆς ὕψεως ἡδονῇ· μὴ γὰρ προησθείς τῇ ἰδίᾳ οὐθείς ἐρῶ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἶδει οἴθην μᾶλλον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθεμῇ. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ φίλους οἱ χ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ εὖνους γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐθὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βοίλονται γὰρ μόνον τὰγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράττειν δ' ἂν οὐθὲν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. Διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτῆς ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνου- 4 μίνην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονίμει τὴν εὖνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ' εὖνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδέ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει 5 αὐτὸν διὰ τινα χρήσιν. Ὅλως δ' ἡ εὖνοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιεικειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῷ φανῇ καλὸς τις ἢ ἀνδρείος ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἶπομεν.

6 Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται· διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρ- ξειν ἄν. Οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁνοῦν ὁμογνωμοιοῦντας ὁμο- νοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οἰρακίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλι-

κάν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταῦτα προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. Περὶ 2 τὰ πρακτὰ δὲ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετάς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονιαῖς, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιπτακόν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. Ὅταν δ' ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστ' ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται οὗ ἐφίενται. Πολιτικὴ δὲ φιλία φαίνεται ἢ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα. Ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ 3 καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὥς εἰπεῖν τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ Εὐριπος, βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. Τοὺς δὲ 4 φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρὸν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πῆλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. Συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον 7 φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὐ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὥς παραλόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι, τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ

εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμέλονται
 τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετή-
 σαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας, ὥς κομιουμένους
 τὰς χάριτας. τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι.
 Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ
 πονηροῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῷ ἀμνήμονες γὰρ
 οἱ πολλοὶ, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται.
 2 Δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον, καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιον
 τῷ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ φίλησις περὶ
 ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἔνε-
 κα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πε-
 πονθότας, κἂν μηθὲν ὧσι χρήσιμοι, μὴδ' εἰς ὕστερον γέ-
 3 νοιτ' ἂν. Ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν·
 πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθεῖη
 ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου. Μάλιστα δ' ἴσως
 τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ
 4 οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. Ται-
 ούτῳ δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπον-
 θὺς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ
 ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. Τούτου δ' αἷτιον, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι
 πᾶσιν αἰρετὸν καὶ φιλητὸν, ἐσμέν δ' ἐνεργεῖα· τῷ ζῆν
 γὰρ καὶ πράττειν. Ἐνεργεῖα δὴ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστι
 πῶς· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. Τοῦτο δὲ
 φυσικόν· ὁ γὰρ ἐστὶ δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖα τὸ ἔργον
 5 μηνύει. Ἄμα δὲ καὶ τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν
 πράξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐθὲν
 καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ'
 6 ἦττον ἢ καὶ φιλητόν. Ἠδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόν-
 τος ἢ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἢ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγεν-
 ημένου ἢ μνήμη. Ἠδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν,
 καὶ φιλητόν ὁμοίως. Τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι μένει τὸ

ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθύντι τὸ
χρήσιμον παροίχεται. Ἡ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν
ἠδεΐα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἡ ἥττον ἢ προσδοκία
δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσκει
ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν. Τοῖς ὑπερίχουσι
δὴ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά.
Ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γυνόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουν· 7
οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβάν-
των δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπορον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ
ποιεῖν ἐργώδες. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκ-
νότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν
ὅτι αὐτῶν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖ-
ον εἶναι.

Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα 8
ἢ ἄλλον τινά· ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦτε μάλιστα ἀγα-
πῶσι, καὶ ὥς ἐν αἰσχυρῇ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε
ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῃ ἂν
μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῃ μᾶλλον ἔγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ
ὅτι οὐθέν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν,
καὶ ὅσῃ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλον
ἔνεκα· τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ παρίησιν. Τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τοῖτοις τὰ 2
ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλήγως. Φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μά-
λιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλό-
μενος ὃ βούλεται τάγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηθεὶς ἐλ-
σεται. Ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ
τὰ λοιπὰ ἢ πάνθ' οἷε ὁ φίλος ἠρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι
ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διέκει.
Καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῖσιν, οἷον τὸ "μία
ψυχὴ" καὶ "κοινὰ τὰ φίλων" καὶ "ἰσότης φιλοῦτης" καὶ
"γόνυ κνήμης ἑγγιον" πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν μά-
λισθ' ὑπάρχει· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ, καὶ φιλητέον

δὴ μάλισθ' ἐαυτόν. Ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρε-
 3 ὦν ἔπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων τὸ πιστόν. Ἴσως οὖν τοὺς
 τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον
 ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. Εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλου-
 4 τον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον. Οἱ
 μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι τοὺς
 ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ
 ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγον-
 ται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ
 περιμάχητά ἐστιν. Οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται
 ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῇ ἀλόγῳ τῆς
 ψυχῆς. Τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προση-
 γορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος. Δικαίως
 5 δὲ τῷ οὕτῳ φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. Ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοι-
 αῦθ' αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασιν λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φι-
 λαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζει τὰ δίκαια
 πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων, ἢ τὰ σώφρονα, ἢ ὅπια-
 οὖν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν
 ἑαυτῷ περιποιῶτο, οὐθεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλουτον οὐδὲ ψέ-
 6 ξει. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλουτος·
 ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθὰ,
 καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πεί-
 θεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι
 δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ
 φίλουτος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζό-
 μενος. Καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν
 τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ, ὡς τούτου ἐκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πεπραγέ-
 ναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα.
 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον,
 καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. Διὸ φίλουτος
 μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ

διαφέρων τοσούτων ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. Τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόν- 7 τως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ εἰς τὸ καλὸν πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τωαυτὸν ἴστιν. Ὅστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φιλαυτὸν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσεται· τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φασύλοις πάθεισιν ἐπόμενος. Τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἃ πρῶτ- 8 τει· ὃ δ' ἐπιεικὴς, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὃ δ' ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. Ἀληθεὶς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν 9 φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν διῇ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἔλκετ' ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἡρέμα, καὶ βιώσαι καλῶς ἑνιαυτὸν ἢ πολλὰ ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πράξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μικράς. Τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἰροῦνται δὴ μίγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. Καὶ χρήματα προσοῖν' ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται εἰ φίλοι· γίγνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὲ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. Καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ 10 καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. Εἰκότως δὲ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἰρούμενος τὸ καλόν. Ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πρῆξεις τῷ φίλῳ προίεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν πρῆξαι τὸ αἰτίων τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι,

- 11 Ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλεον νέμων. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαντον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὥς δ' οἱ πολλοὶ, οὐ χρή.
- 9 Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσεται φίλων ἢ μή. Οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰγαθὰ· Αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὁθεν τὸ

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

- 2 ἔοικε δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ' ἀπονέμοντας τὰγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. Εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὁθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. Διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὥς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχούντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν
- 3 εὐτυχούντων οὐδ' εὖ ποιήσουσιν. Ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. Καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. Δῆλον δ' ὥς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὁθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων
- 4 συνημερεύειν· δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. Τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τὰγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ. Οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν· ἡδὺς γὰρ

ὁ βίος ὅν οὐθέν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς. Οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. Τὸ δ' 5 οἷα ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται, καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. Ἐἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμειν ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδεῖα. Ὁ μακάριος δὲ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπικεικίς καὶ οἰκείας· ταιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος. Οἴονται τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· μονότη μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον καθ' αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' 10 ἐτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥῆον. Ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια 6 συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ' αὐτήν, ὃ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ἢ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἡδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φασύλοις λυπεῖται. Γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἀσκησίς τις τῆς 7 ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θίογνις φησὶν. Φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἰρετὸς εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ' αὐτό· τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται τοῖς ζώοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται. Τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· εἴκει δὲ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ 12 νοεῖν. Τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων·

ὠρισμένον γὰρ, τὸ δ' ὠρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως.
 Τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶ-
 8 σιν ἡδὺ εἶναι. Οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ
 διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη,
 καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. Ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ
 9 τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον. Εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγα-
 θὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐ-
 τοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις
 γὰρ ὁ βίος αἰρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζωὴ),
 ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει,
 καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως
 ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε αἰσθανοί-
 μεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ νοοῖμεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν. Τὸ δ'
 ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν
 αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. Τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῆ, τῶν
 ἡδέων καθ' αὐτό· φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωὴ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν
 ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ. Αἰρετὸν δὲ τὸ
 ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν
 αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ. Συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτό
 10 ἀγαθοῦ ἡδονται. Ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος,
 καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν.
 Καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰρετόν ἐστιν ἐκάστω, οὕτω
 καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. Τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν αἰρε-
 τὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος. Ἡ δὲ τοι-
 αύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. Συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα
 δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ
 συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
 δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ
 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. Εἰ
 δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν
 τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου

ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν ἂν εἴη. Ὁ δ' ἐστίν αὐτῷ αἰρετὸν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεής ἔσται. Δείξει ἄρα τῷ εἰδαιμονήσουσι φίλων σπουδαίων.

Ἄρ' οὖν ὥς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ 10 τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρησθαι δοκεῖ

μήτε πολύξεινος μήτ' ἄξεινος,

καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἀρμόσει μήτ' ἀφίλον εἶναι μήτ' αὐ πολύφιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν 2 καὶ πάννυ δόξειεν ἂν ἀρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπανον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς τοῦτο πράττειν. Οἱ πλείους δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκίον βίον ἱκανῶν περιέργοι καὶ ἐμπύδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν' οὐθέν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. Καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονήν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἡδυσμα. Τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους 3 πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμὸν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικῷ πλήθει, ὥσπερ πόλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. Τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὁρισμένων. Καὶ φίλων δὲ ἔστι πλῆθος ὁρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλείστοι μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν' τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι, ὅτι δ' οὐχ 4 οἶόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν αὐτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον. Ἔτι δὲ κακεῖνοι δεῖ ἀλλήλοισι φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. Καλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ δ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπύπτειν ἅμα τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι, τῷ δὲ συνάχθαι. Ἰσως οὖν εὐ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὥς πολυφιλότατον εἶναι,

ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. Διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. Οὕτω δ' ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. Οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. Πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὥς ἀληθῶς ἐπικεικῇ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλοὺς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὐρεῖν τοιούτους.

- 11** Πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἳ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἳ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. Ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπικεικῆς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ αἰρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν
2 καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτῇ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις· κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. Διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειέν τις πότερον ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἡ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνει δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. Ἔοικε δ' ἡ παρουσία μικτὴ
3 τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. Αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοὺς φίλους ἡδὺ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεται τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι· παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ

ᾧ ψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, εἰς ἣν ἐπιδέξιοι· οἷδε γὰρ τὸ ἥθος καὶ
 ἐφ' αἷς ἡδεται καὶ λυπεῖται. Τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθάνε- 4
 σθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει
 λύπης αἷτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. Διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις
 τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς,
 καὶ μὴ ὑπερτεῖν τῇ ἀλυπία, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην
 οἱ χ' ὑπομένει, ὅπως τε συνθρήνηται οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ
 μήδ' αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός· γυναῖκα δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι
 ἄνδρες τοῖς συστήνουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὥς φί-
 λους καὶ συναλγοῦνται. Μιμεῖσθαι δ' ἐν ᾧ πασι δεῖ δῆ-
 λον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. Ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων 5
 παρουσία τὴν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι
 ἡδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς. Διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς
 μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως· εὐεργε-
 τητικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν· εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα·
 μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὥς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν, ὅθεν τὸ "ἄλεις
 ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν." Μαλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον, ὅταν μέλλω-
 σιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθεῖντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσκειν. Ἴέναι δ' 6
 ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἀρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλη-
 τον καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μαλιστα
 τοῖς ἐν χρεῖα καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ καλλίων
 καὶ ἡδίων), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργεῖντα μὲν προθύμως
 (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῖτα χρεῖα φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ
 σχολαίως· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ περιθιμείσθαι ὠφελείσθαι.
 Διὸς δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνί-
 στε γὰρ συμβαίνει. Ἡ παρουσία δὲ τῶν φίλων ἐν ᾧ πα-
 σιν αἰρετή φαίνεται.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρώσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν 12
 ἐστὶ, καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἰσθησιν ἢ τὰς
 λοιπὰς, ὥς κατὰ ταύτην μαλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ
 γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἰρετώτατόν ἐστὶ τὸ συ-

ζῆν; κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία. Καὶ ὥς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον. Περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἰρετή· καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δὴ. Ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται.

2 Καὶ ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστοις τὸ εἶναι ἢ οὐ χάριν αἰροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων βούλονται διαγιν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅ τί περ μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν

3 οἷς οἴονται συζῆν. Γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρά· κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπικεικῶν ἐπικεικῆς, συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλά.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

Κ.

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· μά-1
 λιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συμφκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παι-
 δεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη. Δοκεῖ δὲ
 καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν
 οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ· διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς
 τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε
 καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδία προαιροῦν-
 ται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν. Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιού-2
 των ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ
 πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφ.σβήτησιν. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰγαθὸν
 ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν
 ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἰομένοι βελτίον
 εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν
 φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς
 αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοῦναντίον
 ἀγχι· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. Μὴ ποτε δὲ 3
 οὐ καλῶς ταῦτο λέγεται. Οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πά-
 θεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττὸν εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔρ-
 γων· ὅταν οὖν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, κατα-
 φρονούμενοι καὶ τὰληθεῖς προσαναιροῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων
 τὴν ἡδονὴν, ὅφθεις ποτ' ἐφύμενος, ἀπακλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς
 αὐτὴν ὥς τοιαύτην οὔσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διαρίζει γὰρ οὐκ
 ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. Ἐοίκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων 4
 οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἶδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 πρὸς τὸν βίον· συμφδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύον-
 ται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς ἀννιντας ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς.

Τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἄλλῃς, τὰ δ' εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

- 2 Εὐδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθὸν φέρε' εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφειμένα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἕλλογα καὶ ἄλλογα· ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν ἐπεικὲς, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὴ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτόν φέρεσθαι ^{ἐπεικὲς} μὴνυεῖν ὥς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον· ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν. ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν· τὸ δὴ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τὰγαθὸν εἶναι. Ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σὺφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὥς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει
- 2 ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. Οὐχ ἦτον δ' φέρε' εἶναι φανερόν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦναντίον αἰρετόν. Μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετὸν ὃ μὴ δι' ἕτερον μηδ' ἐτέρου χάριν αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτον δ' ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερὶ τῶν τίνος ἕνεκα ἡδεται, ὥς καθ' αὐτὴν οὐσαν αἰρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. Προστιθεμένην τε ὅτε οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν· καὶ αὖξασθαι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ
- 3 αὐτῷ. Ἔοικε δὲ οὕτως γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἐτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. Τοιούτῳ δὲ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τὰγαθόν· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρὶς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτὸ τὰγαθὸν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. Δῆλον δ' ὥς οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὰγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετὰ τίνος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γί-
- 4 νεται. Τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. Οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι ὥς οὐκ ἀγα-

θὼν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθέν λέγωσιν ὃ γὰρ πᾶσι
δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἶναι φάμεν. ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν
πίστιν οὐ πανι πιστότερα ἔρει· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνό-
ητα ὠρέγεται αὐτῶν, ἢν ἂν τι τὸ λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ
φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγουσιν ἂν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαν-
λοῖς ἔστι τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρείττον ἢ καθ' αὐτὰ, ὃ
ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. Οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ
ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη
κακὸν ἐστί, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικείμεθα γὰρ καὶ
κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἁμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ, λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ
κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. Ἀμ-
φοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων καλῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἁμφω εἶναι,
τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται
τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακὸν, τὴν δ' αἰρούμενοι ὡς ἀγα-
θόν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀντίκειται. Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν (3)
ποιότητων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οἷδ' ἡ
(1) εὐδαιμονία. Λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὠρίσθαι, τὴν δ' 2
ἡδονὴν ἀρίστον εἶναι, ὅτι δεχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥτ-
τον. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ
α τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς
φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τοὺς ποιοῦντες ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς
ἀρετάς, ἔσται τὸ αὐτό· δίκαιοι γὰρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀν-
δρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον
καὶ ἥττον. Εἰ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μὴ ποτ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ
ε, αἴτιον, ἂν ᾧσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς, αἱ δὲ μιχαί. Τί γὰρ καὶ 3
λύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὠρισμένη οὐσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον
καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμ-
μετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις αἰεὶ, ἀλλ'
ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ
ἥττον. Τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἰ-

1 portion

- (3,4) **ναι.** Τέλειόν τε τὰγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γενέσιν ἀποφαίνειν πειρῶνται. Οὐ καλῶς δ' εἰκόασι λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν· πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκείον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὐτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει· ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἡδεσθαι δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. Μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτήν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἡδεσθαι. **Γενέσεις** τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι. Καὶ οὗ γενέσεις ἢ ἡδονή, τούτου ἢ λύπη φθορά. **6** Καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. Ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστὶ τὰ πάθη. Εἰ δὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἢ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἡδοίτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἢ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδοίτ' ἂν τις, καὶ τεμνόμενος λυποίτο. Ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γινομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἡδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. **7** Τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἀλυποὶ γάρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνημαὶ καὶ ἐλπίδες. Τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔνδεια γεγίνηται, οὐ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. **8** Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονιδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις ἡδέα ἐστὶν, οἷητέον

αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδία εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς
κάμνουσιν ὑγiewὰ ἢ γλυκία ἢ πικρὰ, οὐδ' αὖ λευκὰ τὰ
φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμῶσιν. *Ἡ οὕτω λέγοιτ' ἂν, ὅτι 9
αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γε τούτων, ὥσ-
περ καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ
μὴν ὅτιοῦν φαγόντι. *Ἡ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί; 10
ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ
οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον, οὐδὲ
τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν ἄλλων. *Εμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος, ἕτερος 11
ὢν τοῦ κάλακος, οὐκ οὔσαν ἀγαθὴν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφό-
ρους εἶδει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ
πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν
ὥς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. Οὐδεὶς τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο ζῆν παι- 12
δίου διανοίαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία
ὥς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων,
μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. Περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν
ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέρει ἡδονήν, οἷον
δρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. Εἰ δ' ἐξ
ἀνάγκης ἔπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ελοί-
μεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοντ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή.
*Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τὰγαθὸν ἢ ἡδονή, οὔτε πᾶσα αἰρετή, 13
δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς
διαφέρουσιν τῷ εἶδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν. Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα
περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω.

Τί δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γίνοντ' ἂν ἀπ' (4) 3
ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. Δοκεῖ γὰρ ἢ μὲν ὁρασις καθ' ὅντι-
νον χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνδεής οὐδενός,
δ' εἰς ὑστερον γεγόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. Ται-
οῦτα δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή· ὅλον γὰρ τι ἐστὶ, καὶ κατ'
οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονήν ἢ ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον

2 γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. Διὸ περ οὐδὲ κινήσεις
 ἔστιν· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλος τινός, οἷον
 ἢ οἰκοδομικὴ τελεία, ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὐ ἐφίεται. Ἡ ἐν
 ἀπαντί δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ, ἢ τούτῳ. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς μέρεσι τοῦ
 χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ
 ἀλλήλων· ἢ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἕτερα τῆς τοῦ κί-
 νου βαβδῶσεως, καὶ αὐταὶ τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως. Καὶ ἡ
 μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς πρὸς τὸ προκει-
 μενον· ἢ δὲ τῆς κρηπίδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελῆς· μέ-
 ρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα. Τῷ εἶδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσ-
 τιν ἐν ὁμοῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἶδει,
 3 ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἀπαντί. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως
 καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ φορὰ κινήσις πόθεν ποῖ,
 καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ' εἶδη, πτήσις, βαδισίς, ἀλσίς,
 καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ
 βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πρὸς ποῖ οὐ ταῦτόν ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ
 ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξι-
 εῖναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε καὶ κείνην· οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν
 διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοπῷ οὖσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὐτῇ
 ἐκείνης. Δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις
 εἴρηται, εὐκτε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἀπαντί χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ'
 αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσιν τῷ εἶδει, εἴπερ τὸ
 4 πόθεν ποῖ εἶδοποιόν. Τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁμοῦν χρόνῳ
 τέλει τὸ εἶδος. Δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραι τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλλή-
 λων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τε καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. Δόξειε δ' ἂν
 τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ,
 ἡδεσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τε. Ἐκ τούτων δὲ
 δῆλον καὶ ὅτι οἱ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι
 τὴν ἡδονήν. Οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν
 μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις
 οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οἷθεν κίνησις

οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὲ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γὰρ τι. Διὰ τῆς 5 4
 δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς
 εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ καλλίστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν
 τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐ-
 τὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ, μὴθὲν διαφερέτω·
 καθ' ἑκάστον δὲ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἀριστα
 διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κρῦτιστον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτήν. Αὕτη δ'
 ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη· κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησιν
 ἐστὶν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη
 δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ
 σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτήν. Τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν 6
 ἢ ἡδονή. Οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ᾧ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοὶ καὶ
 τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὅντα, ὥσπερ
 οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαί-
 νειν. Καθ' ἑκάστην δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον· 7
 φανερὰ γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα. Δῆλον δὲ
 καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴν ἢ τε αἴσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ
 πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ
 καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰεὶ ἐστὶ ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ
 ποιήσαντος καὶ τοῦ πεισσομένου. Τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν 8
 ἢ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἑξὺς ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπιγιγνώ-
 μενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίαις ἡ ὥρα· ἕως ἂν οὖν τό-
 τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρῖνον ἢ θεωροῦν,
 ἐστὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ ἡδονῇ· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ
 πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχόντων τοῦ τε παθητι-
 κοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταῦτό πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. Πῶς οὖν 9
 οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἡδεται; ἢ κάμκει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώ-
 πεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. Οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ'
 ἡδονή· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. Ἐνία δὲ τέρπει καινὰ
 ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οἱ αἰχ' ὁμοίως διὰ ταῦτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 πρῶτον παρακίκληται ἢ διάνοια καὶ διαταταμένως περὶ

αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥστε κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, με-
τέπειτα δ' αὖ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ παρημελημένη·
10 διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. Ὁρίεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς
οἷηθε· τίς ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίεν-
ται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνεργεῖα τίς ἐστὶ, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα
καὶ τοῦτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μου-
σικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ
περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος.

Ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὲ, οὐ δρί-
γονται. Εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ

5 11 γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ζῆν, αἰμετὸν ὄν. Πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν
ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφ-
εισθῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι. Συνεξεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνε-
ται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐδέχασθαι· ἀνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ
γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

(5) Ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν· τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ
εἶδει ὑφ' ἑτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῖσθαι. Οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται
καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῶα καὶ δένδρα
καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος. Ὁμοίως

2 φερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. Διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς δια-
νοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶ-
δος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί. Φανερὴ δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ

+ τοῦ συμφκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τε-
λειοῖ. Συναίξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκία ἡδονῇ· μάλ-
λον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς
ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ
γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδύασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον, χαίροντες αὐτῷ.
Συναίξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναίξοντα οἰκία. Τοῖς

ἑτέρους δὲ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. Ἐτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίου ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ φιλανθρωποὶ ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, εἴαν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῇ παρουσίᾳ ἐνεργείας· ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴν τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνέργειαν φθείρει. Ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ· ἢ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρει κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μὴδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν. Διὸ χαίροντες ὁψοῦν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῖμεν ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῖλοι οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ᾄσιν, τότε μάλιστα αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δηλον ὥς πολὺ διαστᾶσιν· σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκείαι λύπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκείαι λύπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπιλυπὸν ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὃ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρὰς οὖσης τῆς ἐνεργείας. Συμβαίνει δὲ περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τοῖναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκείαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. Αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γὰρ, πλὴν οἱ χ' ὁμοίως· Διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικεία καὶ φανυτότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἰρετῶν οὐσῶν, τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν, τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἐκύστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐστίν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φανύᾳ μαχθηρὴ· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί,

τῶν δ' αἰσchrῶν ψεκταί. Οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διαρισμέ-
 ναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς
 ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισ-
 7 βήτησιν εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. Οὐ μὲν
 ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἰσθησις· ἄτοπον γάρ·
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται τισι ταῦτόν. Ὡς-
 περ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἑτέρας, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. Διαφέρει δὲ
 ἡ ὄψις ἀφ᾽ ἧς καθαριώτητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὁσφρησις γεύσεως·
 ὁμοίως δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ
 8 τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. Δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἐκά-
 στῳ ζῳῳ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ
 τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν
 φανείη· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου,
 καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησι· ὄνον σύρματ' ἂν εἰσεσθαι
 μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἡδίων γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφή ὄνοιο. Αἱ
 μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν εἶδει, τὰς δὲ
 9 τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὐλογον εἶναι. Διαλλάττονται δ'
 οὐ μικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοῦτε μὲν
 τέρπει, τοῦτε δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητὰ
 ἐστί, τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. Καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ
 τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι
 καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ
 εὐεκτικῷ. Ὅμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων συμβαίνει.
 10 Δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ᾧπασιν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ
 σπουδαίῳ. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθύπερ δοκεῖ,
 καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἡ τοι-
 οῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα
 οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. Τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἰ τῷ φαίνεται
 ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολλὰ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι
 ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ

οὕτω διακειμένοις. Τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχροὺς 11
 δῆλον ὥς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμέ-
 νοις· τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἢ τίνα φα-
 τέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον;
 ταύταις γὰρ ἔπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. Εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν, εἴτε
 πλείους αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας
 τελειοῦσαι ἡδοναὶ κυρίως λέγοντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ
 εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ
 ἐνέργειαι.

Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ 8
 ἡδονὰς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπου διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ
 τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. Ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ
 τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. Εἵπομεν 2
 δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου
 ὑπάρχοι ἂν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ
 μέγιστα. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρίσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέρ-
 γειάν τινα θετίον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν
 δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἵρεται,
 αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ'
 αὐτὰς αἰρετῶν τινὰ θετίον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς
 γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. Καθ' αὐτὰς δ' 3
 εἰσὶν αἵρεται ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
 Τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ
 γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν,
 καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἵ-
 ροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦν-
 ται, ὑμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. Κατα-
 φεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζο-
 μένων οἱ πολλοὶ, διό παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν
 οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφί-
 ενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφῶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς· δέονται

δὲ τοιούτων. Δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ
 τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ
 4 ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ δυναστεύ-
 ειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι·
 οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῇς ἐλλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευ-
 θερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύ-
 τας οἰητέον αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ'
 αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι. Εὐλογον δὲ,
 ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω
 5 καὶ φανύλοισ καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. Καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρη-
 ται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῇ σπουδαίᾳ τοιαῦτα
 ὄντα· ἐκάστη δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ἔξιν αἰρετωτάτη ἐν-
 6 ἔργεια, καὶ τῇ σπουδαίᾳ δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. Οὐκ ἐν
 παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἀτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι
 παιδιᾶν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον
 ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. Ἄπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἶπεν ἑτέρου
 ἔνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη.
 Σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται
 καὶ λίαν παιδικόν· παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνά-
 χαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παι-
 διᾷ, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δύνανται.
 Οὐ δὲ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἔνικα τῆς ἐνερ-
 γείας. Δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος
 7 δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. Βελτίω τε λέγο-
 μεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ
 τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μαρίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν
 τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμο-
 8 νικωτέρα ἤδη. Ἀπολαύσειέ τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν
 ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ ἦττον τοῦ ἀρίστου εὐδαι-
 μονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῃ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον·
 οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ'

ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.

Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλο- 7
γον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου.
Εἴτε δὴ νοῖς τοῦτο, εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ
ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ
θείων, εἴτε θείων ὧν καὶ αὐτὰ, εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότα-
τον, ἢ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ
τελεία εὐδαιμονία. Ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται.
Ὁμολογοῦμεν δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότε- 2
ρον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. Κρατίστη γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέρ-
γεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ
ἃ ὁ νοῦς. Ἐτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν γὰρ δυνάμεθα
συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν, οἰόμεθα τε δεῖν ἡδὺ- 3
νὴν παραμεμῆχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρε-
τὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν·
δοκεῖ γοῖν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθα-
ριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δε ταῖς εἰδοσὶ τῶν ζη-
τούντων ἡδύα τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. Ἡ τε λεγομένη αὖ- 4
τάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν
γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίῳ καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ
λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων
ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὐδὲ δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν,
καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον βέλτιον ὅ· ἴσως συ-
νεργαυὲς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος. Δόξαι τ' ἂν ὁ
αὕτη μόνη δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γί-
νεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτῶν ἢ πλείον
ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πράξιν. Δοκεῖ τε ἡ 6
εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα

being well enough
in it something

σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. Τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια· αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἀσχολοὶ εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνοιτο. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀσχολος, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμᾶς ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν 7 δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν. Εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἀσχολοὶ καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικῇ οὖσα, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν, αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ τὸ ἀτταρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα. Ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές 8 ἐστὶ τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἢ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν. Εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. Οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητὸν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν, καὶ πάντα

consisting in a
pr. 5. 1. 2. 3.
the quality of it

complete

ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμότητι πολὺ μάλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκασ- 9
τος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον ἄτοπον οὖν γί-
νοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου.
Τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκτεῖον
ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ.
Καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὰν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο
μαλιστα ἀνθρώπος. Οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· αἱ γὰρ κατ' 8
αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ
ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν
συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρεῖαις καὶ πράξεις παντοίαις ἐν τε
τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστῳ. Ταῦτα δ' 1
εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. Ἐνία δὲ καὶ συμβαί- 2
κειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συμφεκέωσθαι
τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετῇ. ■ Συνέζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ 3
φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει,
εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικάς εἰσιν
ἀρετὰς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν.
Συνηρητῆμα δ' αὐταὶ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον
ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί. Καὶ ὁ
βίος δὴ ὁ κατ' αὐτάς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. Ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ
πεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακρι-
βῶσαι γὰρ μείζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν 4
καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι
τῆς ἠθικῆς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεῖα καὶ ἐξ
ἴσου ἴστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολι-
τικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρει
πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευ-
θερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια,

καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλή-
σεις ἀδελφοί, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσ-
θαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμει, εἴπερ ἐπι-
τελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας
5 πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις ; ἀμφισ-
βητεῖται δὲ πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις
ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης. Τὸ δὲ τέλειον δῆλον
ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη. Πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖ-
ται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ᾖσι καὶ καλλίους, πλειόνων.
6 Τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς γε τὴν
ἐνέργειαν χρεια, ἀλλ' ὥς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρὸς
γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἢ δ' ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶ καὶ πλείοσι συζῇ,
αἰρεῖται τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεήσεται οὖν τῶν
7 τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. Ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαι-
μονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν
φανείη. Τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακα-
ρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι
χρεὼν αὐτοῖς ; πότερα τὰς δικαίας ; ἢ γελοῖοι φανού-
νται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ
ὅσα τοιαῦτα ; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φο-
βερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν ; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους ;
τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν ; ἀτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα
ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. Αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἰεν ; ἢ φορτικὸς
ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας ; διεξιούσι
δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ
ἀνάξια θεῶν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν
αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ
τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα. Τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρου-
μένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεω-
ρία ; ὥστε ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα,
θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. Καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὲ ἢ ταύτη

συγγενεσάτῃ εὐδαιμονικωτάτῃ. Σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ 8
μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεαῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμα τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπεὶδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. Ἐφ' ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ 9
συμβεβηκός· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὐτὴ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τιμία. Ὡστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

Δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπου ὄντι· οὐ 9 9
γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τρυφῇν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν. Οὐ μὲν οἴητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐτάρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατόν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς 10
καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλὰ· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναται ἂν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. Τοῦτο δ' ἴστω ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιώται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἦττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπικρὴ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. Ἰκανὸν δὲ τοσαυτὸ ὑπάρχειν· ἴσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. Καὶ Ζόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαί- 11
μονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀ. κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὥς ἦτο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένοι πράττειν ἃ δεῖ. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἰ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οἱτοὶ γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτὸς, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. Συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν 12

δόξαι. Πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινὰ, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. Σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτίον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑπαληπτίον. Ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐλογον· χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. Ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. Θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. Τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

- 10(9) Ἄρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἥ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γινῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά· οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἥ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θεόγιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρόρμησαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἡθὸς τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ

τοῖς ἡθούσις τοῖς
οἱ νέοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν
φίλον καὶ ἀνδρῶν
ἀνδρῶν φαίνονται

τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες
 τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διωκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν αὐταὶ ἔσονται,
 φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ
 ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἀγευστοὶ οὖντες.
 Τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσει; οὐ γὰρ 5
 οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ράδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἥθεσι κατειλημ-
 μένα λόγῳ μεταστήσαι. Ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάν-
 των ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὧν ἐπιεικέως δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, με-
 ταλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. Γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται, οἱ 6
 μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύ-
 σεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος
 θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λό-
 γος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ' οἷκ ἐν ἀπασιν ἰσχύῃ, ἀλλὰ 11/
 δὴν προδιεργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν 12/
 πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέ-
 ψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέ- 7
 ποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ φύσιν ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως
 ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπεῖσαι; ὅλως τ' οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ
 ἐπιείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίῃ. Δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἥθος προὑπάρ- 8
 χειν πῶς οἰκείον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσ-
 χεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρὸν. Ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυ-
 χεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τροφέντα
 νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οἷχ
 ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. Διὸ νόμοις
 δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ
 ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γινόμενα. Οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' 9
 ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τεχεῖν ὀρθῆς
 ἀλλ', ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ
 ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως
 δὲ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον
 ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίῳς ἢ τῷ καλῷ. Διόπερ 10

- οἷονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὥς ὑπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυστέρους υἱσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῇ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσκειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. Διὸ καὶ φασὶ δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἱ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς.
- 11 Εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφήναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίγνοιτ' ἂν βιουμένοις κατὰ τινα νοῦν
- 12 καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσιν ἰσχύν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἢ ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἢ τινος τοιούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος δὲ ἀπὸ τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς τάττων τὸ
- 13 ἐπιεικές. Ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ πόλει μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέλῃται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ ἕκαστος ὥς βούλεται,
- 14 κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχου. Κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθήν καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων ἐκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν πρυσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ἢ προαιρεῖσθαι γε. Μάλιστα δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαὶ δῆλον ὅτι

φ. καὶ καὶ καὶ καὶ

καὶ καὶ καὶ καὶ
καὶ καὶ καὶ καὶ

διὰ νόμων γίνονται, ἐπεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων.
 Γεγραμμένων δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδέν ἄν δόξειε διαφέρειν,
 οὐδέ δέ' ὧν εἷς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ'
 ἐπὶ μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευ-
 μάτων. Ὅσπερ γάρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα
 καὶ τὰ ἔθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ
 ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργε-
 σίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ
 φύσει. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι 15
 τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἱατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ
 πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὶ δ' ἴσως οὐ,
 ὃ τε πυκτικῶς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθη-
 σιν. Ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἄν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκασ-
 τον ἰδίᾳ τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ
 προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. Ἄλλ' ἐπιμεληθεῖη μὲν ἄν
 ἄριστα καθ' ἓν καὶ ἱατρὸς καὶ γυμναστής καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος
 ὃ τὸ καθόλου εἰδώς, ὅτι πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε· τοῦ κοι- α.
 νοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονταί τε καὶ εἰσίν. Οὐ μὲν 16
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνὶς τις οὐδέν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμελη-
 θῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθειμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ
 συμβαίοντα ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἱατροὶ
 εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἐτέρῳ οὐδέν ἄν δυ-
 νάμενοι ἐπαρκέσαι. Οὐδέν δ' ἦττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομέ-
 νῳ τεχνικῶ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῶ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βα-
 διστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν, κακείνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχε-
 ται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. Τάχα δὲ 17
 καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίονε ποιεῖν, εἴτε
 πολλοῦς, εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῶ πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ
 διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γυνοίμεθ' ἂν. Ὅντινα γὰρ οὐκ καὶ τῶν
 προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἴσται τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ'
 εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς καὶ τῶν

- 18 λοιπῶν ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμέλειά τις καὶ φρόνησις. Ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις; ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόνιον γὰρ ἔδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. Ἡ οὐχ ὁμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταὶ, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρία μᾶλλον ἢ διανοία· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες, οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνοντας (καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς), οὐδ' οὐ πολιτικούς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους
- 19 υἱεῖς ἢ τινὰς ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. Εὐλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἂν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλονται ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. Οὐ μὲν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἢ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίγνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὰ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν
- 20 ἐμπειρίας. Τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρῳ ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ' ἂν φοντο ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὔσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρίναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικὴν· οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα

ποίοις συνάδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλαν-
θάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποιήται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ
γραφικῆς. Οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις εἰκόασιν·
πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἢ τοὺς
ἀρίστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἱατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν 21
συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. Καίτοι πειρῶνται γε λέγειν
οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς λαθεῖεν ἂν
καὶ ὥς δεῖ θεραπεύειν ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἔξεις.
Ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ'
ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεΐα. Ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ
τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῇ-
σαι καὶ κρίναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοῦναντίον καὶ ποῖα ποίοις
ἀρμόττει, εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ ἔξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα
διεξιούσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ
ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν γέ-
νοιτο.

Παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ 22
τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον
ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἢ
περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. Πρῶτον μὲν 23
οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενε-
στέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἴτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων
πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς
πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας
αἰτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς, αἱ δὲ τοῦναντίον πολιτεύονται·
θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ
ποῖα πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ
τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένη. Λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξά-
μενοι.

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Numerus Romanus major librum, minor caput, Arabicus sectionem indicat. Capitulum divisione, quam in hac editione numeri uncinis inclusi indicant, perpetuo usi sumus.

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 ψεύδεσθαι vii. ix. 4. ψευδόμενος λόγος vii. ii. 8.
 ψευδομαρτυρία v. ii. 13.
 ψεύστης iv. vii. 12.
 ψήφισμα v. x. 6, 7 : vi. viii. 2.
 ψηφισματώδης v. vii. 1.
 ψιμύθιον ι. vi. 11.
 ψοφεῖν vii. v. 6 : vi. 1.
 ψυχὴ στασιάζει ix. iv. 9. ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια ι. vii. 14, 15 ; ix. 7 ; xiii. 1, 6. δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ι. xiii. 7. ψυχῆς δύο μέρη ι. xiii. 9 : v. xi. 9 : vi. i. 5.
 ψυχικαὶ ἐνέργειαι ι. viii. 2. ἡδοναὶ iii. x. 2.
 ὠνεῖσθαι v. iv. 13 ; vii. 5.
 ὦρα x. iv. 8 ; viii. iv. 1.
 ὠφέλιμον v. v. 18 ; ix. 17 : vi. ix. 6 : viii. iii. 4 ; xiii. 8.
 ὠχρίαν iv. ix. 2.

NOTES.

proposition and the main question is preserved. Observe that the comparative of *good* is in most, if not in all languages, irregular: there are, properly speaking, no degrees of good, though there are approaches towards it, which seem to be its degrees.

- (5.) 2. It is evident that Aristotle is here not merely giving us a piece of information, as it is commonly explained (see Harris on Happiness); laying down a mere abstract difference between the *ἐνέργεια* and *ἔργον*, one signifying the operations which lead to a production, the other the thing produced. This may be a true distinction, but it is not what he has in view here, for he says immediately below that an *ἐνέργεια* may be an *ἔργον*; he is laying down a difference of value between them, with a view to the strict argument he is working out.
- (6.) 4. He lays down that in human actions and systems there is a subordination; that there are some subordinate to those above them, and these again to some one highest of all; that this highest is more an object of choice than those below it: and thus by implication he gives the minor to each of the above major premisses. This, to which all else are subordinate and tend, (i.e. *τέλος πρακτῶν*,) is most *οὐ πάντα ἐφίεται*, and also is the *ἔργον* of all other *ἐνέργειαι*.
- (7.) 3. *ἐπιστήμη*, a collection of abstract *laics*. *τέχνη*, the same applied to practice as *rules*.
- (8.) 4. *ὑπό* refers rather to the constitution of nature, whereby one is placed in subjection to another; the same notion often exists in the word *κύριος*.—*αἰρετώτερα*. Observe that this word always has reference to the opinions of men.
- (9.) 5. *διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέν*. An *ἐνέργεια* may be itself an *ἔργον*: and it is not less a good, or *the good*, for that. It was necessary to lay this down, as the *ἔργον* of man is an *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*. Met. viii. 8. p. 186. Ed. Tauchnitz. See also Eth. vii. 12. 3; vii. 13. 2.
- (10.) 5. *παρὰ ταύτας*. Besides and beyond the *ἐνέργειαι*.
- (11.) 5. *ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεῖσων ἐπιστημῶν*. *ἐπιστήμη* is here used loosely for *systems* or *arts*, such as *ναυπηγική*, *ιατρική*, &c.

NOTES.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) 1. IN this chapter Aristotle is laying down definitions or characteristics of the good, preparatory to drawing the conclusion in chapter ii., that the τέλος πρακτῶν is the ἀγαθόν of man. The syllogisms stand thus:—
1. ὃ πάντα ἐφίεται is the τὰγαθόν of man (*opinions of men*).
τέλος πρακτῶν is οὐ πάντα ἐφίεται.
τέλος πρακτῶν is τὰγαθόν of man.
2. The ἔργον of all other ἐνέργειαι is τὰγαθόν of man (*constitution of nature*).
τέλος πρακτῶν is the ἔργον of all other ἐνέργειαι.
τέλος πρακτῶν is τὰγαθόν of man.
- (2.) 1. πᾶσα κ.τ.λ. All human action as it usually exists in the world. τέχνη, systems of contrivance, with a view to production. μέθοδος (ἐξίς ὁδοποιητικὴ μετὰ λόγου), systems of rules, with a view to the proper regulation of our intellectual, social, or moral faculties, such as logic, politics. πρᾶξις, actions in moral life. προαίρεσις, acts of choice.
- (2.) 3. δοκεῖ. This word points to the opinions of men. πέφυκε, is *by nature*. ἐστὶ, simply *is*. φαίνεται, *evidently is*. So in this chapter δοκεῖ is used in the premiss embodying the opinions of men: "Whatever all desire is rightly defined to be *the good*." πέφυκε is used where the argument is drawn from the constitution of nature; so βέλτιον πέφυκε, "the ἔργον of all ἐνέργειαι is *by nature* the good."
- (4.) 2. Διαφορὰ δέ τις κ.τ.λ. difference in value. Aristotle is not here merely setting forth a distinction between ἐνέργειαι and ἔργα, but he is doing so with a view to their relation to *the good*; that one is a greater good than the other—βέλτιον = ἀγαθώτερον. By noticing this, the connection between this

CHAPTER II.

- (12.) He here draws his conclusion from the premisses advanced in the last chapter, that the τέλος πρακτῶν, whatever it may be, is the ἀγαθόν of man.
- (13.) 1. The leading notion in Aristotle's mind is *that man's own nature, with its tendencies and powers, would lead him to happiness*; and this is what he practically states when he says that it is τέλος πρακτῶν. The πρακτά of man are really only the development and exhibition of man's nature and tendencies; and the very presence of these tendencies (ὁρεξις) implies some τέλος towards which they tend; and the τέλος would be that which most fully comprehended and developed that nature and its ὁρεξις: hence the leading proposition of his moral system is *that the full and complete development of man's nature is his happiness*. He believed man not only designed by nature to be happy, but contrived for happiness; and that his own constitution would lead him to it, if he would honestly follow it. "This is what the Schoolmen mean when, in their way of expression, they say, *That the will is carried towards happiness not simply as will, but as nature.*" Leighton's Lectures on Happiness, II. vol. iv. p. 190, ed. 1830.
- (14.) 1. Εἰ δὲ. δὲ very frequently marks a conclusion in the Ethics. See Grammar, 721, 1.
- (15.) 1. πρόεισι κ.τ.λ. If the elenchus on which this argument rests be worked out, it will bring us to the key-stone of Aristotle's philosophy: οὐθὲν ἡ φύσις μάτην ποιεῖ. It is always worth while to work out compressed arguments of this sort, as well for the mental exercise, as for the sake of the principles up to which they lead us.
- (16.) 1. κενήν, *empty in itself*; ματαίαν, *without result*.
- (17.) 1. ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀριστον, the good and the *bravest*, as we say; the same thing (*summum bonum*) viewed under different aspects.
- (18.) 1. ὁρεξιν. For the senses of ὁρεξις, see the note 40 on book iii. chap. ii.
- (19.) 2. ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ. Mark the word γνῶσις, and compare book x. chap. 9. 1, where he speaks of the result of all the

preceding part of his treatise as τὸ γνῶναι. The Ethics is not a mere practical exposition of virtue, and the way to attain to it, but also, and rather, a search after it, and a proof of what it is in its practical, not its speculative, nature. By such expressions as “τέλος οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις,” on which so much stress is laid, it is meant that the Ethics is not a speculative enquiry into the abstract essence of virtue or happiness, without any further object; but a moral enquiry into their *practical* nature as they exist in action, and with a view to it.

(20.) 3. τύπῳ γε, at least in an outline, or sketch.

(21.) 3. τί ποτ' ἐστὶ, *what its nature is*.

(22.) 3. τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων, to what science or system it belongs. ἐπιστήμη is here both a science and a scientific art, with a definite subject-matter, such as politics, ethics, &c.; δύναμις, an organic art, such as logic or rhetoric, which supplies formulæ, more or less abstract, for any subject-matter. Of course, to whatever system, whether scientific or formal, the good belongs, the knowledge of that science is necessary to its comprehension, and an enquiry into it is necessary to the completeness of that science. Hence πολιτική includes ethics, and ethics is πολιτική τις, a branch of the grand science of politics.

(23.) 4. Δόξειε δ', *would be held, or allowed, to be*.

(24.) 4. κυριωτάτης, that to which most authority is given by nature. ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς, that which is most practically directive.

(25.) 5. φαίνεται, *evidently is*.

(26.) 5. διατάσσει and ὑπὸ ταύτην refer to κυριωτάτης: χρωμένης and περιέχουσι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. — Cf. Pol. 1. 1.

(27.) 7. τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. The ἀγαθόν of man belongs to the science of politics, inasmuch as the end of this science embraces all other ends under it, and therefore is practically the τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν.

(28.) 8. εἰ γάρ κ.τ.λ. This is one of the instances of omission of the sentence to which γάρ refers, which produces so much difficulty in following Aristotle's arguments. The sentence

must be worked out from the context, and supplied, before the bearing of the reasoning can be perceived. It might have been expected that the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν would belong to ἀνθρωπίνη ἐπιστήμη, and not πολιτική: but this is not so, *for* in reality ἀνθρωπίνη ἐπιστήμη is the same as πολιτική, and ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν as πολιτικὸν ἀγαθόν, being different views of the same thing; but πολιτική is higher than ἀνθρωπίνη, as the πόλις is higher than the individual, resting on higher grounds and aiming at higher results (cf. Eth., bk. vi. 8. 1); and therefore the good may be viewed either as πολιτικῆς τέλος, or πρακτῶν τέλος.

- (29.) 9. τοῦτων, either ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν (= πρακτῶν τέλος,) and πολιτικῆς τέλος (= πολιτικὸν ἀγαθόν), or referring back to section 3, τί ποτε ἐστὶ, καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. Looking to the beginning of chap. iv., it is probably the former of these.
- (30.) 9. πολιτικὴ τις οὐσα. Being thus connected with politics, and a necessary branch of that science which aims at the happiness of the state, or, in other words, the ἀγαθόν of the individuals composing it, the good of man belongs to the province of politics, and the knowledge of the former is necessary to the completeness of the latter. The Ethics is the accidence of the Politics.

CHAPTER III.

- (31.) Having now laid it down that the ἀγαθόν of man is πρακτῶν τέλος, and that it belongs to the science of politics, he would naturally proceed to the enquiry as to what this πρακτῶν τέλος may be; but he first guards himself against those who would object to his system that it is not demonstrative, and to those who object that it is above their comprehension. The one class would be of the philosophic, the other of the self-indulgent, careless sort.
- (32.) 1. κατὰ, *proportionably to*.
- (33.) 1. δημιουργουμένοις, works of art. The perfection required differs according to the material, &c.
- (34.) 2. καλὰ καὶ δίκαια, the principles of moral and social right.

- (35.) 2. διαφοράν, difference in different nations. πλάνην, vagueness, even where agreed upon in the general. From this statement we may deduce (partly) the influence of oracles, whereby the Greek endeavoured to supply the want of some certain standard and guide, and the necessity of revelation to correct and steady false, shifting views.
- (36.) 2. δοκεῖν νόμῳ μὲν εἶναι φύσει δὲ μή. The Sophists are here generally alluded to, though, strictly speaking, they held that some καλά were φύσει, others νόμῳ: but that all δίκαια were νόμῳ, and none φύσει. Plato, Legg. 889. As a school, however, they practically get rid of the reality of all natural right and wrong.
- (37.) 3. καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ, the principles and views of human good.
- (38.) 4. περὶ τοιούτων, on such subject-matter. ἐκ τοιούτων, from such premisses. παχυλῶς, *roughly*. τοιαῦτα, *sc.* τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.
- (39.) 5. ἀκοδέχεσθαι, to listen to the proof: we must, in probable matters, be content with *probability*.
- (40.) 5. πεπαιδευμένον. The man of a highly trained mind has the power not only of discerning truth when it is put before him, but of discerning how far truth is attainable: so he only will see that the proofs which Aristotle is about to bring forward give all the proof of which the subject is capable.
- (41.) 6. κρίνει καλῶς ἀγινώσκει. This faculty answers to σύνεσις in morals. See bk. vi. c. x.
- (42.) 6. ἀπλῶς. The generic sense of ἀπλῶς is “keeping out of sight the circumstances mentioned in the context;” here it is *generally*, leaving out τὰ καθ’ ἑκαστα.
- (43.) 7. οἰκεῖος, *the proper; the most suitable*.
- (44.) 7. τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, *moral action*.
- (45.) 7. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. The self-indulgent man will not comprehend the real force of moral reasoning: he may listen to it, and possibly apprehend it with his reason, but it will be ματαιῶς and ἀνωφελῶς, because it will produce no effect on his practice.
- (46.) 7. ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος κ.τ.λ. It is not implied in these

words that the Ethics is a mere practical exposition of virtue, and how to become virtuous. He does not say that he is not going to pursue the subject of morals with a view to the (as far as may be) scientific knowledge of virtue, but merely that he does not mean his treatise to end in mere knowledge, but in knowledge with a view to action. See last chapter, note 19, and also below, where εἰδέναι is spoken of as profitable to those who know how to use it.

(47.) 8. παρὰ χρόνον, from time. Gr. Gr. 637. 3, c.

CHAPTER IV.

(48.) *Resumption of subject.* If there is any agreement among men as to the good, whether viewed as ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν or πολιτικῆς τέλος, then the question is settled, and Aristotle might at once have proceeded to politics proper, or the consideration of the most perfect way of developing and securing this ἀγαθόν by legislation and government; but such agreement does not exist.

(49.) 1. ἀναλαμβάνοντες, *resuming the subject*, after the digression in the last chapter.

(50.) 1. γνῶσις refers to πολιτική: προαίρεσις τοῦ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

(51.) 2. εὐδαιμονίαν. Observe the notion implied in this word: compare it with Latin *fortuna*, from *fors*, and our *happiness*, from *hap*.

(52.) 2. χαρίεντες, *the educated*. See Lidd. and Scott.

(53.) 2. εὖ ζῆν refers to abundance of good things; εὖ πράττειν, to success and good fortune.

(54.) 2. ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, *conceive of*. This is its usual meaning in the Ethics.

(55.) 3. ἀποδιδοῦσιν, *explain it*.

(56.) 3. παρὰ ταῦτα, *besides and beyond*. The Platonic Idea is here alluded to.

(57.) 4. ἐπιπολαζούσας, *most popular*. Lidd. and Scott; literally, on the surface.

- (58.) 5. $\mu\eta\lambdaανθανέτω$. It is not to be supposed that Aristotle introduces this passage in the middle of his subject to give us a piece of information which belongs rather to logic, or possibly found a place in his *Methodica*; but being about to examine human opinions as a possible source of truth, it was necessary to vindicate their right to be thus considered, as Plato and his school would look upon such materials as unsound foundations, and inadmissible in the endeavour to build up truth. Aristotle therefore lays down the principle of the analytical and synthetical methods, and claims for each its proper position in true philosophy, quoting Plato himself as an evidence of the existence of both methods. The opinions of mankind are among the *phænomena* of the world, and a system based on them would be analytical, i.e. analyzing a confused ($\tau\alpha\sigmaυγκεχυμένα$: see *Phys.* i. 1. 2.) mass of facts, in order to arrive at the truth implied in them. The words *analytical* and *synthetical* are explained by the Schoolmen, and after them by Aldrich, in a different sense. This is only noticed to prevent students from confusing themselves by trying to explain this passage by what Aldrich says.
- (59.) 5. $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ in the *Ethics* signifies a *starting-point*, whether in reasoning, scientific or moral,—or in action or choice,—or in his treatise.
- (60.) 5. $\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\tauέονο\upsilonν=ή\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}\acute{\eta}\mu\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\tau\omega$. He claims the right to proceed from $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\tau\acute{\omega}\nu\gamma\eta\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\mu\omega\nu$, from whatever presents itself as $\gamma\eta\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\mu\omicron\nu$, whether matters of human experience, observation, opinion; or $\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\acute{\omega}\varsigma$, abstract principles, prior to and independent of such experience, &c.; that is, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*. For the difference between $\gamma\eta\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\mu\alpha\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ and $\gamma\eta\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\mu\alpha\acute{\eta}\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$, see *Phys.* i. 1. 2; *Anal. Post.* i. 2. 10.
- (61.) 5. $\acute{\iota}\sigma\omega\varsigmaο\upsilonν\kappa.\tau.\lambda.$ The more usual, because the most accessible, sources of enquiry will be $\gamma\eta\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\mu\alpha\acute{\eta}\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\gamma\gamma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha\tau\eta\varsigma\alpha\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$. The facts of moral life—whether these be the facts of our constitution, or the facts of life, as discernible in the actions, the opinions, language, habits of men, set forth either by the $\omicron\acute{\iota}\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\omicron\acute{\iota}$, or the $\phi\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\acute{\iota}\mu\omicron\varsigma$ or $\sigma\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma$, or $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, or $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ —all may be bases of truth, and furnish sound ground for further systems. The characteristic of Aristotle's method is that he claims the right to use both methods, as they may be within his reach. When he draws his arguments

from the abstract constitution of nature he uses the former, but when from opinions of men, the latter; but he usually uses the analytical, because most suited to his subject. It is hardly worth while to enquire at length whether the whole of his treatise is one or the other: perhaps, as he begins with the abstract principle of nature that the ἀγαθόν of every thing is in its ἔργον, and proceeds to shew that ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ does perform the ἔργον, he may be in a certain sense synthetical; but we may remark that he seldom or never brings forward an abstract principle without confirming it by experience.

- (62.) 6. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. As facts form the groundwork of moral science, and as moral facts are appreciable only by men of good morals, hence a right moral education is absolutely necessary for the profitable study of moral or social subjects, or, to speak generally, of politics.

- (63.) 7. ὁ τοιοῦτος, sc. ὁ καλῶς τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡγμένος.

CHAPTER V.

- (64) He now examines the opinions of men on the subject, to see if they can give a satisfactory answer to his question.
- (65) 1. ὁθεν, see end of sec. 4, last chapter.—γάρ refers to the difference among the opinions which the last chapter mentions.
- (66) 2. ὑπολαμβάνειν, *conceive of; form their notions of*.—ἐκ τῶν βίων, *from the different sorts of life*.—φορτικώτατοι, *the vulgar*. See Lidd. and Scott ad v.
- (67) 3. τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου, *but they obtain consideration, or have a show of reason*.
- (68) 4. ἐπιπολαιότερον, *too superficial; too uncertain*.
- (69.) 4. μαντεῖόμεθα, *we feel*: without going into the reason and proof, we have a sort of instinct about it.
- (70) 5. γοῦν introduces the proof of a foregoing statement. See Gr. Gr. 737, c.
- (71) 5. παρ' οἷς, sc. παρὰ τοῖτοισι οἷς, *before those by whom*, &c. See Gr. Gr. 822, obs. 1.

- (72.) 6. *θέσιν διαφυλάττων*, *maintaining a paradox*. Top. i. 9. 5, p. 107.
- (73.) 6. *ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις*. *In my treatise on general subjects*. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. Probably general questions on morals. These were two books of *προβλήματα ἐγκύκλιω*, a passage from which is quoted by Aulus Gellius, *xx*. 4; and from the character of this passage it seems probable that these are the treatises referred to here. See Fabr. Bibl. Græc. iii. p. 392.
- (74.) 7. *ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις*. The next chapter is devoted to a more particular consideration of the supposed *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*, which is the aim and result of the *βίος θεωρητικός* with respect to the supposed science of happiness. These words are commonly supposed to refer to the discussion in the tenth book; but first, as the doctrine of the *ιδέα*, which is the principle of speculative philosophy or *βίος θεωρητικός*, is, as a matter of fact, considered in the next chapter, it seems difficult to give any reason why these words should not refer to that chapter. Next, if we take the passages in which the words *ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις* occur, we shall find that they denote a more real and actual connection than between the first and last book of a treatise. Where he refers to some distant part of his book (as in Rhet. i. 10. 5), he generally gives a more distinct description of the part referred to.
- (75.) 8. *τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα*, sc. *ἡδονή—τιμὴ—ἀρετή*.
- (76.) 8. *καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι κ.τ.λ.* The other reading is *καί*, which would mean that Aristotle had wasted many words on them; and as this could hardly be said to be true, therefore *καίτοι* is the better reading. *But even these do not appear to be final; and yet much reasoning has been spent with regard to them, i.e. to prove them to be τέλη,—not by himself, but by others.*

CHAPTER VI.

- (77.) He now examines the opinions of those who look for the good in the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, and hold that the only true happiness consists in, and is gained by, the mental realisation of the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*,—by the science of the good. It would be beside our purpose to go at length into an account of the

Platonic theory of ideas: it is enough to say that the leading feature of it seems to be, that there existed in the Divine mind certain archetypal forms or qualities, which being communicated to, or at least present in, things visible, gave them these qualities, (Phædo, 100, cf. Arist. Met. xii. 5, pp. 269, 270); and that these archetypal ideas being also impressed on the mind of men, were called out by mental exercise; and when they were thus called out, the true qualities of visible things were recognised in their several shapes and forms of existence. Thus a visible thing was good by virtue of the presence in it of the idea of good, and the mind could recognise and enjoy that good only by virtue of the mental development and realisation of the corresponding idea.

- (78.) 1. καθόλου, sc. the Platonic idea, (Met. vi. 13, p. 155); called καθόλου, from its being the result of the highest abstraction. It may be observed that in the *Physica*, 1. i., καθόλου has exactly an opposite meaning, viz. the whole fully exhibited in its details and phenomena.
- (79.) 1. τὰ εἶδη. Here the *ἰδέαι*, or abstract ideas: when opposed to *ἰδέαι*, as below, section 10, it seems to mean the concrete to which the *ἰδέαι* by its presence gives form and quality.
- (80.) 1. ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. This passage probably gave rise to the Latinised saying attributed to Aristotle, "Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis amica veritas." Whenever Plato is spoken of, even when his theories are opposed, it is always with respect, and almost affection.
- (81.) 2. There are five ways in which Aristotle meets the doctrine of the *ἰδέαι* —
1. By taking some abstract principles of the speculative school, (2—4).
 2. By calling on them to define the difference between the αἰτὶς ἑκαστου and the thing itself, (5—7).
 3. By shewing that their distinction between good independent and good dependent does not help them, (8—11).
 4. By shewing that the common name of "good" does not necessarily imply a common idea, (12).
 5. By shewing that it would be of no practical use, (13—end).

- (82.) 2. He takes as a major premiss, one of the Platonic dogmas, and proves from it that there can be no one abstract idea of good. It would be quite waste of time to enquire either into the meaning of the Platonic dogma, or how far it is true. Aristotle allows, for the purpose of his argument, that it is true, and we may do the same. The argument is a simple negative syllogism in the first figure, and, as well as the other arguments in this chapter, should be worked out in full.
- (83.) 2. κομίσαντες. This may be translated *entertaining*. See Lidd. and Scott ad v.
- (84.) 2. λέγεται, *is predicated in*; that is, may, as a predicate, express substance or quality, &c.
- (85.) 2. ἡ οὐσία. The category of substance. For the other meanings of it,—the essence, the universal, the genus,—see Met. vi. 3, p. 130, where substance is also termed ὑποκείμενον: see also Categ. c. 2, and 3, Met. iv. 8, p. 98.—καθ' αὐτό. The other categories can only exist ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ: they have no independent existence; wherefore καθ' αὐτό is a characteristic of οὐσία.
- (86.) 2. παραφυάδι, *offshoot*; συμβεβηκότη, *property*. See Met. iv. 30, p. 119; see also iii. 4, p. 70.
- (87.) 3. ἰσαχῶς λέγεται, *sc. it is predicated in all the Categories*. A thing may be spoken of as good in respect of its relation to the end, or the time or place when and where it happened, and so on through the rest. Refer to the end of the second chapter of the Categories.
- (88.) 3. καιρός, *opportunity*. This argument is an hypothetical destructive.
- (89.) 4. ἢ ν ἄ ν, *sc. if there is an idea of good*.
- (90.) 5. An argument to shew that, waiving the question of there being such a thing as αὐτο ἕκαστον, the difference between it and the ἕκαστον itself is unreal, a mere play upon words; that the Platonists themselves cannot define them in different terms.
- (91.) 5. καί is emphatic: how they *even* wish to define, &c.
- (92.) 5. ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. ἄνθρωπος and αὐτο ἄνθρωπος are defined by the same terms.

- (93) 6 This is an answer to the argument drawn from the eternity of the αὐτὸ ἕκαστον. The essence of the thing is not altered by its greater or less permanence; that which is white for an instant is as white as that which is white for a thousand years. It may, however, be answered, that permanence being itself a good, a thing which is good for an instant is not so good as that which is so for a thousand years.
- (94.) 7. Σπείσιππος. The nephew and successor of Plato in the Academy, whom Aristotle represents as abandoning, in part at least, the Platonic theory, by making *unity* an exhibition or phase of good, rather than good a development and phase of unity. See Met. vi. 2, p. 129.
- (95.) 7. ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ. This συστοιχία was a sort of catalogue, or double list, in which ten sorts of good and their corresponding evils were placed over against each other; such as πέραις—ἄπειρον. περιττὸν—ἄρτιον. ἐν—πλήθος. κτλ. See Met. i. 5, p. 15.
- (96) 8. τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσι, sc. the arguments adduced by Aristotle. He now takes a modified form of the Platonic theory, which distinguishes between independent and dependent good, and applies the ἰδέα only to the former.
- (97) 8. καθ' ἐν εἶδος, in one sort.
- (98) 10. If the goods mentioned above are not independent goods, there can be none such, except the idea; but then the εἶδος, or concrete, in which the form of good seems to reside, is a delusion,—has no reality: and therefore these are goods. (The argument is a sort of elenchus, whereby the consequent is denied, as ἄστον): and if these are all goods, properly so called, then the former argument is applicable, that there should be identity of predication. The passage is a sort of hypothetical sorites, depending on a *reductio ad absurdum*.
- (99) 12 The identity of name, though predicated in different categories, furnishes an argument in favour of there being an ἰδέα of good. Why, if goods thus differ, is the common name "good" applied to each and all? The three reasons given correspond to the later systems of the Realists, Conceptualists, Nominalists. τῷ ὅπ' ὧν εἶναι, by virtue of all proceeding

from one, gives that of the Realists ; τῷ πρὸς ἐν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, that of the Conceptualists ; ἡ μᾶλλον καθ' ἀναλογίαν, that of the Nominalists : and the words ἡ μᾶλλον mark that Aristotle took the last of the three. Of the three systems there is a short, but not on that account a worse, account in Magee on the Atonement, vol. ii. p. 25, note.

(100.) 12. ὁμωνύμοις, Cat. i.

(101.) 15. ἐπιστήμας, scientific arts ; the arts and sciences, as we see from the word τεχνίτας below.

(102.) 15. τὸ ἐνδεές, that which is wanting to their perfection.

(103.) 16. τὴν ὑγίειαν, health in the abstract.

CHAPTER VII.

Having thus in vain sought for a correct notion of the ἀγαθόν in the practical and speculative views of men on the subject, he now proceeds to discover it for himself ; and his mode of proceeding of course forms the characteristic feature of his treatise. Instead of imitating former philosophers, who, forming abstract notions of what happiness was, tried to find out what sort of life afforded the widest and surest sphere for it, Aristotle proceeds by stating *what will lead to it*, viz. *that it will be the development of the ἔργον, i.e. of the best and highest tendency or principle of man's nature.*

(105.) 2. μεταβαίνων, *changing its ground ; by a different mode of proof.* In the first chapter the conclusion that πρακτῶν τέλος is the τὰγαθόν was arrived at by referring syllogistically to major premisses ; here by induction and analogy.

(106.) 3. He now gives some characteristics of the good, whereby εὐδαιμονία is identified with it among the various τέλη in life, as being permanently τελειον and αὐταρκες, which latter is also a sign of the former ; and the conclusion he comes to is that εὐδαιμονία is *perfect*, perfectly developed in itself ; *self-contained*, requiring nothing external to complete it ; and the highest end of human action.

(107.) 4. διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετόν. τοῦτο, sc. τὸ μηδέποτε διὰ ἄλλο. There are three divisions :—1. Things sought for their own sake

alone. 2. Things sought only for the sake of something else. 3. Things sought both for their own sake and for that of something else.

(108.) 5. *ὄργανα, instrumental goods*; which are valuable only as leading to some end.—*νοῦν, intellectual power, talent.*

(108.) 6. *τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν*, the same result, viz. that *εὐδαιμονία* is *τέλειον*, and therefore the good.

(109.) 6. *ἐπείδη φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος*. Observe this principle, which is the keystone of Aristotle's moral philosophy.

(110.) 7. *τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις*, some bound must be placed to these sympathies.

(111.) 7. *εἰσαυθίς*, see ch. 11.

(112.) 8. *πάντων αἰρετωτάτην*. The highest object of choice, in its own essence, even when in its lowest degree, without any adventitious additions, as compared with anything else; and yet *αἰρετωτέραν*, in its higher degrees, when increased not in essence or kind, but in degree, by the addition of acknowledged blessings, as compared with itself before those additions. The change produced by the addition of external goods is in degree, not in kind.—*μὴ συναριθμουμένην*, not reckoned as joined with anything else; *by itself*. The word is used again Rhet. i. 7.

(113.) 9. *λέγειν*. This word shews that what he has been doing in the preceding sections is to identify that which is called *εὐδαιμονία* with the *ἀγαθόν*.

(114.) 10. It having been laid down *that εὐδαιμονία will be attained by the development of the highest tendency of human nature*, it is necessary to discover the *ἔργον* of man, as this will be the development of his highest and best tendencies; and in it, by a general law of nature, the *εὖ* of man will be found. We here get at one of the major premisses of the Ethics,—*whatever develops the ἔργον, or highest principle or function, of man will be his ἀγαθόν*.

(115.) 10. The terms *ἔργον, τέλος, εὖ, ἀρετή, ἀγαθόν*, only present different views of the same state. *ἔργον*, the proper development of the proper nature; *τέλος*, the same state viewed as in its accomplishment; *εὖ*, viewed as a simple

excellence; ἀρετή, with the additional notion of obligation or the corresponding one of good desert; ἀγαθόν, with a further notion of good or happiness resulting from it.

(116.) 10. ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ. We have here again Aristotle's recognition of the wise benevolence of nature, which has provided that everything and being shall find its ἀγαθόν in the due performance of the function assigned to it by its constitution and position; and thus human nature, rightly understood, will lead to human happiness.

(116.) 11. ἀργόν sc. ἀεργόν, without an ἔργον.

(117.) 11. πότερον οὐν τέκτονος, argument from analogy.

(119.) 11. ἡ κάθ' ἅπερ, argument à fortiori. If each of the parts has an ἔργον, much more the whole.

(120.) 12. ζωή is not the same as βίος, *life without*, or *living*, but a *principle of life within*: so the ζωή of man is afterwards stated to be ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια. It may be translated *nature*, in the sense of a principle or part of *nature*; and of course the ἔργον of man will arise from his peculiar ζωή.

(121.) 12. θρεπτική. In bk. vi. c. 12. 6, he calls θρεπτική the τέταρτον μόνιον: the other three being, the intellectual, the moral, and the αἰσθητική.

(122.) 13. λείπεται marks the conclusion of a disjunctive syllogism, which is implied in what goes before, though not actually stated.

(123.) 13. πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, *the life of a rational agent*. It does not mean here *practical*, as opposed to intellectual, nor a life of moral virtue and activity, as opposed to one of contemplation, for in the subdivision of πρακτική ζωή we find the intellectual energies included. It is opposed to θρεπτική and αἰσθητική, and not to διανοητική. It is necessary to observe this, for it was long the fashion to construe this word *practical*, and to make it the link between ἠθικὴ ἀρετή and εὐδαιμονία.

(124.) 13. τούτου δέ, sc. τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. Of the rational agent one part is receptive of reason, the other is the state and energy of it. ὥς, *as being*.

(125.) 13. καὶ ταύτης agrees with ζωῆς τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ διανοου-

μένον, implied in the context: since the intellect may exist in a passive state (ἔχον, ἔξις, or as an active energy, διανοούμενον; the ἐνέργεια is preferred to the ἔξις.

(126.) 13. κυριώτερον. *More properly and essentially termed* the πρακτικὴ ζωὴ τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. The word λέγεσθαι is something more than merely spoken of, —rather predicated as a definition; and therefore representing more or less accurately the essence.

(127.) 14. κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου. He does not here choose to define the exact proportion which λόγος holds in this ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς: it may be the governing and directing principle, or it may be merely an ingredient. Below he adds the words μετὰ λόγον.

(128.) 15. κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, *in accordance with—according to*—the excellence proper to and resulting from its nature. It must be observed that ἀρετή here does not mean virtue in its technical sense of *moral virtue*, (for we find it afterwards divided into moral and intellectual,) but *excellence*, whatever it may be.

(129.) 15. εἰ πλείους κ.τ.λ. The great object, then, of his treatise is to discover what is the highest (ἀρίστη) and most perfectly developed (τελειωτάτη, ἀρετή of man. This furnishes us with the major premiss of the syllogism: "Whatever is the τελειωτάτη ἀρετή develops the ἔργον of man."—τελειωτάτη, that which most perfectly develops the ἔργον. See Met. iv. 16, p. 110.

(131) 16. ἐν βίῳ τελειῳ, implying both sufficiency of time and sufficiency of means, (see below, note 175,) though the proverb immediately following applies only to the former.

(132.) 17. περιγεγράφθω, *be sketched*. ἀναγράψαι, *fill in*. δοξεῖ δ' ὅν παντός κ.τ.λ. *It would seem to be every one's duty, &c.*

(133) 18. He now repeats his caution as to the contingent character of his subject, and of the sources whence his phenomena and principles are drawn.

(134) 19. ὀρθήν, either γωνίαν, or γραμμὴν.

(135) 20. τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. In the discussion of first principles the ὅτι is sufficient, for this is itself the

starting-point, beyond which it is not possible to go, and which it is not possible to demonstrate, or to require an *αἰτία* for it; it has its own evidence in itself. See book vi. 6.

(136). 21. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ. Of the various ways in which these generalised facts (ὅτι) are apprehended, Aristotle specifies three which depend more immediately on our senses.

α. αἴσθησις, an immediate perception of, and assent to, a general principle, as soon as suggested to us by the phenomena of nature, or the facts of life, or presented to us by others, (*evidentia*.) to deny which we feel (*μαντευόμεθα*) would be a contradiction of our very reason, or instincts; not the same as, but analogous to, the perception of things by the eye. (Book vi. 8. 9. αἴσθησις οὐχ ἡ τῶν ιδίων, ἀλλ' ὅτῳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον,) hence termed αἴσθησις; such as in mathematics, “Things that are equal to the same are equal to one another.” In morals, apart, of course, from religion, the generalised facts thus perceived are, from our inability to see clearly into human nature and human life, but few, and these comparatively uncertain, not in themselves, but in our convictions of them.

Whether these principles are innate and called out by the intellectual energies, or whether they are matters of experience, it is beside our purpose to enquire; it may suffice to say, that the difficulties started by the partisans of each of these theories against the opposite ones, may be disposed of by supposing, what really seems to be the case, that we have innate powers of receiving them from nature, and that nature is fitted to convey them to us; so that wherever the intellect or the heart is in a right state, they are universally received and held, though not themselves innate.

β. ἐπαγωγὴ. Where the principles are not self-evident, but are the result of experience, or at least require experiment and comparison to confirm them, such as “the ἀγαθόν of everything is contained in its ἔργον.” It would be beside our purpose to go into the question of induction.

ἐθισμός, an acquired αἴσθησις, the result of experience and practice, as where an experienced chymist detects laws and properties which escape other men's notice; or as a man accustomed to measurements judges of distance almost instinctively; or where an experienced lawyer sees at a

glance the real point in a case. The (more or less) slow process of induction is superseded and supplied by this acquired power. There is a sort of intuitive and instantaneous induction.—*ἄμα ἐπαγόμενος*. Post. Anal. i. 5, book vi. 8. 9. —*ἡ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς συνήθεια*. See Topics, i. 12. 5.

(137.) 21. *ἀλλὰ αἱ δ' ἀλλῶς*. This would include all those principles which do not come to us through the medium of *αἴσθησις*, (if any such there be,) but are developed by the reflexive power of the mind in itself, or are deduced from principles already formed, or by analogy; all, in short, where *αἴσθησις* does not directly and immediately come in. It was not necessary for Aristotle to specify these, and claim his right to use them, as Plato would not deny their authority as sources of truth, which he would do in the case of those which depended on *αἴσθησις*. See Phædo, 65, A. sq.; 66. A.

(138.) 21. *μετιέναι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Observe the practical wisdom of Aristotle, who does not, on abstract grounds, shut himself out from any sources of truth, but recognises the great principle, that truths are to be sought after according to the nature of their subject-matter. In the Topics, i. 12. 5, p. 110, he gives three heads of *προτάσεις*: *ἠθικαί—φυσικαί—λογικαί*. It is clear that the *ἀρχαί* in these three are not to be sought for in exactly the same way. Much confusion would have been avoided if writers on philosophy had imbibed from Aristotle a little of his comprehensiveness of mind.

(139.) 21. *ὁρίσθῶσι*, *be set out clearly*,—as well in thought as in terms.

CHAPTER VIII.

(140.) The notions of *εὐδαιμονία* were arrived at in the last chapter from the constitutions of nature, deductively (*ἐκ τοῦ συμπερίσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος*) from the general law that the good of everything consists in the development of its *ἔργον*, and from the particular facts of human nature. He now proceeds (according to his usual practice of combining both the sources of proof, where possible), to shew that the opi-

nions of men agree with what he has laid down. The principal opinions of men are all combined in Aristotle's definition :—

1. Happiness resides in the soul = ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς.
2. Happiness is ἀρετή = κατ' ἀρετήν.
3. ἐκτός εὐημερία = ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.
4. ἡδονή naturally arises from this ἐνέργεια.

- (141.) 2. τριχῇ. Plat. Legg. 697, B.
- (142.) 2. καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο, *our definition would hold good.*
- (143.) 3. οὕτω γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It would belong to the soul, *for πράξις* implies both ἔργον (without), and προαίρεσις (within),—it is not only an *act*, but an *action*.
- (144.) 5. ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν κ.τ.λ. *The further questions raised on happiness.* The more particular requirements, as distinguished from the more general notions of τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν, or τὰ ἐκτός.
- (145.) 5. τῷ λεχθέντι, sc. his definition.
- (146.) 7. οὐδετέρους κ.τ.λ. The principle here laid down seems to be the true rule in cases where there are two or more different views, each supported by more or less of sound reasoning,—both are true in some points, both wrong in others. It differs from eclecticism, inasmuch as truth is not compromised, but only sifted and harmonised.
- (147.) 8. ταύτης γὰρ κ.τ.λ. *For to this (virtue) belongs the energy according to it.*
- (148.) 9. ὑπολαμβάνειν, *to conceive of.*
- (149.) 9. ἐξηργηκότι, *in a torpid state.*
- (150.) 9. οἱ πράττοντες, *those who are active.*—opposed to those who are ἐξηργηκότες.
- (151.) 10. τῶν ψυχικῶν. Pleasure is an affection of the soul, and will arise on all energies thereof, according to the disposition of the agent.
- (151.) 11. τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται, *their pleasures are inconsistent.*
- (152.) 11. διὰ τὸ μὴ κ.τ.λ. Work out the major premiss implied here.

- (153.) 12. *περιάπτου τινός*, as it were an appendage. Lidd. and Scott.
- (154.) 13. *εἰ δ' οὕτω κ.τ.λ.* From *πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις* to *ἄλλων* is in a parenthesis, so that *οὕτω* refers to *ἔχει ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ*.
- (155.) 13. *ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ*, further.—*σπουδαῖος*: properly a man who is in earnest,—a man who regards life seriously; hence a good man.
- (156.) 13. *κρίνει ὡς εἵπομεν*: sc. that they are *ἀγαθαὶ καὶ καλαί*. The argument is a simple constructive hypothetical: the hypothetical premiss being, “if the good man judges truly, they are what he judges them;” and the minor depending on a *reductio ad absurdum*, viz., *ἀγαθαὶ καὶ καλαί*, “if he does not judge rightly, who can do so?”
- (157.) 14. *διώρισται*, are not separated from each other.
- (158.) 15. *φαίνεται*, evidently is. He now turns to the opinion of those who hold *ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά* to be happiness.
- (159.) 16. *ᾧθεν*. From this opinion, that *ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά* are happiness, and that the want of these impair it, some identify it with *εὐτυχία*, while others insist on its being *ἀρετή*, intellectual or moral, whereby, as they think, *εὐδαιμονία* is placed above the accidents of life.

CHAPTER IX.

- (160.) 1. *ᾧθεν*. From these two opinions arises a further question as to its attainment. Those who hold it to be intellectual virtue (*σοφία*), say it is *μαθητόν*. Those who hold it to be moral virtue, say it is *ἐθιστόν*, or *ἀσκητόν*. They who hold it to be *εὐτυχία*, say it is *διὰ θεῶν μοῖραν*, or *τύχην*.
- (161.) 1. *μαθητόν*. See Plato. Meno 1. In more than one of his dialogues, such as the Protagoras, Euthydemus, &c., Plato holds this opinion. The conclusion to which he comes in the Meno seems to be meant as a piece of irony against the Sophists. See Stallb. Pref. ad Menon.
- (162.) 1. *παργίγεται*, springs up, as it were spontaneously.

- (163.) 4. πολύκοινον, *open to most*; those only excluded who were πεπηρωμένοι πρὸς ἀρετήν.
- (164.) 5. εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν. Observe the reverential belief in the wisdom and benevolence of nature here laid down. τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, the productions of nature. τὰ κατὰ τέχνην, those things which are in the province of art, or any other productive or directive cause (πᾶσαν αἰτίαν), are also produced in the best way (ὁμοίως).
- (165.) 6. πλημμελής, *contrary to analogy*; out of tune with the rest of the creation.
- (166.) 7. ἐκ τοῦ λόγου κ.τ.λ. The question raised, i.e. how far happiness is matter of τύχη, is solved by what has been said; for it has been stated that in its essence it is a mental energy of a certain sort (ποία τις), according to virtue; while of external goods, some only exist, as adjuncts, (ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας, chap. xi. 17), and others only are of the nature of instruments to it (chap. ix. sect. 15); and if ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖαι κατ' ἀρετήν do not come from τύχη, neither can εὐδαιμονία.
- (167.) 8. τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ, *to what was said at the beginning of the treatise*. This is an argument drawn from the opinions of men, as seen in their practical legislation. The force of the argument lies in ποιῆσαι ἀγαθοῦς, as shewing that ἀρετή does not come from τύχη.
- (168.) 9. εἰκότως. An argument from the opinions of men, as seen in their modes of speaking of animals and children.
- (169.) 10. The difference between εὐδαίμων and μακάριος seems to be, that in the former the mental state of the person spoken of is the leading notion, his being in possession of that which constitutes happiness; in the latter, it is rather his happiness externally, so to say, in its relation to gods and men,—favoured by the gods, and envied by men. In Rhet. i. 9. 34, μακαρισμός and εὐδαιμονισμός are said to be in themselves the same, but to differ inasmuch as εὐδαιμονισμός implies the possession of ἀρετή, as comprehending ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον: and this seems to lead us to the above distinction between μακάριος and εὐδαίμων, which the words *blessed* and *happy* in some degree represent. The distinction, however, naturally enough, is not always observed, and they are often

used indifferently, when it is not required to bring out the proper notion of either one or the other. This will obviate some difficulties from the use of this word in the next chapter.

(170.) 10. δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reason of what has just been said is, that the elements of happiness are its essence, ἀρετὴ τελεία, and its adjuncts βίος τέλειος: for which see the next chapter.

(171.) 11. πολλὰ γάρ. It requires βίος τέλειος, for a man's life may change, and, in the opinion of men, his happiness would, under great calamities, change with it.

(172.) 11. εὐδαιμονίζει. This introduces the opinions discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER X.

(173.) The common feeling of men, to which Solon gave utterance, demands investigation. As the opinions of men were to Aristotle, generally speaking, tests of truth, he had to shew how far, and in what sense, it was true that happiness was not attainable in this life.

(174.) 1. The questions or difficulties started are:—

1. Are we unable to say that a man is happy as long as he lives?
2. If so, is he happy when he is dead?—ἀπορία; "Happiness is an energy."
3. Or is it only meant that we can safely say that he is happy when he is dead?
4. But supposing this, are the events which happen after death to have no influence on his happiness? ἀπορία. "But this is contrary to the opinion of men," (δοκεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.)
5. But if they have such influence, then the dead man would be at one time ἀθλιός, at another εὐδαίμων.

(175.) 6. The three first questions practically resolve themselves into another,—how far external reverses destroy happiness?

This may be solved by observing that *εὐδαιμονία* consists of its *essence* (*ἀρετή τελεία*), and its adjuncts (*βίος τέλειος*). The latter means a life which has performed or arrived at the end for which it was given, (Met. iv. 16, p. 110); and this evidently is when the energies of happiness are exercised without let or hindrance, (bk. vii. 13. 2, *οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη κ.τ.λ.*); and to this end we require both sufficiency of time, (*μῆκος βίου τελείου*, bk. x. 7. 7,) for the development and formation of the intellectual and moral energies, and sufficiency of whatever is necessary or conducive to their exercise; both the presence of those things which are necessary to the calm and continuous exercise of the energies, and the absence of whatever may distract or impede their operation. *βίος τέλειος* then includes both of these,—sufficiency of *time*, and sufficiency of *external goods*; but these destructible things are not the essence (*κύριαι*), but only the adjuncts, of happiness, and are necessary, because the world is what it is (*προσδεῖται δ' αὐτῶν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος*); and therefore they do not affect its real essential existence. Happiness, in its essence, *ἀρετή τελεία*, is indestructible, unless some great blow (*Πριαμική τις τύχη*) should paralyse the powers and destroy the balance of mind in which *ἀρετή* consists; and where this is the case, a sufficient length of time is required for the restoration of what has been destroyed, before happiness can be re-established. If misfortune takes away *χορηγία*, happiness, though mutilated and hindered, is not destroyed. Questions four and five may be answered by observing that, as in personal happiness, only the greater fortunes have any influence, so the fortunes of relations are not such as to destroy the happiness of the dead.

(176.) 1. It is perhaps needless to refer to Herod. i. 32. Solon's opinion, or perhaps the opinions of those who held it in an exaggerated form, are answered by shewing the *ἀπορίαι* which follow, that is, by a *reductio ad absurdum*.

(177.) 3. *εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν*,—not *λέγοιμεν*. He means, that he does not allow it to be true.

(178.) 3. *μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ*, sc. *τῷ ζῶντι*.

(179.) 4. *ἀποστήμασι*, *removes, generations*.

(180.) 5. *ἄτοπον*: that is, supposing that a man cannot be said to be happy till he is dead.

- (181.) 5. τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν, sc. whether a man cannot be happy as long as he is alive.—τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον, how far the fortunes of descendants influence the happiness of the dead.
- (182.) 7. τὰς τύχας ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι, *the wheel of fortune revolves.*
- (188.) 9. προσδεῖται. Observe the πρόσ, i.e. as adjuncts — ἀνθρώπινος βίος, the circumstances of human life,—not the ζῶν τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. We might suppose a state where ἀρετὴ τελεία would produce happiness, independently of these accidents.
- (184.) 9. κύριαι, *are the essence.*
- (185.) 9. αἱ ἐναντίαι. The energies of vice are the essence of human misery, (see sect. 13, οἵδεις ἂν γένοιτο, κ.τ.λ.) Whenever these compressed forms of opposition occur, it is important to work them fully out, not being contented with carelessly construing ἐναντίον *contrary*, but substituting for it the opposed notion which it represents.
- (186.) 10. τῷ λογῷ, our definition of happiness.
- (187.) 10. ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν. It must be recollected that Aristotle is not speaking necessarily of "moral virtue," but the excellence of man, whatever it is.
- (188.) 11. τὸ ζητούμενον, sc. βεβαιότης.
- (189.) 11. ἐμμελῶς, *suitably, gracefully.* See Lidd. and Scott.
- (190.) 12. μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον, i.e. his external life.
- (191.) 12. τὸ μακάριον signifies the state as it is viewed by men externally, without any prominent notion of the ἐνεργεῖαι ἀρετῆς, in which it really consists, though of course it implies these: it is εἰδάλμων viewed from another point. See above, note, 169.
- (192.) 12. τὸ καλόν, the instinctive sense of right,—the principle of ἀρετῆς, and therefore the test of its presence. In the Greek mind, and hence in their language, there was a strong connection between the physically and morally beautiful: so χάρις.
- (193.) 13. τῇς ζωῆς,—not τοῦ βίου,—but the internal life of hap-

piness.—μισητά, *things of bad desert*. Æschylus has expressed something of the same sentiment, Eum. 550.

- (194.) 14. οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο κ.τ.λ. τὸ μακάριον implies both the essence and the adjuncts, and therefore, of course, ceases when the adjuncts cease. The εὐδαίμων continues so long as the essence remains, even though the adjuncts be removed: he will not cease to be εὐδαίμων until the essence is destroyed, i. e. until the balance of mind is disordered by some overwhelming calamity, and the inner man becomes incapacitated for the ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι.
- (195.) 14. τελείω. βίος τέλειος includes, as stated above, both length of time and sufficiency of means: here it evidently means the former.
- (196.) 15. τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν. He now turns from the point, how far a man is happy while he is alive, to the question how far he may be *called* so.
- (197.) 16. μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους, happy as men; as far as human life admits.

CHAPTER XI.

- (198.) Having thus settled the first point, by saying that he who has ἀρετὴν τελείαν and βίον τέλειον may be called happy, (always bearing in mind the uncertainty of human things,) he goes to the second question which arises from this, viz. whether the fortunes of descendants or friends affect this happiness and thus prevent our speaking of a man as happy.
- (199.) 1. ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον. This explains why he enters upon this seemingly unpractical question. If these δόξαι were right, then happiness would be a shifting unreality, and no man could be secure of attaining to it.
- (199.) 4. διαφέρει. There is much more difference between a calamity happening to a living or to a dead person, than there is on the stage between the actual acting of horrors and the relating them as past.—προὔπαρχειν, *be represented as past*. Hor. Ars Poet. 182.

- (200.) 5. ταύτην, i.e. *this difference must be concluded upon in this way, and perhaps still more decidedly* (μᾶλλον ἴσως) *the question whether the dead are sensible of good or evil*, ul. ταύτην, which does not make such good sense.—ἐκ τούτων, *from what has been said*.
- (201.) 5. ἀπλῶς, *in themselves*.—ἢ ἐκείνοις, or relatively to the circumstances of the dead person;—a great loss of money would not be great if a man had died very rich.
- (202.) 5. εἰ δὲ μὴ: if it is heavy, then, nevertheless, it only touches them (δῦκνείται, supplied from above,) in such a kind and degree, &c.
- (203.) 6. μὴτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, sc. εὐπραξιῶν ἢ δυσπραξιῶν τῶν φίλων.—μὴδεν, sc. φαίνεται συμβῆλλεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

CHAPTER XII.

- (204.) 1. Having thus disposed of the current opinion that happiness was unattainable, he now shews that it does not depend on human opinion, (ἐπαινετόν,) but has an independent value and existence (τίμιον). It was necessary that he should do this at once, for it would have been useless for him to have disproved the popular opinion about it, if, in its own nature and existence, it depended on popular opinion. We must every now and then remember, that what may be termed the philosophical cant of the day obliged Aristotle to enter on questions and to use reasoning of which we do not see the necessity or the force: such men he was obliged to meet on their own ground, and argue with them from the positions and dogmas which they admitted. At first sight it would seem as if this characteristic of εἰδαιμονία would have been discussed most properly in the sixth chapter, with τέλειον, αὐταρκεία, &c.; but what is said above shews that there is a reason for its occupying this place.
- (205.) 1. δυνάμεων, things merely instrumental to good or evil; which have no definite character, but may be either good or bad. It must either exist as a good subjectively,

(ἐπαινετόν), or as a good objectively, (τίμιον); for it is not one of those things which may be either good or bad as it is directed by ὁρεξις or προαίρεσις. See Met. viii. 5, p. 180, ἐκεῖναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων κ.τ.λ.; and xi. 2, p. 241, τὴν ὕλην δυναμένην ἄμφω κ.τ.λ.

(206.) 5. Eudoxus (who in Aristotle represents the Epicurean philosophy) argued as follows:—Whatever, being a good, is not praised, is the highest good. Pleasure, being a good, is not praised: pleasure is the highest good.

(207.) 5. συνηγορῆσαι, to act as advocate for; to plead in favour of.

(208.) 7. τοῖς πεπονημένοις περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια, those who have laboured on the subject of encomium. πεπονησθαι: see next chap. sect. 2.

(209.) 8. ἀρχήν. The final cause is in one sense the starting-point of action.

(210.) 8. ταύτης γὰρ χάριν κ.τ.λ. Observe this principle.

CHAPTER XIII.

(211.) There are not many difficulties which require explanation or remark in this chapter.

(212.) 5. κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν: our purpose at the beginning of our book, which was not merely ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, but also πολιτικῆς τέλος.

(213.) 9. ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. Aristotle's treatises in general have been sometimes divided into ἐσωτερικοί and ἐξωτερικοί, and certain subjects placed in the one division, and others in the other; but the difference lay not so much in the *subject-matter*, as in the way of treating it. Οἱ ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι treated it in a familiar, popular way, and were probably used by Aristotle in his more public disquisitions; while the ἐσωτερικοὶ λόγοι went more into the realities and principles of things, and were used by Aristotle in his exposition to his more select circle of disciples. And that Aristotle had a twofold way of treating the same subject,—one a superficial,

popular method, the other more mysterious and deep,—may be gathered from the correspondence with Alexander, (Aulus Gell. bk. xx. 5;) where Aristotle, being reproached by Alexander with having divulged to the world the mysteries of his philosophy, answers that what he had said would only be understood by those who had heard his more secret expositions. The passage in Aulus Gellius should be referred to.

(214.) 10. τῷ λόγῳ, *nominally*.

(215.) 12. οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη, not peculiar to man, *quoad* man.

(216.) 13. πλὴν εἰ πη κτλ. Mark his notion of the origin of dreams,—as if they were the vibrations of our waking feelings.

(217.) 13. τυχόντων, *ordinary men*.

(218.) 15. ἀτεχνῶς καθάπερ: so the Platonic ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ, *just like*. See Lidd. and Scott ad v.

(219.) 17. σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου: these are mentioned as being the most important virtues; one being of the concupiscible, the other of the irascible, part of the αἰλογον.

(220.) 18. ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὁλῶς ὀρεκτικόν: ὀρεκτικόν would include the impulses of the irascible as well as the concupiscible part.

(221.) 18. τῶν μαθηματικῶν: as we apply the terms ἔχειν λόγον to the intellectual energies of a scientific man. This is an argument drawn from language.

(222.) 19. κυρίως, *in a proper sense*.

(223.) 20. τῶν ἱξεων τὰς ἐπαινετὰς κτλ. This is a property of virtue, and a test of it,—not part of its essence, but joined to it; and this is a good instance of a definition τοῦ διορίζεν, as distinguished from one τοῦ δεικνύναι οὐσίαν. The standard of obligation—that whereby obligation and actions were to be weighed was in Aristotle's system ἔπαινος,—not the mere praise and blame of a fickle multitude, the whim of the moment, the mere passing breath of a mob, but the sentence of the collective conscience of mankind; and as, in Aristotle's system, obligation was owing to man in a social state (πόλις), so it followed that the collective voice of man should be the standard of obligation; just as conscience, or the voice of Him to whom our obligation is due, is to us the standard of actions.

B O O K II.

CHAPTER I.

IN this book he discusses the nature of human virtue generally, and, with the exception of the first section, the practical nature of moral virtue; proving it to be a *μεσότης* or *μέσῃ ἔξις*, preparatory to shewing that it develops the *ἔργον* of man as a social being.

- (1.) 1. Of neither part of the soul is the perfection given us by nature, but it is the result of our own exertions and training.
- (2.) 2. *ἐξ ἔθους*. An argument from the opinions of men expressed by etymology; so also *σωφροσύνην*, i. e. *σώζωσαν τὴν φρόνησιν*, bk. vi. 5. 5. *δίκαιος*, from *δίχα*, v. 4. 9.
- (3.) 2. It is worth while to work out these arguments syllogistically. The first is in the second figure, with the major premiss supported by some of the particulars of the induction, which it implies, stated as examples.
- (4.) 3. *παρὰ φύσιν*, contrary to nature. *πεφυκόσι*, fitted by nature for it. So Cicero uses *natus*. This fitness consists in the *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*, which will be treated of more at length in bk. vi. chap. 13. So Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. iii. 1, *semina virtutum*. The passage is worth referring to.
- (5.) 4. *ἔτι ὅσα κ.τ.λ.* Another syllogism in the second figure.—*κομιζόμεθα*, we enjoy.
- (6.) 5. Argument from the opinions of men, as expressed in legislation.—*καὶ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.* Observe this test of a good constitution and government.—*ἐθίζοντες*, gerundial participle—*by habituating them*.
- (7.) 6. *ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.*, from the same source, (viz. *πάθη*, &c.,) and by similar means, (viz. actions). An argument consisting of a simple statement of a fact, supported by the analogy of the arts.
- (8.) 6. *φθείρεται*, i. e. *πάντα γίνεται κακία*. This word is used because the notion in Aristotle's mind was the destruction of

φυσική ἀρετή, or the ἀρχή of right action. See bk. vii. chap. 8, sect. 4.

- (9.) 7. ὀργαί. The ὀργαί, though coming under θυμοειδές, (see Top. iii. 7. p. 133.) are to be distinguished from θυμός, which has κίνδυνος for its object, the principle or source of bravery, in its various shapes; while ὀργαί are those emotions of resentment which have ὀλιγωρία for their object, and are the sources of πραότης: θυμός is rather opposed to ἡδονή or ἐπιθυμία—see chap. iii. 10,—ὀργή τοῦ φιλία or πραότης.
- (10.) 7. ὁμοίως: similar, that is, to the energies of the habit itself.
- (11.) 8. κατὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., i. e. for on different energies different habits result.

CHAPTER II.

- (12.) Moral virtue being thus the result of action, it is necessary to find out the rule of action wherein the virtue consists; and this as well in order that we may find out the practical nature of virtue, as that we may learn how to become virtuous.
- (13.) 1. παρούσα πραγματεία, the present treatise.—οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκα. There is nothing in what Aristotle says here to justify the assertion that his Ethics is merely a practical explanation of and guide to virtue. It really is a scientific treatise, or a proof that virtue is the ἔργον and ἀγαθόν of man, and intended to have a practical result upon life. It is not a mere speculative enquiry into the abstract nature of virtue, for the sake of θεωρία, and nothing more, the result of which might be some such definition of it, as that it was the agreement of man's soul with the Divine will, or the intercommunion of the soul with the Divine nature, or the soul being in harmony with the intentions and will of nature, without any further result, such as *Disciplina Theoretica* (ὡσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι), the science of mathematics, or metaphysics; but an enquiry into its pure practical nature, as exhibited in and governing action, and capable of being carried out by any one who will.

- (14.) 1. κύριαι, *they decide*.
- (14.) 2. κατὰ μὲν ὀρθὸν λόγον. κατὰ, *in conformity with; in obedience to*. The sense of κατὰ, *according to*, will vary, as that to which it is applied is viewed as a lifeless pattern or a living agent; it gives the prepositions great clearness of expression to bear this principle in mind.—ὑποκείσθω. This may be laid down for the present as a general (κοινόν) definition; and he will afterwards enquire into it more accurately: but it is not sufficiently particular and practical for his present purpose, therefore he proceeds to investigate its actual phænomena, as seen in action. Another reading, of equal authority, is ὑπερκείσθω: but ὑποκείσθαι is the Aristotelian word, which he uses to lay down what he means to be a settled fundamental definition or point, or at least one which does not need at present further discussion.
- (15.) 2. ἄσπερον, bk. vi.
- (16.) 3. οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει, *have nothing fixed*. He does not mean in themselves, (objectively,) but in our perception and application of them, (subjectively).—τὰ ἐν πράξεσι, *morals*. τὰ συμφέροντα, *politics*, and τὰ ὑγιεινά, that is, the whole moral and physical nature of man. He again insists on the uncertain nature of his subject, because he is again about to refer to the shifting particulars of human action. He is anticipating the objection that his science was no science at all, owing to its not arriving at certainty.
- (17.) 3. ὑγιεινά. Aristotle's early medical education makes him delight in medical illustrations.
- (18.) 4. τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, *the question in general*.—ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα λόγος, *the question when it goes into particulars*.—παραγγελίαν, *professed system of instruction*. The παραγγελίαι were the promises held out by professors, and especially the Sophists, to make their pupils (or victims) perfect in such and such a subject.
- (19.) 4. αὐτούς, *the agents themselves*.—τὰ περὶ τὸν καιρόν, *the circumstances of each particular act*.
- (20.) 6. τοιαῦτα, i. e. τὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι. Observe πέφυκεν.—φθειρεσθαι, *to be brought into a bad state*.—τῶν ἀφ' αὐτῶν, sc. *this moral virtue, into the nature of which he is enquiring*.

This is a simple statement of the principle of argument from analogy.

- (21.) 6. *σύνμετρα*, the exact point or quantity.
- (22.) 7. *σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας*. These two virtues are here and elsewhere particularised, because the former is the *ἀρετή* of the concupiscible, the latter of the irascible, (*θυμοειδές*,) part of our nature. They are frequently thus joined by Plato. See also *ἀνδρεία*, bk. iii. chap. 6.
- (23.) 8. *οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις κ.τ.λ.* Butler's theory of active impressions and active habits will illustrate much of what Aristotle says in this and the following chapter.—*αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αἱ αὐξήσεις*, habits of virtue are formed; *φθοραί*, habits of vice.
- (24.) 9. *καὶ γενομένοι, when we are so.*

CHAPTER III.

- (25.) 1. When pleasure results from our acting in any particular way, apart, of course, from the consequences of the action, (*αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων*,) it is a sign of the habit being formed; and for this reason: pleasure being the result of energising according to our nature, (*κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν*, Rhet. i. 10,) and habit being a second nature, it follows that pleasure results from it as a matter of course;—and again, virtue being the right regulation of our pleasures and pains, and vice the wrong regulation thereof, it follows that in either case pleasure (good or bad) will wait on the actions proceeding from a good or bad habit.
- (26.) 1. *τοῖς ἔργοις*, *acts*, as distinguished from *actions* (*πράξεις*): the latter imply *προαίρεσις*.
- (27.) 1. *περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας*: not merely *about* pleasure and pain, but the regulation of pleasures and pains,—of the impulses and checks of the compound principle of the higher self-love; one urging us to, the other keeping us from, certain actions. To each of the *πάθη*, which are the sources of the several *ἀρεταί*, there is an *ἡδονή* or *λύπη* attached to the

gratification, and another *ἡδονή* or *λίπη* arising from the sense of *καλόν* or *αἰσχρόν*, which balance one another; and when these are rightly balanced or regulated, right action follows. (See the particular virtues.) It must be remembered that *ἡδονή* has a twofold sense: it is either the feeling, tendency, instinct which is the *motive* cause of action, or the satisfaction which is the *final* cause of action; or perhaps the two may more properly be said to be the same thing looked at from a different point of view: at all events, they imply each other; but there are some passages where the context requires one notion or the other to be more prominently brought out. Aristotle insists on *ἀρετή* being *περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας*, because Plato would give a different view of moral virtue, which he would make to consist in the subordination of the irascible to the rational, and the total subjection of the concupiscible; and therefore Aristotle takes pains to prove that the subject-matter, the raw material, as it were, of *ἀρετή* is the several *ἡδοναί* and *λύπαι* attached to our nature. See Plato, Rep. 441, 442; Phædo, 68, c.

(28.) 1. The proofs given are eight:—

1. They are the motive causes of human action.
2. They are the results of human action, in the regulation of which *ἀρετή* consists (3).
3. In governments, pleasure and pain, in the shape of rewards and punishments, are used to counteract vice, and to encourage virtue; and as all remedies act by contraries, it shews that what punishments are used to counteract is pleasure, what rewards are used to counteract is pain: therefore, in the opinion of men, the regulation of pleasures and pains produces right action (4.)
4. They are the productive causes of virtue and vice (5).
5. They comprehend all the final causes of human action (6, 7).
6. They are innate principles of our nature (8).
7. They are, more or less, the practical standards and rules of action (9).
8. Virtue is either *περὶ θυμόν*, or *περὶ ἡδονήν*: it is more difficult to grapple with and subdue the latter, and therefore *ἀρετή* is *περὶ ἡδονήν* (10).

(29.) 2. ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν. Legg. 653, where he speaks

of the ἀρετή of children as consisting in a right perception of ἡδονή and λύπη : φρόνησις and ἀληθείς δόξαι being the privilege of a more advanced stage of life. In the cultivation of this right αἴσθησις of pleasure and pain consists παιδεία. The passage should be referred to.

- (30.) 4. αἱ κολάσεις. Observe this notion of the true nature and object of punishments, as being ἰατρείαι.—διὰ τῶν ἐναντιῶν : see bk. x. 9, 10.
- (31.) 5. πρότερον : see last chap., sect. 8.—πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει, is of a nature corresponding to these, and has these for its subject-matter.
- (32.) 5. ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται, *or in as many points as reason distinguishes in such matters.*
- (33.) 5. ὀρίζονται, sc. the Cynics, and after them the Stoics, to whose view Plato somewhat approaches, when he speaks of the perfection of the passions consisting in their total subjection to reason. Speusippus used the term ἀσυχλησία to express ἀπάθεια.
- (34.) 5. ἀπαθείας καὶ ἡρεμίας, states of freedom from affections, and of repose. See Butler, Sermon v. p. 82 :—“In general, experience will shew that as the want of natural appetite to food supposes and proceeds from some natural disease, so the apathy the Stoics talk of, as much supposes or is accompanied with something amiss in the moral character, in that which is the health of the mind.” And yet there was truth in it, if they had but said freedom from certain affections, at certain times or ways, &c.
- (35.) 7. τριῶν ὄντων κ.τ.λ. These are the three final causes of human action,—duty, advantage, pleasure : the last comprehends all, for the other two present themselves to us (φαίνεται) as objects of pursuit under the shape of ἡδύ of different sorts. To the καλόν is attached the ἡδύ of good desert, whereby it operates on us as a motive. These three motives, when viewed in their highest character, are identical in every action of the really good man : a true duty, a true and real expediency, and a true and right pleasure, coincide, just as truly as the piety and benevolence and self-love of Butler.
- (36.) 7. αἰσχρόν is not merely *shameful* or *base*, but rather *bad*.

As καλόν is the concrete of ἀρετή, so αἰσχρόν is the concrete of κακία, and implies a breach of moral obligation, viewed as if it were a deformity.

(37.) 9. τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν, the whole matter.

(38.) 10. χαλεπώτερον. The argument seems to be,—virtue must be a regulation of ἡδονή or θυμός, and of these ἡδονή is to be preferred. This refers to Plato's notion, that ἀρετή consisted in the submission of θυμός to λόγος, and the suppression of ἡδονή by the combined efforts of these two ; making it belong to the irascible rather than the concupiscible part of our nature.

(39.) 10. Ἡράκλειτος: Heraclitus's saying was χαλεπὸν γὰρ θυμῷ μάχεσθαι. Pol. v. 11.

(40.) 10. τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ, Ethics and Politics.

(41.) 11. μὴ ὡσαύτως γενομένων, i.e. as those whence virtue springs.

CHAPTER IV.

(42.) It is necessary to modify, or at least explain, what was laid down as to acts producing habits, for the analogy of the arts would seem to suggest that he who does acts of virtue is already virtuous.

(43.) 2. ἡ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν κ.τ.λ. This is an example of the modes of refuting an argument from analogy,—either by denying the resemblance of relations on which the argument is founded, or the fact which it is attempted to apply from one side of the analogy to the other : here both are used. It is denied that, in the case of the arts, a mere act makes a man an artist ; and even if it did, the arts and virtue do not stand on the same ground, (ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὁμοίον ἐστίν) : the productions of art are artistic, whatever may be the mental state of the artist ; while real acts of virtue imply and presuppose a particular mental state and intention, (πὺς ἔχων).

(44.) 3. πὺς ἔχοντα, of a certain sort.

- (45.) 3. ἀμετακινήτως, i. e. whenever occasion offers; so, “pray without ceasing.”
- (46.) 3. τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας. This does not mean that the virtues are arts, nor is τέχνας used for ἔξεις; but τὰς ἄλλας is used in the sense of, “to the others above-mentioned, the arts;” ἄλλας agreeing with τέχνας by attraction. Michelet illustrates it by the French “*nous autres hommes.*”—συναριθμεῖται, *taken into account.*
- (47.) 6. ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον, *to reasoning, theories.*

CHAPTER V.

- (48.) 1. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα. Some editions, following the majority of MSS., omit these words. He here distinctly enters upon the enquiry τί ἐστὶν ἀρετή, though in chap. 2 he had said, οὐ γὰρ ἔν’ εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, σκεπτόμεθα. It need only be repeated that it is into the practical, actual nature of ἀρετή that he enquires, and not into its abstract essence, such as the agreement of the soul with the will of God, &c. See note 13.
- (49.) 1. ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τρία. These are three phases or shapes which the soul possesses or assumes;—looking at the moral part of the soul, it presents itself to us as a simple δύναμις, (susceptibility of anger,) or as that δύναμις called into being, (πάθος, anger,) or the habitual operation of that πάθος (ἔξεις, πραότης). He here uses ψυχὴ for the ἀλογον part of it; for though reason is a δύναμις, the energy of reason, or διάνοια, is not a πάθος: and therefore, if we were here to include the intellectual under the term ψυχὴ, it would not be true that these were only τρία ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.—δυνάμεις. See Met. iv. 12, p. 103; viii. 1, p. 175.
- (50.) 1. The argument of the chapter is a disjunctive, the particulars (denied in the minor) being disproved in the second figure.
- (51.) 2. πρὸς τὰ πάθη, with regard to the πάθη, their nature and objects.
- (52.) 3. ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα, argument from opinions of men, expressed in their modes of speech.

(53.) 4. προαίρεσις τινές, acts of προαίρεσις.

(54.) 5. πάσχειν, to be affected.

(55.) 6. λείπεται. Observe this form for the conclusion of a disjunctive syllogism. Though ἔξις may be translated *habits*, it must not be forgotten that it is not a mere phrase, but implies the notion of a state, consisting in certain principles, or operations, or actions: thus ἔξις διανοητική is the mental exercise of certain powers, and the conscious possession of certain truths; ἔξις ἠθικὴ is the possession of certain moral principles, and the operation of certain moral powers. In all such words it is important to realize to ourselves what they imply, so that the familiarity of the word may not deprive it of meaning.

CHAPTER VI.

(56.) 1. ποία τις, in logical language, *the difference*.

(57.) 2. ῥητέον οὖν. Observe his definition, or rather his description, of ἀρετή generally. This furnishes us with a test of ἀρετή; it is the development of (ἀποτελεῖ) that of which it is the ἀρετή, so that it is in a good state, (αὐτὸ εὖ ἔχον,) and produces goodness of operation, (καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν): whatever does this, looking to the constitution and final causes of the thing or being in question, is its ἀρετή. Whatever, then, does this for man, looking to his nature, and the intentions of nature respecting him, is his ἀρετή; and the standard of this is (as he told us in the last book) ἔπαυος, or the opinion of men. See note 223, bk. i. Michelet quotes from Cicero, De Leg. i. 8, "*est autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura*. ἀρετή is connected with ἄρης; warlike strength and courage being, in the earlier generations of the world, the most esteemed excellence.

(58.) 3. ἀγαθός is the concrete of ἀρετή, when applied to persons, as καλόν is, applied to actions.

(59.) 4. πῶς, i. e. by repeated action.—ἡ δὲ, bk. ii. 4. 3.

(60.) 4. φύσις. This word is used in Aristotle in various ways, just as the designs and operations of nature may be recognised in various parts of the universe, and in different stages of the development of any being. See Met. iv. 4, p. 90. Thus—1. In its widest sense, φύσις is the point up to which Aristotle could trace the governing power of the universe, and is spoken of as being that governing power, full of wisdom, benevolence, and intelligence. 2. φύσις is used to signify that subdivision of this nature in the widest sense, which is opposed to ἀνάγκη and τέχνη, the *general* order of nature. See bk. iii. 3. 7; vi. 4. 4. 3. When speaking of the nature or constitution of any being or thing, φύσις is used—*a*, for the properties and tendencies which that being or thing possesses, (Phys. ii. 1. 10); *b*, for the energies thereof, (Phys. ii. 1. 14); *c*, for the perfection thereof, (Phys. ii. 2. 8; Pol. i. 2).

(61.) 4. συνεχεῖ καὶ διαίρετῳ, *in everything which has parts and is divisible*; in everything, that is, which implies the notion of quantity. The proper sense of συνεχής is *continuous*, where the parts or members of the thing spoken of follow in regular succession on each other, such as the parts of a line, or a solid body; while διαίρετός is where there is no such succession or continuity of actual parts, as in numbers; so that these two words may be taken as opposed, and expressing two different sorts of magnitudes,—“in everything which is continuous, and in everything which is not continuous;” but it seems better to take them as expressing together the characteristics of all magnitudes. In the notion of continuity is implied the notion of parts, and διαίρετός may simply be translated *divisible*; and so the Paraphrast (quoted by Michelet) takes it. Any πάθος and πρᾶξις may both be viewed as containing parts and divisible, both in regard of time and degree.

(62.) 5. τοῦτο, the latter, i. e. τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

(63.) 9. ἐπιστήμη, here used loosely for “*system*,” which proceeds on rules, as distinguished from empiricism, which acts without rules.

(64.) 9. ἡ δὲ ἀρετή, argument *à fortiori*.—ἀκριβεστέρα κ.τ.λ., “proceeds more upon rules.”

- (65.) 10. ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι. In all of the affections given above there is a principle of pleasure or pain, and this it is which is really regulated by the ἀρετή: it is important to keep this in mind, in order to understand the real meaning of ἀρετή being περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.
- (66.) 13. μεσότης ἄρα κ.τ.λ. He here gets to his full definition of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή.—μεσότης, viewed with regard to the mental state implied by εἶς, and when ἀρετή is viewed as being περὶ πάθη, is a balance of the compound principle of self-love, pleasure and pain, which finds place in each of the several πάθη. If ἀρετή is viewed as being περὶ πράξεις, (which are also implied in εἶς,) then it is a mean point in action, equally removed from the too much and the too little; in the former sense it is στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου, in the latter it is τὸ μέσον itself.
- (67.) 14. ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόριοι εἵκαζον, *figured it*. See Met. i. 5. τοῦ ἀπείρου is a characteristic of the ἄπειρον.
- (68.) 15. ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειε. He makes the λόγος of the φρόνιμος the standard,—φρόνιμος, the morally wise.
- (69.) 16. εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι: the former is an effort of the understanding, the latter of the will.—ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι. See above, note 66.
- (70.) 17. τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, the definition declaring its essence,—the τὸ εἶναι τί ἦν, *the being that which it was laid down to be*, (see Gr. Gr. 398, 4,) as conceived of in the mind, the notion we form of it, as distinguished from that which it is in actual nature, (τί ἐστὶ). See Anal. Post. ii. 6. 1.
- (71.) 17. ἀκρότης: in itself it is a μεσότης; in relation to all other moral states it is an ἀκρότης.
- (72.) 18. εὐθὺς ὠνομασται συνειλημμένα κ.τ.λ., *are connected, as soon as named, with the notion of badness*; imply in their very names the notion of badness; instead of συνείληται εὐθὺς ὠνομασμένα. This interchange of the finite verb and participle is not uncommon in Greek, in certain phrases. See Gr. Gr. 696, obs. 7.
- (73.) 18. λέγεται τῷ φαῦλα εἶναι. Bekker reads (on the authority of two MSS.) ψέγεται; but the words, as they

stand, have a definite meaning: "all such are predicated of (as bad) by virtue of their essential and moral badness," (τῷ εἶναι φαῦλα).

- (74.) 18. ἀλλ' αἶχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ κ.τ.λ., sc. λέγονται φαῦλαι.
 (75.) 18. ἐν τῷ ᾧ δέῃ κ.τ.λ., "in the category of the proper person, or time, or mode, as in the case of anger."
 (76.) 19. ὁμοίον οὖν κ.τ.λ., "it is the same as if one was to lay it down that there is a mean," &c.
 (77.) 19. ἔσται γὰρ οὕτως: every ὑπερβολή and ἑλλειψις would, on this supposition, have a ὑπερβολή, μεσότης, ἑλλειψις in itself.
 (78.) 20. διὰ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πῶς ἄκρον: the notions of ὑπερβολή and ἑλλειψις are excluded from ἀνδρεία, (for example,) because, though a μέσον, it is also an ἄκρον or ἀκρότης, a fixed point of perfection. A man cannot have too little ἀνδρεία, or too much, and still be ἀνδρεῖος; so those states or actions in the other extreme, which are fixed points of badness, are not bad from being in ὑπερβολή or ἑλλειψις, but simply from their own nature. A man is not ἄδικος from being too much so, but simply from being so at all.

CHAPTER VII.

- (79.) 1. κενώτεροι: another reading is κοινώτεροι, which would mean that such arguments have a wider application, and thus have their advantages, but particular arguments are more accurate and true; while if κενώτεροι be read, there is no opposition between the two clauses: κοινός is used in this sense in ch. ii. 2, κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω; and Michelet quotes De Anima, i. 1. The Paraphrast undoubtedly read κοινώτεροι.
 (80.) 1. διαγραφῆς, a sketch, a table, or tabular view: the latter is the best. This table should be drawn out.—ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν; "in the case of these particulars" the universal arguments must hold true. Gr. Gr. 633, 3, c.
 (81.) 2. It will be found that each of these several μεσότητες is a regulation, or balance, of the various instincts of pleasure and pain—the impulses to, and the checks from, certain

actions—by the *καλόν*, which acts by virtue of the pleasure attached to it, (see bk. iii. note 15.) or by the pain attached to the *αἰσχρόν*. These *μεσότητες* are, as we shall see more fully in the following books, regulations of the instincts, of *θυμός*, of bodily pleasure, of love of money, of love of power, social instincts, and of the sense of shame, which constitute the heart of man.

- (82.) 2. *φόβους καὶ θάρρη*. There seem to be four vices belonging to this *μεσότης*, as also to the *δόσις καὶ λήψις τῶν χρημάτων*, but in reality there are only two; but these may be looked at from different points of view. There are two instincts (*φόβοι* and *θάρρη*) belonging to this *μεσότης*, (from either of which it may proceed,) which exist in different degrees of strength in different constitutions, though the former is by far the most common, and therefore, in the particular discussion of *ἀνδρεία*, it is viewed almost exclusively as a regulation of *φόβος* by *καλόν*: but as one or the other instinct is viewed as the motive cause, the extremes are called the excess and deficiency of either the one or the other.
- (83.) 2. *πολλά ἐστὶ ἀνώνυμα*. Human language not having recognised them, is a sign that practically they never, or at least very rarely, exist. *φόβος* is an universal instinct.
- (84.) 3. *ἡττον περὶ τὰς λύπας*. Temperance consists rather in acts of abstaining from pleasure than endurance of pain; hence, in the third book, it is almost exclusively treated as *περὶ ἡδονάς*. See bk. iii. 10. 1.
- (85.) 3. *οὐ πᾶν*, *not at all*. Soph. Œd. Col. 142.
- (86.) 6. *διαθέσεις = ἔξεις*.
- (87.) 8. *περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρονσα*, having its difference in being about small things.
- (88.) 10. *ὑφηγημένον τρόπον*, literally, in the way which is our guide.
- (89.) 11. *ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν κ.τ.λ.*: that is, that this *μεσότης* is the *ἀρετή* of the moral part of the soul; for he has before laid down *τῶν δὲ ἔξεων τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς καλοῦμεν* as his standard of *ἀρετή*.—*ἐπαινετόν*, object of good desert; *ψεκτά*, objects of bad desert.
- (90.) 14. *ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι*, in the mere affections, which are not

exhibited in any definite πράξις. Thus αἰδώς is an instinct rather than a virtue; νεμεσις and ἐπιχαιρεκακία are feelings.

(91.) 16. ἀλλόθι, sc. Rhet. ii. 9.

(92.) 16. οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, is not spoken of in one sense only.

CHAPTER VIII.

(93.) This chapter and the next are rather practical: having shewn his ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ to be a μεσότης, he gives us practical directions as to its attainment.

(94.) 1. πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντικείμεναι πως σωφροσύνη, for instance, is opposed to ἀκολασία; ἀκολασία is opposed to ἀναισθησία.

(95.) 2. ἀπωθοῦνται, *push him further from themselves.*

(96.) 6. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον κ.τ.λ. Each virtue being the regulation of the impulse of ἡδονή, by the check of λύπη, or *vice versa*, the extreme, which is an exaggeration of the regulating principle, is less opposed to the mean than the other: thus in ἀνδρεία, the λύπη (φόβος) is regulated by the ἡδονή, (θάρρος, arising from a sense of καλόν,) and hence θρασύτης, which is an exaggeration of θάρρος, is nearer ἀνδρεία than δειλία: so in σωφροσύνη, the ἡδονή is regulated by the λύπη arising from a sense of αἰσχρόν, making us decline pleasure; and hence ἀναισθησία, which is an exaggerated form of declining pleasure, is less opposed to σωφροσύνη than ἀκολασία.

(97.) 7. ὁμοιότερον. See last note.

(98.) 8. ἐτέρα δ' ἐξ ἡμῶν. The passion which, from our constitution, is the one which rises up first within us, is the one to be regulated; and therefore, from what was said in note 96, the extreme, which is the development of this emotion, is more contrary to the mean than the other, which is only the regulating principle carried too far.

(99.) 8. οἷον αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ. There is here a recognition of the corruption of human nature.

(100.) 8. ἐπίδοσις, properly, "that to which the greater increase accrues," i. e. that to which we are mostly inclined,—*tendency*

CHAPTER IX.

- (101.) 1. *ικανῶς εἴρηται*. He speaks as if he had sufficiently proved the point that *ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ* is a *μεσότης*: it now remains for him to prove that this *μεσότης* performs the *ἔργον* of man.
- (102.) 2. *ἐπαινετόν* refers to the opinion of others; *καλόν* to our own sense of right.
- (103.) 3. *καλυψώ*. A curious instance of Aristotle's memory failing him: it was Circe who gave the advice which Ulysses refers to in the lines quoted from *Od. xii. 219*.
- (104.) 4. *κατὰ τὸν δεύτερόν, φασι, πλοῦν*: a proverb, applied to those who having tried and failed, try again, or, according to Eustath. *Odys. p. 1453*, *ὅτε ἀποτυχὼν τις οὐρίου κόπαις πλείη κατὰ Πανσανίαν*. See Stall. ad Plat. *Phæd. p. 99, D*,—*as our next best*.
- (105.) 5. *εἰς τοῦναντίον κ.τ.λ.* One would hardly expect to see self-distrust and self-denial so fully and practically recognised by a heathen philosopher, at the same time with the distinction between resistance to and total suppression of the passions. But here, as elsewhere, Aristotle's knowledge of human nature and human circumstances, and his sound practical sense, led him right where others went wrong: mark, too, the practical wisdom of making *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* the test of our disposition. *ἐαυτούς* is omitted in some editions: on its use for *ἡμᾶς αὐτούς*, see Gr. Gr. 654, 2, b.
- (106.) 6. *ἐν παντὶ δὲ φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδύ*. Aristotle, though of course unacquainted with the doctrine of the corruption of man, had too practical an eye to overlook its actual results on men's hearts and actions.
- (107.) 6. *ἀδέκαστοι*, unbribed. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. *δεκάζω*.—*ὅπερ οὖν*. Il. γ. 158.—*ἐπιλέγειν*, to repeat.
- (108.) 7. *οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον κ.τ.λ.* The whole of this passage is a striking instance of the practical wisdom of Aristotle's views and system.
- (109.) 8. *τῷ λόγῳ*, in a general argument or principle.
- (110.) 8. *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν*. He here fully recognises the variable nature of all objects of sense; but he does not, for that reason, discard all that they tell us, as valueless to the philosopher.

- (111.) 8. ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. He seems here to recognise a moral sense, which is able to recognise right and wrong in particulars. He connects this αἰσθησις with φρόνησις in bk. vi. ch. 10. 9 How far this moral sense is, in his opinion, given us by nature, or acquired by experience and instruction, is a disputed point; but on the whole, he seems to recognise it as a faculty of our nature, which is improved and developed by education.
- (112.) 9. δῆλον: another reading is δηλοῖ, which is used intransitively. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. ii. *So much, then, is clear.*
- (113.) 9. ὅτι ἡ μίση ἔξις κτλ. He speaks here as if he had quite concluded this part of his subject, viz. that this μεσότης, or μίση ἔξις, is the virtue (ἐπαινετή) of the moral part of the soul.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) IN this book Aristotle discusses the voluntariness of human actions, and the consequent responsibility of man as a moral being; and then enters into the particulars of the principal virtues of the irascible and concupiscible passions, (ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη,) partly to support what he had before shewn, that ἠθικὴ ἀρετή is a μεσότης, and partly to prove that in each particular this μεσότης performs the ἔργον of man, and puts him in right relations to himself and others, which was the test of his ἀρετή, as given in the second chapter of book ii.
- (1) 2. Before it can be shewn that ἠθικὴ μεσότης is the ἔργον of man, it must be proved that human actions, whether good or bad, are voluntary, or rather, the vague theories of certain philosophers to the contrary must be overthrown: for if these are true, and moral action, right or wrong, virtue or vice, is not voluntary, but determined by some overruling influences, (men being mere puppets of the caprice of fate,) the notion of λόγος would be excluded, and thus moral virtue

could not be the true ἀρετή τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ λογίου ἔχοντος; the ἔργον of man must be looked for elsewhere: besides which, it has a *practical* use for politicians, in theory as well as *practice*, for the adjustment of rewards and punishments.

- (3.) 3. The major premiss of ἀκούσιον διὰ βίαν, which he takes first, is—Whatever is βίαιον has its ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν.—ὁ πρῶτον ἢ ὁ πῶσχων does not mean the agent and patient of the same action, but the patient of the βιά, whether active or passive.—κύριοι ὄντες, having power over us.
- (4.) 4. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον κτλ. It has been said that there is a contradiction between what is said here about καλόν and what is said in sect. 11; but he is talking *here* of actions in themselves involuntary, which are very different from what he is considering in sect. 11; and the immediate motives to such actions are either a feeling of fear or a sense of duty: these act one against the other. A man sometimes does something which fear would make him decline, from a sense of duty; sometimes something to which his sense of duty makes him averse, from fear.
- (5.) 4. πράξαντος, sc. αὐτοῦ, supplied from the general context. See Gr. Gr. 696, obs. 3.
- (6.) 6. μικταὶ πράξεις, *compound actions*. Where there is a mixture of willingness and unwillingness, though the mere fact of the action being done proves that willingness prevails, (μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκούσιαις. Sect. 10,) yet unwillingness exists in the abstract (ἀπλῶς, καθ' αὐτό); but willingness, looking at the circumstances: and acts thus done, are to be judged by the state of the will at the moment of action; and hence they are voluntary, or at least partly so, as no action can take place without the will, for some cause or other, consenting (πράξεις δ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια. Sect. 10). There are four such πράξεις here given: two of negative suffering, where φόβος is overruled by καλόν; two of positive action, where καλόν is overcome by φόβος. The nature of these μικταὶ πράξεις, and the view taken of them, vary according to the thing done and the motive for doing it: where ἐκούσιον is evidently the strongest element of the compound, there ἔπαινος or ψόγος is awarded; where ἀκούσιον is, from the very nature of the action, very strong, even though overpowered, we grant σιγγνώμη

1. Where shame or pain is borne for the sake of some great real καλόν — ἔπαινος.
2. Where shame or pain is borne for the sake of no καλόν at all, or no equivalent καλόν—ψόγος.
3. Where καλόν is violated to escape some horror, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπου—(πυγγνώμη).
4. Where καλόν is grossly violated to escape something less horrible—ψόγος.

Michelet instances Zopyrus and Regulus for the first,—we might add Lady Godiva. αἰσχρόν is here used in the sense of “*shameful*” rather than, as usually in the Ethics, of *wrong*, as opposed to καλόν. Numerous instances of the three other sorts will be found in the histories of any Eastern rule, such as Gibbon’s Rome, or Creasy’s Ottoman Empire. In our own history, the first is illustrated by the martyrs refusing their pardon at the stake; the second by Quakers preferring to go to prison to taking off their hat in court; the third by Cranmer signing his recantation; and the fourth by any traitor who has turned king’s evidence to save his neck.

- (8.) 7. ἀνὰ πάλιν, sc. ὅταν αἰσχρόν ἢ λυπηρόν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ τινῶν μὴ μεγάλων ἢ καλῶν.
- (9.) 8. Ἀλκμαίωνα. Alcmaeon is made to kill his mother on the plea that his father imprecated curses on himself and his country if he did not do so.
- (10.) 9. Observe how Aristotle refuses to dogmatise in cases where each action must assume its particular hue from the circumstances.
- (11.) 9. ὥς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The force of the γὰρ is difficult to discover at first, especially in connection with what follows, ὅθεν κ.τ.λ., but the whole may be paraphrased thus: “It is difficult to abide by one’s deliberate determination, (τοῖς γνωσθείσιν,) for the struggle is, for the most part, between duty, which forbids αἰσχύρα, and fear, which urges to them; fear makes us give up what had been, from a sense of duty, resolved on: and hence praise and blame arise on such actions, for the struggle thus being, for the most part, between fear of pain, a wish to avoid τὰ προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, and a sense of duty, a wish to decline ἃ ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχύρα,” (αἰσχύρα is here used for something “*wrong*,” not merely “*shameful*,” it is here

opposed to *λυπηρόν*, before it was joined with it;) “and these being balanced one against the other, then if *αἰσχρόν* is preferred, it shews that the will is more disinclined to *καλόν*, and *ψόγος* is attached to it; if *λυπηρόν* is preferred, it shews that the will is rather inclined to *καλόν*, and *ἔπαινος* ensues; where *λυπηρόν* is too great to be borne, then there is *συγγνώμη*, for there is no proof of any lack of inclination to *καλόν*, as far as is practicable for man; where there is no real *καλόν*, as in 2, note 6 above, the very act of enduring *λύπη* or *αἰσχρόν* unnecessarily is wrong, and hence *ψόγος*.”

- (12.) 10. *ἀπλῶς*, without reference to the *μικταὶ πράξεις*.
- (13.) 10. *καὶ ἡ ἀρχή*, sc. *ὧν ἡ ἀρχή*.
- (14.) 11. The argument is an elenchus, which it may be as well to work out, as well as that in the second figure, immediately following.
- (15.) 11. *καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς*. This is the pleasure which follows on right action, in the shape of self-approbation.
- (16.) 11. *γελοῖον δὲ*. This argument need not be reduced to a strictly logical form, as it is a simple appeal to common sense. Another reading is *δέ*, but *δή* marks a new argument, as well as a conclusion: see Gr. Gr. 721, 1. He refers to a modified form of the former theory, which makes *ἡδύ* alone *βίαιον*.
- (17.) 13. *τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοϊαν*. Bekker here begins chap. ii., which is perhaps the more natural division; but for the convenience of other editions, the sections will be numbered as if in continuation of chap. i.
- (18.) 14. *ἕτερον δὲ ἔοικε κ.τ.λ.* The difference between doing an action *δι' ἄγνοϊαν*, and *ἀγνοῶν*, is that in the former the *ἄγνοια* is the direct cause of the act, in the latter the *ἄγνοια* is not the direct cause of the act, but of the *μοχθηρία*, whence the act proceeds. This is illustrated by bk. v. chap. viii. sect. 12, *ὅσα γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἄγνοϊαν ἀμαρτάνουσι συγγνωμονικά*.—*ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἄγνοϊαν ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ οὐ συγγνωμονικά*. The *πάθος* may make the agent *ἀγνοεῖν* what he is about, but it is itself the cause of the action, and not the *ἄγνοια*;—*ἄγνοια* is but the accident of the action.

- (19.) 11. The *ἄγνοια*, which does not take away responsibility, is either *ἡ καθόλου*, ignorance of some general principle of morality, which ought to be known, as, "Honesty is the best policy;" or *ἡ ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει*, ignorance shewn in the act of choice, where, through the bad moral state of the agent, he fails to discern the character of the particular action, but puts sweet for bitter, and bitter for sweet; such as where a man fancies that what is called a white lie is not dishonest. In this case the *ἄγνοια* is not the immediate, but the remote, cause of the action; indeed, it is not properly the cause of the action at all, for this springs directly from the *ποχθηρία*, or wicked tendencies, which partly consist in this absence of moral principles, and, in particular cases, in the want of moral perceptions. Thus, if a man does not think impurity wrong, this is a result of guilty demoralization, a want of moral principles; or if he does not think obscene language to come under the category of impurity, this want of moral perception does not make the action *ἀκούσιον*; in either case it is not the cause of his doing something which he does not intend, but it is the *αἴτιον τῆς ποχθηρίας*, of his intentionally doing what is wrong, inasmuch as the bad moral habit is caused by his not knowing better the nature of right and wrong; and thus *ποχθηρία* leads him wrong, though it might not have acted had he known the real nature of the matter better. Hence the importance not only of moral principles, but also, and, if possible, still more, of right and clear moral perception in particulars.

The case of the *ἀγνοῶν*, however, who is ignorant not of the moral character of the particulars, (*ἡ ἐν προαίρεσει ἄγνοια*), but of the particulars themselves, (*ἄγνοια ἡ καθ' ἑκαστα*), is very different: here the *ἄγνοια* is not the cause of his intentionally doing a wrong action, (*τῆς ποχθηρίας*), but of his doing something which he does not intend; as where a man shoots a friend from not being aware that the gun in his hand was loaded. But in both cases the degree of blame or sympathy would vary with the consideration whether the ignorance was such as might or ought to have been avoided, or the strength of the *πάθος* which overruled the moral knowledge or perceptions, (see note 18). But on all these points Aristotle refuses to dogmatise.

- (20.) 14. *διὰ τὴν κτλ.*, through the drunkenness or the anger,

or, as others interpret it, through *ἡδονή*, or some such motive, not through ignorance of right from wrong. These are instances of τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν: but the τὸ ἀγνοεῖν of the man who is in these states does not relieve him of responsibility, though the moral knowledge which would have restrained him is, by his own fault, suspended. A man indeed, in an angry or drunken fit, might strike his father, not through ignorance of its being wrong to do so, but having mistaken his father for some one else. In such a case there is *συγγνωμη*, when the state of blindness is considered; but when the person is viewed as having wilfully, and contrary to morality, brought himself into this state, *διπλὴ ἐπιτιμία* ensues.

- (21.) 14. ἀγνοεῖ. Mark the state of ignorance in which Aristotle conceives the bad man to be: and if this plea were allowed, there would be no such thing as blame attaching to any bad action, *ὑπερ ἀτοπον*. Michelet remarks on the contrast between Aristotle and some modern philosophers, who hold that a man is excused in whatever he does, if he does but think it right. Conscience is *objective*, as well as *subjective*.
- (22.) 15. βούλεται λέγεσθαι, claims to be defined as. *The meaning of it is—λέγεται*, simply predicated; βούλεται λέγεσθαι is in theory predicated.—τὸ σὺμφερρον. The political ἀγαθόν is viewed as implying that of the individual.
- (23.) 15. ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοία, ignorance at the moment of choice of the character of the particular.—ἡ καθόλου, ignorance of the universal.
- (24.) 15. ἐν οἷς, the circumstances; περὶ αἷ, the particulars. The former would be when a man shot his friend not knowing he was near; the περὶ αἷ, when he did not know the gun to be loaded.
- (25.) 16. οὐ χεῖρον, it will be as well.
- (26.) 17. ἐκπείσειν αὐτούς, it had escaped them unawares; they had let it fall.—ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη: see Poet. c. 14. Merope is about to kill her son in ignorance, but recognises him in time.
- (27.) 17. δεῖξαι, to exhibit in any way.—ἀκροχειζόμενοι, Anglicè, with the gloves.
- (28.) 18. ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις, in the most essential points

of the action,—those that most decide its character — ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, the circumstances of the action.

- (29.) 20. This definition of ἐκείσιον, the result of the foregoing chapter, will now be applied to human action.
- (30.) 21. γάρ refers to an objection against this definition, on the ground that actions from concupiscible or irascible impulses, though ἐν αὐτῷ, are involuntary.
- (31.) 22. The argument is an elenchus.
- (32.) 24. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι. For the final causes of anger here recognised by Aristotle, consult Butler, Sermon viii.
- (33.) 25. Argument in second figure.
- (34.) 26. τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι. What difference is there in faults committed from reason and those committed from desire, *in respect of their being voluntary*?—it cannot be predicated of the one without being predicated of the other.
- (35.) 27. οὐχ ἥττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη. This is the key-stone of Aristotle's moral system, discernible whenever he treats of man, his nature, position, duties, —as in the Rhetoric, for instance. He looks upon him as being of a compound nature, made up of reason and passions: in fact, he looks upon him as he is, and not as he might have been, had he been created differently.

CHAPTER II.

- (36.) 1. περὶ προαιρέσεως: by an examination into the motive cause of human action he will shew it to be voluntary. προαίρεσις is the deliberate act of choice; not the general principle which directs the choice, but the choice of some particular, directed well or ill by the reason, as the agent is good or bad.
- (37.) 1 οἰκειότατον, most nearly connected.—τῶν πράξεων: πρᾶξις is here used in a loose way for ἔργον, as, strictly speaking, πρᾶξις includes προαιρέσις.
- (38.) 2. φαίνεται, evidently is.—ἐπὶ πλείον: it is a species of ἐκείσιον.

(39.) 3. οἱ δὲ λείγοντες. He proceeds to shew, by an analysis of προαίρεσις, that it is not a simple mental impulse or act, but a compound motion: it is not an impulse of the irascible or concupiscible parts of our nature, nor is it merely an opinion on moral matters, in any of which cases it might more or less lose the character of ἐκούσιον.

(40.) 5. This chapter and the following one will be more clearly understood if we trace the course of an action of our concupiscible part from its first beginnings in the soul of a rational agent up to its completion.

ἐπιθυμία (De Anima, p. 32,—ἡδέως ὄρεξίς), a general latent appetite or propension towards ἡδύ, resulting either from the λύπη of φυσικαὶ ἐνδείαι (κοιναί), or from particular propensions of ἡδονή (ἴδια, ἐπιθετοί), existing differently in different individuals, as the several πάθη exist in them in different degrees of strength.

αἰσθησις, presenting to the ἐπιθυμία, by means of the φαντασία, (see De Anima, p. 30,) an object suitable to the ἐνδεία or πάθος.

ἐπιθυμία, existing actively, (τοῦδε τοῦ ἡδέως ὄρεξίς.)—a sensible propension,—appetite in motion.

ὄρεξις=ἐπιθυμία, directed towards some definite object, appetitive;—διώξις, an *appetite*, a seeking after;—ὄρεξις, a stretching forth after.

δόξα, a judgment of the moral reason as to the pursuit or avoidance of the object in question.

βούλησις, *will*,—an act of the will consequent on the decision of the reason that the object is a proper one for pursuit,—a choice of the end,—*will of the end*: βούλησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

ὄρεξις, again,—confirmed by the assent of the reason,—rational διώξις: bk. vi. 2; putting in motion,

βούλευσις, a deliberation as to the means proper for the attainment of the object,—*will of the means*: τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀγαθοῦ γε ὁντός.

προαίρεσις, *will of the action*,—*purpose*; a deliberate choice of the whole action and means, combining βούλησις and βούλευσις.

ὄρεξις again, under the shape of προαίρεσις, (ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν): see end of chap. v.

There are then three sorts of *δρεξις*:—

1. The energy of *ἐπιθυμία*, *appetitive*, (*De Anima*, p. 32,) *τοῦ ἡδέος*.
2. The energy of the *ἐπιθυμία* confirmed by reason,—*rational*, *τοῦ τελοῦς*.
3. Of the whole action,—*determinate*, *τῆς πράξεως ὡς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἡδέος*.

It must further be borne in mind that when the character is rightly formed, that is, when the agent is a good man, all the steps previous to *βούλησις* are merged in the impulses towards action; are rational impulses of the *ἡθός* towards good, inasmuch as nothing presents itself to the desire as good or pleasant, but what the reason simultaneously approves of as really good and pleasant. Here the *δρεξις* and *βούλησις* are synonymous, and the act of desire may be termed either *δρεξις* or *βούλησις*: and this probably is the reason why Aristotle not unfrequently interchanges these terms, using the one for the other. This, though founded on a true view of the phenomena of human action, will confuse the student, unless he is careful to distinguish between cases where a difference, as given above, is made between them, and where they are viewed, as in the case of a good man, as practically identical. Where analysis requires strict accuracy, *ἐπιθυμία* may be translated *desire* or *propension*,—*δρεξις*, *appetite*,—*βούλησις*, *will*;—these terms being used in the sense given by Hooker, bk. i. vii. 3: "The object of *appetite* is whatever sensible good may be wished for; the object of *will* is that good which reason teaches us to seek." So *βούλησις*, rather than *δρεξις*, would be the term for a desire after those things which reason, rather than *αἴσθησις* presents as *ἡδέα*, such as a present sacrifice for future gain; but even here *δρεξις* might be used to express that assent and energy of the irrational part towards the *ἡδύ*, without which an action cannot arise. In this case, the course of the action would stand thus:—

βούλησις, presenting the *ἀγαθόν* as *ἡδύ*.

δρεξις, stretching out after it.

The next stage, the definite *βούλησις* of an ordinary action, is of course merged in the former impulsive act of *βούλησις*. The fact is that the irrational part, as the motive cause, must operate in every action: where the irrational presents

the object, reason follows and directs; where reason presents the object, *ὄρεξις*, the act of the irrational part, adopts it as a motive: and further, where the motive power of the end is rather considered than its quality (right or wrong), *ὄρεξις* is the word used, rather than *βούλησις*. Hence, when speaking generally of an action, (as in bk. vi. chap. 2,) it is said to proceed from *βούλευσις* and *ὄρεξις*: when viewed in relation to the intellect, *βούλησις* is the proper term. *ὄρεξις*, properly speaking, takes cognizance of the end as *ἡδύ*; *βούλησις* as *ἀγαθόν*.

βούλησις, again, has degrees, and corresponds both to *wish* and *will*, as used in English Ethics: when the object is in itself unattainable, it is a mere *imperfect βούλησις*, or *wish*; the question of *δύνατον* is not taken into consideration; indeed, this properly belongs rather to *βούλευσις*: but when the object it decides upon is attainable, then it is a *perfect βούλησις*, or *will*.

ἐπιθυμία, again, is apparently identical with *ἡδονή* in its sense of a principle of human nature, which impels us to pursuit of the sensible *ἡδύ*, but it has *λίπη* attached, as implying an *ἔνδεια* (*μετὰ λίπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία*, chap. xi. 6); and in bk. vii. 7. 3, it is distinguished from it: as *ἐπιθυμία* is rather a passive feeling, created by *ἐνδεΐαι*, and drawn out by temptations; *ἡδονή*, a general tone, or temper, or mind, in which the motive cause of human nature consists,—(see bk. vii. 7. 3,)—in its bad sense, a tendency towards self-indulgence, either general or particular, which creates temptations and opportunities for itself: it is this which Aristotle is warning us against at the end of bk. ii. It is believed that an attentive consideration and development of what is here said will enable the student to assign to these terms, wherever they are used, their real meaning and value, and to solve the seeming contradictions which the use of them in different meanings produces.

- (41) 3. *ἐπιθυμία*. It is not a simple energy of our concupiscible nature—*ἡ θυμόν*, nor of the irascible—*ἡ βούλησις*, nor of the rational will—*ἡ τινα δόξαν*, nor of the moral intellect: in any of these cases, it might be said it was sudden and involuntary.

- (42.) 3, 4. It is not *ἐπιθυμία*, by arguments in the second figure.

(43.) 5. ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. It seems at first sight as if desire could be opposed to desire; but we must recollect that the opposition here in question must be "*de eodem*:" there is such an opposition *de eodem*, and at the same time, between προαίρεσις and ἐπιθυμία: but a man cannot desire the same thing and desire the exact contrary at the same time,—a man cannot be hungry and not hungry at the same time.—ἡ δ' ἰός καὶ ἐπιλύπον, i.e. ἐπιθυμία is moved either by the presence of some ἡδύ, or by the pressure of some pain such as hunger: so in bk. vii. 7. 3, he speaks of λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας—προαίρεσις looks upon an action as ἀγαθόν or κακόν: in the case of the good man, καλόν is coincident with ἀγαθόν, αἰσχρόν with κακόν; to the ἀκόλαστος, or man of reprobate mind, it is the reverse,—αἰσχρόν is his ἀγαθόν, καλόν is his κακόν.

(44.) 6. θυμός ἔτι ἤττον. He simply appeals to the common sense of mankind.

(45.) 7. σύνεγγυς, akin to it.—βουλήσις ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων: that is, imperfect βούλησις, or wish, as stated above. The consideration of ἀδύνατον belongs rather to βούλευσις, but *real* βούλησις, actual will, nevertheless does not exist where ἀδύνατον is manifest. All these arguments may be resolved into the second figure, though perhaps we conclude differences between things which have different objects from a process of perception, rather than of actual reasoning.

(46.) 10. δόξα, a mere intellectual act.

(47.) 11. δόξη τινί, an act of the intellect on moral subjects. This δόξα enters into a moral purpose, as shewn above, but it is not the whole of it.

(48.) 13. ἢ τῷ ὁρθῶς. ἢ is "or," not "than;" as μᾶλλον preceding might suggest.

(49.) 15. See vii. 7. 4; and below, 4. 5.

(50.) 17. μετὰ λόγου κ.τ.λ. λόγος, properly, reason; διανοία, exercise of the reason: see *De Anima*, p. 69.

CHAPTER III.

He now examines one of the elements of *προαίρεσις*,—the will of the means, *βούλευσις*.

- (51.) 4. *ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι*, that is, that the side and the diagonal of a square have no common measure. This is a favourite illustration of Aristotle's. It probably was a problem then in vogue in the learned world, like squaring the circle with us.
- (52.) 4. *διότινα ἄλλην αἰτίαν*. He here leaves room for the opinion of those who distinctly held a Divine Providence separate from nature.
- (53.) 7. *ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐστὶ λοιπά*, and these are what are left, i. e. when the other causes of action are excluded.
- (54.) 7. *αἰτίαι κ.τ.λ.* This is Aristotle's usual theory of causation, in things physical. In the Rhetoric he divides *ἀνάγκη* into *φύσις* and *βία*: but *ἀνάγκη* there is only used popularly to express the plea of involuntariness, which does away with the responsibility of the agent in a trial, which he is laying down in the passage in the Rhetoric: see also An. Post. ii. 10, p. 217.
- (55.) 7. *φύσις*, in its widest sense, as the whole system of things natural, is divided elsewhere, as here, into—
1. *ἀνάγκη*, where the connection between cause and effect, or even antecedent and consequent, is invariable and perceptible,—*τῶν αἰεί*,—such as fire and heat.
 2. *φύσις*, where this connection is perceptible and general, but not invariable, as clouds and rain. *τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*. Eth. vi. 4.
 3. *τύχη*, (*αἰτία ἄοριστος*), where this connection is neither invariable nor perceptible,—*τῶν μήτε αἰεί μήτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*. See Met. p. 228; Top. p. 130; Phys. p. 35.
- (56.) 8. *ἀκριβεῖς*, of which the laws are well ascertained.—*ἀετάρκεις*, where they do not depend, in part or whole, on some other science or art for their realization: where they do thus depend, there may be deliberation as to what science, or what operations of that science, are necessary to them, as producing or co-operating cause.

- (57.) 9. ἥττον διεκρίβωται, as its principles are less accurately ascertained.
- (58.) 9. περὶ τέχνας κ.τ.λ.: we deliberate more on the application of principles than the principles themselves; and more on scientific arts than on abstract sciences.
- (59.) 10. ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον: sc. ἐστὶ.—συμβοίλους δε. Proof of the nature of βούλευσις.
- (60.) 11. ἀλλὰ θέμενοι κ.τ.λ. Mark carefully this analysis of βούλευσις, in every step of which the voluntariness of the action is evidenced. When he considers εἰβουλία in bk. vi., he adds to this analysis that the means thus chosen must be right means: see εἰβουλία.
- (61.) 11. πρῶτον αἷτιον, the first link in the causation.—ἀναλύνειν is to resolve anything into its simple elements or parts.
- (62.) 12. ὥσπερ διάγραμμα, sc. ὥσπερ τις ἀναλίων διάγραμμα. If a puzzle were placed before us, we should take out piece after piece, till we had gone backwards through the process of putting it together; and when we proceeded to put it together, the piece which had remained till last (ἔσχατον ἐν ζητήσει) would be the one we should begin with, (πρῶτον ἐν γενέσει). But this is rather an illustration than an explanation of the text, as διάγραμμα is a geometrical figure. If a person resolve a geometrical figure into its simple elements, —a hexagon, for instance, into six triangles,—afterwards wish to construct it, the last step in the analysis would be the first in the reconstruction.
- (63.) 15. ἔοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ. refers to ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, just above. He is shewing how it is that these points, which depend on others, are subjects for βουλή.—αἱ δὲ πράξεις, sc. τῆς βουλῆς: those which βουλή takes cognizance of.
- (64.) 16. τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα: not particulars and their simple qualities, but their fitness for or relation to the end in view. See bk. vi. 8, fin.
- (65.) 17. ἀφωρισμένον, *determinate*. When by βούλευσις the ἔσχατον ἐν ζητήσει has been discovered, and is in our power, then there arises a determinate purpose to perform the action, and further, a determinate ἔρεξις, called προαίρεσις.
- (66.) 14. δι' οὗ, *through what means*. διὰ τινός, *through whose help*.
- (67.) 17. τὴν ἀρχήν, the starting-point of the action,—the

πρῶτον ἐν γενέσει. When this point is found to be something immediately depending on oneself, and is approved by the judgment, (αὐτοῦ τὸ ἡγούμενον, the τὸ προαιρούμενον,) or power of moral choice, which decides on pursuit or avoidance.

(68.) 18. ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν. This is rather introduced as an ornamental figure than as any actual proof of what he is saying. Homer (Il. E. 53.) has introduced the chiefs declaring to the people what they had thus decided upon as things to be done. The process was ended when προαίρεσις had taken place in their councils.

(69.) Deliberation, then, is a process of enquiry carried on by the reason, with its various powers and functions, set in motion by the presence of some ὄρεξις, (approved by reason = βούλησις.) beginning with the end in view, and proceeding, link by link, through the chain of means, till it reaches the point in our own power, and which our judgment approves. When this is reached, βούλευσις ceases, and the act of choice or purpose supervenes.

CHAPTER IV.

(70.) He now proceeds to consider the other element of προαίρεσις, *the will of the end*, or βούλησις.

The first question is whether the *will* has for its proper object the real good, (τἀγαθόν,) or that which presents itself to us as good, (τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν).

(70.) 2. τὸ βουλευτόν, the object of βούλησις.

(71.) 2. συμβαίνει, *it follows*. He states the difficulties of the several notions on the subject.

(72.) 4. The question is solved by saying that (ἀπλῶς) in its own nature the τἀγαθόν is the proper object of will; but as this presents itself differently to different individuals, practically and accidentally, not from its own desirableness, but from the weakness and blindness of human agents, that is to each βουλευτόν which presents itself as such: so that there is a proper object of choice, though it is realized by none but the good man. He here again introduces one of his favourite medical illustrations.

- (73.) 4. ὁ σπουδαῖος κρίνει ὀρθῶς. Here is an act of *δοξα* as to the character of the *ἡδύ* proposed by *δρεξις*: so in bk. vii. 8, he says that *ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἠθικὴ* is *τοῖς ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν*. When the moral character or moral sense is formed in its first stage, (as we shall see hereafter, bk. vi., addenda,) nothing presents itself as *ἡδύ* which is not *ἀγαθόν*, and the choice of good is instinctive, (*δρᾶν*): earlier, the *δρεξις* presents many objects which the moral reason rejects as undesirable because bad.
- (74.) 5. And herein is one great (if not the greatest) difference between the good man and the bad,—that to the good man the true good presents itself (*φαίνεται*) as good, and an object of pursuit,—the *ἀγαθόν* presents itself as *ἡδύ*; while to the bad man the *ἡδύ* presents itself as *ἀγαθόν*: the views of the *ἡδύ* and the *καλόν* are affected by the tone and state of mind (*εἶξις*). The view we take, then, of the several ends we propose to ourselves depending upon our frame of mind, (*εἶξις*), this is an *ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν*; and therefore the choice of ends is voluntary.
- (75.) 5. διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, the propension to pleasure, as pleasure, which exists in us, as we should say, by nature. Aristotle would ascribe it rather (though not entirely) to bad education.
- (76.) *προαίρεσις*, then, as described by Aristotle, is an act of deliberate choice, by a moral agent, of a certain end, by certain means: the whole action lies before the mind, and is resolved upon in all its details; the choice of the end, the selection and adoption of the several means, implies voluntariness and responsibility on the part of the agent. On this act of deliberate choice follows the carrying it out, of which more will be said in the latter part of bk. vi. It may be added here, that there is no more accurate description of a virtuous moral action than that given in the second collect at Evening Prayer,—*holy desires, good counsels, just works*. Why *προαίρεσις* is generally used for “good counsels,” see note 79: for the effect of character on our moral judgment, see bk. vii.

CHAPTER V.

- (77.) Having thus shewn that each of the parts of *προαίρεσις* is *ἐν ἡμῖν*, he now uses this to shew that the actions proceeding

from it are voluntary. Plato held the contrary opinion, *De Legg.* ix. 860, D, οἱ κακοὶ πάντες εἰς πάντα εἰσὶν ἄκοντες κακοί: and again, *Prot.* 343, D, οἶδεις τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οἶδεναι ἀνθρώπων ἔκοντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν, οἱ δὲ αἰσχρὰ τε καὶ κακὰ ἔκοντα ἐργάζεσθαι: *Timæus*, 81, D, κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔκων οἶδεῖς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἔξιν τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαιδευτον τροφήν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός.

(78.) He considers four pleas of necessity:—

1. Absolute predestination, or controlling power, ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν: to this he answers by his proof that προαίρεσις in itself and its parts is an ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν.
2. Natural desires, corruption of nature: the ἀρχὴ is ἐν ἡμῖν, and therefore the action voluntary.
3. Acquired habits,—ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, and therefore voluntary.
4. Wrong impressions from external things, the ἀρχὴ is ἔξωθεν: he answers this by shewing that as this impression (φαντασία) arises from our character and tone of mind, as well as from external things, we are responsible for it, as having formed that character and tone; and, further, that this φαντασία, supposing it to be sudden and irresistible, only affects part of the action,—the choice of the end,—and does not take away the voluntariness of the choice of the means. Contrast this mode of treating the subject with that of Butler, who supposes the plea of necessity true, and shews that, even on this supposition, it would not do away with human responsibility, or the notion of a supreme God.

(79.) 1. βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν κ.τ.λ. It is to be observed, both here and in some other places, that he confines προαίρεσις to the choice of means, whereas, in reality, it is a choice both of ends and means. The reason of this is, that where the first stage of the moral character is formed, the right end is chosen instinctively, without any effort on the part of the intellect. τὰ γὰρ θύμῃ presents itself as ἡδύ, and then the function of the intellect in the choice of the action is confined to the choice of proper means: see bk. vi. chap. 12.

(80.) 1. The first argument is in the first figure; the result of the analysis of προαίρεσις, which has occupied the three last chapters.

(81.) 2. In the *Magna Moralia*, i. 9, it is said that Socrates uses

this opposition between *κακία* and *ἀρετή* to shew that as *κακία* is involuntary, so must *ἀρετή* be.

- (82.) 3. τοῦτο δ' ἦν κτλ. should be in a parenthesis. This is a formula for the reference to a former admitted definition or position: see bk. v. i. 12, Gr. Gr. 398, 4 — *ἀγαθοῖς*: the dative is in attraction to *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*.
- (83.) 4. Aristotle here alludes to a proverb, wherein, by a plausible antithesis, the truth of the one true clause is made to throw a shadow of truth over the other, and quietly disposes of it by pointing out which is true and which is false.
- (84.) 5. He then refers to another argument of the fatalists, that a man's actions cannot be said to proceed from *him*,—that a man is not the source whence his actions flow,—that they proceed from his nature, which he cannot help,—plea of necessity in a man's nature.—*τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένους*: what has been said about *προαίρεσις*, *βούλευσις*, *βούλησις*, and the conclusions drawn therefrom.—*ἀναγαγεῖν*, trace.
- (85.) 6. ταῦτα. — *τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα*—*φαίνετα*: are evidently so.
- (86.) 7. τοῦτοις. He has hitherto drawn his arguments from the nature of *προαίρεσις*: he now (7, 8, 9.) confirms them by the opinion and practice of man. This is much the same as Butler's practical argument.
- (87.) 10 Responsibility not taken away by the plea of acquired habits.
- (88.) 10. Analogy of bodily defects, which arise from former carelessness or dissipation: if they are blamed, they are looked upon as voluntary; and therefore, if mental habits are blamed, they are voluntary likewise.
- (89.) 13. μὴ βούλεσθαι. It was argued that a man could not *wish* to do himself harm, and therefore could not do so voluntarily.
- (90.) 17. Another plea of the fatalists is, that the external world conveys certain impressions to the mind, which it cannot help receiving; and therefore the actions proceeding from these are to be considered as caused by the external world acting on the mind, and not by the mind or will of the agent.
- (91.) 17. φαντασία, the impression which external things make on the mind, (*φαίνετα*), or the power which receives, and, as

it were, daguerreotypes such impressions : in either sense the meaning is the same,—either that we have no power over the impressions from external things, or no power over the faculty which receives them ; in either case, we cannot help receiving them. In the Rhetoric it is called *αἰσθησίς τις ἀσθενής* : it is used again, in bk. vii. 3. 11, for the impressions from sensible objects of which beasts are capable ; and again, bk. vii. 7. 8, for the impression which men follow hastily, without stopping to consult their reason. In the De Anima, p. 61, it is joined with *αἰσθησεις*—*αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις* ; and *φάντασμα* is the impression of the *αἰσθημα* upon the mind, *ἄνευ τῇ ὕλης*, of which *φαντασία* is the power : see De Anima, p. 76. It is important to understand the real meaning of this word in this passage, as it is sometimes translated “ *imagination*,” which, in the usual sense of that word, does not give its sense.

(92.) The answer to this argument is, that if the external world conveys wrong impressions, the tone of the mind must be prepared to receive them ; and for this tone the agent is responsible : and further, if the first step, the object of desire, be necessarily impressed upon us by the external world, every subsequent step in the action is voluntary.

(93.) 17. *εἰ δέ τις λέγοι*. The apodosis, “ this is my answer,” is suppressed.—*εἰ δέ μὴ, οὐθείς* : another reading is, *εἰ δέ μήδεις*, making this another protasis, without its apodosis, and referring both to the answer given in sect. 18 ; both are supported by MSS. The reading in the text makes it a *reductio ad absurdum* to suppose that we are not *φαντασίας αἵτιοι* ; the other would refer more directly to Plato's words on the subject, and place the false pleas in a string, to be answered in sect. 18.

(94.) 17. *ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις*. This is another theory of the fatalists.

(94.) 19. *παρ' αὐτόν*, *from himself*. *παρ' αὐτῷ*, *al.* : but see Grammar, 637. iii. 3. d.

(95.) 20. *καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει*. Another reading is, *καὶ τῷ τελείῳ*, *as it is to the good man*. There is something to say for and against both : the former alludes to the argument above, that the means are in the agent's power, even supposing the end not to be ; the latter, to the frequently re-

peated proposition, that the bad man has it in his own power to act or not, as well as the good. Against the former, *εἰ καὶ* is the proper form of introducing an admitted supposition; but Aristotle may have wished to mark that he only admitted it for argument's sake: against the latter, *σπουδαῖος* is the term we should expect, not *τέλειος*.

(96.) 22. *ἡ πρόσθεσις*, the accumulation. It would almost seem as if sections 21 and 22 had got transposed. Section 23 evidently fits on to 21.

(97.) Aristotle's mode of treating the great question of human responsibility is very simple and practical. Without entering into metaphysical or psychological abstractions, he analyzes the source whence human actions proceed, and demonstrates that, if there is such a thing as voluntariness, it must exist in such actions. He points out some of the absurdities which are involved in the contrary theories, and the practical witness which human opinion and human institutions bear to man's responsibility as a fact.

CHAPTER VI.

(98.) In this consideration of the several virtues, Aristotle has it in view to explain the nature, the subject-matter, and the mode of each, and, at the same time, to shew, as part of the proof of his book, that each several *μεσότης* is the *ἀρετή* of that particular part of human nature of which it is the development and regulation.

(99.) As *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* generally is *περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας*,—the regulation and balance of the impulse and checks of action, so each particular is the regulation and balance of some particular *ἡδονή* and *λύπη*,—of self-love, directed towards some particular object, in some particular sphere,—of some particular impulse or check, operating in some particular pursuit or avoidance. Where the check would lead from what ought to be done, it is regulated and balanced by the sense of honour and duty arising from *τὸ καλόν*, partly residing in the feelings, partly recognised by the reason, to which *ἡδονή* is attached. Where the impulse would lead us wrong, it is regulated and balanced by the sense of shame, arising from the same source, to which *λύπη* is attached. The sense of

good desert and bad desert counteracts and controls within due bounds the natural impulses of pursuit and avoidance. Where either the original or the counterbalancing impulse operates too much or too little, then we are in one or other of the extremes.

- (100.) 1. *ἀνδρεία*, the *μεσότης* between *φόβος* and *θάρρος*, and *σωφροσύνη*, the *μεσότης* *περὶ σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας* come first, because they are respectively the principal virtues of the irascible and concupiscible natures, which was the usual view taken of man's impulsive constitution by the philosophers of the time; and because in these the impulses and checks are most apparent, as being most readily and instinctively acted upon by external things, and therefore most effective in producing and influencing action. And *ἀνδρεία* before *σωφροσύνη*, because, of the two, the impulse of fear is the most instinctive and effective. We can suppose a person to have an appetite for *ἡδονή*, and yet be too indolent to allow it to move him to pursuit: but where the *λύπη* of fear comes, avoidance follows almost instinctively, even where regulated by *θάρρος* into *ἀνδρεία*. That *ἀνδρεία* belongs to the irascible part may be seen from *φόβος* being placed under the *θυμοειδές*, *Top. iv. 5. 4*, p. 170, *ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐν τῇ θυμοειδεῖ*, cf. *ii. 8. 4*, p. 133. It must be recollected that, in Plato's theory, the *θυμοειδές* was the basis of the moral character, as far as the *ἄλογον* part of the soul contributed to it; its function was to assist the reason in suppressing the concupiscible impulses.

- (101.) 3. *εἶτι γὰρ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι*. He here recognises certain final causes of this feeling implanted in us. Remember to translate *καλόν*, *right*, the sense of duty, or rather, perhaps, the sense of honour, which, where positive religion is not the guide, does in some sort supply its place,—*αἰσχρόν*, *wrong*,—keeping in mind, at the same time, the connection between physical and moral beauty,—the beauty of holiness, which the Greeks embodied in several words and notions. When *καλόν* is loosely translated "*honourable*," and *αἰσχρόν*, *shameful* or *base*, the real notion in Aristotle's mind is lost.

- (102.) 3. *ἐπισεικῆς*, as applied by Aristotle to express goodness, and not merely justice or equity, is scarcely to be represented by any English word. Its meaning is derived partly from its primary, partly from its secondary, sense; it signifies

that the agent is acting as he ought, and therefore justly ; but, further, it signifies that there is something beautiful and attractive in what he does.—A *seemly* person,—from whence it probably was used for equity.—αἰδῆμων, *possessed of a sense of shame*.—λέγεται κ.τ.λ., *sc. δ μη φοβοίμενος*. μεταφορὰν : from genus to species.

(103.) 5. οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ κ.τ.λ. : because ἀδοξίαν δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι.

(104.) 6. φοβερώτατον δὲ ὁ θάνατος. This notion, that the meeting death with firmness is the final cause of θάρρος, and the perfection of ἀνδρεία, harmonizes with his view of man as a citizen designed for the good of the state.—πέραις γάρ. Stress must be laid, in this passage, on the word δοκεῖ, to mark that it was the common opinion of which Aristotle was speaking, not his own. See De Anima, i. 5. p. 25, δοκεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν : ἐξελεύσῃ γοῦ διαπνέεται καὶ σήπεται. The word διαπνέεται is taken from the Phædo, 80, c.

(105.) 11. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. The ἀνδρεῖος will be ἀδεής in storm or sickness ; but still his ἀνδρεία will have no sphere for exercise.

(106.) 11. οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς θαλάττιοι. The man who is sick and the sailor in a storm look upon death nearly in the same way ; and the latter is used to illustrate the absence of ἀνδρεία in both cases.—οἱ μὲν, οἱ δέ, may be two sorts of θαλάττιοι. That is, in the case of the θαλάττιοι, there is either (οἱ μὲν) utter despair of life and a dislike of a death in which there is no καλόν, or (οἱ δέ) there is a hope of escape, arising from their skill or experience : or οἱ μὲν may be the ἀνδρεῖοι, and οἱ δέ the θαλάττιοι.—οἱ μὲν referring to the ἀνδρεῖοι, being, with reference to this particular case, ἀδεής, (though in a different way from the θαλάττιοι,) and not ἀνδρεῖοι. The ἀνδρεῖος is not here ἀνδρεῖος because there is no καλόν ; and though his tone of mind prevents his fearing death, yet he would escape it if he could, whereas the ἀνδρεῖος would not. The sailor is ἀδεής, because his experience prevents death from threatening him as it does the landsman. Neither case is that of death being willingly met, when it is possible to avoid it, for the sake of the τὸ καλόν. In real ἀνδρεία there must be within reach a means of averting death, (ἀλκή,) and a counterbalancing motive to meet it.

(107.) 12. ἀνδρίζονται, act bravely

CHAPTER VII.

- (108.) The conditions, then, of true ἀνδρεία are:—1. The presence of the really φοβερόν, (i. e. death). 2. φόβος, an impulse (see chap. ix.) arising from it, to avoid it, (λύπη). 3. A means of averting it, (ἀλκή). 4. θάρρος, (ἡδονή,) arising from a sense of καλόν,—an impulse towards meeting it. 5. προαίρεσις. 6. ἔξις, (see chap. viii. 15,) it must be ready to act on emergencies, without reasoning and persuading itself on each particular occasion. The absence of any one of these conditions destroys the character of ἀνδρεία.
- (109.) 1. In ἀνδρεία the λύπη comes first, and is balanced by ἡδονή; αἴσθησις presents the φοβερόν, and there is an impulse to avoid it: this is checked and regulated by θάρρος, suggested by καλόν, which acts as a motive, by virtue of the ἡδονή of good desert attached to it.
- (109.) 2. ὡς ἄνθρωπος, as far as humanity can bear. Mark the sound practical wisdom which Aristotle shews in all his views of the nature, the position, and the duties of man.
- (110.) 2. ὡς ὁ λόγος, sc. κελεύει.
- (111.) 3. τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. So the θάρρος, which is to regulate the φόβος, must not be mere animal courage, nor yet a mere fear of shame, but must be suggested by a sense of καλόν. The final cause which should set men on right action is the καλόν, to which the sense of good desert is attached, so that it shall be ἡδύ: see iii. 1. 11, τὸ δὲ διὰ—καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς. The καλόν in the Rhetoric is defined as having a twofold source,—either our internal impressions, ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ᾖ, ἡδύ ἢ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, or the praise of men, ὃ αἰρετόν ᾖ, ἐπαινετόν ἐστι. The notion of καλόν embraces both these,—one in its sense of beautiful, the other in its sense of honourable. The καλόν, as the motive of virtue, must be an internal sense of right and good desert, (see note 101,) not only ἐπαινετόν: see chap. viii. sect. 1.
- (112.) 5. κατ' ἀξίαν. = ὡς δεῖ in section 2,—with the additional notion of “as becomes him.”
- (113.) 6. πάσχει καὶ πράττει, both *enduring* and *doing*,—passive as well as active. Leonidas would be an instance

of the latter; a martyr, to whom a pardon is offered on condition of apostacy, of the former.

- (114.) 6. *τέλος δέ κ.τ.λ.* The *μεσότης* between the two extremes fulfils the conditions of *ἀρετή*, *ἀ δ' εἰ*, &c. He now shews more definitely that it has for its object τὸ καλόν, because that which is in accordance with the habit (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν) is the τέλος; that is, if the ἔξις is καλόν, this is its τέλος,—if the ἔξις is αἰσχρόν, αἰσχρόν is its τέλος; and ἀνδρεία is καλόν, therefore the τέλος is καλόν, for everything takes its character (ὁρίζεται) from its τέλος; so that if you know the character of the τέλος, you know the character of the ἔξις, and *vice versa*.—*ἕκαστον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* This is a sort of prosyllogism to the sentence, *τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας κ.τ.λ.*, which seems to have struck him as necessary when he had worked out the argument.

- (115.) 7. *τῶν δὲ ὑπερβαλλόντων.* Each of the extremes stands in a double relation,—an excess of one principle, a deficiency of the other; and hence *ὑπερβαλλόντων* is used for both extremes. Even *ἀφοβία* (the deficiency of fear) may be viewed as an excess of *θάρρος*, though different from the real excess, (*θρασύτης*), inasmuch as it would consist in the absence of an instinct inseparable from human nature in its proper state. And, as was said in the second book, one of these extremes is less opposed to the mean, and is better in itself than the other: it will be found that the excess of the regulating principle is the better. Thus in *ἀνδρεία*, *φόβος* is regulated or counterbalanced, by *θάρρος*, the excess of which is *θρασύτης*, and this is better than *δειλία*.—*ἐν τοῖς πρότερον*: bk. ii. 7. 2.

- (116.) 9. *ἐν τούτοις* = *ἐν οἷς δύναται μμεῖσθαι*.

- (116.) 13. *ἐν οἷς εἴρηται*, sc. *τοῖς μεγίστοις*: see chap. viii. 6.

- (117.) 10. *καὶ ἐν ταῖς λύπαις.* *δειλία* is rather passive than active: it is not that the *δειλός* has no instincts towards bravery, but that the prospect of pain influences him too strongly; hence it is viewed rather as a *ὑπερβολή* of *φόβος* than a deficiency of *θάρρος*.

- (118.) 12. *περὶ ταῦτά, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα*: but the former is the better, though there is MSS. authority for the other.—*βουλόμενοι*, *ready and eager*.

- (119.) 13. The suicide is not ἀνδρείος, because one of the conditions for ἀνδρεία given above is wanting, viz. the καλόν as a motive.
- (120.) 13. ὅτι is to be taken after αἰρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει.—ὑπομένει, sc. θάνατον, ὅτι καλόν ἐστι.

CHAPTER VIII.

(112.) Each of the spurious imitations of ἀνδρεία considered in this chapter is deficient in one or more of the conditions of ἀνδρεία given above.

a. ἡ πολιτική: the true internal καλόν wanting, and its place artificially supplied by external honour and disgrace.

b. ἐξ ἐμπειρίας: no φοβερόν.

c. ἐκ θυμοῦ: no φοβερόν,—it is overlooked; no καλόν, rather διὰ πάθος; no προαίρεσις.

d. τῶν ἐυελπίδων: no φοβερόν,—there is however a δεινόν, which distinguishes these from the next sort.

e. ἐξ ἀγνοίας: no φοβερόν, or rather no δεινόν.

(122.) 1. ἡ πολιτική. It is difficult to find any equivalent word for this; “*political*” does not convey the required meaning; it may be called the courage displayed by citizens, as citizens, i. e. which would not influence them if they were removed from social life.—μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν: first πολιτική, for this is most like the true.—ἐκ τῶν νόμων: see Thuc. ii. 39.

(123.) 2. Πουλυδάμας κ.τ.λ.: see Il. xxii. 100. Διομήδης: Il. viii. 148.

(124.) 3. δι’ ἀρετήν. It arises from a good state of mind, viz. respect for oneself and others, (αἰδῶ,) and the desire for καλόν in the shape of honour; but not like ἀνδρεία, from that internal καλόν which is its own reward.

(125.) 4. εἰς ταῦτο, sc. τοῖς πολιτικοῖς.—ὃν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Il. β. 391; and quoted again Pol. iii. 14.—τύπτοντες: see Hdt. vii. 223.

(126.) 6. ὅθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ. Protagoras, 350; Laches, 195.

(127.) 6. κενά, al. καινά: both have MSS. authority. Michelet quotes from Tacitus, Hist. ii. 69, “*inania belli*,” and Cicero

ad Att. v. 10, "scis enim dici quædam πανικά, dici item τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου." καινά, on the other hand, is supported by Thuc. iii. 30, τὸ καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου: so Dion. 40, τὸ καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου ἤρπασε: and again, Diod. Sic. xi., ἀληθὲς εἶναι ὅτι πολλὰ τὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμου. If the former is preferred, we must translate it "*vain alarms*;" if the latter, "*surprises*." Section 15, "ἐν τοῖς ἀφνιδίους φόβοις" seems to favour καινά.—συνεωράκασιν, *take in at a glance*.

(128.) 7. ποιῆσαι: sc. κακόν, *act on the offensive*.—ὅποῖα ἂν εἴη: the ἂν belongs to the εἴη,—which *may be*. Gr. Gr. 832.

(129.) 8. ἰδιώταις, *amateurs*.

(130.) 9. τὰ πολιτικά, for οἱ πολῖται, opposed to the mercenaries, στρατιῶται—ἐπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ. Onomarchus of Phocis having occupied the Hermæan plain, at the city of Coronæa, the levies of the citizens fought to the death against him, while the Boeotian auxiliaries took to their heels.

(131.) 10. ἰτητικώτατον: see Arist. Nub. 445: so ἴται and ἰταμοί, Plato. Ὀμηρος: Il. xvi. 529; Il. v. 510; Odys. xxiv. 317.

(132.) 10. θυμός is the animal instinct, which, when regulated and elevated into a rational instinct, and directed towards the καλόν, may become ἀνδρεία: it is the natural instinct towards doing and suffering.—συνεργεῖ: cf. Plato, Rep. 440, B.

(133.) 12. ἔξεσεν αἶμα: Theocr. x. 15.—φυσικωτάτῃ, *engrained in our nature*.—ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμόν, sc. λεγομένη ἀνδρεία.

(134.) 12. τὰ δι' ἀλγῆδόνος, sc. τὰ θηρία.—διὰ ταῦτα, for the sake of λυπηρόν in ὀργή, and ἡδύ in τιμωρία.

(135.) 13. διὰ τὰ προειρημένα, sc. διὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος.

(136.) 15. ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς, less a matter of preparation.—τὰ δὲ ἐξαίφνης κτλ. That is, λογισμός is merged in the ἔξις, so that the impulses of passion and the suggestions of reason are both lost in the rational instinct.

(137.) 16. ἀξίωμα, no notion of their own powers.—ἔκεινοι δέ, sc. ἔχουσι ἀξίωμα.

(138.) 16. οἱ Ἀργεῖοι: Xen. Hell. iv. 10. The Spartans, arming themselves with the shields of the vanquished Sicyonians,

advanced upon the Argives, who, taking them for Sicyonians, received them with contempt, but when they found out who they really were, fled.

CHAPTER IX.

- (139.) In this chapter he shews that *λύπη* and *ἡδονή* are the real springs of *ἀνδρεία*, and that it is the regulation of the *λύπη*, (*φόβος*), by the *ἡδονή*, (*θάρρος*).
- (140.) 1. *μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά*. It is *φόβος* which strikes on the mind from external objects: the *θάρρος* is supplied afterwards from within, as a corrective to the *φόβος*.
- (141.) 2. *τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος*, sc. *τὸ καλόν*. This connection between the *καλόν* and *ἡδύ* is recognised in “*dulce et decorum est*,” &c.—*ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ*, by circumstances.—*εἴπερ σάρκινον*, if they are flesh and blood.—*πᾶς ὁ πόνος*, sc. *ἐστὶ λυπηρόν*—*ταῦτα*: τὰ ἐν κύκλῳ.
- (141.) 3. *καὶ ἄκουσι*: see Gr. Gr. 599. 3.
- (141.) 4. *τῷ τοιούτῳ*. Compare this with what Socrates says in the *Phædo*, 62.
- (142.) 5. *οὐ δὴ κ.τ.λ.* *οὐ δὴ*, al. *οὐδέ*, not in all: it does in *σωφροσύνη*, for instance, in which there is enjoyment in moderate indulgence, besides that arising from the *καλόν*. In *ἀνδρεία* it arises from the *καλόν* alone.—*ἐφάπτεται*, attains to: *τὸ ἐνεργεῖν* is the supplied nom. Michelet,—“*aliter quam in fine positum est*.”
- (143.) 6. *στρατιώτας κ.τ.λ.* Take these words, *οὐδὲν κελεύει κρατίστους εἶναι στρατιώτας, μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους*, (sc. *τοὺς ἀρετὴν ἔχοντας πᾶσαν*) ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. “There is no reason why the best soldiers should be, not these above-mentioned but, those who, though having less *ἀνδρεία*, have less to lose in dying.”

CHAPTER X.

- (144.) *σωφροσύνη*, which, as it is treated of here as one of the virtues, is the regulation of the animal impulses of pleasure, has, both in Aristotle and in strictly classical Greek, especially

in its adjectival form of *σώφρων*, the far wider signification of *self-control*: so that *σώφρων* is sometimes used almost in the same sense as *φρόνιμος*, and it has this signification,—first, in a metaphorical or applied sense,—for as *ἀρετή* generally is *περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης*, so *σωφροσύνη* is *περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης* in their simplest form; secondly, because the regulation of the animal impulses is so difficult, that he who has really won the mastery over them must have arrived at a considerable degree of moral virtue; and thirdly, because, since all wrong actions spring from wrong notions and conceptions of *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* in general, the right regulation of the all-powerful motive seems right action, (*σωζει τὴν φρόνησιν*: bk. vi. 5. 5).

- (145.) 1. αὐταί, sc. *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία*: the one is the principal virtue of the concupiscible, the other of the irascible, parts of the soul; they spring directly from the very instincts of our animal nature, which no one is without; so that where they are supposed to be wanting, he is obliged to coin the words *ἀναισθησία* and *ἀφοβία*. The objects which excite them are presented simply by *αἰσθησις*, without the intervention of reason (*ἄλογος*); while the impulses of the other virtues, such as ambition, are taken cognizance not by *αἰσθησις* alone, but by *αἰσθησις* and reason, (*οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας*). They are *νοητικαὶ ὁρέξεις*, which could hardly rise up in an animal who was without some share or shadow of reason or intelligence.

- (146.) 1. *περὶ ἡδονῆς*. As in *ἀνδρεία* the *λύπη* (*φόβος*) is regulated and counteracted by the *ἡδονή*, (*θύρρος*), so in *σωφροσύνη* the *ἡδονή* is counteracted and regulated by the *λύπη* arising from a sense of the *αἰσχρόν*, which is, so to say, the negative side of the *καλόν*: (chap. xii. 1, *ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, — ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην*). First of all a desire arises,—if it be a bad one, there arises almost coincidently a sense of the bad desert which will wait upon it; and this acts, or ought to act, as a check upon our passions; hence it is *ἥττον καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ λύπης*.

- (147.) 1. *ἀκολασία*. Mark the derivation. The state where no correction can avail,—thorough depravity,—where all sense of *αἰσχρόν* is lost.—*φαίνεται* evidently is.

- (148.) 2. Mark his practical appeal to the general language of men

- (149.) 2. διηρησθωσαν. The division here of ἡδοναί is:—1. σωματικαί and ψυχικαί. 2. σωματικαί is divided into those τῆς ἀφ᾽ ἧς which arise from the organs of sensation, (αἰσθητήρια,) and which we share with animals, and those arising, not directly, from αἰσθητήρια, but from some higher sort of αἴσθησις, (taste,) in which our intellectual nature bears some part, as of beauty and harmony, &c., whether presented to us by the eye or the ear,—what are known in modern philosophy by the name of aesthetics, in which, though not directly the result of reasoning, our intellectual nature bears some part, and which may be formed and improved by study.
- (150.) 6. κατὰ συμβεβηκός, in a metaphorical or applied sense, i.e. arising from the associations accidentally connected with the objects on which sense proceeds, and not from the sense itself.—ἐπιθυμητῶν, al. ἐπιθυμημάτων, the objects or acts of their desire.
- (151.) 8. κατὰ, in; literally, corresponding to: see Gr. Gr. 629. 11 3, b.—πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, *except as an accidental result*; by an accidental association with some other merely animal perception.—τὴν δ' αἴσθησιν, sc. τῆς βρώσεως.
- (151.) 10. οἷ γε ἀκόλαστοι. The thoroughly depraved man's habits will be without even the elegance and taste which sometimes disguise vice: he will get drunk on anything, so that he gets drunk.
- (152.) 10. ὀψοφάγος. Some editions give the name Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐπίξιος before ὀψοφάγος, but Bekker omits them. Athenæus, p. 6, b, (1. 10.)—ἐκείνος ἐπιμεμφόμενος γὰρ τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὴν ἀπολαυσιν ἠΐξαστό ποτε γέρανον τὴν φάρνγγα σχεῖν: and again, 341, d, (viii. 26,)—Φιλόξενος ποθ' ὡς λεγόνσ', ὁ Κυθήριος ἠΐξαστο τριῶν ἔχειν λάρνγγα πῆχεων.—αὐτῷ, al. αὐτῶ: see Gr. Gr. 656. 1, and obs.
- (153.) 11. ἡ ζῶα. This gives at once a simple and yet complete definition of the subject-matter of σωφροσύνη.—τρίψεως, friction—θερμασίας, warmth, as in a bath.

CHAPTER XI.

- (154.) Having thus discussed *σωφροσύνη* in its relation to the affections, and explained what sorts of pleasure and pain come properly within the sphere of *σωφροσύνη*, he now goes on to shew how far *propensions* or *desires* are regulated by this habit of mind.—*ἐπιθυμία*, when distinguished from *ἡδονή*, differs from it, in that it springs from *ἔνδεια*, and therefore is painful: see below, sect. 6.
- (155.) 1. *κοιναί*, universal, generic. *ἰδία*, peculiar and individual. *ἐπιθετοί* acquired.
- (156.) 2. *ἡμέτερον*, to be of our own making; nevertheless, Nature has some hand in it.—*ἐνία* κτ.λ. Every one has particular objects which are to him more pleasant than general ones.
- (157.) 3. *ἐφ' ἐν*, in one direction, viz. in quantity; while in the *ἰδία ἐπιθυμία*, as he tells us below, the *ὑπερβολή* is not only in indulging too much, but indulging at wrong times, &c.; all which shew the passion within us to be stronger and less under control than it ought to be.
- (158.) 3. *αὐτῇ*, sc. *γαστέρα*, or *τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν*.
- (159.) 4. *περὶ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν*. *ἡδονῶν* is used here instead of *ἐπιθυμιῶν*, because, in reality, the peculiar propensions are not from the *ἐνδείαι* of nature, but from particular views of pleasure; these give rise to *ἐπιθυμία*: see chap. i. note 40. In the other sort, *ἐπιθυμία* exists previously to any notions of pleasure whatever.
- (160.) 4. *ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὥς οἱ πολλοί*, more than most men do; *χαίρειν ὥς οἱ πολλοί* could never, in Aristotle's view, make a man *δέδαστος*.—*ἢ ὥς*: for *ἢ*, see Gr. Gr. 779, obs. 2.
- (161.) 4. *μισητόν* is to *αἰσχροῦ* what *ἐπαινετόν* is to *καλόν*; the one referring to the disapprobation of others, the other to that of our consciences.
- (162.) 5. He first takes the two habits of mind in relation to *ἡδονή*, and then to *ἐπιθυμία*.—*ψεκτόν* is evidently a less strong term than *μισητόν*: it expresses the opinions of men, while

the other expresses their feelings —περὶ τὰς λύπας. σωφροσύνη is not, like ἀνδρεία, the regulating and counteracting of pain by pleasure, but of pleasure by pain. Pain does not enter into the composition of σωφροσύνη, as presenting objects whence the moral action springs: σωφροσύνη is not resistance to an attack of λύπη, nor ἀκολασία the yielding to it. As far as λύπη is concerned, the ἀκόλαστος feels pain when he fails of his desire; and to the σώφρων the absence of the object of desire is accompanied by pain. And so far pain is connected with these states of mind; but ἡδονή is the essence of them.

(162.) 6. ὁ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In the matter of ἐπιθυμία, again, the ἀκόλαστος is its slave, and as every ἐπιθυμία is a painful feeling, the success as well as the failure of the ἀκόλαστος causes him pain; and hence may be seen the folly and absurdity of such a man, (ἀτόπως δὲ ζῶει).

(163.) 7. Asceticism was unknown to Aristotle. What would he have said to those who refused the good things of God's providing merely because they were good?

(164.) 8. The σώφρων has his notions of ἡδονή purified and chastened; his ἐπιθυμίαι moderated and directed.

(165.) 8. ὅσα δὲ πρὸς κ.τ.λ., al. δ. The final causes of these bodily appetites are evidently the health and well-being of the body. Whatever the σώφρων seeks will either contribute directly to these, or, at the least, not hinder them. This rule for cases where positive laws are not laid down, is of universal application, and one much to be remembered as a practical law of action.

(166.) 8. οὕτως ἔχων, sc. ὀρεγόμενος τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων, ἐμποδίων τοίτοις.—ὑπερ τὴν οὐσίαν, beyond his means.

CHAPTER II.

(167.) It might be argued that there was some excuse for ἀκόλαστος, inasmuch as he was hurried away by passion, while the δειλός acted more slowly. In this chapter Aristotle, who always shows a peculiar abhorrence of ἀκολασία, proves the contrary.

- (168.) 1. ἡ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ἀκολασία is the excess of the influence of ἡδονή, unmoderated by the λύπη of shame; δειλία is the influence of λύπη, uncontrolled by the ἡδονή of καλόν. —αἰρετόν: hence ἀκολασία is more voluntary.
- (169.) 2. διὰ καὶ ἐπονείδιστόπερον καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.: being voluntary, it is a reproach to any one who falls into it, for he must do so voluntarily; and it is easy to habituate oneself against it; for there are so many ἡδέια in life that a man may, without much trouble, exercise himself in temperance: while ἀνδρεία, from the comparatively rare opportunities for its exercise, which are to most men few, and always attended with pain and risk, is less easily attained.
- (170.) 3. δόξειέ τε κ.τ.λ. Voluntariness is mostly tested by the τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα: and hence, as no one wishes to be δειλός, and only is so under pressure from without, it is less voluntary at the moment of action than ἀκολασία, where the motive cause of the evil is ἐπιθυμία and ὀρεξίς from within. ἀκολασία, however in the abstract, is as little an object of desire as δειλία, (τὸ δ' ὅλον ἦτον οὐδεὶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.): in this respect both are equally (if at all) involuntary.—τοῖς καθ' ἑκάστον: the dative marks the middle term of the argument: Gr. Gr. 609, 5.
- (171.) 3. αὐτή, sc. ἀκολασία.
- (172.) 6. μετενήνεχθαι, to be applied.—ἐν τούτοις, sc. παιδίοις.
- (173.) 7. εὐπειθέες, the nom. is τὰ αἰσχροῦν ὀρεγόμενον.—καὶ πανταχόθεν, from whatever quarter it comes.—τὸ συγγενές, that which is kindred to it in the soul, or that whence it springs.—Michelet, "that which is in our nature."
- (174.) 7. The notion of the struggle between ἐπιθυμία and λόγος, so frequently spoken of by Aristotle, the key-stone of his Ethics, as applied to education, would suggest the great problem of all systems of education,—how to subdue the passions to the reason,—the great difficulty of right action, and, even apart from the Scriptures, the best proof for the necessity of divine grace.
- (175.) 8. αὐτάς, sc. ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐνεργείας.
- (176.) 9. ἀμφοῖν,—τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ λόγου.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

- (1) THE virtues of fortitude and temperance are the regulation of the animal appetites, instincts of human nature, the immediate impressions of the senses. Those in the fourth book are the regulation of other human appetites or instincts, with which the senses are less directly concerned,—love of money, love of power, love of honour,—the instincts towards social intercourse in every-day life. Thus they are no longer those of the man as an individual, but as a social being: for fortitude and temperance relate rather to the well-being and right action of a man in his relation to himself; liberality, &c., rather refer to his relations and behaviour towards others. Hence the notions of ἡδονή and λύπη come in less visibly, though not less really, inasmuch as *actual* pleasure and pain have less to do with such actions. But still there is an ἡδονή and λύπη, an impulse towards, or a check from, a certain course of action, (see chap. i. 28); and whichever of these is, from the constitution of the agent, or the nature of the circumstances, the prevailing motive, is regulated, as the case may be, by the λύπη or the ἡδονή arising from the sense of αἰσχρόν or καλόν: and as in σωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία the better of the two extremes is that which is the excess of the regulating principle, so in many of these virtues, where there is any general tendency towards one extreme, (where we are συμφνέστεροι μᾶλλον,) there the error in the other extreme is the better; while in others of these virtues the impulses and checks are not the same in all men, but vary according to character and circumstances: so that if the better extreme is specified at all, it is not from its being the excess of the regulating principle, (for either extreme may be this, according to character or circumstances,) but ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος,—the nature and effects of the thing itself.
- (2) 3. ἐπιφέρομεν συμπλίκοντες, *we apply*, in connection with other notions.

- (3.) 5. βούλεται εἶναι, *properly is; claims to be.*
- (4.) 5. διὰ τούτων, sc. χρημάτων; implied in αὐσίας.—ἐκδεχόμεθα, *we use the term.*
- (5.) 9. καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δέ, *and praise too: see Gr. Gr. 769. 2.*
- (6.) 9. τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἥττον προίενται μᾶλλον. μᾶλλον belongs to the whole sentence, ἥττον to προίενται. It is easier not to take than to give; for men have a reluctance to give away (ἥττον προίενται) what is their own, rather than (μᾶλλον ἢ) not to take what does not belong to them.
- (7.) 10. οὐχ ἥττον, *rather; so οὐχ ἥκιστα, most. Lidd. and Scott ad v. 3.*
- (8.) 11. τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, i.e. σπουδαίων: see Gr. Gr. 620. 3, b.
- (9.) 15. τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα, al. τοῦ τιμῶντος, —but there is no sense in this. The same characteristic as that in the text is given again in sect. 26, and more fully in sect. 20,—μὴ τιμῶντα δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα.
- (10.) 18. τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν. This has no connection with the ὑπερβολή, (going beyond the mean,) but simply to give largely, —more than most people would, or more than what might have been expected of him.
- (11.) 19. τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν. Here, again, we have the absence of self as an ingredient of virtue.—οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει. This is one distinction between ελευθεριότης and μεγαλοπρέπεια. —The widow's mite will, of course, occur to every reader.
- (12.) 20. ἐλευθεριώτεροι κ.τ.λ., are, it would seem, more given to liberality.—παρалаβόντες, *inheriting it.*
- (13.) 21. ἐγκαλεῖται: neuter passive: *blame is thrown on.*
- (14.) 23. ἄσωτος: from ἄ and σῶζω.—τυράννους, *monarchs.*
- (15.) 24. ἐπόμεναι, *thus connected with each other. ἐναντία, opposed to each other.*
- (16.) 25. λυπησεται. This will shew μεταμελεία, and make the action οὐκ ἐκούσιον.
- (17.) 26. δύναται ἀδικεῖσθαι, *is open to wrong.*
- (18.) 27. Σιμωνίδην. He was notorious for his love of money: see Rhet. iii. 2; Arist. Pax, 698, Σιμωνίδης; πῶς; ὅτι γέρον ὦν καὶ σαπρὸς κερδοῦς ἕκασι κἂν ἐπὶ ῥιπὸς πλῖσι.

- (19.) 29. πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς, *but in small matters, or with petty objects*. Liberality is displayed in large gifts as well as small; but illiberality shews itself in petty gains. Where the wickedness is on a large scale, it is hardly illiberality, but rather πλιονεξία: see sect. 44.—τὰ τῆς ἀσωτίας, *the actions of ἀσωτία*.
- (20.) 30. ἐπεὶ. Michelet rightly observes that ἐπεὶ does 'not always require an apodosis, but can stand independently for *moreover, then, thus*: see bk. vi. 8. 6. This may be an elliptic construction for "since this is so, then," &c.—οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται, *do not always go together*; cf. bk. viii. 4. 5: συναύξεται, on the authority of several MSS.
- (21.) 30. οἷπερ. The ἀσωτος is a man who outruns his private means: see above, sect. 23.
- (22.) 31. ἔχει γὰρ κτλ. ἀσωτία is nearer the mean, inasmuch as it is only an exaggeration of the virtuous principle. Men, by nature, are prone to think of self, and to feel reluctance (λίπη,) to give to others,—(37, συμφιέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: cf. 44): the regulating principle, the ἡδονή of the καλόν attached to giving, comes in; and this, if carried too far, i.e. beyond the καλόν, becomes ἀσωτία. The καλόν never occurs to the ἀνελεύθερος as ἡδύ, and is therefore no principle of action,—(cf. 34, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν).
- (23.) 33. κάθ' ὅπερ εἴρηται, as is implied in what has been said.
- (24.) 35. οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα, sc. τοῦ καλοῦ.
- (25.) 36. πορίζουσιν, dat. plur.
- (26.) 36. εἰς ταῦτα: ἀκολασία—δαπάνη—ἡδονή.
- (27.) 38. ὁλόκληρος, in all its forms.
- (28.) 39. τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν, a sort of rectitude, differing from the real, because it is not from love of καλόν, but from the inferior motive, a cautious, selfish fear (εἰλαβεῖαν) of αἰσχρόν.—αἰσχρόν is not a legitimate motive of right action, where positive καλόν should come in: αἰσχρόν here is "disgrace," not "wrong."
- (29.) 39. ὠνόμασται,—sc. κυμινοπρίστης, this name is thus *proverbially applied*.
- (30.) 40. κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῶ, al. μικρά: those who lend

in small sums at high interest. κατὰ μικρόν,—Gr. Gr. 629, 11. 3, f.—al. καὶ τὰ μικρά. Michelet interprets it, “who give small things for large,” joining it with ἐργαζόμενοι.

(31.) 41. ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς: is a term common to these: see Gr. Gr. 634. 3, a, fin.

(32.) 44. ἐπὶ ταύτην, in the direction of this.

CHAPTER II.

(33.) 1. ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη. Alcibiades’ speech furnishes a good illustration: Thucyd. vi.

(34.) 2. πρὸς αὐτόν. The three points in the μεγαλοπρεπής are: 1. the man’s own rank and character; 2. ἐν ᾧ, the circumstances in which he is placed; 3. περὶ ὃ, the matter in hand, the sum expended,—al. καὶ ᾧ: that is, Alcibiades was μεγαλοπρεπής in his magnificent display at the Olympic games, for the Olympic prize. He would have been βάναισος, had he made the same display at an insignificant meeting, or for an object of mean repute. An Athenian of lower rank would have been βάναισος, had he made the display anywhere;—all the conditions of the πρέπον would have been violated.

(35.) 4. ἀπειροκαλία, want of taste.

(36.) 5. ἐπιστήμονι ἴσικε, is as it were a man of knowledge,—inasmuch as the ἐπιστήμων can, in physical truth, discern the true point; so can the μεγαλοπρεπής in his habits of life and expenses.—ἐμμελῶς, in fit proportion.

(39.) 6. ἡ ἕξις ὀρίζεται ταῖς ἐνεργείαις (sc. τῷ πρέποντι ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ὃ) καὶ ὧν ἐστίν, (sc. τῷ πρέποντι πρὸς αὐτόν.)—τὴν δαπάνην, sc. ἀξίαν εἶναι.

(40.) 10. οἷον μέγεθος. This is a difficult passage: the best interpretation seems to be to join it with ἐλευθεριότητος: “In these the μέγας is the characteristic of the μεγαλοπρεπής;” as it were an increased degree of liberality, which has the same subject-matter; or if ταῦτα be read: is on these matters. ἐλευθεριότης, on a large scale; or it may be: “But in these points the μέγας of the μεγαλοπρεπής comes in, as if it were a greatness of something; the notion of greatness is implied in the

very term of *magnificent*. The μεγαλοπρεπής has the characteristic of greatness, though ἐλευθεριότης is concerned with the very same actions."

- (41.) 10. καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης κ.τ.λ.: and not only when the thing done is greater in itself, "but even when the expense and pains are equal, the μεγαλοπρεπής will produce something more magnificent." Aspasia, quoted by Michelet, illustrates this by saying that the Olympian Jupiter of Pericles was more magnificent than if, at the same cost, he had made a smaller statue, but more richly adorned: in this case, too, the μέγα of the μεγαλοπρεπής exhibits itself. μεγαλοπρεπέστερον seems to have here the sense it would have anywhere else, without any peculiar technical reference to μεγαλοπρέπεια.
- (42.) 10. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτή κ.τ.λ.: for the ἴση δαπάνη does not make an equality, as it would if both were κτήματα, which are valued by their cost; but the nature of the action and character of the agent come into account.
- (43.) 12. τὸ τίς ὢν, the question who he is: see Gr. Gr. 457.
- (44.) 14. τὰ τοιαῦτα, such actions.—ἐν αὐτοῖς μίτεστιν, those in whom they have some interest,—such as living relations, &c.
- (45.) 15. τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα, sc. μεγαλοπρεπῇ ἐστί.
- (46.) 16. ἐνταῖθα, that which, in this or that case, is great, falls under μεγαλοπρέπεια.
- (47.) 19. εἰνπέρβλητον, is not to be surpassed; that is, it is as great as it can be.—καί refers to τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον, not to εἰνπέρβλητον.
- (48.) 20. παρὰ μέλος: literally, out of tune, unsuitably.—πορφύραν. In comic exhibitions the παραπέτασμα (or curtain to decorate the scene) was usually of leather, not of purple cloth.—ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς: they were proverbial for their bad taste, and probably had committed some such solecism as that in the text.

CHAPTER III.

- (48.) 1. *ῥοιαν εἶναι*, we should suppose to be.
- (49.) 4. *σώφρων*, a man of well-ordered mind; modest. This word has a generic sense of controlling in some one way or other and restraining our natural tendencies; and the particular sense varies according to the context.
- (50.) 5. *ἀστειοί*, patty, and well made.
- (51.) 6. *ὁ δὲ μείζων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος*. The essence of *χαῦνος* is that he is *ἀνάξιος μεγάλων*:—if a man is *ἄξιος μεγάλων*, and thinks himself *ἄξιος μεγίστων*, this is rather a spurious *μεγαλοψυχία* than *χαυνότης*.
- (52.) 7. *ὁ δὲ δόξειεν*, sc. *μικρόψυχος εἶναι*.
- (53.) 8. *οἱ δέ*, the others.
- (54.) 9. *περὶ ἐν*, sc. *ὁ θεοῖς ἀπονέμεται = τιμὴν*.—*ἡ δ' ἀξία κ.τ.λ.* This is put in to confine it to its particular subject-matter, viz. some one of *τὰ ἔκτος ἀγαθὰ*.
- (55.) 11. *ἀνευ λόγου*, without argument,—of itself.
- (56.) 13. *οὐ μὴν τὸν γε κ.τ.λ.* sc. *πρὸς τὸν γε κ.τ.λ.*
- (57.) 15. *παρασείσαντι*, *demissis manibus*; wringing his hands.—*μέγα*, of consequence.
- (58.) 16. *κοσμοῖ*, the setting of the virtues.
- (59.) 17. *τῷ μὴ ἔχειν*: dative of cause considered as instrument: see Gr. Gr. 607.
- (60.) 20. *ὃ δ' ἄμφω*, sc. *ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ*.
- (61.) 21. *ἐκείνων μὲν*, others.—*αὐτοί*, they themselves do what they fancy; their life is without rule: hence they are *ὑπερόπται*.
- (62.) 24. *ὁ ὑπάρξας*, he who first did him a kindness.
- (63.) 25. *οὗτος δὲ*: *οὗτος* is in attraction, while *ὁ* in the next clause depends directly on *μνημονεύειν*.

25. *Θεῖται*. Il. a. 503.—*οἱ Λάκωνες*. The interchange of the infinitive, (*λέγειν*), and finite verb, (*ἔλεγον*, implied after *Λάκωνες*), is curious: in the former, the notion in Aristotle's mind was that Homer had not made Thetis *λέγειν*, &c.; in

the other, that *οἱ Λάκωνες* did not, as a fact, recount, &c. : or it is possible that in the former construction *διό* is equivalent to *τοῦτο αἰτιόν ἐστι*, after which *λέγειν* would follow naturally.

- (64.) 26. *ἡ μόγις*, or *very reluctantly*.—*ἐν ἐκείνοις*, al. *ἐπ'*, but not so well.
- (65.) 27. *ἀλλ' ἢ*, *except*.
- (66.) 28. The former reading of several MSS.—*παρησιαστικὸς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, καὶ παρησιαστικὸς δὲ διὰ καταφρονητικὸς καὶ ἀληθευτικός & τ.λ.*—is evidently corrupt. The reading in the text is given in one MS., and makes good sense. Perhaps *τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι* might have been substituted from the majority of MSS. for *καταφρονεῖν*; and the following words, which really create the difficulty, may have easily crept in, by some carelessness, from the preceding line.
- (67.) 28. *πλὴν ὅσα μὴ*, *except what*; after the analogy of *πλὴν εἰ μὴ*, *except*.—*ὅσα μὴ καὶ* = *εἰ μὴ τινα*.—*εἶρονα*, al. *εἰρωνείαν*. He does not think it worth while to say what he really means to the common sort.
- (68.) 29. *πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν*: literally, *to live looking to another*; *to order his life by another*.
- (69.) 31. *ἀνθρωπόλογος*, *he does not talk of men or human life*, but of something higher.
- (70.) 32. *σπουδάζοντας*, of one who cares for such things.
- (71.) 34. *λίξεις στόσιμος*, and his style stately.—*σύκτονος*, *eager*.
- (72.) 33. *οὐδ' οἷτοι*: see chap. ii. 22.
- (73.) 35. *ὀκνηροί*, *lazy*; not caring to take the trouble to act worthily of themselves; al. *νοεροί*, *sharp*, i.e. looking too sharply into themselves; al. *νωθροί*, *stupid* = *ἐαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες*.
- (74.) 37. *γίνεται μᾶλλον*, there is a greater tendency to it; men are more apt to act below themselves: so that *χαυνότης* is merely an excess of that proper pride which regulates and elevates self-distrust into self-knowledge, and, where true merit really exists, leads to the self-esteem wherewith the *μεγαλόψυχος* regards himself (in a human sense, not improperly) as the possessor of virtue.

(75.) 38. The *μεγαλόψυχος* is doubtlessly, at first sight, contrary to Christian humility, and contains many repulsive features; but we must remember that a Christian is to walk worthily of the vocation wherewith he is called, and that there is nothing unchristian in what Leighton speaks of in Serm. xiv. vol. iii. p. 256: "It is a thing both of unspeakable excellence and usefulness for a Christian often to consider the excellence of that state to which he is called. It cannot fail to put him upon very high resolutions, and carry him on in that divine ambition of behaving daily more suitably to his high calling and hopes;" and again, Serm. xv. p. 271: "There is a greatness and height of spirit in the love of God and union with Him that doth vainly swell and lift it up, but with the deepest humility joins the highest and truest magnanimity." Who can read the end of Montrose, and say that his *μεγαλοψυχία* made his death less Christian? The *μεγαλοψυχία* of the heathen is founded on his own merit,—that of the Christian on the position in which he is placed by God; but with this distinction, the *μεγαλοψυχία* of Aristotle contains a great principle of Christian ethics, which it is much to be wished might be more recognised, especially by the young. It must be borne in mind, too, that the *μεγαλόψυχος* must be *ἄξιος* before he can pay respect to virtue in his own person; and that it is revelation only which teaches us distinctly that we never can be personally *ἄξιοι*. The features which are so repulsive and ridiculous in this character are its accidents, and arise from the fashions and notions of the time, which made them seem proper ways of exhibiting one's self-esteem before the world.

CHAPTER IV.

(76.) 1. *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις*. Bk. ii. 7. 8.

(77.) 1. *ἀφιστάσι*, *lay no claim to,—have nothing to do with*.

(78.) 1. *τιμῆς ὀρέξει*. In *μεγαλοψυχία* there is no *ὀρεξις τιμῆς*: the really magnanimous is content, whether he is praised or blamed by those around him.

(79.) 4. *ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό*, *we do not refer it to the same standard*.

(80.) 5. *ἰρῆμης*, *sc. μεσότητος*.—*καὶ τὸ μέσον*, *sc. ὅτι, where*

there are extremes, there is also a mean.—ἀνώνυμος, an evidence of such a character being practically unrecognised.

- (82.) 5. φαίνεται δὲ κ.τ.λ. When contrasted with φιλοτιμία, such a well-regulated desire of honour would seem short of what was proper; when with ἀφιλοτιμία, it would seem to exceed it; while contrasted with both at once, it would seem, in some way or other, to combine both: it would seem to be either, according to the light in which it was held.

- (83.) 6. ἔοικε κ.τ.λ. This, it seems, is the case in the other virtues,—the mean is opposed to each and both the extremes, while the extremes are only accidentally opposed to each other, as being each opposed to the mean; but here the only apparent opposition is between the two extremes, as the mean, though really existing, is not practically recognised: hence over-ambition seems to be directly opposed to under-ambition; but in reality each is opposed to a well-regulated ambition.

CHAPTER V.

- (84.) 1. μεσότης περὶ ὀργῆς. The regulation of those emotions of our irascible nature, (Top. iv. 5, 5. p. 172, ἡ δὲ ὀργὴ ἐν τῷ θυμοῖδαι: cf. Top. ii. 7. 4. p. 133,) which are created by the actions of others towards us, and in which θυμός, with ἡδονή attached to it in prospect, (see Rhet. ii. 2. 2.) furnishes the impulse, rather than any pleasurable ὀρεξις: it is ὀρεξις μετὰ λύπης, not μεθ' ἡδονῆς, (sect. 10, τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ποιοῦσα ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ λύπης). For the meaning and function of θυμός, see bk. iii. note 10.

- (85.) 1. ἀνωνύμων ὄντων κ.τ.λ. There is some difficulty in treating of this virtue, because it does not seem as if there were three distinct degrees or forms of anger; both ὀργή and πραότης which are the only recognised forms in which this πάθος shews itself, being rather simple affections, than affections controlled or uncontrolled: hence πραότης is by some men, and under certain circumstances, looked upon as the right habit of mind, and at other times, ὀργή: but Aristotle contents himself with shewing that in their praise recognise a mean between rage and ir

mean or regulation of anger, which he calls *πραότης*, is stamped as the virtue of these instincts of our nature by that approbation of men which in the end of the first book he laid down as the standard or sign of virtue, (see sect. 14, *infra*: τό γε τοσούτον δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση εἴς τις ἐπαινετή).

(86.) 3. βούλεται γάρ: see bk. iii. note 15.

(87.) 6. τὸ δὲ προπηλοκιζόμενον κ.τ.λ. It is scarcely necessary to call attention to the contrast between this feature of heathen ethics and Christianity.—περιορᾶν, sc. προπηλοκιζόμενους.

(88.) 7. ὁλόκληρον, occupied the whole character; or was developed in all its points.

(89.) 8. ἀνταποδιδόασιν, return the injury; al. ἀποδιδόασιν.—ἡ φανεροί εἰσι, in the way in which their anger is felt, (see Rhet. ii. 2. 1, and 3. 16). Michelet takes it, "so that through their sharpness of mind they discover their anger;" but it seems better to join διὰ εὐρίτητα with ἀνταποδιδόασιν, and to take ἡ φανεροί as above, especially when we refer to the characteristic given in the Rhetoric, as to the necessity of their revenge being felt to come from them: they do not wish to do a harm secretly, but openly.

(90.) 12. τῇ πραότητι: the lack of anger is merely an excess of the controlling principle; for anger is the instinct which, being properly regulated, becomes *πραότης*,—μᾶλλον γίνεται, sc. ἡ ὑπερβολή.

(91.) 14. The mean, though ἀνώνυμος, is recognised by the praise of men generally as the virtue of this part of our nature.

CHAPTER VI.

(92.) We come to the virtues of the social, or what perhaps may be more properly called the sociable, instincts of man.

(93.) 2. τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν, in whose society they may be.

(94.) 3. ὅτι ἡ μέση εἴς τις ἐπαινετή. The point proved in this chapter likewise is, that the mean is recognised as the virtue of the sociable instincts, considered apart from *φιλία*, or the affections.

ταί, he will approve.

- (96.) 5. τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, from his social instincts being properly regulated, and in the mean.—οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν, *to grieve for them.*
- (97.) 6. καθόλου κ.τ.λ.: speaking of it generally in its abstract character, it is merely habitual propriety in social intercourse; but when we consider how far it takes cognizance of what is individually or socially right, (ἀναφέρων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ σύμφερον,) we shall find that it is habitual propriety in regard of the sympathies of social life, and the pleasures and pains attached to them; that such pain and pleasure is the subject-matter of it, and that the mean consists in the regulation of our natural desire to please and sympathize with others, (καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἰρούμενος συνηδύνειν,) by the higher considerations of private and public good: that when it is for another's good, he will not hesitate to give pain by not sympathizing with the evil or harmful pleasures of others, but rather opposing them. And this virtue, as given by Aristotle, is no small ingredient in the practical Christian propriety which refuses to join in the scoff or the jest of ribaldry; and which, knowing that such things are worthy of death, can find no pleasure in those that do them. There are few points of practical Christianity more habitually needed, few more neglected. It is a jewel both precious and rare.
- (98.) 8. τοῖς δὲ ἀποβαίνουσιν κ.τ.λ., *following its accidental results; that is, private or public good.*
- (99.) 9. The ἄρεσκος or κολαξ seems to be the only contrary to the δύσερις, through the mean to which really both are opposed having no name; δύσερις is opposed to κολαξ, and both to the μέσος.

CHAPTER VII.

- (100.) 1. προσποιήματα, *pretensions.*
- (101.) 2. τῶν ἐνδόξεων: of what might be, but is not.
- (102.) 4. ἀθέκαστος, simple, straightforward; without pretence; just what he really is: Eud. iii. 7, ἀληθὲς καὶ ἀπλοῦς δὲ καλοῦσιν ἀθέκαστον.
- (103.) 6. ἐπισεικὴς, *a good, honest man.*

(104.) 9. ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον κτλ. The μάλλον belongs to ἀποκλίνει: *he rather tends to make things seem less than they are.*

10. οὐ γὰρ δύ, sc. εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἦν.

(105.) 12. οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει. The same phrase occurs in the Rhetoric about the sophist, on reference to which, and the context, its meaning will be seen to be, that the sophist has no separate formulæ, or false system of logic, (οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην); but he uses true logic as well as false if it suits his purpose, (προαίρεσις τοῦ φαίνεσθαι σοφός): so here the ἀλάζων has no formulæ or system to guide him in the choice and treatment of his subject-matter; but uses whatever comes to hand, just as it may for the time suit his purpose, of making him seem a greater man than he is: what he says is not even always false, but simply so said as to produce false impressions about the greatness of his own merits. Others translate τῇ δυνάμει by *what he can do*, by *his having the power to do so*,—referring to Top. iv. 5. 7, p. 170; but the passage seems to refer to something else,—to the cases where the person has been blamed merely because he has it in him to do wrong, whereas the *will* (προαίρεσις) is the point in question.—τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι, i. e. *by his disposition*, (προαιρίσει).

(106.) 12. ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης, κτλ. as the liar is so, i. e. κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι;—one sort lying for the mere sake of lying, the other from his tendency to ambition or covetousness, (δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους); or ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης may be in a parenthesis, *as the liar proper*, and ὁ μὲν and ὁ δὲ refer to two sorts of ἀλάζωνες, and not of ψεύσται.

(107.) 13. οἱ μὲν οὖν κτλ. Supply ἐστὶν after ἐφ' οἷς; after κέρδους, supply ἀλαξονευόμενοι προσποιούνται τοιαῦτα ὧν καὶ κτλ.—διαλαθεῖν which may be undetected, if they do not exist: pretensions which cannot be tested; as a false prophet, or a quack, can always give reasons why their predictions or their remedies turn out wrong—μάντιν σοφόν, al. μάντιν ἢ σοφόν, i. e. two persons, a seer, or a sophist or philosopher. In the reading in the text, σοφόν is only an ironical epithet of μάντιν, like our *wise man* for a fortune-teller.

(108.) 13. τοιαῦτα, such things as; sc. μαντείαν, σοφίαν, ἰατρειάν.—τὰ εἰρημίσια, sc. δόξα, ἀπόλαυσις, λαθεῖν.

- (109.) 15. βαυκοπανοῦργοι, *affected fellows*: ἀπὸ τῶν βαυκίδων δ' ἐστὶν αἶδος ὑποδημάτων ἰωνικῶν.
- (110.) 15. οἶον ἢ τῶν Λακωνῶν ἐσθής: the ultra-simplicity of the Spartan costume is in reality not modesty, but conceit. Cf. Xen. de Rep. &c., ii. 3. 4.
- (111.) 16. ἐμπροδῶν, *before one's feet*,—obvious.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (112.) 1. ὁμιλία ἐμμελής, a certain well-timed sociability. Another virtue of social life consists in the proper regulation of the instincts towards relaxation and society.
- (113.) 3. βωμολόχοι: properly, those that waited about the altars to get the refuse of the sacrifices; a *lickspittle*, *buffoon*.
- (114.) 4. εἰτράπελοι, *witty*. We have a similar metaphor in our *well-turned jest*, *compliment*, &c.—χαρίεντες, *amusing*, *pleasing*.
- (115.) 4. ἐπιπολάζοντες, *being very common*. Cf. bk. i. 4. τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας δόξας.
- (116.) 5. ἐπιδεξιότης, *neatness*, *tact*.
- (117.) ἐν παιδίᾳ μίρει, *jestingly*, *in sport*.
- (118.) 6. ὑπόνοια, *the under or hidden sense*; wit, jest, play on words.
- (119.) 9. εἴδει ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν, *perhaps they ought to have forbidden joking a person*.
- (120.) 10. ἦττων ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., *is a slave to his jest*.

CHAPTER IX.

- (121.) 1. πάθει. This αἰδώς is one of the elements of φυσικὴ ἀρετή.
- (122.) 2. ἀποτελεῖται, *its results are of like nature with those of fear and danger*; literally, it is perfected, or develops itself, in much the same way as fear; i. e. both are σωματικά.
- (123.) 3. ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς. Here we see the function of αἰδώς: men are also hindered by the fear of αἰσχρόν; but this rather is a rational, the other an instinctive, emotion.

- (114.) 5. οὐδέτερα πρακτέα, we should avoid the very appearance of evil.
- (115.) 6. τὸ δὲ οὕτως ἔχειν κ.τ.λ. The notion that shame, or sorrow for vice, is the same as being virtuous, is absurd, for the notion of virtue implies abstinence from indulgences or actions on which shame would follow.
- (116.) 7. εἴη αὖν: "*shame would be the feeling of a virtuous man on the supposed case (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) of his doing what was wrong;*" but this is really and practically impossible (οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς): ἐπισεικοῦς would be a better reading, were there MS. authority for it.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) HAVING now treated of the particulars of our moral obligation separately, and shewn that in each part of our moral nature the μεσότης, or balance of the impulses and principles proper to that part, is the ἀρετή and performs the ἔργον thereof,—he now proceeds to our social nature, and shews, first, that looking on δικαιοσύνη as a habit of mind, these ἀρεταί of our moral nature are collectively the performance of social obligation, which is the highest law to which man, as man, is subject; and secondly, looking on δικαιοσύνη as a political system, that as the perfection of man's nature lies in the mean, so does the perfection of the state. The ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη is not, as we shall presently see, primarily a balance περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, as the other virtues are, but περὶ ἴσον καὶ ἀνισον in a social system. The former completes the proof of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή being the proper ἔργον of man's nature,—

δικαιοσύνη develops the ἔργον of man, (is ἀρετή τελειοτάτη. see bk. i. c. 7);

ἠθικὴ ἀρετή is δικαιοσύνη;

ἠθικὴ ἀρετή develops the ἔργον of man;

while the latter is an additional proof in the way of analogy that the moral excellence of man lies in the mean habit: for in ancient philosophy, so close an analogy was conceived to

exist between the state and the individual, that if the excellence of the state were not in a mean, it would have been, according to the rule of the scholastic philosophy of those days, an almost conclusive argument against a μεσότης being the ἀρετή of the individual.

- (2.) 2. ὁρῶμεν δὲ πάντας κ.τ.λ. The most usually received notion of δικαιοσύνη views it as a habit of mind which makes us just both in will and act. We must examine in what just action consists. He takes the opinions and notions of men on the subject, just as he had referred to them in forming his notion of εὐδαιμονία, and in discussing the several ἀρεταί, (κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις).
- (3.) 4. οἱ δὲ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The γὰρ refers to some such suppressed sentence as "*this general outline of the nature of the two, and the opposition between them, will help us to define justice, for, &c.*" δύναμις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. In the sciences or the formal arts, opposite results proceed from the same system, as logic is equally used by the logician for a good and by the sophist for a bad end; so that a bad result is no evidence of a bad science or art, but only of a misuse of a good one; while in moral matters, opposite actions must proceed from opposite habits: and thus from bad actions a bad habit is proved to exist, and from good actions a good habit; hence, from unjust actions we may argue the existence and nature of ἀδικία, and ἀδικία must have a contrary habit (δικαιοσύνη), whence just actions arise; and from knowing what is ἀδικον we may find what is ἀδικία (αἱ ἔξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων), and from knowing ἀδικία we may find out δικαιοσύνη (γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἔξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας): and in this case this is the easiest and most certain way; for δικαιοσύνη embraces so much, and is so high a perfection, that men have scarcely formed any positive notion of it, while ἀδικία is so much a matter of every-day life, that there is no difficulty in pointing out what men hold to be unjust; and this done, we easily get at a positive notion of ἀδικία, and thence of the ἐναντία ἔξις, viz. δικαιοσύνη.
- (4.) 4. οὐ, sc. δοκεῖ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων: the opposite habit does not belong to opposite results, i. e. an habit which has some other habit opposed to it, cannot produce the results which belong to that opposite. Thus health cannot produce the same result as sickness, but the art of medicine may be used

to produce either. Some commentators leave out *οὔ*; i. e. "but the contrary habit is of (i. e. has) contrary results." The sense is much the same.

- (5.) 6. *πλεοναχῶς λέγεται*, spoken of in more senses than one. —*ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*, not in all cases; the Paraphrast instances *φιλεῖν* and *μισεῖν*, where *μισεῖν* has not all the meanings opposed to *φιλεῖν*.
- (6.) 7. *ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύγγγυς κ.τ.λ.* For *ὁμωνυμία*, see Categ. i. 1. Where the identity of name arises from a close similarity between the things, the difference between them is apt to be overlooked.
- (7.) *διαφορὰ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν*, the generic difference.
- (8.) 8. *καὶ ὁ ἀνιστος*, al. *καὶ ἄδικος*; but the former is the better, dividing *ἄδικος* into *παράνομος*, *πλεονέκτης* and *ἀνιστος*: the two last are afterwards combined.
- (9.) 8. *ἐπεὶ δὲ καί*. He gives his reasons for omitting *πλεονέκτης* in his division of the *ἄδικον* and *δίκαιον* just given, though spoken of by men as a sort of injustice. *καί* is omitted in some MSS.
- (10.) 9. *οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι* down to *ἀγαθὰ* is in a parenthesis.
- (11.) 9. *δεῖ δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαι κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle here seems to recognise the necessity for some change of heart: men have wrong notions of *ἀγαθόν*; they do not recognise the real *ἀγαθόν* as good to them. This ought not to be so; their notions of good ought to undergo some change. This cannot be done by themselves, but they must *pray* for it.
- (12.) 10. *ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.* He is merely explaining why there is no such term as *μειονεξία*.
- (13.) 11. *τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει κ.τ.λ.* The term *ἀνιστον* embraces both *πλεονεξία* and *μειονεξία*. Michelet reads the passage, *ἔστι γὰρ ἀνιστος, (τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν,) καὶ παράνομος· τοῦτο γὰρ, (ἡ παρανομία ἥτοι ἡ ἀνισότης,) περιέχει πᾶσαν ἀδικίαν καὶ κοινόν ἐστι πάσης ἀδικίας*; but this is probably a gloss. Cardwell's edition has *καὶ παράνομος* before *τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει*, but this destroys the meaning of the passage, which is to shew that *ἀνιστος* comprehends and is applicable to both *πλεονεξία* and *μειονεξία*. This is fully stated in what follows in some editions, but is probably a gloss, (*τὸ γὰρ ἀνιστον ἔχει καὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον*).

- (14.) 13. οἱ δὲ νόμοι κ.τ.λ.: δίκαιον in this its widest sense and sphere embraces the whole political system,—every thing which is ποιητικόν or φυλακτικόν τῆς εὐδαιμόνιας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ.—This is ὅλη δικαιοσύνη, which comprehends under it the δικαιοσύνη κατ' ἀρετήν, and ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη.
- (15.) It may be as well to give at once the scheme of δικαιοσύνη, as it will throw light on what is coming:—
- α. ὅλη δικαιοσύνη, (given in ch. i. 13,) the whole system of political arrangement (νόμιμον), the ἀδικία of which is παράνομον in its widest sense.
- β. ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν, (ch. i. 14 and 19,) ordering and encouraging habits and acts of the several virtues; the ἀδικία of which is not ἄνισον, but παράνομον, though this in its wider sense comprehends both divisions. This exists first as an habit energising in the performance of virtues considered as duties towards others; secondly, as a political system of laws, rewards, punishments, guiding to such an habit.
- γ. ἡ ἐν μέρει τῆς ὅλης, (ch. ii.), regulation of political union; the ἀδικία of which is ἄνισον. This exists first as a political regulation of the principles of political union, and of distributive, retributive, catallactic arrangements, (παρὰ τὴν ἀρετήν); secondly, as a habit of mind or disposition towards acting on such principles, (ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς,) a regulation of the covetous tendencies with especial view to others: hence it is that this δικαιοσύνη is said at one time to be παρὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, (ch. ii. 7,) and at another, ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς, (ch. ii. 1).
- (16.) 13. πᾶσιν, democracy: ἀρίστοις, aristocracy; ἡ τοῖς κυρίοις, or the governing body.—ἡ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον ἢ κατ' ἀρετήν, selected for virtue or some other principle, such as wealth, birth, &c. The difference between the ἀριστοὶ and the κύριοι κατ' ἀρετήν would be, that in the former the interest of the better sort, whether in office or not, would be consulted; in the latter, the interest only of those who in consequence of their merit hold office: the latter would be rather oligarchical. ἡ κατ' ἀρετήν is omitted in some editions, and in one MS.
- (17.) 15. αὕτη μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνη. This is the δικαιοσύνη which answers to ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, and performs one part of the function of δικαιοσύνη generally, (the general prosperity of the

state,) by enjoining and encouraging virtue, (τὰ δὲ ποιήματα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ ὅσα νουμοθειῖται περὶ παιδείαν, ch. ii. 11).

- (18.) 15. ἀρετὴ τελεία. Here then is solved the question started at the outset, (bk. i. ch. vii. 16,) and this gives the middle term for the syllogism of the book:—

Whatever is τελειοτάτη ἀρετὴ performs the ἔργον of man;

ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον is this (for it = δικαιοσύνη, which is τελειοτάτη ἀρετὴ);

ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν performs the ἔργον of man.

In the after-part of this book he shews that there is no higher law, or ἔργον, than δικαιοσύνη, as he has before shewn that each particular μεσότης performs the ἔργον of the passions or tendencies to which it belongs, making the habit of mind good, with relation to oneself and to others.

- (19.) 15. οὐχ ἀπλῶς, *not without some limitation; not in its most literal sense.*—οὐθ' Ἑσπερος κ.τ.λ. This saying is ascribed to Euripides, Theognes, or Aristotle himself, all equally without authority.

- (20.) 15. τελεία μάλιστα: because it is social, which is the highest standard we can take for man, as man. ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ taken ἀπλῶς could not have been the ἀρετὴ of social man, but it becomes so when it is connected with δικαιοσύνη.

- (21.) 16. ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει: cf. Soph. Ant. 175.

- (22.) 20. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ αὐτή: in themselves, they are identical; each being the possession of the same habits and the performance of the same duties.—τὸ μέντοι εἶναι: their essence is different; they will be differently defined. ἀρετὴ = the possession of the habits and performance of the duties with reference to *individual* or *moral* perfection, (ἀπλῶς); δικαιοσύνη = the possession of the same habits and performance of the duties with reference to *social* perfection, (πρὸς ἕτερον). τὸ εἶναι is used in Aristotle in different senses, (πολλαχῶς γὰρ τὸ εἶναι λέγομεν, Met. xii. p. 261): when opposed to λόγος, it signifies the actual objective existence of anything, as opposed to a verbal or merely subjective notional existence, (Met. xii. 2, p. 263); in another sense, (as here,) it means the full mental notion or definition of the thing, as opposed to an accidental, incomplete view of it. So De Anima, iii. 2, ἡ δὲ τοῦ

αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μία—τὸ δὲ εἶναι οὐ ταῦτόν αὐταῖς): accidentally, the reception of the image of the αἰσθητόν and its transmission from the αἰσθητόν are the same; but in essence they differ, inasmuch as one is an energy of the subject, the other of the object: so the words spoken are the same to the bearer and speaker, but they would be differently defined in relation to each.

CHAPTER II.

- (23.) 1. There is some difficulty in determining the exact relation in which ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη stands to δικαιοσύνη in general, and to ἡθικὴ ἀρετή; whether the ἐν μέρει refers to its being a subdivision of δικαιοσύνη, or as contained under ἡθικὴ ἀρετή: either of these views seems at variance with expressions used in these chapters. ἡθικὴ ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη are not convertible terms, as that would exclude the ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη in its function of a regulation of διανομή and χρεῖα. It will be found best, I think, to adopt the general division given above, and to view ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη as a subdivision of ὅλη δικαιοσύνη when considered as a regulation of the above principles of social life, and as contained under ὅλη ἀρετή when viewed as a habit of mind; so that ἡ ἐν μέρει ἀδικία is παράνομον in its widest sense of a violation of the whole νόμιμον, as well as in its lesser sense of a violation of ἡθικὴ ἀρετή. The twofold nature of ἡ ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνη as a social arrangement and mental habit, necessitates this seeming cross-division; had there been a separate term for each, this of course would have been avoided.—ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς: as being an habit of mind, it falls under the general class of ἀρετή; it is a particular virtue. The arguments here fall into the second figure.
- (24.) 3. τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον: in the widest sense of παράνομον, in which it is opposed to νόμιμον, to the whole system of political arrangement.
- (25.) 4. The argument here is also in the second figure.
- (26.) 5. ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν: no moral vice.
- (27.) 6. παρὰ τὴν ὅλην: as being a political regulation of διανομή and χρεῖα, and thus having a different subject matter

this ἀδικία is distinct from ὅλη κακία, and this δικαιοσύνη from ὅλη ἀρετή.—ἐν μέρει: as being an habit of mind, or habitual disposition to act unfairly in these points, διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους.

(28.) 8. διώρισται κ.τ.λ. This may be thus paraphrased:—"ἄδικον being divided into παράνομον and ἄνισον, there is a δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία proper to each of these, which we must discuss; and the ἀδικία and δικαιοσύνη of these two stand to each other in the relation of whole and part." The object is to shew how it is that, though ἄνισον and παράνομον are contrasted divisions of ἄδικον, yet one falls under the other as a subdivision, and of the two sorts of δίκαιον corresponding to these, one is contained under the other, (ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς,) just as πλεόν and ἄνισον, though likewise contrasted divisions of ἄδικον, stand to each other as part to whole.—ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία, sc. that which is opposed to χρήσις ὅλης ἀρετῆς.

(29.) 9. καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία κ.τ.λ. The way to construe this is: "the ἄδικον and ἀδικία of the παράνομον and ἄνισον (ἐκείνων referring to the division given above, note 28,) are different; the former includes as a whole the latter, just as ἄνισον includes as a whole the πλεόν." Some editions read παράνομον for πλεόν, which confuses the passage: the MSS. vary; but the reading in the text is the best.

(30.) 9. τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης: see above, note 23.—αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία, sc. περὶ τὸ ἄνισον.—ὅλης ἀδικίας: that is, the ἀδικία which is the violation of ὅλη ἀρετή. The words "ψέγομεν γάρ" in the first section shew that he is speaking of this particular ἀδικία as a part of the violation of ὅλη ἀρετή, (ἐν μέρει κακίας,) and not merely as a subdivision of δικαιοσύνη generally. See note 15.

(31.) 10. πραττόμενα, al. προσταττόμενα.

(32.) 11. ἀπλῶς, generally, properly speaking; considered as an individual.—ἕστερον: briefly in the last chapter of the book, but at length in the Politics.—ἡ ἑτέρα: sc. whether education should be of public or private concern.

(33.) 11. οὐ γὰρ ἴσως κ.τ.λ. There may be, indeed are, states in which the rewards and punishments of the law do not coincide with the impulses and checks of conscience, nor

even with the recognised duties of a moral being. It would be easy to give instances in which this is the case. In the *βελτίστη πολιτεία*, the model state, they would coincide. The matter is discussed in Pol. iii.

- (34.) 12. The motive powers of the state, answering to *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* in an individual, are *διανομή* and *χρεία*; and Aristotle proceeds to shew that the perfection of the state is arrived at by a mean, and thus to confirm his view, that the perfection of an individual lies in a mean.
- (35.) 13. *τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων, κ.τ.λ.* The *ἐκούσια* belong to catallactic, the *ἀκούσια* to diorthotic or corrective justice, so called from its correcting evils: distributive justice would exist even in the *βελτίστη πολιτεία*, as being an adjustment of the common property which must find place in every society; but the other would cease to exist where *δικαιοσύνη* was superseded by *φιλία*, in that ideal state to which theorists thought it possible to mould society, and with a view to which they would admit (as Plato in his Republic) such institutions as community of property, wives, children, &c.

CHAPTER III.

- (36.) 1. *ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.* Since the *ἄδικος* is *ἀνισος*, it is further to be observed that there is a mean (*μέσον*) implied in the notion of *ἀνισον*, (as containing a *πλέον* and *ἐλαττον*,) viz. the *ἴσον*; and the *ἄδικον* being *ἀνισον*, it follows (*ἐξ ἐναντίων*) that there is an *ἴσον*: *δίκαιον* is this *ἴσον*, and hence also *μέσον*; it is not only an absolute equality (*ἴσον*), but also a relative equality (*μέσον*), as equally removed from *πλέον* and *ἐλαττον*: where the equality is absolute, the *δίκαιον* will be simply *ἴσον*, but being *ἴσον*, it will also be a *μέσον*; where the equality is relative, the *δίκαιον* will be a *μέσον* between *πλέον* and *ἐλαττον*, and hence also *ἴσον*: in both cases it is *δίκαιόν τισιν*; hence the following arrangement holds:—

Distributive justice.

δίκαιον is { *δίκαιόν τισιν* = general, soldier.
μέσον τινῶν: things in which, looking to the position of the parties, there is in the *διανομή* neither *πλέον* nor *ἐλαττον*, but a *μέσον*,—relative equality; see sect. 12.

Catallactic justice

δικαιον { δίκαιόν τισιν.
 ἴσον δυοῖν, absolute equality between two things,
 without reference to their character, (see ch. iv.
 sect. 3,) but still, as being ἴσον, it is a μέσον, (see
 iv. 6).

(37.) 6. *δταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα κ.τ.λ.* Here are given the two faults which prove *οἰκείαι φθοραί* to a constitution admitting them;—the French system before the revolution is an instance of the former, and the American constitution of the latter.

(38.) 7. *ἐλευθερίαν*, i. e. that every free man is entitled to an equal share.—*εὐγένειαν*. This was the principle of the old constitutions of Athens and Rome, in which the belonging to certain tribes or families was the *ἀξία* of the constitution.

(39.) 8. *μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ*, *number proper*, such as 1, 5, 10, &c., by which we count; *ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ*, numbers generally, —wherever the notion of quantity exists.

(40.) 9. *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής*: this is merely to answer a plausible *ἑνστάσις* against his statement that all analogy has four terms. In arithmetic this continuous proportion may occur, (as 3 : 6 :: 6 : 12,) but in geometrical proportion, (*ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον ὡς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον*), which is the proportion of distributive justice, the same term cannot be used twice, and therefore it is not continuous: see sect. 13. Michelet thus illustrates this:—

ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον
 Achilles Ajax Nummi Achilles Nummi Ajacis
 8 : 4 : 6 : 3

ἐναλλάξ
 Achilles Nummi Achilles : Ajax Nummi Ajacis
 8 :: 6 :: 4 3

ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει
 Achilles et Nummi Ajax et Nummi Achilles : Ajax
 (8+6=) 14 : (4+3=) 7 :: 8 : 4

Hence τὸ ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον ὡς ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον.

(41.) 11. *ἐναλλάξ*, *interchanging them*.—*συνδυάζει*. The act of distribution attaching the proper proportion to each person, *forms by combination* the ὅλον, Achilles and his share, (α + γ); πρὸς ὅλον, Ajax and his share, (β + δ).

(12.) 12. τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, of the ἀδικον which is contrary to proportion. The syllogism is—

ἀνάλογον is μέσον,—as being the point between πλείον and ἔλαττον;

δίκαιον is ἀνάλογον;

δίκαιον is μέσον.

(43.) 13. γεωμετρική: Gorg. 518, A.

(44.) 13. ἐν ἀγαθοῦ λόγῳ γίνεται, is regarded as ἀγαθόν.

CHAPTER IV.

(45.) 1. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν εἶναι: divided into two—corrective and catallactic,—each διορθωτικόν as correcting existing inequalities.

(46.) 2. εἰσενεχθίεντα, the terms introduced.


(47.) 3. οἷδέν γὰρ διαφέρει. There may be cases where the character and circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant respectively are taken into consideration in estimating the amount which will make them equal; that is, the ζημία suffered by one, and the κέρδος gained by the other, (τὴν τοῦ βλάβους διαφοράν): as, for instance, in an action for libel, a minister of state or a clergyman would, from his position, suffer a greater ζημία than another person would from the same act, and therefore the amount of damages would properly be greater; but supposing the right value to be thus fixed for the ζημία, then the damages would not be assessed according to the proportion existing between the parties. Thus, supposing a plaintiff in one case to = 4, and the defendant 4, that is, both to be in respect of station, &c. exactly equal, the ζημία might be represented by 3; while in another exactly similar act, where the two parties were unequal in their position, as plaintiff = 6, the defendant = 2, the ζημία might be represented as 10; and this would be the damages: whereas, if proportion was introduced, the balance would be struck thus, as 6 : 2 : 30 : 10, and the defendant would have to pay, not 10, the actual ζημία, but a threefold one,—and this is what Aristotle is guarding against here.

(48.) 5. τισίν, to some cases.—οἷον, as if there was κέρδος.

(49.) 6. ἀλλ' ὅταν κ.τ.λ. The most proper application of these terms, though even this is improperly used in some cases, is

of profit to the agent, loss to the patient; but when (ἀλλ' ὅταν) the πάθος has been estimated, that which the agent restores to the patient is called ζημία, as well as the loss which the patient suffered at first. He seems to be accounting for the phrase τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, inasmuch as the term ζημία is properly confined to the injury inflicted on the patient, and not to the restitution made to him.

(50.) 12. This may be illustrated by the lines given in the text:—



Then from $\gamma\gamma\delta$ must be taken $\gamma\delta$, and added to $\alpha\epsilon$, to make it equal to $\beta\beta$. The patient's and agent's case is represented by $\alpha\alpha$, $\gamma\gamma$: $\beta\beta$ is only used to set the inequality clearly before us.—τὸ ἐφ' ὧν. This cannot properly be applied to a single line. It seems to have crept in either as part of the formula, or by a clerical error. If it is omitted, then τὸ $\gamma\delta$ answers to τῷ $\alpha\epsilon$; and below we have τῷ $\gamma\delta$. The passage beginning, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ., down to καὶ τοιοῦτον, occurs thus in all MSS., but it does not belong here: and it occurs again in the next chapter; whence probably it was carelessly or ignorantly transferred by transcribers or commentators.

(51.) 13. ἀδειαν, liberty to act as one will.

(52.) 13. ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γίνονται. This is a difficult passage. Michelet suggests that ἀλλά is to be taken for "præterquam, except when," and translates it thus:—"When there is neither excess or deficiency except when they are caused by themselves, (taking δι' αὐτῶν as masculine,) i. e. by consent on both sides;" and he quotes a passage in De Anima, i. 1. 17, p. 5, for this sense of ἀλλὰ ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τις ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη ἀλλ' (except) ὁ φυσικός. There are some others in Xen. Vect. iii. 6, Anab. vi. 4. 2, (given in Gr. Gr. 773, 4,) which might bear out this meaning of "except:" if it is adopted, a stop should be put before and after ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν; but it does not


seem to be the sense required; and I would rather explain the δι' αὐτῶν by the sense of διὰ in such phrases as διὰ φόβον, *to be in fear*,—one thing being in another, (see Gr. Gr. 627. 1, 3, b,)—and construe it, *when they* (the two sides) *are contained in themselves*, i. e. *self-contained*; do not encroach upon each other, and thus are equal. He is shewing that there is a middle point to which neither ζημία nor κέρδος is applicable.

CHAPTER V.

- (55.) 1. Πυθαγόριοι. They defined justice to be ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκεις ἴσος, (Magna Moral. i. 1).
- (54.) 3. εἰ κε πάθοι, placed by Gaisford (Poet. Min.) among the Fragments of Hesiod.
- (55.) 6. συνέχει κ.τ.λ., *is the principle or bond of*.—τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὲν κατ' ἀναλογίαν, taking into consideration the value of the things to be exchanged, (καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα); not giving one for one, or two for two. They are considered, not with regard to quantity, but quality.
- (56.) 6. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. The state is said by Aristotle, in different passages, to depend upon an interchange of offices,—on demand (χρεία,)—on φιλία. The first is the practical view of the working of social life; the second views it as arising from the mutual needs of men; the third from the instinct towards social life.—τὸ κακῶς, sc. ποιεῖν.
- (57.) 7. Χαρίτων ἱερὸν, moral beauty expressed in physical beauty. The number of the Graces represents the threefold sense of χάρις,—the feeling of kindness, the kind action, the kind feeling in return; while their being interwoven represents the inseparable connection which does, or at least ought to, exist between the three.
- (58.) 8. ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις: such as exists between A and O, or E and I, in the logical scheme of opposition, cross combination, De Interp. x. p. 81, thus:—

Jeweller = 10.

Shoemaker = 2.



Ring = 20.

Shoe = 4.

The jeweller takes the shoe, the shoemaker the ring;—the difference between them being 16: the shoemaker gives four more pairs of shoes, or their value, to make the exchange equal.

- (59.) 8. *πρῶτον*, *at first; at once*; that is, if before the exchange takes place, the value of the two things is considered relatively to each other and to their producers, and then an exchange is made, (*εἴτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται*), that (fair exchange) we speak of (*τὸ λεγόμενον*) will take place;—or *τὸ λεγόμενον* may refer to the proverbial expression mentioned above, *τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ*.—*τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου*: partitive genitive; *al. τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον*.
- (60.) 8. *εἰ δὲ μή*, *if the quality or value is not first considered, but only the quantity or numerical value, &c.*—*οὐδὲ συμμίνει*, *sc. ἡ πόλις* *or τὸ δίκαιον*.
- (61.) 9. *ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο*. This relative equality, and not an absolute equality, obtains in all arts of life. The value of an article is not settled by the seller or producer and his production alone, but relatively to the consumer and his wants and wishes. “*An art would be destroyed unless, of whatever sort or in whatever quantity, the producer (τὸ ποιοῦν) produced, the consumer also (πάσχον takes this sense as the patient of ποιοῦν) wanted this thing in that same quantity and quality.*” That is, an exact exchange, where each offered to the other exactly what the other offered to him, such as bread for bread, could not go on: nor where there was no way of equalizing products of dissimilar quantity. Others make *τὸ ποιοῦν* and *τὸ πάσχον* refer to the same person,—the former as producing something, the latter as receiving something of the same quality and quantity in exchange for it; but the interpretation given above is the better. Others, again, make these two words refer to the giver and receiver: that *arts would be destroyed unless the consumer (τὸ πάσχον) was willing to suffer (i. e. to give, ἑπασχε,) as much as the producer had earned*; but this is, I think, the worst of the three.
- (62.) 10. *διὸ κ.τ.λ.*: hence there must needs be some way of comparing the value of these dissimilar articles of commerce, viz. money, which thus represents the difference (*ὑπερβολή* and *ἑλλειψις*) between two articles differing in value and kind.
- (63.) 10. *πόσα ἄττα*: this depends on *μετρεῖ*.—*ὑπερ κ.τ.λ.*

The value will be determined by the materials, time, and labour of each, and the demand for the thing produced: as the time, labour, materials, and demand of the architect exceed those of the shoemaker, he will want so many pairs of shoes in exchange for his house; he will want some means of equalizing the pairs of shoes and the house, or there will be no *κοινωνία*.

- (64.) 11. *ἡ χρεια*. This is supplied by the market value, and its representative, money. If, in the market, a house will fetch so many times more than a pair of shoes, the difference between them is immediately found; and a means of stating and equalizing that difference is supplied by the common measure of value, "money."
- (65.) 11. *ἡ πάντα συνίχει*, is the bond of social union, viewed as arising from the reciprocal wants of men. Thus Cicero views it.—*ὑπάλλαγμα*, the representative.
- (66.) 12. *ὅπερ σκυτοτόμος κ.τ.λ.* The relative position and character and skill of the two parties are to be taken into account in estimating the value of the production of each: the higher the art, and the greater the learning and skill, &c. it requires, the higher will be its value, supposing the materials employed and the time occupied in each case to be the same; but the value of each work once being ascertained, the relation between them is not to be taken into account *at the moment when the balance is struck*; nor can it be expressed by the *σχῆμα ἀναλογίας* (geometrical proportion), when the exchange has been made, (*ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται*: see Gr. Gr. 842. 6,) though the previous process of estimating the value of their respective productions may be so expressed. When once this has been ascertained, they are to be made *actually*, not *relatively*, equal. Thus, supposing the jeweller to be worth six times as much as the shoemaker, the jewel would be worth six pairs of shoes,—jeweller = 6, shoemaker 1; then the jewel = 12, the pair of shoes 2, the relative value of the ring and the shoe stands thus, as 6 : 1 :: 12 : 2; and the value of six pairs of shoes (= 12) must be given by the shoemaker. If they were to be made *relatively*, not absolutely, equal, then as : 12 : 2 :: 72 : 12; and on this principle the shoemaker would have to give the value of 72 instead of

12, and he would thus have an extreme on either side of the just mean, i.e. an excess of labour and expense, and a deficiency of profit, (ἀμφοτέρας ἔξει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον).—τὸ αὐτῶν: their proper share.

(67.) 13. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία κ.τ.λ. That mutual wants are the bond of commerce is clear from the fact, that where these wants are lacking in both or either of the parties, there is no dealing. Thus, if one person needs some wine, and can give nothing but some of the produce of his fields, (σίτου ἐξαγωγῆς,) of which the other at the moment is not in want, money comes in as a surety (ἐγγυητής) that when he does want it, he will be able to get it.—ἐξαγωγῆν, al.; but the partitive genitive is best.

(68.) 14. πάσχει κ.τ.λ. The value of the precious metals sometimes varies: the expected results of the gold discoveries illustrate this. This is parenthetical.—βούλεται, *has a tendency to remain fixed*.

(69.) 15. συμμετρίας, *common measure*.

(70.) 15. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, *is conventional*; it is not so actually, but is accepted as such.—νόμισμα, i.e. τῷ νόμῳ, *conventionally*.

(71.) οἰκία ἐφ' ἧς, al.; but the weight of authority is against it.—ἡ ἀξία: the ἧ refers to ἴσον, *equal, or of the same value*.

(72.) 17. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον: in its most prominent character, it is not περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, a regulation of pleasures and pains, but περὶ διανομὴν καὶ χρεῖαν, a regulation of the principles of social life; secondarily, as a habit of mind, (ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς,) it is a disposition to act on these principles of fair distribution and exchange, arising from the proper regulation of the ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους.

(73.) 18. ἡ δ' ἀδικία, sc. καθ' ἣν λέγεται πρακτικὸς τοῦ ἀδίκου.—τοῦναντίον, sc. διανεμητικὸς τοῦ ἀνίστου κ.τ.λ.—τοῦτο, sc. τὸ ἀδικον.

(74.) 18. ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐστίν κ.τ.λ.: because it is of the nature of ὑπερβολή and ἐλλείψις. With regard to oneself, it is always too much of the good, and too little of the bad; with regard to others, the ἀδικία, which is a violation of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, (τὸ μὲν ὅλον,) is always the taking too much
 enough evil.—seeking pleasure, or shunning

pain at another's expense.—ὁμοίως, sc. to the case of ἐφ' αὐτοῦ just given. In the distributive injustice (τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον) it may be either ὑπερβολή or ἑλλείψις of good or bad, as the case may be, (ὁποτέρως ἔτιχε). It may be giving too much good, or too little good, or too much or too little evil, to another.

CHAPTER VI.

(75.) He now distinguishes briefly between unjust acts and injustice, and proceeds to shew that the only δίκαιον, or law of obligation, really binding upon man as an individual, is that πολιτικὸν δίκαιον which is equivalent to ἠθικὴ ἀρετή; the other sorts of δίκαιον are only so in a secondary and analogical sense, and form no element of the ἀρετή or ἔργον of man.

(76.) 1. ὁ ποῖα, al. ὅποια.—οὕτω, sc. looking to the acts only.

(77.) 4. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν κ.τ.λ. The following is an analysis of δίκαιον, as laid down by Aristotle:—

The principles.—Natural justice.

δίκαιον	
ἀπλῶς δίκαιον.	πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.
κοινὸς, ἄγραφος νόμος: Rhet.	ἴδιος, γεγραμμένος νόμος: Rhet.
i. 10, i. 13, ii. 3.	i. 10, i. 13. 11.
α. ἐπιείκεια β. ὑπερβολὴ ἀρετῆς.	φυσικόν νομικόν.
	γεγραμμένος ἄγραφος.
ἄγραφος γεγραμμένος: Rhet. i. 13. 11.	
Common law. Statute law.	
Rhet. i. 13. 11.	

1. δίκαιον in the abstract, existing prior to any formal declaration of it by states or individuals.

2. That part of the δίκαιον which is adopted by the legislator and embodied in the laws and institutions of the state.

3. That part of the δίκαιον which the legislator did not or could not transfer to his laws or institutions, consisting—

α. of the spirit of the laws, which he could only take imperfectly,—ἐπιείκεια.

β. the principles or quasi duties which he did not take, (ὑπερβολὴ ἀρετῆς); works of imperfect obligation.

4. φυσικόν, that part of πολιτικόν which is drawn directly and positively from the abstract δίκαιον, (1.) divided into—

c. That which is ordained by actual statute, (*statute law*).

d. That which has obtained by consent, (*common law*).

5. νομικόν, that part of πολιτικόν which is not drawn directly from natural justice, but arises entirely from the wants or whims of men; care being taken that it is not contrary to natural justice. This, too, is divided into statute and common law.

(78.) 4. τὸ ζητούμενον, sc. περίως δίκαιον; that δίκαιον, the violation of which would make a man ἀδικος.

(79.) 4. τοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ. The only justice or law of obligation really binding upon man is the πολιτικόν; that which is embodied in the laws and regulations of a social state, and which is represented in the individual by ἠθικὴ ἀρετή; for real obligation cannot exist except where there are social relations. He proves this by the following argument:—δίκαιον can exist only where there is νόμος, (ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον εἰς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτοῖς,) νόμος where there is ἀδικία, (νόμος δ' ἐν εἰς ἀδικία,) ἀδικία where it is possible to take too much good and too little evil, (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλεον αὐτῷ νέμειν); and this can only be where there are social relations,—common property and interchange, (ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι οὐτάρκειαν,)—so that where these social relations do not exist there can be no real δίκαιον, but only καθ' ὁμοιότητα.

(80.) 4. ἰλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων κ.τ.λ., where there are some relations of equality between the persons in the state: either absolute equality, as in a democracy where each man is on an equality with the rest, (κατ' ἀριθμόν,) or relative equality, (κατ' ἀναλογίαν,) where the several parties in the state are equal according to their several claims arising from a principle of blood, as in an oligarchy of families; or education, as in an aristocracy; or property, as in a timocracy.—μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, sc. κοινωνία.—ἀλλὰ τὸ down to ὁμοιότητα is parenthetical.

(81.) 4. νόμος ἐν οἷς ἀδικία. This may best be understood by tracing society from its simplest to its most complex form. In good old patriarchal days, when persons of the same family lived naturally together in mutual love, there was no mention of δίκαιον, no notion of rights; as time went

on, and the ties of blood daily became less close, and interests more distinct, the notion of personal rights took the place of affection; injuries or invasions of these rights took place, the notion of *δίκαιον* was evolved, and the question was referred to the *κριτής*, who decided between right and wrong, and by his decision gave a definite existence and shape to *δίκαιον*, which was then, as society became more extended, embodied in the *νόμος*. The order of things was this: *κοινωνία*, *φιλία*, *ἀδικον*, *δίκαιον*, *κρίσις*, *νόμος*; hence *νόμος* is an evidence of the existence of *δίκαιον*, and can only exist where there is *κοινωνία*, for where this is not, the question of *ἀδικον* and *δίκαιον* cannot arise. This is illustrated by the history of the early Church: at first they had all things in common, (*φιλία*.) then complaints arose, then *δίκαιον* stepped in, and called for the appointment of arbitrators, (deacons,) and the operation of a *νόμος*.—*τοῦτο δὲ ἴσται*, *sc. ἀδικία*.

(82.) 5. *διὸ κτλ.*, *wherefore*, (= a proof of *ἀδικία* being this taking to ourselves the good, is that) *fearing ἀδικία*, *we do not entrust the supreme power to a single man's will*,—because we are afraid of his doing this from the natural impulses of human selfishness; but we place ourselves under the government of reason expressed by law, of which the chief magistrate is the interpreter and administrator. And the chief magistrate, to whom we thus intrust the state, is *ex officio* the guardian of justice and of that equality which excludes the notion of *πλεον αὐτῷ νέμειν*, therefore it is clear that *ἀδικία*, against which we are thus guarding, consists in *πλεον αὐτῷ νέμειν*; hence we see that it can exist only where this inequality is possible, i. e. in *κοινωνία*. He seems to be bringing forward men's notion of government as an evidence of his proposition, that true *δίκαιον* exists only where *κοινωνία* exists.

(83.) 5. *ὁ ἄρχων*. Some persons make *ἄρχων* refer to *λόγος*, but this breaks the connexion with what follows, where he is evidently speaking of a person.

(84.) 6. *ἐπεὶ*. The apodosis being some sentences off, is introduced by *ἄρα*: *μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτός*.—*οὐδὲν αὐτῷ κτλ.*, *there seems to be no advantage to him to be ἄρχων*.

(85.) 7. *ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ κτλ.* Whosoever is not content with this, but tries to seize upon an unfair share of good, commits *ἀδικία*, and becomes a *τύραννος*. In the case of the *ἄρχων*,

δικαία, which is embodied in the very notion of τύραννος, would arise from the attempt πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν.

- (86) 8. There are certain relations of life in which quasi justice obtains, viz. the δεσποτικόν and the πατρικόν: in the former, the slave, being merely a chattel, has no κοινωνία, no claims or rights whatever, and therefore acts which are unjust in themselves are not unjust towards him; and a child may be viewed in the same light, as one who has no rights as against his father.
- (87.) 9. ἦν, it was laid down to be, Gr. Gr. 389.4: so ἦσαν, below.
- (88.) 9. οἷς ἐπάρχει κτ.λ. There must be some relations existing between the governors and governed; in other words, a constitution on some principle of equality.

CHAPTER VII.

- (89.) 1. τὸ μὲν φυσικόν. Whoever framed the constitution and laws for any social state would take from natural justice such principles as were suitable to his purpose, and these, when adopted by the public voice, either expressed or implied, fall under πολιτικόν φυσικόν, or that portion of the social arrangements and laws which are drawn directly from the law of nature,—enactments of moral obligation. The other sort are only of positive obligation.
- (90.) 2. τὰ ψηφισματώδη, matters of special enactment.
- (91.) 2. δοκεῖ δὲ ἐνίοις. The argument is in the second figure, and Aristotle meets each premiss with an ἔνστασις; denying that all natural things are invariable, and that all justice is variable. It should be worked out at length.
- (92) 3. παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς. In the βελτίστη πολιτεία which may be supposed to exist among the gods, those principles of justice, which among men are variable, may well be believed to be fixed and invariable.
- (93) 3. κινητὸν μὲντοι πάν. In Eth. Eudem. we find κινητὸν, οὐ μὲντοι πάν,—putting the stop before οὐ; but this is not supported by the majority of MSS. It gives, however, a very good sense. If the reading in the text is to be preferred, Aristotle is drawing a distinction between the αὐτοδίκαιον of the gods and the δίκαιον of men. This latter, though variable, is, in some cases, at least, from nature, and not merely conventional.

- (94) 4. φύσει. His constant definition of things φύσει is ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, being a subdivision of that higher φύσις which comprehends τὸ αἰὶ, (ἀνάγκη,) as well as ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, (φύσει). —δῆλον: that is, it is not matter of proof, but of perception.
- (95) 4. ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν, sc. in matters of pure physics, where νικῶν and συνθήκη do not come in, it is equally true to say that some things which are natural are variable.—ἡ δεξία κτλ.: an ἔκστασις from a particular. See *Analyt. Prior.* ii. 28. p. 110.
- (96) 5. τὸ σύμφερον, that which merely depends on human expediency: as in a place of wholesale trade, (οἱ ὠροῦνται,) a nominal cwt. is practically 112lb., and in a retail shop (ἐν πωλείᾳ) only 100lb., and yet the measure which thus varies is in itself the same; so there is a similar variation in δίκαιον depending on the caprice or convenience of men, and it varies as the constitutions to which it is attached vary. These constitutions are not the same everywhere, and consequently δίκαιον is not in its practical details the same everywhere, though there is such a thing in the designs of nature as a constitution, and consequently δίκαιον, which ought to obtain everywhere.
- (97) 6. As you cannot argue from particular to universal, neither can you argue from the variableness of the single phenomena of justice, as seen in the particulars of action, (τὰ πραττόμενα,) that the principle whence they proceed is variable also.
- (98.) 7. διαφέρει κτλ. ἀδίκον is injustice in the abstract,—the principle; ἀδίκτημα, the act, ἀδικία, the evil or vice.—ὁμοίως κτλ.: so δίκαιον, δικαίωμα, δικαιοσύνη; or for δικαίωμα we may better use δικαιοπραγία of the act, for δικαίωμα is rather the remedying injustice, and therefore is not properly applied to every sort of just act.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (99) 1. οἷς γὰρ κτλ., sc. πράττουσιν ταῦτα, οἷς συμβέβηκε κτλ.
- (100) 3. ἀγνοῶν is here used in the sense of δι' ἄγνοαν, bk. iii. ch. 1. —τίς λαβὼν χεῖρα αἰτοῦ. αἰτοῦ refers to the person whose hand some one has taken, and struck another it.—τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω, let the same distinction be

drawn also as to the motive; so to decide whether the act is ἐκούσιον, or not.

(101.) 4. ἴσται δ' ὁμοίως κ.τ.λ., *the συμβεβηκός also (καὶ omitt. al.) is the same, i. e. it prevents what is seemingly a just or unjust action from being so.*

(102.) 6. τριῶν οὐσων κ.τ.λ., *sc. ἀνόχημα, ἀμάρτημα, ἀδίκημα.—βλαβῶν, as distinguished from ἀδικία, which is a fourth case, ὅταν ἐκ προαίρεσιως. In Rhet. i 13.16, ἀδικήμα includes the ἀδικία. Of course, the distinction here drawn suggests to every one the words of our Litany,—sins, negligences, ignorances.*

(103.) 7. συνβη οἷχ οὐ ἐνέκα ᾗθη, *a result happened which he had not thought of as the end.*

(104.) 8. ὅσα τε διὰ θυμόν κ.τ.λ. The passion, which hurries the agent so rapidly away that he has no time to reflect, is the cause of the action, not κακία. See bk. iii. 1. 21, where he says that desire or anger do not abstractedly destroy ἐκούσιον. Here he looks at what accidentally and occasionally accompanies them.

(105.) 9. ἀναγκαῖα, *hunger, thirst, &c.; φυσικά, love, anger, &c.*

(106.) 10. ἴτι δ' οἰδέι If in a court of justice an enquiry arises as to whether a man who committed some wrong act under the influence of anger is accountable for it, the question is not whether the act was committed or not, but whether the anger was justifiable; whether there was any ἀδικία φαινομένη to justify the anger: it is not the act which makes a man ἀδικος, for that is admitted, but the mode and manner of it.

(107.) 10. ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας. The man who has attacked another even under the influence of anger cannot plead ἄγνοια. — ὥστε κ.τ.λ. Hence, the fact being allowed, one party looks upon himself as injured, the ὀργή being unjustified; the other denies it, pleading the provocation; and this is the question to be settled: and hence it is clear that προαίρεσις is necessary to the notion of ἀδικία. Michelet takes it differently, making the clause ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οἷκ ἄγνοει, a parenthetical statement of the difference between the act done from anger and one done from προαίρεσις. The angry man may plead ἄγνοια, but the ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας cannot. And conceiving the question to be, whether the angry man who retaliates an injury is just or unjust, he makes the words ὥστε κ.τ.λ. to mean that he upon whom the angry man

retaliated thinks he has been injured by the angry man, while the angry man denies it; but this both destroys the force of the passage, and is, I think, contrary to the sense of the words: for ἐπιβουλεύσας is not the same as προβουλεύσας; and it is clear from the words ἐπὶ φαινομένη ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστίν, that the question is not whether the angry man has προαίρεσις, but whether the φαινομένη ἀδικία by which his anger was provoked had it so as to make it really ἀδικία, and therefore to justify the anger. Aristotle seems to mean that it is not pretended that the person who provoked the anger by an act of aggression (ἐπιβουλεύσας) can plead excusable ἄγνοια of particulars, so that he may on this plea deny the injustice which the other asserts, but he can do so on the plea of want of προαίρεσις to do an unjust action: the act of aggression (τὸ ἐπιβουλεύειν) is admitted; the question is, it was done whether ἐκ προαιρέσεως, with a deliberate intent to be unjust, so as to justify the anger of the other party.

(108.) 11. ἡ δὲ, so. where there is προαίρεσις.

(109.) 12. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων. He uses this word in a looser sense than in bk. iii. 1. 2, (where he says, ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν: see note 104,) for any actions done without definite προαίρεσις, even those which arise from ignorance of the general principles under the impulse of πάθος; such as where a starving man, under the pressure of hunger, loses sight of his knowledge of the nature of theft, and his abstract προαίρεσις against it; his act does not arise from a bad προαίρεσις, but from the pressure of the hunger, which obscures, for the time, his προαίρεσις: it is therefore συγγνωμονικόν. Where the πάθος is less urgent it is not so.—δι' ἄγνοιαν: see bk. iii. note 19.

CHAPTER IX.

(110.) The questions discussed are as follows:—

1. Can a man be injured if he consents to the act? (πρῶτον μὲν—ἔκοντες).

2. Is the recipient of an injury always injured? (ἐπεὶ—δικαιοπραγοῦντος)

And this latter one branches off into two other points, (sect. 9).

a. Whether he who receives, by an unjust sentence, more than he ought, is himself unjust?

β. Whether a man can injure himself?

ἀτόπως, *paradoxically*.

- (111.) 2. εὐλογον ἀντικείμεναι ὁμοίως. The opinion that ἀδικεῖσθαι is not always the same, either voluntary or involuntary, but sometimes one, sometimes the other, according to circumstances, arises from the consideration that though δικαιοπραγεῖν is always invariable in respect of voluntariness, yet δικαιοῦσθαι does not follow it, but is sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary (ἐνιοὶ γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οἱ χεῖροντες); and it might reasonably be expected (εὐλογον) that ἀδικεῖσθαι would stand in the same relation (ἀντικείμεναι ὁμοίως) to ἀδικεῖν as δικαιοῦσθαι does to δικαιοπραγεῖν, and therefore, as δικαιοῦσθαι is variable, so would ἀδικεῖσθαι be also, and hence, though ἀδικεῖν is always voluntary, yet it might be sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary.

- (112) ἀντικείμεναι ὁμοίως:—

ἀδικεῖν — δικαιοπραγεῖν

|

ἀδικεῖσθαι δικαιοῦσθαι.

ἀδικεῖσθαι and δικαιοῦσθαι ἀντίκεινται as occupying similar positions in this scheme of opposition, each being the patient of their respective agents; so in this sense in the logical scheme of opposition I would be said ἀντικείμεναι to O. The questions stated in the first four sections arise from the opposition and relation of the several terms to each other.

- (113.) 3. ὁ ἄδικον πεπονθώς: not only the sufferer, but the recipient of an act of injustice; so that under this head fall both the questions α and β above, note 110. The ἀπορία here is, whether ὁ ἄδικα πάσχων always ἀδικεῖται, or whether it may not be sometimes κατὰ συμβεβηκός, as ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, where the agent acts unknowingly; the answer is, that it may be so when he is injured voluntarily; then ἄδικον πάσχει, but οἷα ἀδικεῖται.

- (114.) 3. κατὰ συμβεβηκός κτλ. In the case of δίκαιον the act may be κατὰ συμβεβηκός in respect both of the agent and the patient (ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων); so we may expect it to be the same with ἄδικον. whether it is so or not is the question to be discussed below.

- (115.) 3. *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν κτλ.* Again a similar question arises with regard to these, for a patient implies an agent, and as *ἀδικεῖν* being *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* makes the *ἀδικεῖσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, so likewise may we suppose that if *συμβεβηκός* obtains in *δικαιοπραγεῖν*, it does also in *δικαιοῦσθαι*.
- (116.) 8. *δύο*: involved in question 2, above, note 110.
- (117.) 9. *τὸ πρότερον λιχθύν*, sc. *εἰ ἀδικεῖ ὁ νέμας*.
- (118.) 12. *νομικόν* = *πολιτικόν*: he is considering the case of *ὁ νέμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν*.—*τὸ πρῶτον* = *δίκαιον ἀπλῶς*.
- (119.) 13. *διὰ ταῦτα*, sc. *χάριν* or *τιμωρίαν*—*ἐπ' ἐκείνων*, in the case of those who divide the unjust spoil between them.
- (120.) 14. *δοῦναι κτλ.* This is an act of liberality equally easy with the acts of vice mentioned in the same sentence; but to do a liberal action, which supposes a certain state of mind, and certain circumstances, is not easy.—*οἷτ' ἐπ' αἰτοῖς*. Aristotle here recognises the great fact in human nature,—the weakness of the will for good.
- (121.) 16. From supposing that every wrong act is a vicious action, every unjust act an act of injustice, it is said that a just man may act unjustly: but not so; for though, under certain circumstances, a just man might act in the same way as an unjust man, or a brave man act as a coward might, it would not be an unjust or cowardly action, unless it was done in the frame of mind and purpose which are necessary to injustice or cowardice.—*ἐπ' ὁποτέρωιν*, *right or left*; al. *ὁποτέρωνοιν*.
- (122.) *ἔστι δὲ κτλ.* Justice and social obligation exist among *κοινωνοὶ τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν*.—*ἔχουσι* is dative plural agreeing with *τούτοις*: *who are capable of having too much or too little thereof*. Justice cannot exist among the gods, for having all things, they cannot be supposed to have too much; nor among the reprobate, for being incapable of having anything, they cannot be said to have too little: but as men in general occupy a middle position, they are capable of it; wherefore it exists among men in a social state, and is the *ἔργον* of man as a social being. Some editors omit *οἷκ* before *ἔστιν ὑπερβολή*, understanding Aristotle to say that the gods are above these human *ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά*: the *ἀπλῶς κακοὶ* are below them.

CHAPTER X.

- (123.) 1. *ἐπιείκεια* represents the spirit of the natural *δίκαιον*, which the legislator was unable to transfer to his system of polity; and as it provides for those cases in which that system is wanting, it is the *ἐπανάρθωμα* or complement of the *δίκαιον νόμιμον*, which here=*πολιτικόν*: see also Rhet. i. 13, 12.—*ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιφέρομεν*, we refer in our praise to something besides justice.
- (124.) 2. *διὰ ταῦτα*, for these reasons; *ἅπαντα*, all these.—*ὅτι ἐναντίον*, these have nothing contradictory to themselves.—*δικαίου τινός ὄν*, belonging to a sort of *δίκαιον*, sc. natural justice.
- (125.) 4. *ἐκ πρώτης*, "from the first."
- (126.) 5. *συμβῆ ἐπὶ τούτου*, and there happens in this particular case.
- (127.) 6. *τινός δικαίου*, sc. *πολιτικοῦ*.
- (128.) 6. *διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς*, the fault arising from its generality.
- (129.) 7. *τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας*. In *Λεσβία οἰκοδομία* the stones were rough, and the *κανὼν μολὶβδίνος* fitted itself to the inequalities of the stone:—
Æsch. Fragm. 70, *ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τις Λέσβιον*
κῦμα' ἐν τριγώνοις ἐκπεραίνεται ῥυθμοῖς.—*κῦμα*, a waved moulding.
- (130.) 8. *ἐλαττωτική*, yielding.

CHAPTER XI.

- (131.) 1. *φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*, first, from what has been said, it is clear that he who commits suicide injures somebody, for he violates the law; secondly, that it is not himself whom he injures, for he does it willingly, but it is the state.
- (132.) 4. The question whether a man can injure himself is important; for it might be urged, that if a man put restraint on himself for the sake of others, he might be unjust to himself, and then *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* would be in this view wrong. There is no law of obligation to a man's own self which obliges him to take care of his own interests in preference to those of his

neighbour. The contradictory notion is embodied in popular expressions, and more or less covertly in several moral systems of ancient and modern times. The only sense in which a man can be said to injure himself, (and then only by a metaphor,) is when the lower part of his nature governs the higher.

(133.) 4. καθ' ὃ. Even under the view that he who commits merely an unjust act is unjust, though not bad in its widest sense, one cannot injure oneself.

(134.) 4. τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου, (*I mention this*) for this is different from the former case, where injustice is considered as a violation of right generally,—as ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὀλὴν ἀρετὴν.

(135.) 4. ἔστι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This means, there is an ἡ ἐν μίρῃ ἀδικία, which is merely πλεονεξία, and not even in this sense can a man injure himself; for being both the patient and agent of the injustice, he would both gain and lose by the same act.—ὅπερ ἀδύνατον: there must be more than one party in an injustice.

(136.) 5. καὶ πρότερον: a man, to be unjust, must be the aggressor; for retaliation is no injustice.—αὐτὸς δ' αὐτόν, sc. ἀδικῶν.—ἀμα: so that it is not πρότερον.

(137.) 6. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κ.τ.λ.: no one acts unjustly without committing some particular, definite act of injustice, and this a man cannot do towards himself: a man cannot steal his own property.—ὅλως, generally, as well as by the settled principle οὐχ ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι.

(138.) 7. ἡ ἐγγύς, or bordering on it—; it is not in every case τελεία κακία, for in some cases, though the action is voluntary, it is not complete ἀδικία, as where there is excusable ἄγνοια.

(139.) 8. οὐδὲν μέλει κ.τ.λ., to the act or system. Medicine, as a system, takes no cognizance of the accidental character of the matter in hand.

(140.) 9. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ λόγοις, on these theories or views.—διέστηκε, is separate from.—ἐν τούτοις, sc. the two parts of the soul.

BOOK VI.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) HAVING now practically proved that ἠθικὴ ἀρετή is the ἔργον of man, both as being the right operation of our several feelings and instincts, and also as agreeing with that δικαιοσύνη besides which there is no duty really binding on man, he now proceeds to consider in what kind and in what degree the intellectual part of our nature is an ingredient of this ἠθικὴ ἀρετή. That it is so in some kind and degree was before implied, when ὀρθὸς λόγος was said to be our guide to right action. He now considers what this ὀρθὸς λόγος is, and in what faculties or habits of our reason it consists.
- (2.) 1. ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, *the limits or sphere of the mean habits.*
- (3.) 3. τούτων τίς ὁ ὅρος: *what is its definition or nature.*
- (4.) 5. ὑποκείσθω, *let it be laid down that there are.*
- (5.) 5. ὁμοιότητα, *the adaptation of the powers to receive the impressions and conceptions of the several objects of perception and thought. αἰκείότητα, the affinity between them.* This is rather a trenching upon the higher metaphysics, and probably, like some other similar passages, was used by Aristotle as a recognised principle, which would compel the assent of those, who received it, to the point he wished to prove.
- (6.) 7. ἡ δ' ἀρετή: *that is the excellence of anything which develops its ἔργον; we must therefore discover what is the ἔργον of the two parts of the soul. Cf. bk. ii. 6. 2.*

CHAPTER II.

- (7.) 1. The end of the logistic part of the soul is right moral action; we must therefore discover what produces this.
- (9.) 1. There are in the soul three powers of moral truth, (πρά-

ξεως καὶ ἀληθείας.) scil. αἴσθησις, νοῦς, ὁρεξις: in one of these three the ἔργον and the ἀρετή of the logistic part must reside.

- (9.) 2. τούτων—κοινωνεῖν. Of these, perception need not be considered, as it is no immediate cause of moral action; it merely conveys to the senses an object which may lead to a moral action, if the recipient be capable thereof; but if not, as in the brute creation, it produces nothing but a mere sensual act.
- (10.) 2. ἐστὶ δ' ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. The other two powers of moral action, νοῦς and ὁρεξις, are intimately connected. The assent and dissent of the νοῦς are what pursuit and avoidance are in the ὁρεξις, and they mutually imply each other. As, therefore, the προαίρεσις is made up of ὁρεξις and λόγος, (or νοῦς,) if it is to be good, the νοῦς must be ἀληθής in decision, and the ὁρεξις ὀρθή in its pursuit, (τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν). The ὁρεξις cannot be ὀρθή unless the νοῦς be ἀληθής, nor can the νοῦς be ἀληθής unless the ὁρεξις is ὀρθή: if the νοῦς assented to a wrong ὁρεξις, it would be ψευδής; if the ὁρεξις accepted a false decision of the reason it would not be ὀρθή. (See bk. iii. note 40); hence, as a good προαίρεσις is made up of ὁρεξις and λόγος, or νοῦς, it follows that the ἀλήθεια νοῦ, working with, and implying, a right ὁρεξις, is the ἔργον of the logistic part of the soul, as producing, and securing, (or combining to produce,) right action.
- (11.) 2. ὡς τ' ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ. Since, then, right action implies a good act of choice, and this good act of choice is simply a true decision and a right end, it follows that ἀλήθεια τοῦ νοῦ, which, as we have seen, implies both, will produce good moral action: he assumes, as he has a right to assume, that right action, and therefore right προαίρεσις, is the ἔργον of the logistic part of the soul.
- (12.) 2. διὰ ταῦτα, for these reasons, viz. the nature of ἀρετή and προαίρεσις, and the connection between the reason and the desire given above.
- (13.) 2. αὕτη μὲν οὖν: this, then, is the moral intellect and moral truth, which performs the ἔργον of the logistic part.
- (14.) 3. τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς: of the pure intellect, truth is the acknowledged ἔργον: see Met. ii. 1, p. 35.—τοῦ δὲ πρακτι-

κοῦ καὶ διαπονητικοῦ, of the moral intellect, truth corresponding to and implying a right ὁρεξις; hence truth, moral or intellectual, is the ἔργον of both parts of the soul.

(15.) 4. To shew that προαίρεσις is not merely an intellectual act, as some would have it, nor yet a mere orectic appetite or desire, as others hold, but a combination of the two, we may examine the efficient and motive powers of human action.

(16.) 4. πράξις. The motive cause (ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις) of right action is προαίρεσις; the material cause or constituents of προαίρεσις are ὁρεξις and λόγον δ' ἐνεκά τινος; not mere ὁρεξις, but ὁρεξις approved of by λόγος. The first point proved is that ὁρεξις by itself is not enough.

(17.) 4. διό. This being the nature of προαίρεσις, it is clear that the intellect is an ingredient of right moral choice; not merely the intellect (νοῦς) as being a necessary ingredient in the act of an intellectual being, but the actual exercise of that intellect (διάνοια) in acts of choice and pursuit.

(18.) 4. οὐδ' ἀνευ ἡθικῆς εἰσεως: this is not the same as πάθος, but it is that right moral state which has the intellect worked into it, and therefore implies the moral truth as one of its elements.

(19.) 4. εὐπραξία γάρ κ.τ.λ.: for right being and acting, which is the object of προαίρεσις, cannot exist without the action of the intellect and that right moral state in which the intellect and πάθος are combined, (ἡθος).

(20.) 5. It being thus clear that the διάνοια is an active cause of right action, it now must be proved that it is not the only one, but that ὁρεξις must be joined with it.

The mere intellect (διάνοια αὐτή) is not properly motive cause at all, (οὐδέν κινεῖ); it is true that the moral intellect is concerned in action, (πρακτική.) and when it is working towards an end (ἐνεκά τοῦ) is such a motive cause, for it sets in motion (ἄρχει) the contriving faculty; that is, when the intellect in the shape of βούλησις and βούλευσις has decided on the end, and that such and such steps are necessary and practicable towards the end proposed, then the productive or contriving faculty (ποιητική) commences its operations; when the ζήτησις is ended the πράξις begins, (τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει,

lib. iii. 3. 12): it cannot be the pure intellect which thus works in morals, for every one who contrives, necessarily contrives to an end; and though the moral intellect is the motive cause of these contriving powers, something must have preceded it, for the subject of the contriving powers (ποιητόν,) which is thus supplied by the moral intellect, is a τέλος only in a secondary sense, (οἷχ ἀπλῶς,) and only relative (πρός τι) and subordinate (τινός) to some further end, but the subject of moral action is the real τέλος (ἀλλ' τὸ πρακτόν); this is εὐπραξία, and this end is supplied by ὁρεξίς, which is thus shewn to be as necessary an ingredient as the moral intellect itself.—ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πρακτόν, αἰ. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν, which must be construed, *but it is not the subject of moral action, for this, &c.*

- (21.) 5. διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ. There is a point of view in which this seems to be wrong, viz. where the object of desire is not perceptible by the senses, but by νοῦς, such as some future good: but this perceptive νοῦς which performs the functions of αἴσθησις where the thing is invisible, is not really the ἀρχή of the action; it is only a channel whereby the ἡδὺ reaches the πάθος. There are two sorts of φαντασία which present the ἡδὺ to the ὁρεξίς; one (αἰσθητική) of visible, the other (νοητική) of invisible, objects: see ch. vii. 9, where he speaks of a sort of a νοητικὴ αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων ἀλλ' οἷα κ.τ.λ.: so bk. vii. ch. 6. 1, ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία, εἰς μόνον εἴπη, ὅτι ἡδὺ, ὁ λόγος ἢ αἴσθησις: see also Met. vi. 10, p. 148.

- (22.) 5. διό κ.τ.λ.: whence προαίρεσις may be viewed as νοῦς accompanied by ὁρεξίς, or as ὁρεξίς assented to by νοῦς, (see bk. iii. note 40); at all events, it implies both these as necessary: and this complex principle of action is humanity, (ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος): whatever habit of mind, then, secures, as far as it is in the province of the intellect to do so, that these two shall be right, secures right προαίρεσις, right moral action, and therefore is the ἔργον of the logistic part of the soul; and in the beginning of the chapter we have seen that ἀλήθεια τοῦ νοῦ does this.

- (23.) 6. οὐκ ἔστι κ.τ.λ. Προαίρεσις has nothing to do with that sort of πρακτικὴ διάνοια, the subject of which may be moral action, but which has no end beyond its own exercise, as that which considers past events.

CHAPTER III.

(24.) 1. Truth, then, in one shape or the other, being the *ἔργον* of both parts of the intellectual faculties, we now proceed to investigate what is the state or habit of mind which most perfectly and certainly arrives at truth in each.

(25.) Things or notions are said to be *true* in different relations:—

1. In respect of their corresponding to the designs of nature, *things* are said to be in a *true* state: *Physic.* i. 8. 1, ἀληθείαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων; see Hooker, Sermon on Justification.

2. In respect of their correspondence to the external natures which they profess to represent, *notions* and *conceptions* of the intellect and reason are said to be *true*,—ἀληθείαι ἡ ψυχῇ.

3. In respect of their expressing real relations between the subject and predicate, *judgments* and *propositions* are said to be *true*.

4. In respect of its operating as nature designed, and so as to discover and represent truth to the mind, the *reason* is said to be *true*,—λόγος ἀληθής, and λόγος ψευδής, *ch.* iv. 6.

(26.) 1. ἀρξάμενοι κ.τ.λ. Having thus cleared the way, we may consider the habits or states of mind whereby the intellectual faculty arrives at truth in its decisions, and is in a state of truth (ἀληθείαι). These are five in number: neither scientific knowledge, nor intelligence, nor art, nor moral wisdom, nor wisdom generally, admit of falsehood. They vanish respectively into their contraries when falsehood encroaches upon them.

(27.) 1. ὑπολήψει καὶ δόξῃ κ.τ.λ. ὑπόληψις is a general conception, (*Met.* i. 1, p. 2, ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις: *Anal. Post.* i. 16,) right or wrong, of the nature of any thing, arising from αἰσθησις, or νοῦς, or συλλογισμός, (*Anal. Post.* i. 16 p. 172, ὅταν διὰ συλλογισμοῦ λάβῃ τὴν ὑπόληψιν: *ibid.*, ὅταν ἀπλῶς ὑπολάβῃ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν: *ibid.*, τῆς ἀπλῶς ὑπολήψεως ἀπλῇ ἢ ἀπάτῃ, τῆς δὲ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ πλείους,) and may be quite false, and yet would be an ὑπόληψις: so in *ch.* ix., the distinguishing epithet ἀληθής is applied to it. So δόξα is a judgment (φάσις) on a

matter of probable truth, of which though it took a false view, it would still be a *δόξα*, (Anal. Post. i. 33. p. 139, sq., and ix. 15, 8): *ἐπόληψις* differs from *δόξα* inasmuch as the latter is a *φάσις*, and implies a subject, copula, and predicate, while the former conceives of the subject and predicate as a whole, without the intervention of the copula; *δόξα* is of two notions separately, *ἐπόληψις* is of the two notions combined. The mental process may be thus represented: *αἰσθησις*, *φαντασία*, *νόησις*, *ἐμπερία*, *ἐπόληψις*, then *δόξα* on contingent, *φρόνησις* on moral, *ἐπιστήμη* on necessary, matter. The complex idea contained in *δρισμός*, the *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, is an *ἐπόληψις*: so Anal. Post. i. 33, *ἐπόληψις τῆς ἀμέστου προτάσεως*.

- (28.) 2. *ἐπιστήμη*. This word has two senses:—1. an intellectual state, or habit; 2. a scientific system, or collection of principles and laws of necessary matter. It is, of course, in the former of these two senses that it is used here.—*ταῖς ὁμοιότησι*. See Anal. Post. i. 2. 1, for spurious sorts of science.

- (29.) 2. *λανθάνει εἰ ἴσται ἢ μή*, (cf. Met. vi. 15, p. 158): therefore they are not fit subjects for *ἐπιστήμη*; and hence the subject-matter of *ἐπιστήμη* is *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*, things necessary and unchangeable. Aristotle recognises in the order of things which he expresses by *φύσις* in its higher sense: 1. *ἀνάγκη*, *τῶν ἀεί*, where the connection is invariable and perceptible; 2. *φύσις* in a second sense, (*τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ πολὺ*), where the connection, though perceptible, is variable, (*τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως εἶχαι*); 3. *τύχη*, where the connection is variable and imperceptible: *δόξα* belongs to the second and third, *ἐπιστήμη* to the first.

2. *ἀπλῶς*, to speak generally.

3. *τὰ αἰδία κ.τ.λ.*: we here get his views of the past and future eternity of the universe.

- (30.) 3. *ἴτι διδασκῆ κ.τ.λ.* Science falls under teaching, as whatever may be known scientifically may be taught and learnt: as teaching and learning presuppose certain principles from which to start, it follows that science implies having such principles to refer to; therefore science is a habit, or habitual state of the intellect, which is able to refer what it knows to certain principles or *αἰτίαι*, (*ἐξ ἧς ἀποδεικτική*;) or rather, speaking more accurately, as a state or habit of mind is only the presence of certain emotions, perceptions, con-

ceptions, or principles in the mind, science is the principle or universal conception itself, (ch. vi., ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις,) it is the certain conscious possession of fixed conceptions or principles (ἀρχαί), and their application to less abstract, and apparently less evident, truths. Thus the ἐπιστημών in mathematics would possess the principles of mathematical reasoning laid down by others, (λαμβάνων ὡς παρὰ ξυγείτων, Anal. Post. i. 1, p. 145,) and be able to apply them to the various theorems and problems following therefrom, which, not self-evident in themselves, would become certain to him from their resting on principles of fixed truth: of this the instrument is syllogism, referring back these problems or theorems to their principles or αἰτίαι.—ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς: Anal. Post. i. 1.

- (31.) 3. ἡ μὲν δὲ ἐπαγωγή. This passage would be enough to shew Aristotle's view of induction, and its relation to syllogism as necessary to it. There are numberless passages of the same sort throughout his writings. Among others, see Anal. Post. i. 18, ii. 15. 7; Anal. Prior, ii. 25. 8, p. 139.
- (32.) 3. ὅν οἱ κ' ἐστὶ συλλογισμός. Syllogism is not the only channel or evidence of truth. There are certain fixed truths which, so far from being arrived at by a syllogistic process, furnish to that process its starting-point and foundation. So great and so entirely un-Aristotelic is the mistake of those who would wish to reduce all the processes of arriving at truth to the syllogistic form.
- (33.) 4. ἐξίς ἀποδεικτική. ἀπόδειξις is the proving some fact or position in necessary matter, (cf. Met. v. 3, p. 100; Top. i. 1. 4, p. 15,) by referring it back to the αἴτιον, or cause of it: ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἴομεθα ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς, (i. e. διὰ ἀποδείξεως: see end of sect. 3,) ὅταν τὴν αἰτίαν οἴωμεθα γνωρίζειν, Anal. Post. i. 2, the whole of which chapter should be read in connection with this passage. See also Phys. i. 1; Anal. Post. i. 31; Met. i. 3.—ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς: Anal. Post. i. 2, sqq., 83.
- (34.) 4. ἐπίσταται: he stops in his enquiry. This is the way in which ἐπίστασθαι comes to signify "to know."—See Phys. vii. 3, p. 166, τὸ γὰρ ἡρεμῆσαι κ.τ.λ.
- (35.) 4. κατὰ συμβεβηκός: he will indeed know that, the possession of which is in itself knowledge; but it will not be knowledge to him, for if the principles are not more cer-

that to him than the *ἐπιστήμη*, the *ἐπιστήμη* will have nothing to rest on. There will be no sense of there being *truth*. The *σοφιστής* says, "This is true, because the *σοφιστής* is true," and the *σοφιστής* himself will say, "This is true" when it has no *ἀλήθεια* to rest on: or "This is true," the *σοφιστής* says, when the *ἀλήθεια* is not more certain than what is referred to it. See *Anal. Post.* i. 2.

CHAPTER IV.

- (25) Another energy of the intellect is *ἐκτελέσειν*, and when this faculty is so strengthened and sharpened by its use as to discern with truth and readiness the nature of the result required, and the instruments and combinations necessary to produce it, and is able practically to call it into being, then we are said to have *Art*, or the productive *ἁβίη*. This *ἁβίη* arises from experiment and experience, (*Met.* i. 1, γινώσκουσι δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας συστάμεται ἐκδόλου καὶ γινώσκου περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐκδόλου: cf. *Anal. Post.* ii. 15,) and its functions are, 1. to produce results similar to those of nature; 2. to develop what nature has left, as it were, in embryo, (*Phys.* ii. 8. 5, ὅπως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐκτελεῖ δὲ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ὑπεργράψου, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται); 3. to detect the laws and powers latent in results apparently accidental, and by arrangement and combination to make them matters of rule and comparative certainty. It differs from *ἐπιστήμη* as it regards the things and laws of nature, not in their abstract essence or relations, but only so far as it may arrange and combine them with a view to production. Hence those things which are subject to an *invariable* law of nature (*ἀνάγκη*), such as the motion of the heavenly bodies, are out of its province; or those things wherein, whenever they occur, nature works for herself, and by her own inherent motive power (*φύσις*), as in the production of rain from clouds: art has to do only with such things as it is in the power of man to call into being, or not, as he likes. It investigates, indeed, and reflects (*θεωρεῖ*) on the properties and laws of the universe, but not as a mere speculation ending in itself. This knowledge of the properties and laws is not properly its subject-matter, but only accidentally, as being conducive to production. It

is this mental power which is most cultivated and most prized at the present day, and has hence almost appropriated the word "philosophy." We must not, in reading what Aristotle says of τέχνη, expect to find his view of it agree with our conceptions of it as drawn from what it is now; for it has made so much progress since that time, and its functions and sphere are so much enlarged, as to make it difficult to understand how it can be said that the universal or general laws of the universe do not fall within its province; as, though many are excluded, yet others again (such as the production of an electric current) are evidently now matters of *art*, or the contriving faculty.

(37.) 2. ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις: see bk. i. note 213.

(38.) 3. This is an instance of the universal conclusion, *per simplicem enumerationem*. Architecture, and every other intellectual habit of production, is an art.

Every art is an intellectual habit of production, consequently these two are identical.

(39) οὐτε τοιαύτη is merely a repetition of the other side of the induction, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ οἰκοδομική.

(40.) 3. ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου ποιητική. The word "habit," though it may be conveniently used to express ἐξίς, yet does so very imperfectly. ἐξίς ποιητική is not so much a habit of production, as the productive faculty trained and exercised to habitual operation. Ἐξίς denotes that power of the mind, to which it is applied, as in a particular state of development and perfection, and might perhaps be expressed by the word *power*, as opposed to faculty; and in using the word "habit," we must be careful not to lose sight either of the faculty itself, or of the state of development in which it is.

(41.) 3. λόγου ἀληθοῦς: true, inasmuch as it judges rightly of external things, and their fitness for the particular object of our contrivance.

(42.) 4. ἐστὶ δὲ τέχνη κ.τ.λ. In the *Metaphysics*, p. i. 1, he says, γίνεται ἡ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων καθόλου μία γίνηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. Art is the possession and application of the general principles of production: of course things necessary, or out of our power to produce, are excluded. We must be careful (as in the case of ἐπιστήμη) to

distinguish between the word *τέχνη* when used to denote a state or power of the mind concerned in contrivance, and when used to express a system, or collection of rules for the production of any given result.

- (13.) 4. *περὶ γένεσιν*, the production of something as its *τέλος*, and the contriving the means thereto (*τεχνάζειν*), and considering what they are (*θεωρεῖν*). They seem to be placed in this order because looking at the object of *τέχνη* as completed, and going backwards as it were in process of completion, (*γένεσις*), comes first, then *τεχνάζειν*, or the active part of *τέχνη*, and then the reflective, deliberative process of *θεωρεῖν*, or examining into the nature of the object, and the powers or combinations which will produce it.
- (14.) 4. *τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κ.τ.λ.* In this chapter we have the division given above, (note 29,) of *φύσις* into *ἀνάγκη*, *φύσις*, *τύχη*: see *Met.* x. 8, p. 228.
- (15.) 5. *ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* The same notion of the independent, self-moving powers of nature we find in *Phys.* ii. 8. *μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον ὅταν ἐαυτὸν ἰατρῆν ὁ ἰατρος, τοῦτω γὰρ ὅκειν ἡ φύσις.*
- (16.) 5. *περὶ τὰ αὐτά κ.τ.λ.*: *Met.* i. 2, *ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τύχην*: cf. *Plato*, *Gorgias*. 448. Many of our most valuable discoveries in art were made by chance combinations and results. These being observed and experimented upon, the connections between cause and effect discerned, the art was gradually called into being. The well-known history of the discovery of glass-making is an instance in point.
- (17.) 6. *ἀτεχνία*. The contrary habit, or rather the want of the contriving faculty, consists in the reason judging falsely of the nature of the end to be pursued, of the combinations or instruments necessary for the work, and thus failing in the object.

CHAPTER V.

- (18.) We have examined the faculties and habits of contemplation and production; we now proceed to those of reflection and action, and to the consideration of *φρόνησις*, or moral

wisdom; a term which, as the mental state it expresses differs according to its different functions, is used in different senses. The chief difficulty of this book is to reconcile what he says of *φρόνησις* in one place with what he says of it in others. The difficulty will be removed if we get a clear notion of the functions of *φρόνησις*, and are careful to observe the particular one in which it is at the moment spoken of. For this the reader is referred to the table at the end of the book; and it will suffice at present to call attention to the following distinctions:—

1. Between *perfect* and *imperfect φρόνησις*. In the latter the reason acts outside, as it were, of the passions, directing and checking them so as to mould them into virtues. In the former it works in the passions, so that they operate rightly by virtue of the rational instinct which arises from their union, or rather amalgamation, with the reason.

2. α. The practical knowledge of the right principles of moral action, (*ἀρχιτεκτονική*).

β. A right judgment on each particular of choice and action, (*ἡ περὶ καθ' ἑκάστα*).

3. α. A right judgment in particular objects of pursuit and avoidance, with regard to the end, (*φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους—τοῦ ἐσχάτου*). When this is perfectly developed, the simple term *νοῦς* is applied to it.

β. A right judgment on the means, (*εὐβουλία*.) See ch. xi. 2.

For another sort of *φρόνησις*, arising from *δεινότης*, see notes on ch. xii.

(49.) 1. *εὖ ζῆν*, *well-being*, according to his proper *ζωή*, whatever that is.

(50.) 2. *ὧν μὴ εἰσι τέχνη*, for which there are no rules laid down.

(51.) 2. *φρόνιμος βουλευτικός*. The most usual notion of *φρόνησις*, as an intellectual operation, is the consideration of the means towards a good end, which is presented to us as an object of pursuit by *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*, in its first stage, (see ch. xiii. 6); but *φρόνησις* has to do, not only with *βούλευσις*, or the *τὰ πρὸς τέλος*, but with the *τέλος* itself. See ch. ix. 7.

(52.) 3. *πάντα*, sc. *τοιαῦτα ὧν αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως εἶναι*.

(53.) 4 *περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ κτλ*. The connection between these paragraphs is this.—In *ποιήσεις* we arrange well

certain materials with a view to produce some end; in right *πράξεις* we arrange and regulate certain actions, not with a view merely to *εὐπραξία*, for such arrangement in itself is *εὐπραξία*; so that the energy and the end are one and the same thing: wherefore *φρόνησις* has τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ for its subject-matter, though this is at the same time its τέλος: if *φρόνησις* were ποιητική, it could not be said to be περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὰ, but περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πρὸς τὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὰ. He seems to be accounting for his making it περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὰ; but we must recollect that many of these short arguments in the Ethics, and, indeed, more or less, in all his works, seem obscure and needless at first sight. It is not easy to see why they are introduced, but it is probably with reference to some subtle theories or distinctions of one or other of the schools of his day, which he answers thus parenthetically.

- (54.) 4. ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος: the end of *ποίησις* is something beyond the *ποιητόν*, and therefore its end and its subject-matter differ; not so with *φρόνησις*, for, &c.
- (55.) 4. τῆς πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη. Michelet reads οὐκ αἰ, following four MSS., and on the ground that there are some *πράξεις* of which this is not true, sc. where they are instrumental to some higher τέλος; but still it would be true of them *qua* πράξεις, and they would be complete in themselves, though there was something beyond them.
- (56.) 5. διὰ τοῦτο, as a proof of this.—ἔθεν. From *φρόνησις* enabling a person to judge rightly on human action, the word *σωφροσύνη* has been formed.
- (57.) 6. τοιαύτην, i. e. an ὑπόληψις περὶ τὰ πρακτά, or περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ, for it secures right notions of pleasure and pain; and these notions are the causes of human action: wherefore that which *σωφροσύνη* preserves is right notions on human action.—τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά, the final cause of the action.
- (58.) 6. εὐθύς, *ipso facto*. The right motive to action, the right view of good and evil, will in action not present itself to one who is thoroughly demoralised by pleasure or pain; and this is what the contrary habit (*σωφροσύνη*) preserves and improves; whence *φρόνησις* preserves a right view of good and evil in action.

- (59.) 6. οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν. That this right end is the true final cause (τούτου ἕνεκα) and motive (διὰ τοῦτο) of moral action and moral choice (οὐ φαίνεται).—φθαρτικὴ ἀρχή: hence φθείρεται is used in bk. ii. for the formation of habits of vice. See note 8, bk. ii.—μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ: not merely μετὰ ἀληθοῦς λόγου, as τέχνη.
- (60.) 7. τέχνης ἀρετή. There are degrees of development in art, and consequently an excellence of it; while of φρόνησις, properly speaking, there are no degrees,—it implies perfection in itself. He who is truly φρόνιμος has all the virtues, and if he fails in any one, so that his φρόνησις is defective, he cannot be said to have φρόνησις, but only to approach to it.
- (61.) 7. ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ. Another reason why φρόνησις is the ἀρετή of the logistic part of the soul, rather than τέχνη, is that it has the characteristic of virtue which τέχνη has not, viz. that voluntary failing in it is worse than where it is involuntary; whereas, in art, if a man makes a mistake on purpose, he is not the less master of his art for that.
- (62.) 7. ἀλλὰ μήν. Moral wisdom is not merely an intellectual habit or faculty, as τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη are, for it is so worked into the πάθη and the πάθη into it, that it becomes an energy of our whole nature rather than merely of the intellectual part of it; it is a part of our self-consciousness and self-existence; so that it is not possible that it should be forgotten,—τῆς τοιαύτης (μετὰ λόγου μόνον) ἔξωθεν λήθη ἔστιν, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

CHAPTER VI.

- (63.) 1. νοῦς, or the intellect, is the foundation of the whole reasoning process, and yet in a less strict sense is used for the whole of that process; it is the power of διάνοια, (ᾧ διανοοίμεθα, De An. iii. 4, p. 69), but it is here used for that power of the mind which intellectually perceives particular objects and their invisible qualities, compares them, and evolves from them the general notions and the general principles which are involved therein: it resembles αἴσθησις, inasmuch as it is an intellectual perception of things and qualities invisible; while αἴσθησις is, properly speaking, con-

fined to objects of sense and visible qualities; but as it is an intellectual *αἴσθησις*, that word is used sometimes for it, and the verb *αἰσθανόμεθα* for *νοοῖμεν*. *Noûs* is the intellectual eye, and its characteristic is that it sees whatever may be presented to it. The act of intellectual vision may be more or less acute and searching, just as powers of sensible vision differ in kind as well as degree. Its use in the Ethics is, at first sight, somewhat wide; but all its meanings are connected together by its general sense of the intellectual perception of the qualities of things; and its functions may be stated to be:—

1. The *νοῦς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς ἐπιστήμης*,—*νοῦς τῆς ἀμείσου προτάσεως*, the perceptive and inductive power which perceives or works out the immutable qualities and laws of things necessary; and this again (as well as that given below, 2.) is divided into what is called *αἴσθησις*, where the laws and principles are self-evident; or *ἐπαγωγή*, where a process of comparison and combination is necessary; or *ἐθισμός*, where the intellectual eye of the soul has been so sharpened and perfected by use as to discern *ἀρχαί* instinctively: (Eth. i. 7, τῶν δὲ ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσει θεωροῦνται αἱ δὲ ἐπαγωγῇ, αἱ δὲ ἐθισμῷ τινί).

2. The *νοῦς τῶν ἀρχῶν* in morals; the moral intellect; the perceptive and inductive power, which perceives the moral qualities and works out the moral laws from the moral world in general, on which *φρόνησις* is founded, (*τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως*, ch. xi. 4); which, when it has the shadowy notions of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν* worked into it, and is itself worked into the *πάθος*, becomes (see below, 3.) the *moral sense*.

3. The *νοῦς τοῦ τέλους*: *τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου* = *φρόνησις τοῦ ἐσχάτου*, perception of the moral quality of any object of desire; where the *φρόνησις* has been so perfected in its first stage, that a right choice of the end is an intellectual *δύναμις* or instinct, rather than the result of an intellectual operation.

Hence we may see that *αἴσθησις* + the intellect = *νοῦς*: *νοῦς* as the moral sense = *φρόνησις τοῦ ἐσχάτου*: hence *αἴσθησις* is sometimes used for *νοῦς*, and *νοῦς* for this *φρόνησις*.

Observe that *νοῦς* is not said to be *τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος*. This is the office of deliberation, *διανοίας*, which implies a longer and more complex intellectual process than Aristotle assigns in the Ethics to *νοῦς*. Could this process (the *φρόνησις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος*) become instinctive, so that a man could at a glance see the right means, it would be termed *νοῦς*: of course *νοῦς* is employed in it as enabling us to see the nature of the means which *βούλευσις* suggests to us as desirable.

(64) 1. *μετὰ λόγου γάρ*: as *ἐπιστήμη* uses *λόγος*, and *λόγος* starts from certain principles, there must be some power to arrive at them.—*περὶ ἐνίων*, SC. *τῶν τιμιωτάτων*.

(65.) 2. *λείπεται*, conclusion of disjunctive syllogism.

CHAPTER VII.

(66.) 1. In the study and contemplation of things immutable, we have seen that there are two separate habits or powers of mind: the one discerning, tracing, and laying down fixed laws and principles from the shifting particulars in which they operate; the other discerning the connection between these first principles and results, and what follows or depends upon them. The one is the inductive, the other the deductive, or, perhaps, more properly retroductive power, because it refers back principles and phenomena to the higher and more fixed principles on which they depend. There is, however, another habit or power, in which both the others are combined; whereby a man becomes thoroughly master of that which is within the compass of human knowledge,—at one glance seeing the laws, and their results. This man is the *σοφός*; he has *ideas* in each particular branch, and is completely master of the subject; while the universal *σοφός* is master of everything within the compass of human knowledge which is worthy his attention, and especially the higher and more eternal subjects, such as the laws of the material universe, (*ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος*). In mathematics, for instance, Euclid would be a *σοφός*, as having both *invented* and applied the laws of mathematics; while the professor who thoroughly understood the connection between the laws of Euclid and the problems and theorems which depend on them, would be *ἐπιστημὴν*.

- (67.) 1. τὴν δὲ σοφίαν κτλ. The word is loosely applied to excellence in the several arts; but besides this, which is recognised as well in common speech as in the verses of Homer, its most proper and highest meaning is accurate and perfect knowledge, not only of the truths which may be referred back to higher principles, but of the highest and most ultimate principles themselves. The ἐπιστημῶν accepts these ultimate principles as starting-points, and believes in them, the σοφός, as it were, detects them; they have to him not only a subjective, but an objective reality; they are not merely convictions in his own mind, but facts which he realizes in external nature.
- (68.) 3. κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα, containing within itself, or *the summing up*, or *the perfection*: it may be taken either way.—τῶν τιμιωτάτων. πολιτικὴ and φρόνησις, though the highest excellencies of man's social and moral nature, are nevertheless not the highest attainments man is capable of, inasmuch as man, their subject-matter, is inferior to the immutable and eternal elements and powers of nature. In ancient philosophy, permanence was a main standard of excellence, and the short-lived man, with his shifting and perishing societies and affairs, naturally seemed inferior to the apparently everlasting things of nature, of which no one knew the beginning nor the end, and which had outlived so many ages of humanity.
- (69.) 4. εἰ δὲ κτλ. If, then, the bodily and moral good of man is variable, and the physical properties, such as whiteness and straightness, always the same, it would be also (καί) allowed that τὸ σοφόν, which contemplates the former, is as invariable as its subjects, and that τὸ φρόνιμον, which contemplates shifting particulars, is variable, and therefore both different from and inferior to σοφία.
- (70.) 4. διὸ καὶ κτλ. That φρόνησις has for its subject these particulars of shifting life, is clear from its being applied even to those animals who shew in any degree a faculty for providing for their every-day lives. (There is a curious passage in *Metaph.* i. 1, on the application of this term to animals: φρόνιμα μὲν ἀνευ τοῦ μαθεῖν ὅσα μὴ δύνата ψοφῶν ἀκούειν, ὅσον μέλιττα καὶ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζώων ἐστι.)
- (71.) 4. φάνερον δέ κτλ. Plato, *Rep.* 473, holds the contrary theory: εἰ μὴ—ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ἢ οἱ

βασίλῃς—φιλοφύσῳσι γνησίως καὶ ἱκανῶς καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτόν συμ-
πίσῃ δύναμις πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία—οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῖλα ταῖς
πύλαις κ.τ.λ.

(72.) 5. περιττά, superfluous matters.

CHAPTER VIII.

(73.) 6. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις. It would seem as if ch. viii. ought to begin here. He has finished the examination of σοφία, and now proceeds to a further examination of that intellectual virtue which has to do with morals; but inasmuch as he is contrasting φρόνησις with σοφία, it may also be viewed as properly belonging to ch. vii.

(74.) 7. φρόνησις is divided into the knowledge of general principles and the knowledge of particulars, and their relation to those general principles; it is not merely a καθόλου ὑπόληψις, but περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

(75.) 7. εἰ γὰρ εἰδείῃ. If one has the general principle, but is ignorant of the nature of the particular, it is not so practically useful as if one knew the nature of the particular. Therefore φρόνησις is rather περὶ τὰ ἕκαστα, though both are desirable.

(76.) 7. εἴη δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. It is probable that there will be some governing power or system to direct and inform this particular φρόνησις. The following scheme of the relation between φρόνησις and πολιτικὴ will set this forth clearly:—First, we must observe that πολιτικὴ and φρόνησις are practically identical; the propositions and principles of which they consist are the same in themselves (ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἔξις,) though both these habits themselves, and these principles would be defined differently. (τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταῦτόν αὐταῖς). Thus φρόνησις, consisting of a number of general principles on human good, might be defined to be the science of moral good, while πολιτικὴ, consisting of exactly the same principles, might be defined to be the science of social good. Such a principle as "honesty is the best policy," which belongs alike to πολιτικὴ and φρόνησις, would, with regard to one, be said to be a principle of social, to the other, a principle of moral, wisdom. Now the two habits of mind being in themselves iden-

the nearest approach to practice of which πολιτική is capable, (τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον).

(80) 3. δοκεῖ δέ. As πολιτική is rather concerned with the general principles of good, so is φρόνησις rather concerned with the application of those principles to oneself, and hence this has appropriated to itself the name φρόνησις, though it properly includes the general principles as well as the particular application of them.

(81.) 3. ἐκείνων. From ἐκείνων to δικαστική is parenthetical.—ἐκείνων, sc. the divisions given above,—the different sorts of πολιτική:—

οἰκονομία, the system of family government.

νομοθεσία, the laying down general principles of social good.

πολιτική, the practical application of these principles,—

α. by ψηφίσματα—βουλευτική.

β. by rewards and punishments, (δικαστική).

(82.) 4. εἶδος κ.τ.λ. This is to be connected immediately with the sentence in which φρόνησις is said to be περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἑνα; and Aristotle goes on to shew that this particular φρόνησις really requires that knowledge of the general principles of social good which is supplied by πολιτική, (καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εὐ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας).

(83) 4. ἐκ ταύτης κ.τ.λ. From this received notion, that the φρόνιμοι mind their own affairs, the πολιτικοί the public affairs, it has resulted that particular φρόνησις is supposed to be the only φρόνησις, although general principles are needed to enable a person to see and to carry out his private good; and these being supplied by πολιτική, the ἡ καθόλου φρόνησις is lost sight of.

(84.) 5. τοῦ εἰρημένου, sc. that φρόνησις practically is τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα: that it is not merely the possession of moral principles, but the acting on them in particulars, is evidenced by the fact that the young can become μαθηματικοί, but cannot become φρόνιμοι,—the point which they lack being experience in the particulars of every-day life.

(85.) 6. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο κ.τ.λ. That this arises from the particular nature of the subject may be seen from the fact that the same observation holds good in those sciences or systems which depend for their principles on

experience. A boy may be a mathematician, because mathematics start from abstract principles, (δι' ἀφαιρέσεως,) and not from experience; he cannot be a philosopher, because that implies an acquaintance with particulars as well as principles; nor yet can he study physics, for this too is the science of the phenomena of the natural world.

(86.) 6. δι' ἀφαιρέσεως, *abstract*.

(87.) 6. τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄδηλον. Abstract principles of mathematics are in their very nature to be received before they are understood, for their nature and meaning is hidden; but matters of experience must be comprehended to be received, as their nature and meaning is not hidden, but manifest. It is no proof that a person has not abstract principles because he does not understand them; but if a person does not understand matters of experience, he evidently has no experience of them.

(88.) 7. ἔτι κ.τ.λ. This passage seems rather to be connected with what he said above, (sect. iv.) as to the necessity of knowledge of the general principles furnished by οἰκονομία or πολιτική.

(89.) 8. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις κ.τ.λ. This is a difficult passage, and requires much attention to master it.—τοῦ ἐσχάτου, i. e. τέλους: of the particular object of a particular προαίρεσις, (οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθῆς ὑποληψίς ἐστίν, ch. ix. fin.). The first function of the moral reason is to direct us in forming a right judgment (δόξα) on the true nature of any object of desire, (τοῦ ἐσχάτου,) and in deciding whether it is to be sought or declined. When this function is by practice become habitual, it operates instinctively, and is called νοῖς, as being an immediate perception of a moral fact, of the moral quality of an action or thing, which is one of the functions of νοῖς. See note 62. 3.

(90.) 9. ἀντίκειται κ.τ.λ. This does not mean that it is opposed to νοῖς as a contrary, but that it stands over against νοῖς, and is analogous to it. (See Metaph., p. 100.) Thus:—

Moral action.

Intellectual operation.

φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους.

νοῖς τῶν ὄρων.

(91.) 9. He is shewing why the term νοῖς is applied to this moral perception, φρόνησις. φρόνησις stands (ἀντίκειται) to moral action,

as *νοῦς* does to scientific operations, supplying the starting-point to morals, as *νοῦς* does to science: *νοῦς*, as used here, is *reason without reasoning*; so *φρόνησις*, when the first stage of the moral character is formed, is moral reason without reasoning, (rational sense). *νοῦς* is used (ch. xi. 2.) to denote this *φρόνησις* when it has become so instinctive as to operate as a *δύναμις*, (like *αἴσθησις* of things visible,) to see instinctively and immediately the qualities in any object which make it fit to be pursued, and to accept it as an object instantaneously and without any effort or deliberation.

(92.) 9. *νοῦς τῶν ἔργων ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος. νοῦς*, as we have seen in ch. v., discovers the *ἀρχαί* or principles which are not capable of demonstration, but are perceived by *αἴσθησις*, or *ἰδισμός*, or *ἐπαγωγή*.

(93.) 9. *ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἑσχατοῦ*: that is, of the particular *τέλος*, with which *ἐπιστήμη* has nothing to do, but which is matter of *αἴσθησις*; not the simple *αἴσθησις* of visible properties, such as whiteness in an object, (*οὐκ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων*), but that sort whereby we perceive some invisible quality, (*ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα κ.τ.λ.*) and in which *νοῦς* operates instinctively,—as, when seeing a triangle by simple *αἴσθησις* we see its visible shape, and also by *νοητικὴ αἴσθησις*, (cf. *Anal. Post. i. 31. 8*, p. 197; also *De Anim. iii. 3. 1*), by the power of an habituated *νοῦς*, we recognise its invisible quality of being the simplest figure, and capable of no further resolution, (*ὅτι τὸ ἐν μαθηματικοῖς ἑσχατον τρίγωνον*); for when we have arrived at a triangle we stop, knowing instantaneously and immediately that we cannot go further, (*στήσεται γὰρ κακεῖ*).

(94.) 9. *ἀλλ' αὕτη κ.τ.λ.* This latter, the instinctive power of *νοῦς* to see the invisible and remote qualities of material objects, is not called *φρόνησις*, but *αἴσθησις*, for it resembles the perception of visible properties more closely than it does the perception of moral qualities, (*μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις*), both being supposed to be instantaneous and immediate; but the former, *φρόνησις*, (the perception of moral qualities,) belongs to a different species of intellectual perception from *αἴσθησις*, (*ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος*), and therefore, having nothing to do with sensual perception, is not simply called *αἴσθησις*, but *νοῦς*. We shall see in ch. xi. that this *φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους* is simply called *νοῦς*.

CHAPTER IX.

- (95.) 1. *φρόνησις* being thus viewed as a simple instinct of the moral intellect, an *ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις τοῦ τέλους*, Aristotle now proceeds to consider that intellectual process which directs us in the choice of the means.
- (96.) 1. *πότερον ἐπιστήμη*: whether it is a purely scientific intellectual process of the reason alone, directed to moral action. The syllogism whereby this is answered is in the second figure.
- (97.) 2. *εὐστοχία*, a mere instinct,—a lucky knack of guessing at the right means; implying much natural talent, but no intellectual process. This too is answered in the second figure.
- (98.) 3. *ἀγχίνουα*: Anal. Post. i. 34. 1, *ἡ δὲ ἀγχίνουα ἐστὶν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκήτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου*.—οὐδὲ δὲ *δόξα*: nor, again, is it a mere intellectual decision on moral action.—*ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.* As error always attaches to bad counsel, and correctness always to good, it follows that good counsel is a certain correctness, (*ὀρθότης*). This argument is from the perception of a certain quality inherent in a certain subject, tested and confirmed by the perception of the contrary quality in the contrary subject.
- (99.) 3. *ἐπιστήμη*. Science does not admit of error; if error comes in, science ceases: therefore we cannot talk of anything as the correctness of that which is essentially right. There is no such notion as *ὀρθότης ὀρθότητος*.
- (100.) 3. *δόξα*. Opinion is liable to error, and therefore has an *ὀρθότης*; but this is *ἀλήθεια*, and therefore not *εὐβουλία*.

Again, *δόξα* is the result of an intellectual process. Whenever *δόξα* has taken place the matter is settled, (*ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὠρισταί ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν*). It is a decision more or less certain on some point, (*ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη*), while *εὐβουλία* is evidently the seeking for a decision, (*ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος—ζητεῖ τι*); but then *εὐβουλία* is an intellectual process, (*ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβουλία*), and it must be either an *ὀρθότης ἐπιστήμης*, or *δόξης*, or *διανοίας*: it is not of the two first, therefore it remains that it is of the last, i. e. of some intellectual operation or process, (*λείπεται ἄρα διανοίας*)—*λείπεται* being constantly used to denote the con-

clusion of a disjunctive syllogism. It is hardly credible that for a long time this was, and perhaps is still, construed, "*It is therefore inferior to the δαίνοια.*"—*διανοίας*: see the *De Anima*, iii. 4.

(101.) 4. *ἵπεί δέ κτλ.* There are different senses of *ὀρθότης*: as applied to *εἰβουλία* it means correct judgment towards a right end, and by right means. Thus the *ἀκρατής* or *φαῦλος* has an *ὀρθότης βουλῆς* inasmuch as he takes right means towards his end, but his end being bad, he has not *εἰβουλία*, because his *βουλὴ* is not *ἀγαθοῦ τεκτική*. Again, a man may have a good end and attain it, but by means not good or proper: he has not *εἰβουλία* any more than a man who arrives at a right conclusion by a faulty syllogism is a logician.

(102.) 5. *ἀλλ' ἔστι κτλ.* Some persons perplex themselves needlessly by trying to refer this to the moral syllogism which he speaks of in the seventh book as preceding moral choice or moral action, but it seems best to take it merely as an illustration drawn from logic.

(103.) 6. *οὐκοῦν.* Where the process of deliberation is slow and tedious the power of *εἰβουλία* is not yet formed, though there is some progress made towards it.

(104.) 7. *οἷ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθῆς ἐπόληψίς ἐστιν.* *φρόνησις* is here viewed as perfect in its first stage or function of choosing the right end, to which *εἰβουλία* considers and chooses the means.

CHAPTER X.

(105.) The intellectual processes or habits necessary to an act of good *προαίρεσις*, viz. the choice of a good end and right means, being thus laid down, it remains to consider two other faculties or habits which are aids, or, as they are termed, handmaids, to moral wisdom. The first of these is *σύνεσις*, or *apprehension*, whereby, being unable to form for ourselves right moral principles, we are able to apprehend them, to go along with them (*συνιέναι*) when stated by another person, (*ἄλλον λέγοντος*), and to decide upon their being right or wrong, (*κριτική*), so as to adopt the one and reject the other.

Of course, now, when teaching is carried on by books, rather than orally, ἄλλου λέγοντος must have a wider sphere than in the time of Aristotle, (ἄλλου λέγοντος ἢ γράφοντος). Things of ἀνάγκη or τύχη are not taken cognizance of by σύνεσις, but whatever is matter of deliberation. It has therefore the same subject-matter as φρόνησις, from which it differs inasmuch as φρόνησις has a directive function which σύνεσις has not. Nor, again, is σύνεσις the possession or formation (ἔχειν ἢ λαμβάνειν: see Anal. Post. ii. 15, p. 231.) of φρόνησις, for the former is φρόνησις itself, the latter is a function of the moral νοῖς; but as in matters of science a person is said συνιέναι when he goes along with his teacher, when he uses the science he has so as to apprehend a subject laid before him, so in morals, a person is said συνιέναι when he uses his moral intellectual powers on contingent matter (δέξασθαι) to judge in moral matters, whether what is advanced by another person (ἄλλου λέγοντος) is right or wrong, true or false,—so that we can apprehend and learn truth from the teaching or direction of another; and hence the name, for συνιέναι (to go along with what another person says) is often used for μαθάνειν.

(107.) This σύνεσις is the ear of the mind,—“he that bath ears to hear let him hear,”—and depends on the moral state or tendencies of the individual. If a man's moral state, as far as it may be developed, is good, he will apprehend and adopt truth, and if not, he will not be able to comprehend it; so in every subject he who is not πεπαιδευμένος, ματαίως ἀκούσεται. Cf bk. i. ch. iii. 5.

(108.) Many persons suppose σύνεσις to be an intellectual virtue, consisting in a habit of judging of a person's character from what he says; whereas Aristotle throughout is talking of the powers of the mind which are concerned in producing right moral action; not those whereby and wherein a person judges of another, but those whereby he guides himself.

(109.) 2. ἐπιτακτική. Aristotle did not recognise the judicial function of conscience.

(110.) 3. οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν. So in Anal. Post. i. 2. 9, p. 148, εἰδέναι, the possession, is distinguished from ξυνιέναι, the comprehension, of knowledge.

(111.) 3. οὔτε λαμβάνειν. So in Post. Anal. ii. 15. 4, p. 231,

λαμβάνειν rather denotes the formation of principles for one-self; σύνεσις is μαρθάνειν φρόνησιν rather than λαμβάνειν.

(112.) 3. ἄλλου λέγοντος. So Dem. 67. 14, ἄλλου λέγοντος ξυνειῆτε: Eth. x. 9. 7, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσεις λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οἷδ' ἂν ξυνεῖη ὁ κατὰ παθὸς ζῶν: see *ibid.*, sect. 20.

(113.) 4. λέγομεν γάρ κτλ. That συνιέναι is to judge of what another person puts before us, and to receive it from him, is clear from its being frequently used as synonymous with μαρθάνειν.

CHAPTER XI.

(114.) The next habit which is necessary to moral wisdom is, that we should be able to apply rightly to our own particular selves and circumstances those principles which by σύνεσις we have received from others. This power is γνώμη, *discretion*, *discernment*, as συγγνώμη is the fair and right application of general principles to the persons and cases of others, so dropping the σύν, (which in this compound word gives the notion of *others*,) γνώμη by itself is a right and sensible application of general principles to ourselves; and thus γνώμη corrects possible errors into which we might be led by adopting general principles from others.

(115.) 2. εἰς δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἔξεις κτλ. These four habits, as we might expect from their nature. (εἰλόγως,) have a relation and bearing towards the same point, that is, any moral action. Their functions are as follows:—

νοῦς, perceiving the character and quality of any τέλος which presents itself = φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους. See note 91.

φρόνησις, choosing the right means towards such an end.

σύνεσις, supplying us with principles by enabling us to judge of, and apprehend rightly from others, the principles of right and wrong.

γνώμη, enabling us to apply these principles rightly to our needs.

On this we must observe:—

1. That νοῦς is substituted for that φρόνησις which is ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις τοῦ τέλους, because φρόνησις, being perfected in its first stage as the right choice of the end, becomes a rational instinct, or δύνάμις, whereby, without any intellectual *pro-*

cess, the moral eye of the soul perceives right or wrong in particulars, just as αἴσθησις perceives some visible, or νοῦς some invisible, attribute of an object. In fact, this function of moral perception is exercised directly by νοῦς morally instructed; it is a simple energy of the intellectual eye, operating instinctively and immediately. We now see the meaning and bearing of the passage (ch. viii. 9.) beginning "ἀντίκειται τῷ νῷ,"

2. εἰσουλία is omitted and φρόνησις substituted for it, because the first stage of φρόνησις being thus perfected, so that the slow deliberation of moral wisdom is supplied by the immediate energies of a moral intellectual perception (νοῦς), the only intellectual process that remains—i. e. the proper function of φρόνησις as an intellectual *process*—is concerned with the means. It may be observed that this is the moral state of most, or rather of all, men. The choice of the end is very often matter of instinct, and immediate,—in fact, where a man is good at all, it must be so, more or less,—that of the means very seldom, if ever. It is almost impossible practically to conceive a man so good, so thoroughly exercised in virtue, that the means as well as the end should present themselves to the eye of his soul without any effort on his part.

Practically, then, the good man does not arrive at a higher degree of moral perfection than an instinctive choice of an end and a slow, deliberative choice of means: and Aristotle, with his usual faithful portraiture of human nature as it is, assigns the several functions necessary to right moral action, to the habits or powers which practically perform them.

- (116.) 2. δυνάμεις. In proportion as they become matters of habit, and perform their functions invariably and rapidly, and truly, they become powers or faculties whereby we choose the end, or the means, or learn rightly the principle of others, or apply them to ourselves.
- (117.) 2. τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ. Supply "is not confined to δίκαιον, (οὐ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον ἀλλὰ) κοινά κ.τ.λ."
- (118.) 3. τῶν ἐσχάτων. The τέλος is termed ἐσχάτον as being the extreme point of the whole moral action, where it stops; and it is also used to denote τὸ καθ' ἑκάστον, or τὸ πρακτόν, as being the τέλος.

(119) 3. καὶ ἡ σύνεσις κ.τ.λ. Though σύνεσις is the reception of general principles from others, yet it is of general principles with reference to particular actions, and hence it is τῶν ἐσχάτων as well as φρόνησις.

(120) 4 This difficult passage may be mastered with a little attention. Νοῦς has to do with extremes in both science and morals. in science it has to do with first principles, whence scientific reasoning starts, or to which it returns. These cannot be arrived at or proved by reasoning (λογος), but are perceived by νοῦς. But in morals, νοῦς (=φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους) is of the shifting particular τοῦ ἐσχάτου (ἐσχατον as being τέλος) καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, because by it we perceive immediately the good or bad in what presents itself to us as an end, and pursue or avoid it accordingly; and also of the major premiss, (τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως,) which is applied instinctively in that energy of the moral νοῦς: for the sources of the οὐ ἕνεκα, that whereby anything becomes an οὐ ἕνεκα, a final cause of action to us, are these: 1st. the principle or standard of pursuit and avoidance, (in which pursuit is predicated of certain qualities,) and 2ndly. the perception of these qualities in some particular. It is from these two combined that anything becomes to us an object of pursuit or avoidance, (ἀρχαὶ τοῦ οὐ ἕνεκα αὐταί,) thus:—

πάν καλὸν διωκτόν, general principle, laid down by the νοῦς of ourselves or others.

τοῦτό ἐστι καλόν, perceived by νοῦς in its moral function.

τοῦτο ἐστι διωκτόν, that is, τοῦτο becomes an οὐ ἕνεκα to us.

(121.) 4. ἐτέρας προτάσεως. It is generally assumed that ἐτέρα πρότασις is the minor premiss. In Anal. Prior, i. 8. 1, it is either one of the premisses. But the fact is, that it is the premiss which has not been spoken of before; so that it is only the minor when the major has been mentioned or implied: Here the ἐσχατον καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον, the shifting particular, clearly indicates a minor premiss, so ἐτέρα πρότασις is the major.

(122.) 4. ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα γάρ: 1. Anal. Post. i. 31. 5. This γάρ refers to the ἐτέρα πρότασις: νοῦς is of the ἐτέρα πρότασις as well as of the particular, because this ἐτέρα πρότασις is formed (ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα) by that intellectual αἰσθησις which is called νοῦς,—αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.

(123.) 5. διὰ καὶ φυσικά. As a proof of this, that these powers of moral action do not spring from or belong to σοφία, but are of τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα, we may remark that they are conceived of as more or less natural gifts, which σοφία is not; and a proof of their being natural gifts is found in the notion that they are held to be attached in different degrees to different natural states and ages of life, (σημείον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἴομεθα ἀκολουθεῖν κ.τ.λ.,) as if nature was the author of them. This passage is in a parenthesis.

(124.) 5. διὰ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς. This διὰ refers to the passage preceding the parenthesis.

νοῦς is the ἀρχή as forming the major premiss inductively from particulars. So Anal. Post. ii. 15. 8, ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀν' αὐτῇ.

It is the τέλος as applying deductively the principle so formed instinctively and almost unconsciously, so as to judge at sight of the character, good or bad, desirable or undesirable, of an action.

(125.) 6. ἐκ τούτων, sc. τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα.—αἱ ἀποδείξεις, moral reasoning,—ἐκ τούτων, as data; περὶ τούτων, as conclusions.

(126.) 6. ὥστε δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Since moral reasoning is mostly about the particulars of moral action, the qualities, good or bad, of particular actions, men of experience, or age, or moral excellence, are enabled to judge, as it were by sight, of moral actions, and therefore their axioms and opinions, even though not supported by reasons, are to be followed as guides with as much confidence as the conclusions of the moral reason of ourselves or others who are not thus qualified.

(127.) 6. ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα: cf. St. Matt. vi. 22, 23; Heb. v. 14.

CHAPTER XII.

(128.) The question now arises, what is the use or advantage of these intellectual perfections, scientific or moral? Wisdom, it is urged, has no practical value, for it leads to no action; while moral wisdom, allowing it to lead to action, is not necessary to right action; for, first, if moral wisdom consists in the knowledge of right and wrong in action, of what advan-

tage is this knowledge? for the virtues are habits, and when we have them we act from that habit, and not from the knowledge which may be implied therein: so in bodily health, we are not more healthy or strong for knowing medicine or gymnastics scientifically, (sect. 1). Or, secondly, suppose we allow that moral wisdom does not merely consist in the knowledge of right and wrong, but also plays an important part in the formation of the habits, then it may be asked, of what use is it to those who have the habit? and even those who have it not can form it under the direction of others, as in matters of health, (sect. 2).

And again, it is absurd to suppose that moral wisdom, inferior as it is to intellectual perfection, is to govern it, as will be the case if we assign to moral wisdom the supreme direction of our lives, (sect. 3). These points Aristotle answers.

(129.) 1. τοῦτο μὲν, sc. γίνεσθαι εἶναι πράξεων.—δικαία, *social good*, (benevolence); καλά, *individual excellence*, (piety); ἀγαθά, (*individual good*), self-love.—ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν: whatever are matters of *πρᾶξις*, and not of *τίχνη*.

(130.) 4. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν. First, they are desirable ingredients of human happiness, as being human excellencies, and this even if they actually contributed nothing productively to that happiness; but, secondly, they do contribute something,—they are ingredients thereof, the essential causes: as health is the cause of being healthy, though it is not the productive cause of it as medicine is, so is intellectual perfection a cause of happiness, as existing and operating in it.

(131.) 6. ἔτι κ.τ.λ. With regard to moral wisdom, it is actually one of the productive causes of moral excellence, for it is concerned in the development of the ἔργον of man; for take that stage of moral development in which a right choice of the end is made instinctively, by the so far formed moral habit, ἡθελεῖ ἀρετή (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή τὸν σκόπον ποιεῖ ὀρθόν,) then moral wisdom, in its function of εἰσουλία, judges of, selects, and determines on the means, (ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον,) and this is necessary to the whole moral action.

(132.) 6. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου κ.τ.λ. The ἀρεταί of the other three parts—the strictly scientific, the moral intellect, the æsthetic,—having been mentioned under the names of ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις,

ἀρετή (ἠθική), he is induced to mention parenthetically the fourth principle or part of humanity. The perfection of the æsthetic part is here represented by ἀρετή, because that stage of the moral character is here supposed to be formed, in which ἀρετή operates instinctively, as a sort of αἴσθησις, in distinguishing a good end from a bad one.

- (133.) 7. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηδέιν κτλ. He now turns to the other point put by the objectors, viz. that if φρόνησις is useful for the formation of ἠθική ἀρετή, it is useless as soon as the habit is formed. He recapitulates (μικρὸν ἀνωθέν ἀρακτέον) what he has said as to virtue not only consisting in action, but in action deliberately chosen (διὰ προαίρεσιν). Now supposing the moral character *completely* formed, there is an instinctive, though rational, choice of the whole action, both end and means, by the operation of the moral habit, (τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή). The whole action then being supposed to be the instinctive operation of the perfectly formed character, the question now comes of what further use is φρόνησις? It must be remembered that this is a supposed case. The moral character is rarely so perfectly formed as to choose both means and end instinctively: the usual stage is that which Aristotle recognises elsewhere, viz. where the end is chosen instinctively, and the means are still matters of deliberation and doubt. In section 6 it is said that, ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ὀρθόν: see also ch. xiii. sect. 7: this instinctive choice of the end being the first stage of the moral character, which in the passage before us is viewed as in a further stage of perfection, the φρόνησις of the means being merged in the moral habit as well as that of the end.

- (134.) 7. φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων Moral knowledge, and moral sense of individual and social right; or the genitive may depend on πρακτικώτερος —δι' ἀγνοίαν: where ἀγνοία is the cause of the action.

- (135.) 8. τὰ δὲ ὅσα κτλ. Supposing the whole action to be deliberately chosen by the instinctive moral habit, it yet remains to carry it out into act,—to contrive and execute the means which we have selected. This is not within the province of ἀρετή, even when most perfectly formed into a δύναμις, (οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως). No moral excellence can give a man this power, and therefore some fur-

ther consideration is necessary, (λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασαι (*more carefully*: see Lidd. and Scott ad v.) σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν).

- (136.) 9. That φρόνησις which recognises and selects the right end and means, whether together or separately, springs from νοῦς in its function of perceiving the moral qualities and uses and tendencies of things or acts; but there is another function of the intellect, or, it may be said, another function of νοῦς, which has the distinct name of δεινότης, which perceives (not the moral, but) the *useful* qualities of things; sees how these necessary means may be carried out and obtained, (ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκόπον συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν: cf. Magn. Mor. i. 34, p. 48, τῆς δὲ δεινότητος σκέψασθαι ἐκ τινῶν ἂν ἕκαστον γένοιτο τῶν πρακτῶν καὶ ταῦτα πράττειν;) and from this δύναμις of δεινότης there springs a second sort of φρόνησις, which is able to devise, carry out, obtain the means predetermined upon towards a *good end*; for unless the end is good, the habitual and deliberate exercise of this contriving faculty is not φρόνησις, but πανουργία. And it is very important to the understanding of this chapter, to keep in mind the different nature and functions of the φρόνησις which springs from νοῦς, and that which springs from δεινότης; that which chooses the means because they are good and right, and that which carries such good and right means out: hence it is seen how moral wisdom, or φρόνησις, is necessary even after the habit has been perfectly formed, see note 133,—as perfectly as it is possible to conceive it,—more perfectly than it practically can be,—certainly than it ever has been, except in the single case of Him Who had our nature without our imperfections.

δεινότης. Soph. Ant. 332, πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοῦδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει. Our word *cunning* represents δεινότης more fully than any other, but still it does not give the notion of fear which exists in δεινός. *Cunning* is used in old authors both in a good and bad sense, though in later times it is mostly confined to the latter,—a tacit evidence of the way in which the faculty is generally used.—πανούργους: so we call both φρόνιμοι and πανούργοι δεινοί.

- (137.) 10. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις κ.τ.λ. φρόνησις, when thus ap-

plied to the carrying out our choice, is not the same as this faculty; for, first, it implies a greater degree of intellectual exertion, as *δεινότης* is rather an instinctive power; and secondly, *φρόνησις* implies a good end, while *δεινότης* is indifferent to the character of the end: but still *δεινότης* is an ingredient of active moral wisdom, for without it we should choose, but not act; our moral character would remain unproductive, from our inability to carry out our determinations. Practically, we do meet such people not unfrequently, to whom nature seems to have denied *δεινότης*, and hence, though they have *φρόνησις* as moral knowledge and moral perception, their light is hid under a bushel; indeed, in this world, as it is at present ordered, their very moral excellence often makes them shrink from doing what is necessary to secure their end. It must be remembered, that though the *φρόνησις* of the end often becomes actually instinctive, and the *φρόνησις* (choice) of the means can be conceived of as instinctive, the *φρόνησις* which consists in a rational and right use of *δεινότης* cannot, from its nature, ever become an instinct, and therefore remains even when the moral character is looked upon as perfectly formed; see note 133.

(138.) 10. ἡ δὲ εἰς κ.τ.λ. The habit of contriving and carrying out the means to a good end arises to this eye of the soul, when to it is joined *ἀρετή*; for the end must be good, or else it will be *πανουργία*, and good ends do not present themselves (as good) except to those who have *ἀρετή*.

(139.) 10. ὁμοῦται τῇ ψυχῇ may either be *φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος*, or *δεινότης*: in either case the meaning is the same, viz. that to the exercise of this practical faculty moral excellence is necessary.

(140.) 10. οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοί. In acts of moral choice there is a reasoning process more or less distinct; a reference of the particular to some principle, some standard of right, which may be syllogistically stated. This standard of right, this major premiss, by reference to which we draw our conclusion as to the pursuit or avoidance of the particular object in question, is not known except to the good man. The man without *ἀρετή* has a bad standard by which he measures acts in the moral syllogism, (see bk. iii. 4. 4, 5,) and there-

fore his end is wrong, and his δεινότης becomes πανουργία, and not φρόνησις; therefore without ἀρετή we cannot have the φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος.

- (141.) 10. ὥστε ἀδύνατον κ.τ.λ. This seems to be a mere repetition, for the greater part of the book has been occupied in shewing the way in which φρόνησις and ἀρετή are connected: but he is speaking, not of the φρόνησις which works in βούλῃσις and βουλευσις, but of the φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος, and shews that to the development of δεινότης into φρόνησις it is necessary that ἀρετή should exist. φρόνησις ἀπὸ νοῦ requires δεινότης to carry it out, otherwise it would have eyes but not hands; but in the case supposed above, and considered here, where the ἠθικὴ ἀρετή secures both the right end and right means, the φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος is the only definite energy of φρόνησις, as the operation of the moral intellect, distinguished from moral sense.

CHAPTER XIII.

- (142.) 1. ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει κ.τ.λ. δεινότης stands in such a relation to the φρόνησις which belongs to it, that the latter is a development of the former by the addition of certain ingredients; so does φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ stand to κυρία, or ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ, as the latter is likewise developed from the former by the addition of certain ingredients. This φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ consists in certain instinctive impulses towards good, (ὁρμαὶ ἄνευ λόγου: Magn. Mor. i. 34. 49, οἷον ὁρμαὶ τινες ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἄνευ λόγου πρὸς τὰ ἀνδρεία κ.τ.λ.:—the passage should be read, as it illustrates what is said here: see also Eth. x. 9. 8, δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἥθος προὔπαρχειν πῶς οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν,)—certain shadowy visions of καλόν and αἰσχρόν, which float indefinitely before the mind of every one who possesses human nature, unless, perhaps, we are to except those savage nations or individuals whose nature has by long corruption and degeneracy fallen below even the original

fall. The shadowy instincts, residing in the imagination rather than the reason, are the guide of the child while yet his reason is dormant: as his powers in course of nature unfold themselves, these shadowy instincts impregnate his reason, and become rational, (*μετὰ λόγου οἶσαι*), until, as the child grows into the man, instinct is no longer his guide, but reason; he knows why he avoids the evil and seeks the good, and thus *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*, which resides in the *πάθη* (especially in *αἰδώς*) by the admixture and impregnation of the reason, becomes *ἠθικὴ*; and this again, as has been before said, the nearer it approaches to perfection, becomes in its operation more instinctive, more a *δύναμις*.

(143.) 1. *ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ κ.τ.λ.* *φυσικὴ ἀρετή* then is *ἀρετή* minus *νοῦς* — *οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα*. These shadowy feelings sometimes lead one wrong. — *ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν*. It is not by the addition of *δεινότης* that *φυσικὴ ἀρετή* becomes *κυρία*, but by the addition of that *φρόνησις* which springs from *νοῦς*.

(144.) 2. *ἡ δὲ ἔξίς ὁμοία οὔσα*. Both *φυσικὴ* and *κυρία ἀρετή* consist in avoiding what is wrong and doing what is right; but the latter energizes thus upon rational grounds.

(145.) 2. *ὥστε καθάπερ κ.τ.λ.* As in the moral intellect there are the two powers of *δεινότης* and *φρόνησις*, which are so connected, (at least as far as *φρόνησις* is considered as an habitual and rational exercise of the contriving and acting power,) that *δεινότης* becomes *φρόνησις* by the addition of *ἀρετή*, so in moral action these states *φυσικὴ* and *κυρία ἀρετή* are similarly related, inasmuch as *φυσικὴ* by the addition of *φρόνησις* becomes *κυρία*.

(146.) 2. *ἄνευ φρονήσεως*. Here *φρόνησις* is that moral wisdom which arises from *νοῦς*, (see above, *ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν*): *ἀρετὴ ἠθικὴ* can exist without the *φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος*, (see last chapter, sect. 8,) though it cannot act.

(147.) 3. *διόπερ κ.τ.λ.* From this admixture of the intellect in the moral habit some persons think that the virtues are wholly intellectual. — *φρονήσεις*, acts or energies of *φρόνησις*. — *πάσαι τὰς ἀρετάς*, the whole of the several virtues.

- (148.) 4. σημείον δέ. That he was partly wrong and partly right is proved by the way in which men speak of any virtue as *ἔξισ κατά τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*, which shews on the one hand that *ὀρθὸς λόγος* is not the whole, and on the other that it is part of it.
- (149.) 4. μαντεύεσθαι, *to feel*. It is applied to those convictions or impressions which we have without being able to give any definite reason for them, which come over the mind as the supposed inspirations of the prophet. Rhet. i. 13, *μαντευόμεθα γὰρ πάντες κ.τ.λ.*
- (150.) 5. μεταβῆναι, *to change our ground*.—οὐ γὰρ μόνον κ.τ.λ. *ἀρετή* is not only the *πάθη* under the government of reason, as of some power external to them, (*κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*), but it is a compound state of which *ὀρθὸς λόγος* is an essential ingredient, (*μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου*). It is not the moral governed by the intellectual, but it is the moral-intellectual. It may be said to be *κατὰ λόγον* with regard to the subordination of the passions to the reason, but *μετὰ ὀρθοῦ λογού* when viewed as an *ἔξις*, or state of mind made up of certain emotions or energies.
- (151.) 5. ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος κ.τ.λ. This marks the distinction between the two sorts of *φρόνησις*,—*ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ* and *ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος*. The latter would very inadequately express *ὀρθὸς λόγος περὶ πρακτῶν*.
- (152.) 5. λόγους, *acts of reason*; μετὰ λόγου, *in which reason is an ingredient*; ἐπιστήμας, *states of the pure intellect*.
- (153.) 6. οὐδὲ φρόνιμον. From there being a sort of *φρόνησις* which arises from *δεινότης*, and which is not in its idea inseparable from right action, it might be supposed that a man might be *φρόνιμος* without being *ἀγαθός*, but from what has been said it is clear even this sort of *φρόνησις* implies *ἀρετή*.
- (154.) 6. διαλεχθεῖη, *argue*.
- (155.) 6. εὐφύεστατος. The *ἄλογοι ἔρμαι*, in which *φυσικὴ ἀρετή* mainly consists, are not all equally strong. In fact, the different nature and strength of these makes different dispositions.—*ἀπλῶς, strictly, properly*.
- (156.) 6. ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει. Until *φρόνησις* is formed, and is in active operation as the guide of every-day life, the

virtuous acts we may perform are only the energies of φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ more or less advanced towards ἀρετὴ κυρία. When φρόνησις is formed, it operates throughout the whole πάθη, and moulds them into virtues by proper regulation. So St. James: "*If a man offend in one point, he is guilty of all.*" That is, disobedience to God in one point proves the want of that faith which conforms the whole man to obedience. The virtues may exist separately when they are only *in posse*, as the man is advancing towards moral excellence; but they cannot when they are *in esse*, inasmuch as virtue does not consist in this or that action, but in a particular frame of mind exhibiting itself in action. φρόνησις is a focus which collects the several scattered rays of light, and transmits them through itself the same, though changed.

(157.) 7. He now sums up his answer to the difficulties started in the 12th chapter, by saying, that even were it true that φρόνησις was not concerned in moral action as a productive cause and necessary ingredient, yet, as being an excellence of part of man's nature, it would be a part of happiness: but it is a productive cause and necessary ingredient. Nor is any superiority or authority given to it over σοφία hereby, —for it is merely with relation to man that its functions are thus assigned it,—any more than medicine is superior to health because it exercises authority over it, but with a view to it,—any more than because we say πολιτικὴ is the highest science with regard to man, we mean that it is to direct the gods.

(158.) 8. ἡ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. φρόνησις is here considered again (as in ch. xii. 6.) as it practically exists and operates in men; the moral character giving the end, the means being found by the slower intellectual process of φρόνησις.

νοῦς.—φρόνησις.

As one of the difficulties in this book is the different senses in which the words φρόνησις and νοῦς are used, it may be as well to give them. Their being used sometimes as different, sometimes as the same, arises from the functions of the one being in certain parts and stages of the moral character the same, (see ch. viii. 8,) in others different.

νοῦς.

1. Perception of the invisible physical qualities of things, whence and whereby the ἀρχαί of scientific reasoning are perceived or formed; differing from αἰσθησις, which is the perception of the visible qualities of things.

2. Perception of moral qualities of things, whence moral premisses or principles are inductively formed, (ἀρχή, ch. xi. 6).

3. Perception of the moral quality of a particular action, by an instinctive reference to, and application of, a moral principle; instinctive perception of the end, (τοῦ τέλους, ch. xi. 6,) followed by φρόνησις in its shape of εἰβουλία, (ch. xi. 2,) which is also ascribed to ἀρετή, (ch. xii. 6,) inasmuch as it is by the existence of ἀρετή in the soul that this rational perception is able to operate as an instinct towards good, and in it the ἀρετή τοῦ τέλους consists.

α. φρόνησις ἀπὸ νοῦ.

1. The possession of moral principles.


2. The application of these principles to a particular, called also νοῦς, because the intellect sees instinctively the moral quality, as νοῦς proper sees the physical quality, (ch. viii. 8). In this sense it is an ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις τοῦ τέλους, (ch. ix. 7). Whenever the φρόνησις is thus worked into the πάθη, a moral sense is formed.

3. The discovery of the right means by the perception of their moral qualities, as well as of fitness for the purpose in hand. This is the proper function of φρόνησις when, in its first function, it has become that moral intuition which is called analogously νοῦς; and it is its usual function in most men, because it rarely happens that the perception of the means becomes intuitive; hence it is used for εἰβουλία, (ch. xi. 2).

β. φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος.

The perception of the way in which the means determined on are to be accomplished, and the end obtained, coming in after the προαίρεσις of the end and means: this would remain a definite energy of the intellect in every action, even if the above προαίρεσις could become an instinctive energy of ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, (ch. xii. 8).

Formation of the moral character.



The undeveloped nature of man seems to have been viewed by Aristotle as consisting,—1. Of the tendencies of *ἡδονή* and *λύπη*, residing in and working by the several *πάθη*, more or less strongly in different individuals. 2. Of the antagonistic instinct of *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*,—a shadowy sense of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*, chiefly the latter, residing in the imagination, and not in the reason, with the *ἡδύ* of self-approbation attached to them as a motive. 3. The neutral power of *νοῦς*, or intellect, as first dormant, but daily developing itself.

From the first of these proceed the actions of simple selfishness; from the other the actions of *καλόν*; and as *νοῦς* is developed it is impregnated by one or the other of these, and whether it is by the one or the other settles in the main the question of the future character. If the passions have their way, and the *νοῦς* is unimpregnated by them, its judgments and views are simply sensual, and it results in the *αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη*, (the law of the members,) which holds *πάν ἡδὺ διωκτόν*—*πάν λυπηρόν φευκτόν*. If, on the other hand, the shadowy sense of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν* controls the passions, the *νοῦς* is impregnated by it. These motives daily find their way more and more into the reason, and the reason apprehending and receiving them, the result is *κυρίως ἐπιστήμη*,—a rational apprehension of the principles of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*, as facts in morals and as motives of action. This shews itself first in *βούλησις*, which, under the direction of *φρόνησις*, makes a right choice of the end, judging rightly of the fitting objects of pursuit and avoidance, as well as of the nature of the objects presented for its decision, (*ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ κατὰ λόγον*); and when this has become habitual, it impresses itself in the *ἐπιθυμίας*, gives right notions of pleasure and pain, so that the true *ἡδύ* alone presents itself as *ἡδύ*, and the motive and cause of action in its shape of *βούλησις* becomes an instinct, with this difference, that it is now a rational instinct, (*ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ μετὰ λόγου*); not only the mere shadowy sense of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*, but an instinct founded on the views and judgments of reason. The first stage of the moral character (*φρόνησις τοῦ τέλους*) is now formed, and this is the highest stage of perfection to which men can ordinarily rise. The second function of *φρόνησις* is that of choosing the right means, (*βούλευσις*), and this also we may conceive of as being merged in the moral character, so as to act instinctively; but it is

practically impossible, or at least nearly so, for mere men. Should it take place, then the second stage of the moral character is completed,—and ἡ ἀρετὴ τῇ προαίρεσει (not only σκόπον) ὀρθῶν ποιεῖ,—and the man has as perfect an *ἔξο* or *ἡθος* as we can conceive him to have: but men generally (may we not say of mere men universally?) are incapable of this, and this function of φρόνησις remains as a distinct intellectual operation, capable, of course, of various degrees of perfection, as the nature of things is better and more instinctively understood, and therefore the choice of the means carried on with greater readiness and truth. But there is yet another function of φρόνησις, arising from δεινότης, which is necessary to the ἐνέργεια of the good man, and which is developed and formed coincident with the other two: for this see note 136.

BOOK VII.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) IN the theory of moral virtue, as laid down by Aristotle, the intellect has only a limited authority over the passions. His virtues are not merely acts or states of the intellect, but of the passions and intellect combined, each contributing its share to the action. Hence, as it practically happens that the proper relation between the intellect and passions is seldom attained, it might be argued that the Platonic theory, which assigns a more despotic authority to the intellect, would remedy the contradictions which arise from the rebellion of the appetites against the reason, and that in the Aristotelic system the intellect was not sufficiently developed, being liable to be dragged about by the passions at their will. And that φρόνησις which allows itself to be thus dragged about by the passions is not really knowledge, for it is impossible to act contrary to such knowledge. In answer to this, he shews how it is that φρόνησις, from the inseparable conditions of human action, fails always to obtain the proper degree of mastery, and how it is that a man may act contrary to his

knowledge; and in explaining this he at the same time completes his portraiture of our moral nature.

- (2.) 1. ἀλλήν ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, *taking a fresh starting-point*. He has discussed the nature of moral virtue, its relation to the ἔργον of man, and its connection with his intellectual nature; he now proceeds to fresh ground—to the examination of certain difficulties in his moral theory, and certain facts in our social position, with a view to illustrate still further the relation between moral virtue and the destinies and happiness of man.
- (3.) 1. There are three stages of moral evil,—*vice, incontinence, brutality*; and it is the second of these whence the difficulties which present themselves in our moral theory arise. ἀκρασία is but vaguely rendered by *incontinence*, but for want of a better the term may be retained,—care being taken that it represent to our minds, not the notion which is conveyed by its ordinary English meaning, but the more technical one of its Greek original,—*want of power over oneself*.
- (4.) 1. θηριότης. In ἀρετή the rational perception of καλόν agrees with the impressions of ἡδύ; in ἐγκράτεια the impressions of ἡδύ differ from, but succumb to, the perception of καλόν; in the τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιθεμένη ἕξις the whole being and nature is above the mere rational perception of καλόν, and exempt from any impulse of ἡδύ; while in κακία the rational perceptions of right and wrong are so distorted, that the αἰσχρόν presents itself as ἡδύ: in ἀκρασία the rational perceptions of καλόν differ from, and are overcome by, the impulse of ἡδύ; in θηριότης all rational perceptions of right and wrong are lost, and the desires, in consequence of the obscuration of reason, are so utterly depraved, that they belong to a nature lower than that of man.
- (5.) 2. εἰ καθάπερ φασίν κ.τ.λ. Mark the use of the indicative mood, not the conditional. It is not at all impossible but that this passage really represents Aristotle's impression on the subject.
- (6.) 2. καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδέ θηρίου κ.τ.λ. The brute creation are, from their lack of reason, incapable of that choice of

good or evil which constitutes ἀρετή or κακία, while the gods are removed from that sphere of action in which alone these habits can exist.

- (7.) 3. ἑτερόν τι γένος κακίας: not a different sort of κακία, but a sort different from κακία.
- (8.) 3. Σεῖος: Lac. for Θείος.
- (9.) 3. ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις. In such people there is no cultivation of the reason, and therefore the passions, left to themselves, grow more and more degraded.
- (10.) 3. νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις. Where the reason is deranged or impaired, and the natural tastes and desires vitiated, either by the failure or loss of some faculty or instinct; as where Nebuchadnezzar, being deprived of his understanding, lived and fed as the beasts of the field; or where mental or corporeal disease have so affected the organs or senses as to make things repugnant to human nature agreeable and natural.
- (11.) 4. ἀκρασίας—μαλακίας—τρυφῆς. The former is properly the moral temper or state acted upon by ἡδύ or λυπηρόν.—μαλακία is the disposition to avoid trouble, whereby λυπηρόν is more able to convey its impression.—τρυφή, the tendency to self-indulgence, a certain luxury-loving softness, whereby ἡδύ operates more rapidly and sensibly; but it is here used in connection with the two last, rather as a natural tendency towards ordinary pleasure and aversion to pain, which exists in every one. All these vary according to the particular constitutions of men, and thus are different phases of moral weakness different in different people.—ἐγκράτεια is the general moral state opposite to ἀκρασία, (self-denial generally,) and also the particular temper which does not care much for things of sense.—καρτερία is a certain manliness of character which stands up against λυπηρόν, rather glorying in hardships than flying from them, resists the softer solicitations of the ἡδύ.
- (12.) 4. ὥς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔξεων. The more natural construction would be, ὥς τὰς αὐτὰς ἔξει, but περὶ κ.τ.λ. depends directly on ὑποληπτόν: "We must not form a conception of these severally, as if the conception were about," &c.

(13.) 5. ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων: see bk. i. ch. 4. The whole of this passage is valuable, as giving a distinct statement of Aristotle's method of enquiry. There is not much trace here of his being the patron of a deductive as opposed to an inductive method.

(14.) 6. δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. The dogmas and difficulties which are started on the subject, and each of which resolves itself, more or less easily, into a question:—

1. That ἐγκράτεια is good, ἀκρασία bad, which may be stated as a question: "Is all ἐγκράτεια good, all ἀκρασία bad?"

2. Is adherence to reason always ἐγκράτεια, departure therefrom always ἀκρασία?

3. The ἀκρατής acts contrary to what he knows to be right, under the influence of passion; the ἐγκρατής, with the same knowledge, resists his desires, through reason. Have the ἀκρατής and ἐγκρατής knowledge?

4. The ἐγκρατής or καρτερικός is held by some to be identical with the σώφρων, and the ἀκρατής with the ἀκόλαστος; by others only partially so; while others say they are always different.

5. Can ἀκρασία and φρόνησις exist together? and if so, in what sense?

6. To what objects may the term ἀκρασία be applied, and in what senses is it applied to such matters as anger, gain, &c.?

CHAPTER II.

(15.) 1. He here starts some difficulties which are suggested or implied in these several views of ἀκρασία.—πῶς ἱπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς, i. e. with a right ὑπόληψις on moral subjects; that is, with φρόνησις. Some say that φρόνησις is incompatible with ἀκρασία. Others distinguish between φρόνησις and ἐπιστήμη, (ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν,) and say that such a habit of mind is incompatible with the degree of intellectual conviction expressed by ἐπιστήμη; while Socrates denied the possibility of any one erring against his mental conviction, whether it were weak or strong; that is, he denied such a sort of action as ἀκρασία at all, but said

that when any one did so err, it was not contrary to their better knowledge, but from lack of it, (*δι' ἀγνοίαν*).

(16.) 2. This, like many of Socrates' views, he rejects on the simple ground of its being contrary to *experience*.—*ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἴεται γε, ὅτι δὲν πράττειν*: see ch. x. 3. 2, last line.

(17.) 3. He next states the objections which attach themselves to the view which distinguishes between complete (*ἐπιστήμη*) and incomplete knowledge (*δόξα*). It must be borne in mind that he is stating not his own difficulties and arguments, (though he may agree with some of these,) but the opinions and arguments of others, which give him, as it were, the questions which he begins to consider in the next chapter. Almost all these opinions are open to objections, and this it is which makes an enquiry into *ἀκρασία* so complicated as well as so necessary, in order to form a clear conception of its nature.

(18.) 4. The argument here is a destructive conditional syllogism. If it be a weak conviction, then there is *συγγώμη*, but the action of the *ἀκρατής* is *μοχθηρόν* and *ψεκρόν*, therefore it is not a weak conviction.

(19.) 5. *φρονήσεως κ.τ.λ.* *ἄρα* is emphatic *then*, marking a new supposition, and referring it to the former one. Supposing that *ἀκρασία* is the acting against *φρόνησις*, an objection arises here too.

(20.) 5. *ἀτοπον*. This supposition is met on the other side by the elenchus, that the logical deduction of such an hypothesis (that the *φρόνιμος* was *ἀκρατής*) would be contrary to mental phenomena: we may see that the *φρόνιμος* cannot be *ἀκρατής*: such a supposition would imply that the *φρόνιμος* could knowingly act wickedly, which is contrary to the opinions of men, (*οὐδ' ἂν φήσκει τις*), as well as to the practical character of the *φρόνιμος*, (*ὅτι πρακτικὸς ὁ φρόνιμος*).

(21.) 5. *τῶν γὰρ ἐσχαίων τις*, *for he is one who has to do with the particulars*, not the principles of action only. If he is *φρόνιμος*, his single actions must be good; which, if the above hypothesis be correct, they will not be.

(22.) 6. *ἔτι ἐν μὲν κ.τ.λ.* These are the arguments and difficulties connected with the fourth question in the preceding

chapter. It must be remembered that these are not stated as Aristotle's own arguments, even though he may agree with the position advanced. The whole passage is a complicated argument, consisting of a syllogism in the second figure,—*ἐγκρατής* being the minor, *σώφρων* the major term,—the minor premiss being supported by a double conditional syllogism.

- (23.) 6. οὐτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν κ.τ.λ. Excess does not belong to the *σώφρων*. The desires of the *σώφρων* must be both modified and purified.
- (24.) 6. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε, sc. that *ἐγκρατής* should have desires both excessive and evil,—both *ισχυραί* and *φαῦλαι*—combined.
- (25.) 6. εἰ μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ. If the desires are *χρησταί*, then the declining them is bad.—εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐδὲν σεμνόν. If they are weak and not bad, it is no such wonderful thing to control them; the negation of the consequent takes away the *μὴ* from *φαῦλαι*, therefore the desires are *φαῦλαι*: the emphasis of this part of the argument rests more on the *μὴ φαῦλαι* than on the *ἀσθενεῖς*.
- (26.) 6. εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἀσθενεῖς (= μὴ *ισχυραί*). The negation of the consequent takes away the *μὴ* from *ισχυραί*, without touching upon *φαῦλαι* at all,—the emphasis of this part of the argument rests wholly upon *ἀσθενεῖς*; therefore they are *φαῦλαι* (proved before), and *ισχυραί*, proved by negation of *ἀσθενεῖς*: without keeping this in mind, the conclusion of this hypothetical would be, the desires are *μὴ φαῦλαι* and *μὴ ἀσθενεῖς*.
- (27.) 7. The real question is the kind and degree of intellectual firmness which constitutes *ἐγκράτεια*.
- (28.) 8. ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ψευδόμενος. The sophistical trick of reasoning called *mentiens*, (see Aldrich, iii. 8. 12): either an illustration; as in this fallacy of *mentiens* the mind feels itself logically bound to the conclusion which common sense rejects, so in *ἀκρασία* the mind feels the falsity of the moral fallacy from which it is unable practically to loose itself; or that the fallacy itself suggests a question on the nature of *ἀκρασία*, whether he who abides by such a conclusion is *ἐγκρατής*, and he who leaves it *ἀκρατής*; i. e. whether

these habits obtain in matters of pure intellect: in which case ἀκρασία would be good, ἐγκράτεια bad.

(29.) 8. διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See Soph. Elench. i. 6, sqq.—ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, *when they make a hit.*

(30.) 9. ἐκ τινος λόγου, *from a certain conceivable mode of stating it.*—ὡς ὑπολαμβάνει, SC. δεῖν πράττειν.

(31.) 10. δόξειεν ἄν, *may be held to be.*

(32.) 10. μὴ ἐπέπειστο. Most MSS. omit μὴ: "If the ἀκρατής had done it from a (bad) conviction that he ought to do it, he would have had a chance of altering when his conviction is changed; but now with a different conviction, viz. that he ought not to do it, he does it." But μὴ ἐπέπειστο, which seems on the whole preferable, is supported by one or two MSS.: "If he had not had a right conviction," (that he ought not to do it,) "he might have changed when he got that conviction, (μεταπεισθεῖς); but now, though he has that conviction, he does it." In the reading without μὴ, πεπεισθαι and ἐπέπειστο mean the false conviction of the ἀκόλαστος, while πεπεισμένος refers to the right conviction, implied in μεταπεισθεῖς. If μὴ is read, πεπεισθαι refers to the wrong conviction of the ἀκόλαστος, and ἐπέπειστο and πεπεισμένος to the right conviction of the ἀκρατής. In either case it is awkward to construe the same word differently in the same passage, but it is less so to do this with πεπεισθαι and ἐπέπειστο than with ἐπέπειστο and πεπεισμένος: if we take these two last to mean the same, then we must read μὴ.

(33.) 11. The last words of the chapter are worth remark:—ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὗρεσις ἐστίν.

CHAPTER III.

(34.) 2. τῷ περὶ ἃ ἢ τῷ πῶς, *differ in their subject, or their method of handling the subject.*

(35.) 3. οὐκ οἶεται, SC. δεῖν πράττειν.

(36.) 3. περὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.: cf. Plat. Rep. 479, E.—παρ' ἧν, *contrary to which.*

(37.) 4. *δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος*. See Preller, page 21, Plato, *Cratyl.* 402, E. Heraclitus professed to have *δόξα* only; yet his *δόξα* was practically as strong as Plato's *ἐπιστήμη*: it is merely a difference in words.

(38.) 5. There are various ways of accounting for a man's acting contrary to his knowledge, founded on the practical difference between active (*χρώμενος*) and inactive (*οὐ χρώμενος τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ*) knowledge:—

α. By the difference between the knowledge of the universal principle, and the knowledge of the character of the particular thing which presents itself for the time to the will: a mistake in the latter does not prove the absence of the former.

β. By the varieties of this knowledge of the universal and particular which are concerned in a simple action; the knowledge of a general principle as regards such things generally; the knowledge of a principle as regards men, or some class of men generally; and to each of these belongs a particular; so that frequently four varieties of knowledge are concerned in a single act, and the absence of any one of these may cause error, though the agent may be in conscious and active possession of the other three. What Butler, in Sermon X., calls *self-partiality*, continually operates to prevent men applying to themselves principles, which they believe abstractedly.

γ. By the various temperaments and states which are favourable to the exercise of knowledge, or the contrary. Not only is there abstractedly a great difference between knowledge when active and when dormant, but practically the knowledge is called into action, or suppressed, by different temperaments, or by those changes of temperament to which human nature is liable; so sleep, anger, excitement, mental or bodily, suspend the active operation of the knowledge of which, at other times, we may be in conscious possession;—a veil is thrown over the intellect at such times by the general suspension of our faculties, as in sleep, or by the over-activity of one part of our nature: how this veil is removed, and activity restored to our knowledge, is a question for pathology. Such persons cannot be said to have knowledge.

and therefore to act contrary to it at the moment of action, though they have it at other times.

(39.) 8. συμφῦναι, *to be worked into the nature*. The whole phenomena of moral action depend on the degree in which knowledge of good and right is worked into the whole system, so as to become part of our self-consciousness, and to operate instinctively, or exists externally, as it were, to ourselves, and operates only with great effort. In ἀκρασία the φρόνησις may exist externally; in ἐγκράτεια it is partially, in σωφροσύνη it is wholly, worked into our being. See below, note 42.

(40.) 9. φυσικῶς, *psychologically*; according to its nature, and hence here psychologically. —ὧν αἰσθησις ἤδη κυρία, *which thenceforward depends on the senses*.—ἤδη: the function of ἡ καθόλου δόξα has ceased.

(41.) ὅταν δὲ μία κ.τ.λ., *when these agree*. This syllogistic process of reasoning in moral action seems to be a true account of what goes on, though, as in scientific reasoning, the process is often instantaneous and imperceptible.

He supposes two premisses or principles in the mind, arising, the one from the law of the mind, the other from the law of the members; the one may be represented by πᾶν γλυκὺ αἰρετόν, the other by πᾶν αἰσχρὸν φεικτόν (ἢ κωλύουσα γενέσθαι). The mind assents, and the will follows whichever of these is called most strongly and sensibly into being, by having its particular attached to it. If it is τοῦτό ἐστι γλυκύ, then the major premiss, πᾶν γλυκὺ αἰρετόν, is aroused (αὕτη δ' ἐνεργεῖ), and the conclusion of the will follows, (τοῦτό ἐστι αἰρετόν): whereas, if the premiss τοῦτό ἐστι αἰσχρὸν had suggested itself with equal strength, the major premiss, πᾶν αἰσχρὸν φεικτόν, would have presented itself in full force, and the conclusion of the will would have been τοῦτό ἐστι φεικτόν. Now where sensual desire or pro-pension is present (τύχη δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα), the sensual minor premiss, τοῦτό ἐστι γλυκύ, presents itself with more readiness and force than the moral one, τοῦτό ἐστι αἰσχρὸν. It is true that, except where the mind is quite depraved, the moral major premiss *virtually* forbids it (ἡ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο); but the mind is carried away by the impulsive impression of desire (ἡ ἐπιθυμία δ' ἄγει), so that the warning voice is disregarded: thus the man is overcome not wholly

contrary to knowledge, but yields to a sensual knowledge, and the syllogistic process arising from it, which represents the end as an object of *rational* desire. Hence it is of the greatest importance to right action that the tone of the mind, according to which we take a sensual or moral view of particulars, should be in a true and healthy state, so that the particular should strike us in its moral rather than its sensual view; hence the Apostle's direction for holy living,—*"to have our loins girt about with truth,"* so that it may be always ready for use.

- (12.) Our actions in matters of sensual pleasure and pain depend really on the greater or less degree in which *φρόνησις* is worked into our moral nature.

In *ἀκολασία* the *φρόνησις* is totally absent, and a sensual wisdom (*αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη*) is substituted for it,—*πάν γλυκὺ διωκτόν*: sometimes, in cases of utter depravity, *αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ γλυκὺ* obtains. The principle which should counterbalance and restrain the passions (*πάν αἰσχροὺν φευκτόν*) is lost (*ἀρχὴ διαφθείρεται*), and "*he imagineth mischief to himself as a law.*"

In *ἀκρασία* the moral principle and the moral view is so far worked into our nature, that though external objects strike us in the sensual view rather than the moral, and the sensual principle consequently acts more instinctively and forcibly, yet there is a slight reaction on the part of the latter, though not sufficient to prevent the wrong action.

In *ἐγκράτεια* the moral principle and moral view is more completely worked in, so that the reaction is sufficient to overpower the *ἐπιθυμία*, and the moral fallacy connected with it.

In *σωφροσύνη* the *φρόνησις* is so wholly worked in, that the moral principle and moral view has become part of our very being, and takes the lead; and though there may be some slight reaction on the part of the senses, yet it does not affect or hinder right action, or even produce wrong *ἔργα*.

- (13.) 9. *ἄμα τούτῳ*, i. e. as soon as the *φάσις* has taken place.

- (14.) 10. *ὅταν οὖν κ.τ.λ.*: cf. Plato, Rep. 439.—*τίχῃ* depends on *ὅταν*, which is carried on by *δέ*.—*ἑκαστον*, the passions and the reason.—*ἐπὶ λόγῳ*, sc. the reasoning process, *πάν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τούτῳ γλυκὺ, τούτῳ ἡδύ*.—*δόξης*, a result of a reasoning process; sc. *τούτῳ ἡδύ*.

- (45.) 10. οὐκ ἐναντίας κτ.λ., sc. ὀρθῷ λόγῳ. This δόξα is not *essentially* opposed to right reason, though it is so *accidentally*, in consequence of the ἐπιθυμία making it a practical guide to an action which ὀρθὸς λόγος disapproves: there is no struggle between this δόξα and ὀρθὸς λόγος, but between the ἐπιθυμία and the ὀρθὸς λόγος. From οὐκ ἐναντίας to λόγῳ is in a sort of parenthesis, so that the sentence beginning ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο belongs to the sentence immediately preceding οὐκ ἐναντίας κτ.λ.
- (46.) 11. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κτ.λ. This is brought forward as a proof that ἀκρασία is founded on some sort of reasoning process, on some general principle which, true in itself, is κατὰ συμβεβηκός, a right guide for practice under certain circumstances; it is not a mere impulse. Hence animals are not termed ἀκρατεῖς because they are not capable of these general principles, but act on the impulse of the senses.
- (47.) 11. φαντασία, the impression received from external things, from τὰ φαινόμενα.
- (48.) 12. πῶς δὲ λύεται κτ.λ. It being thus shewn how the principles of moral wisdom are lost sight of by the active influence of desire, it is no business of ours to enquire how and when they return in power to the mind: that is a question for pathology.
- (49.) 13. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τελευταία κτ.λ. It is the particular premiss of the moral syllogism, the judgment we form of the object before us (δόξα αἰσθητοῦ), which mainly influences our action (κυρία τῶν πράξεων); and he who is under the influence of desire does not take the moral view of the particular object, but only a sensual view. The object suggests to him τοῦτ' ἡ γλυκύ, which calls forth πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, and not τοῦτ' αἰσχρόν, which would call forth πᾶν αἰσχρόν φευκτόν, and prevent the action. And it may be again said, that it is of the utmost importance to right action that the tone of the mind should be right, that things should strike us in a moral, and not a sensual, point of view;—this is the object of right education.
- (50.) 13. καὶ διὰ τὸ κτ.λ. Since a right judgment on particulars is not necessarily implied in the knowledge of the general principle (διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου δοκεῖν εἶναι), and, being of particulars, is not matter of ἐπιστήμη (μηδ' ἐπιστημονικῶν ὁμοίως),

the want of right judgment on a particular does not imply the want of the general principle: if the particular were *ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως*, then a wrong view of the particular would imply the entire absence of the general principle.

- (51.) 14. οὐ γάρ κ.τ.λ. Socrates appears to be right (*ζοικε δ' ἐξήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν*), for *ἀκρασία* does not take place when *ἐπιστήμη*, properly so called, (*κυρίως ἐπιστήμη*, the law of the mind,) is present in power in the mind. This is hindered and obscured, though it exists passively. But there is a sort of *ἐπιστήμη* present, viz. *ἡ αἰσθητική*, the law of the members, such as *πάν γλυκὺ ἡδύ*; and this does exist when *ἀκρασία* takes place. *ἀκρασία* is not a mere animal impulse, but, by the aid of a reasoning process, it operates in spite of our better knowledge, which exists, though not actively, (*ἐνίστι*, not *παρίστι*). The natural reference which a reasoning creature would make to reason to approve his actions is supplied by the operation of the sensual syllogism, and thus *φρόνησις* is suspended as a principle of action.
- (52.) 14. οὐδ' αὖτε—πάθος is in a parenthesis, so that *τῆς αἰσθητικῆς* is in the same construction as *κυρίως ἐπιστήμης*, depending on *παρούσης*.

CHAPTER IV.

- (53.) Having thus discussed the nature of *ἀκρασία*, he now goes on to the subject-matter. *ἀκρασία*, properly speaking, does not apply to all the particulars of moral action, but only to such bodily pleasures and pains as are necessarily part of our nature, (the *ἀναγκαῖα ἡδέα*): when honour or wealth have become, as it were, *ἀναγκαῖα*, then the term is applied metaphorically to the wrong pursuit of them, contrary to our better judgment.
- (54.) 1. *ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ κατρεπικοί*. See notes at the end of the book.
- (55.) 2. *ἔχοντα ὑπερβολήν*, liable to excess.—*ἀπλῶς*, in its proper sense.—*ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος*. As we add an epithet or characteristic to the man who thus differs from other men; the common term "man" has a slight difference attached to

it to mark the individual: it is a slight difference; but nevertheless, by it he differed from other men, ἄλλ' ὁμῶς ἕτερος ἦν. Another interpretation is, that a man named *Anthropus* won the Olympic prize, and that in order to prevent it being supposed, when the individual *Anthropus* was spoken of, that the class ἄνθρωπος was meant, they attached to his name ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς; so that the κοινὸς λόγος (ἄνθρωπος) ἰδίου (Ἀνθρώπου) μικρῶν διέφερον.

(56.) 2. ἐκεῖνον, sc. τῷ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκότε. —κατὰ τὸ μέρος, as ἀκρατὴς πότου, ἀκρατὴς ὄψου κ.τ.λ., which are all varieties of ἀκρασία proper. The argument here is in the second figure.

(57.) 3. τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι, modal dative. —οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, not with an addition.

(58.) 4. μαλακοί. This term, which expresses one phase of ἀκρασία proper, is not (like ἀκρατὴς) used metaphorically, and is only applied to bodily pleasures: if ἀκρατὴς were properly applied to all the above, then it would be applicable to them in all its shapes and phases; but it is not so. Another reading is ἀκόλαστος, taking the meaning to be, if ἀκόλαστος cannot be properly applied to ὀργή τιμή, &c., so neither can ἀκρασία; but the former is best. —περὶ ταύτας, sc. περὶ ἃς ἀκρατὴς λέγεται ἁπλῶς. —ἐκεῖνων refers to περὶ τὰς, ὀργήν, τιμήν, &c. The argument consists of an affirmative and a negative conclusion in the third figure. —οὐκ ἐκεῖνων οὐδένα is parenthetical, so that διὰ τὸ κ.τ.λ. belongs to the preceding clause: the meaning is, we do not place ἀκρατὴς ὀργῆς, τιμῆς κ.τ.λ. in the same category with ἀκόλαστος, as we do the simple ἀκρατὴς. —μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν. The ἀκόλαστος is rather bent on indulgence from the tone of his mind and taste (ἡδονή), than hurried into it by vehement desire. Mark the distinction here drawn between ἐπιθυμία and ἡδονή.

(59.) 5. τῷ γένει, generically of the number of things fair and esteemed. The first sentence of the next chapter, however, suggests that τῷ γένει may mean "to the species man."

(60.) 5. τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων κ.τ.λ. This is a difficult passage, especially when compared with sect. 2; but it is solved by taking τὰ μεταξὺ to be the ἀναγκαῖα of sect. 2; standing, that is, between τὰ φύσει αἰρετά and τὰ φύσει φεικτά, being neither the one nor the other; not being αἰρετά, matter of choice at all,

but simply ἀναγκαῖα, in which we have no choice. The division then stands thus:—

1. φύσει αἰρετά—τιμὴ—νική κ.τ.λ. ἐν ὑπερβολῇ ψίγεται ὡς φευκτά.

2. φύσει φευκτά—θηριότης—ἀπλῶς ψίγεται.

3. τὰ μεταξύ: μηδὲ φύσει αἰρετά μηδὲ φευκτά, food and raiment, &c., ἐν ὑπερβολῇ ψίγεται ὡς ψεκτά.

No one would call the last καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα.

(61.) 5. καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον; sect. 2, that is, as far as the φύσει αἰρετά and the τὰ μεταξύ are concerned.

(62.) 5. τὰ τοιαῦτα: τὰ φύσει αἰρετά.—οὐ τῷ πάσχειν, *not by the simple affection.*

(63.) 5. ὅσοι, *all are blamed who*—. Supply ψίγονται. We must distinguish between ψίγεσθαι and ψεκτά: the latter has got a technical sense of things of bad desert, and thus is contrasted to those things which, as we see below, are simply φευκτά. ψίγεσθαι simply means *to be found fault with*. Another way of taking the sentence is to suppose that from “καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα” down to “μωραίνειν” is in a parenthesis, to support the introduction of the new terms, τὰ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς, and that the words after this parenthesis, “μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτα,” is an anacoluthon for μοχθηροὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ; and on the whole this, perhaps, is the best.—ταῦτα, *sc.* τὰ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς.

(64.) 5. κρατοῦνται refers rather to the mental state of such persons; διώκουσι to the practical result thereof: he turns his attention only to one of the above divisions, the τὰ φύσει αἰρετά.

(65.) 5. Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ. Satyrus having been aided by his father in obtaining an object of unlawful desire, loved him to such a degree, that on his father's death he threw himself from a precipice.—περὶ ταῦτα, *sc.* τὰ φύσει καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα.

(66.) 6. ἀλλὰ καὶ ψεκτῶν. Mark the distinction between φευκτῶν, ψεκτῶν, μισητῶν: the first to be avoided as excess in things καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα; the second, objects of evil desert, as ἀκρασία; the third, objects of abhorrence, as θηριότης.

(67.) 6. δι' ὁμοιότητα κ.τ.λ. Analogously, not strictly, the word

ἀκρατής is applied to these cases, as the word *κακός* is to one who is unskilful or unlearned.—*περὶ δὲ θυμόν κ.τ.λ.* His endeavour to shew that *ἀκρασία* is properly confined to *ἡδονή σωματική* has reference to his opposition to Plato's theory of morals,—that *θυμός*, and not *ἡδονή*, is the real motive cause of human action.

CHAPTER V.

- (68.) In this chapter he shews that the gross violations of right and decency are not to be classed under *ἀκρασία*, or from acting contrary to knowledge, but proceed from a perverted nature, where there is a complete confusion, or rather absence, of principles of right and wrong.
- (69.) 1. *τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐστίν*, sc. *οὐκ ἐστὶν φύσει ἡδία*,—*are not objects of desire by nature.*
- (70.) 2. *τὴν ἄνθρωπον*. Lamia, a lady of Pontus: Hor. Ars Poet. 340.—*περὶ τὸν Πάντων*: Arist. Pol. viii. 3, p. 260, and bk. iv. 18, p. 106.—*εὖ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον*. Phalaris is said to have eaten his son.
- (71.) 5. *οὐκ ἡ ἀπλὴ ἀκρασία*. Supply *ἡ ἐγκράτεια*.—*περὶ τοῖς θυμοῖς*, *angry passions*. See Gr. Gr. 355, obs. 1.—*τοῦ πάθους* sc. *ἀκρατῇ θυμοῦ*, not *ἀκρατῇ ἀπλῶς*.

CHAPTER VI.

- (72.) 1. *ἥττον αἰσχροῦ*, *less wrong*, less a violation of duty. *αἰσχρόν* gives the neuter notion of *κακία*, as *καλόν* of *ἀρετή*.
- (73.) 1. *φαντασία*, the faculty which receives impressions (*ἄνευ τῆς ὄψης*) from external things and acts, following on *αἰσθησις*, so that below *αἰσθησις* is used for it. *ὑβρις*, properly speaking, is not matter of *αἰσθησις*, but of *φαντασία*; it is not any thing or act actually *seen*, but it arises from some such thing or act.
- (74.) 1. *ὁ λόγος ἡ ἡ αἰσθησις*. The two channels whereby *ἡδὺ* presents itself, the one of things absent, the other of things present, are here distinctly recognised.
- (75.) 2. *ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ*. He is here speaking of right reason, which puts forth its directions under the form of *δεῖ*, as a matter of duty, which *ἐπιθυμία* does not, as we have seen in

ch. iii., allow to operate. The sensual λόγος, αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη, may have operated so far as to shew that this particular thing is ἡδύ, or that πᾶν ἡδύ διωκτόν, and so far it operates in ἀκρασία as to sanction the ὁρμή of ἐπιθυμία, but it does not say δεῖ πᾶν ἡδύ διώκειν: in θυμός, a sort of right reason, something which pretends to be so, lends its sanction to the action: δεῖ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν.

(76.) 2. καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης κ.τ.λ. Supply τοῦ θυμοῦ ἐστὶ φυσικωτέρα τῆς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.

(77.) 3. δολοπλόκον. The force of the quotation of course lies in the δόλος of the compound.

(78.) 3. ὥστ' εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. The way to construe this is, "If ἀκρασία proper is more a violation of justice than that of anger, it is also (καί) worse (αἰσχίον), and it is most properly termed ἀκρασία, and in a certain sense is vicio."

(79.) 4. This sorites is somewhat difficult, from the short way in which the argument is stated, and from there being a change from the first middle term,—*the greater cause for resentment in ἐπιθυμία*, and consequently greater injustice—to that which implies this, but does not state it,—*the less cause for resentment in ὀργή*, and consequent less injustice: "and ἀκρασία δι' ἐπιθυμίαν is worse than that from anger, for it is a fitter object for resentment, (ἀδικωτέρα); for ὀργή, being accompanied with λύπη, can have no ὕβρις, and therefore is a less fit object for resentment, and therefore less unjust."

Or it may be stated in another way:—

Whatever has pain has no ὕβρις:

ὀργή has pain;

ὀργή has no ὕβρις.

Whatever is a more fitting object of resentment than ὀργή is ἀδικωτέρα τῆς ὀργῆς.

ἀκρασία δι' ἐπιθυμίαν is more an object of resentment than ὀργή, (for ὀργή has no ὕβρις). Rhet. ii. 2. 5.

ἀκρασία δι' ἐπιθυμίαν is ἀδικωτέρα.

(80.) 4. καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία κ.τ.λ., sc. ἐστὶ ἀδικωτέρα.—μεθ' ἧς δ' αὖτε: see Rhet. ii. 2. 5.

(81.) 6. κατ' ἀρχάς: the beginning of this part of his book. Cf. ch. i., ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν.

- (82.) 6. τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, *in kind and degree*; i. e. both in their nature, and when they exceed proper bounds.
- (83.) 6. ἀλλὰ ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τινα κτλ., *except by a figure, and that when any kind of animal, &c.* οὐ γὰρ ἔχει belongs to the sentence ending λέγομεν, being the reason why those terms are not applied to animals except in a figure.—ἀλλὰ ἐξέστηκε, *but nevertheless it has transgressed its nature by its excesses*, and therefore in a figure we do apply these terms.
- (84.) 7. ἔλαττον κτλ., *sc. κακόν*.—φοβερώτερον, “*more awful*,” *sc. κακόν*. That θηριότης is not φοβερώτερον from the amount of evil it might inflict, is clear from the words in the end of the chapter, which say that the evils it can inflict are less than what a man with νοῦς can cause. φοβερώτερον, therefore, must mean in itself, in the impressions it creates. Thus a madman at large is more awful—creates stronger impressions of fear for the time, though he is really less able to do injury than a deliberate villain. (Cf. Plato, Republic, 519.) In the next sentence the emphasis lies on διεφθαρται, as opposed to οὐκ ἔχει.—θηριότης, *the state of beasts*,—whether it be in the brute creation, or in men who are “as brute beasts.” The words οὐ γὰρ διεφθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, mark, he considers such men merely brute beasts in human form.
- (85.) 7. ἀσινεστέρα, *less harmful*. See last note.—τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν: that which has no principle or power of action, no power of originating action, viz. νοῦς.—παρὰ πλῆσιον οὐν. This sentence is in a parenthesis, down to κάκιον, so that μυριοπλάσια γὰρ κτλ. refer to the clause ending ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή, to shew that the φανλότης of the one which has νοῦς is more harmful than the other which is without it.

CHAPTER VII.

- (86.) The habits of mind on bodily pleasure and pain, mentioned in this chapter, exhibited in the characters corresponding thereto, are—

1. ἀκόλαστος: seeks pleasure and avoids pain. (προαιρούμενος); this is the law of his life. ἡδὺ presents itself to him

as his sole ἀγαθόν, λυπηρόν as his sole κακόν,—ἀρχὴ διαφθείρεται, conscience reprobate.

2. ἀκρατής: indulges in evil pleasure contrary to his conscience and sense of right. The ἡδύ presents itself as ἀγαθόν, but not as τἀγαθόν.

3. μαλακός: shrinks from right pains. λυπηρόν presents itself for the time as κακόν.

4. καρτερικός: abides right pains for conscience' sake. λυπηρόν presents itself as a κακόν, but is counterbalanced by fear of αἰσχρόν, or love of καλόν, as the case may be.

5. ἐγκράτης: declines evil pleasures for conscience' sake. ἡδύ presents itself as a good, but is overpowered itself by fear of αἰσχρόν or love of καλόν.

6. σώφρων: evil pleasures do not present themselves as ἡδύ, nor proper pains as λυπηρόν, but the καλόν presents as ἡδύ, the αἰσχρόν as λυπηρόν.

(87.) 1. μεταξὺ δέ κτλ. Observe this expression of Aristotle's view of human nature.

(88.) 2. ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς κτλ.: excessive pleasures, out of the way, extraordinary indulgences,—such as are told of the old Roman epicures.—ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς, sc. ἡδία; carrying common pleasures to excess,—such as the drunkard or sensualist. The ἡ before διὰ προαίρεσιν is evidently out of place, as the ἀκόλαστος always acts with προαίρεσις: it is found, however, in almost all the MSS. Nevertheless, the Paraphrast and some other commentators omit it. It certainly creates hopeless confusion. Michelet suggests εἰ for ἡ, but it seems quite as simple an alteration to omit it: it may have crept in from the ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς.

(89.) 3. τῶν μὴ προαιρουμένων, sc. Aristotle here draws a distinction between the man whom an internal bias towards self-indulgences (ἡδονή) leads to act against his conscience, and one who acts thus under the pressure of a strong desire, an urgent external temptation, (ἐπιθυμία,) of which the former is the worse. This is the principle of the rhetorical way of putting a wrong act, (τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα,) the less the external temptation, the greater the natural tendency to wrong.

(90.) 3. διὸ κτλ. is introduced parenthetically, as what may be called "a proof by instance."

(91.) 3 τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων, *sc.* ἀγόμενος δι' ἡδονήν, and ψευδὲς τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας: of these, the latter is a species of μαλακία, the former approaches nearer (μᾶλλον) to the ἀκόλαστος, inasmuch as the motive cause of the evil act is his own evil tendencies.

(92.) 5. τρύφη: a species of μαλακία, a certain indolent, self-indulging temperament, which, above all things, dislikes trouble.—τὴν λύπην: equivalent accusative to πονήσῃ.—καὶ μιμούμενος κ.τ.λ. The man who does this affects the gait and indolent bearing of a sick person, but does not fancy that he is to be pitied for his affectation, though he is so as much as a sick man.

(93.) 6. Καρκίνον. I have so often heard a false quantity in this word that I think it as well to refer the student to Arist. Vesp. 1508.—ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ, a play of Carcinus.—Κερκίον. In this play Cercyon killed himself on finding out his daughter's disgrace.—Ξενοφάντῳ. A Xenophantus is mentioned by Seneca as having been a minstrel at the court of Alexander; and thus Aristotle became intimate with him.—Σκῦθας: see Hat. i. 105.

(94.) 7. παιδιώδης. He seems to seek ἡδὺ ἐν ὑπερβολῇ from προαίρεσις, but he is really trying to escape from λυπηρόν.—ἀνεσις, a cessation from toil.

(95.) 8. σφοδρότητα, *their vehemence*. See ch. xiv. 6, for an account of this.

In προπέτεια the κυρίως ἐπιστήμη has not time to make itself heard.

In the case of μελαγχολικοί, it speaks to ears closed by the dogged vehemence of the desire for some self-indulgence,—such as when a man tries to drown care by pleasure.

In ἀσθένεια the κυρίως ἐπιστήμη is partially heard, but ἐπιθυμία leads the mind to the wrong course of reasoning, and thus carries it off.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (96.) 1. ὡς περ ἡ πορῆσαμεν: see ch. ii. 10.—λανθάνει, *it escapes the person's notice*. The ἀκόλαστος is so without being aware of his wretchedness. The ἀκρατής is reminded of it by the stings of conscience.
- (97.) 2. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων, sc. the different sorts of ἀκρατεῖς: there is a parenthesis down to ἀτεροί, and we might not unreasonably suspect it to be an interpolation.—ἐκστατικοί, sc. ὕψις: see last chapter.—ἡ τῶν ταῦ, sc. οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ.—ὁμοίος γάρ refers to οὐ λανθάνει.
- (98.) 3. Here, instead of stating the similarity or dissimilarity between them separately, he states it together, and proves each separately, so that the clause τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ . . . ἐστίν belongs to the former clause, ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . φανερόν, and the clause οὐ μὴν . . . ἀδικοῦσι δε τοῦ ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως, "*but perhaps in some respects they are the same*."—τὸ Δημόδοκον. All that is known of Demodocus is that he was a native of a small island near Miletus, who made the Milesians butts for his wit.—ἀδικοὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ,—because the προαίρεσις is wanting.
- (99.) 4. ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι κ.τ.λ.: see bk. iii. ch. 4. The final cause is the starting-point in moral reasoning or actions, as in scientific reasoning we start from the hypothesis.—ἐκεῖ in mathematics: see bk. vi. 11. 4; and ch. 2. 3.—ὁ λόγος, *reasoning*, as opposed to νοῦς.
- (100.) 4. ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἠθικὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. We here gather that a δόξα of some sort is necessary to a moral action. After the ἐπιθυμία has been roused, and the ὁρεξίς moved, there is then a decision of the moral intellect (δόξα) as to the fitness or unfitness of the end. We are guided aright in this decision by the general tone of our mind,—either by the shadowy instincts of right and wrong (φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ) in the yet unformed character, or by the rational principles or instincts (ἠθικὴ) in the more developed mind. When this δόξα has pronounced the proposed οὐ ἔνεκα to be right, βούλησις follows, and the οὐ ἔνεκα becomes an actual end to us, (see bk. iii. note 40). The σὺμφων is of such a character that right always presents itself to him as right, and good, and pleasant; the ἀκόλαστος views

pleasure as good, and consequently very often the ἡδὴ as the good. He imagines it to himself as a law.—τοῦ ὀρθο-δοξεῖν depends on διδασκαλική.

- (101.) 5. ἔστι δέ τις. He is setting forth the two characters already described, not introducing new ones—ἀνέδην δεῖν, “that he ought unrestrainedly to follow evil pleasures.” The ἀρχή, the sense of right and wrong, οἱ διαφθείρεται, while in the ἀκόλαστος it is destroyed.

CHAPTER IX.

- (102.) The question started in ch. ii. 7 divides itself into three:—

1. Is ἐγκράτεια merely intellectual firmness?
2. Is it intellectual adherence to a right opinion?
3. Is intellectual rectitude the essence of it, intellectual firmness the accident?

- (103.) 1. ἡ δὲ τῷ ψευδεῖ refers to the case supposed in ch. ii., such as that of Philoctetes:—is such a man to be considered ἀκρατής?

- (104.) 1. ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. A man to be ἐγκρατής must have intellectual firmness; but this is not enough—it is καθ’ αὐτό possessing and acting on right moral judgment and principles, to which the peculiar circumstances (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) of the case make intellectual firmness necessary. The essence of ἐγκράτεια is moral, the way in which it accidentally operates is intellectual; the intellectual is a means to the moral, therefore the latter is the essence, the former the accident, (εἰ γὰρ τις—τό πρότερον).

- (105.) 2. ὥσπερ ἄσωτος κ.τ.λ., i. e. it is an exaggeration of the right principle.—ἐπεὶ εὐπείστος: the ἐγκρατής may change διὰ λόγον, though not δ.α. παθος: the difference between firmness and obstinacy.—ὁ δὲ οἶχ’ ὑπὸ λόγου, sc. μεταβάλλει.—λαμβάνουσιν, receive from external things.

- (106.) 3. ὥσπερ ψήφισματα. The ψήφισμα does not carry with it any power of effecting what it decrees; as far as itself goes, it is inoperative.—ὥστε μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.: because they are influenced, not by reason, but by pleasure and pain.

- (107.) 4. ἀλλὰ καλήν, sc. δὴ καλὴν ἡδονήν. Remark the distinction here drawn between the sorts of ἡδονή, καλή, and αἰσχρού.
- (108.) 5. He here shews that ἐγκράτεια is a mean, as well as those properly termed virtues.—ἢ τοιοῦτος; that is, as far as this point in his character is concerned. This is supported by three MSS. ὁ τοιοῦτος al. is a mere repetition of the first words of the clause: ἐστὶ must be supplied, ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐκ ἐμμένων ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ.—διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι: through his sense of pleasure being too strong; while the other does not allow himself the indulgences which reason allows, owing to his sense of pleasure being too weak, (διὰ τὸ ἥττον τι).
- (109.) 6. ἠκολούθηκεν, is derived from it in the way of analogy.

CHAPTER X.

- (110.) 1. He now shews that wherever ἀκρασία takes place, perfect φρόνησις is wanting. It is not that φρόνησις is not a sufficient development of the intellect, but because it is not sufficiently worked into the πάθος.
- (111.) 2. τὸν δὲ δεινόν. As δεινότης does not involve any moral considerations, but is merely a power of carrying out the necessary means to a desired end, the δεινός may be ἀκρατής, and *vice versa*, for the ἀκρατής may shew great δεινότης in arriving at his end.
- (112.) 2. κατὰ τὸν λόγον. δεινότης and the φρόνησις ἀπὸ τῆς δεινότητος are, as far as the intellect is concerned, an exertion of nearly the same faculty, but the latter has a right end in view, while the former may have either one or the other; or κατὰ τὸν λόγον may be construed, “as to their definition,” for both might be defined to be δύναμις τοῦ πράττειν τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος, though in the case of φρόνησις it must be ὀρθὸν τέλος.
- (113.) 3. ἐπιβουλος, “with malice intent.”—ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν, sc. ἀσθενής: does not abide by his intent. The μελαγχολικός is a person of morbid temperament, upon whom a temptation comes suddenly, and is embraced as a relief from the pain of existence.
- (114.) 4. τῶν βουλευσομένων, sc. the ἀσθενεῖς.

CHAPTER XI.

- (115.) Having discussed and explained the nature of ἀκρασία and ἐγκράτεια, he now proceeds to ἡδονή and λύπη as the motive causes of human action; while in the tenth book he rather considers them in their relation to, and connection with, the end, εὐδαιμονία.
- (116.) The fact that Aristotle discusses the question again in bk. x., and goes over, in many points, the same ground as here, has led some to suppose that these last chapters have found their way from the Eudemian Ethics (in which they occur verbatim) into this place; but the distinction given in the last note will point out a difference in his way of looking at pleasure and pain in this book and the tenth, while their close connection with ἀκρασία will suggest a sufficient reason why he should have introduced them here.
- (117.) 3. ζῆναι μὲν εἶναι, εἰ. ἀγαθὰ.
- (118.) 4. He gives the arguments by which these three opinions are supported.—γένεσις, *transition state*.—συγγενής, *co-existent with*. While the γένεσις (οικοδόμησις, for instance) is going on, the τέλος thereof (οἰκία) is not in existence; when the τέλος (οἰκία) is in existence, the γένεσις (οικοδόμησις) has ceased: therefore, if ἡδονή is a γένεσις, it cannot ever be co-existent with the ἀγαθόν, for this is a τέλος.

CHAPTER XII.

- (119) Aristotle in this chapter is giving the arguments on the other side of the question. We must not suppose that these are held all by the same persons, but they probably were used by differing schools or individuals, so that we must not expect the same facts to be assumed or the same results deduced in the several positions:—
1. That there is a difference between the ἀπλως ἡδύ and the τιμὴ ἡδύ, so that what may be true of the latter is not true necessarily of the former, (sect. 1).
 2. That there is a difference between the ἐνέργεια of pleasure and the ἔξις of pleasure, (sect. 2).

3. That even those pleasures which seem to be *γενίσεις* are not so really, but rather *ἐνέργειαι*, (sect. 3).

Sects. 4, 5, 6, and 7 are evident.

(120.) 1. *πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ.* The argument here is, that the objections urged above may be true as against *ἡδονή τινι*, but not *ἡδονή ἀπλῶς*.

(121.) 1. *ἀκολουθεῖσιν*. As there is an *ἀγαθόν ἀπλῶς*, and *ἀγαθόν τινι*, so there are *φύσεις* and *ἐξεις*, which are *ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς*, and others only *ἀγαθαὶ τινι*; and further, there are some *κινήσεις* and *γενίσεις ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς*, and others only *ἀγαθαὶ τινι*,—as, for instance, the *γένεσις*, or process of the act of sight, is *ἀγαθὴ ἀπλῶς*, the *γένεσις*, or process of recovery from sickness, is *ἀγαθὴ τινι*.

(122.) 1. *ἔναι δὲ οὐδὲ τῷδε*, sc. *δεῖ* or *καθ' αὐτάς*.

The divisions of *ἡδονή* in this respect are,—

ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς.

ἀγαθαὶ τινι δεῖ.

ἀγαθαὶ τινὶ ποτε.

φαίνεσθαι ἡδοναί.

(123.) 2. *ἔτι κ.τ.λ.* Further, we must distinguish between the *ἀπλῶς ἡδύ* and the *κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδύ*; for as not only an *ἐξίς*, or completed state, is *ἀγαθόν*, but also the *ἐνέργειαι* which precede and lead to that state, so also those *ἐνέργειαι* which may be viewed as *γενίσεις*, carrying us onward and producing in us some state which is agreeable to nature, αἱ (*ἐνέργειαι*, sc.) *καθιστᾶσαι (ἡμᾶς) εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἔξιν*: see Rhet. i. 10,) are pleasures, though only accidentally so, as being the *ἐνέργειαι* which are working towards a yet imperfect and deficient state, (*ὑπολοίπου ἔξιος*, so below, sect. 3,) *εἰς τελείωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως*, in order to get rid of the pain, *ἐνδεΐα*. They are not *καθ' αὐτάς* or *ἀπλῶς ἡδεῖαι*, because they are only *ἡδεΐαι* when the *ἐξίς* is *ὑπόλοιπος*; while to those who have no such lack or deficiency they are not pleasant. But all *ἡδονή* is not such a *γένεσις*, since (*ἔπει*) some exist without any preceding *ἐνδεΐα* or *ἐπιθυμία*, i. e. without any such *ὑπόλοιπος ἔξίς*. Michelet reads *ὑπολύπον ἔξιος*, i. e. *connected with pain*, that is, with an *ἐνδεΐα*; but the other reading has the same meaning. Aspasius interprets these words as above, —*τῆς λοιπαζομένης φύσεως καὶ ἐν ἐνδεΐᾳ οὐσίας*: the Paraphrast,—*ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὴν ἐλλείπουσαν ἔξιν ἀναπληροῦ*. Others interpret *ὑπολοίπου*, the re-

mains of our former nature; i.e. those appetites and wants which arise from the recollection of our former nature: but the former interpretation is the best, though the sense given to ὑπολοίπος is unusual; but the words οὐκ ἐνδεοὺς οὕσης below point to this sense. Cardwell reads, with one MS., "ὅτι αἱ ἐνέργειαι" for "ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια," making this sentence the reason or explanation of the former one: but the reading in the text comes to much the same thing. The clause beginning ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνευ λύπης seems to belong to the one ending with ἡδεῖαι, εἰσιν, so that ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια—ἔξως is in a sort of parenthesis, and we must supply before good, &c. But all are not of this sort.

- (124.) 2. ἔτι ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.—ἔξις. The connection of these words with what follows seems to be, that as the ἀγαθόν shews itself in an ἐνέργεια or an ἔξις, so the ἡδύ exists either as an ἐνέργεια or an ἔξις, though in the former it is only κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδύ, as tending towards a desired ἔξις.
- (125.) 2. τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοὺς οὕσης. This expression gives us the sense of the one opposed to it, viz. ὑπολοίπου ἔξως.
- (126.) 2. σημείον κ.τ.λ., sc. that the pleasures belonging to the ἐνέργεια of ἀναπλήρωσις and those belonging to the state which is the result of that ἀναπλήρωσις are different, so that what may be true of the one is not necessarily true of the other.
- (127.) 2. ἀναπληρουμένης: in the process of ἀναπλήρωσις.—καθεστηκυίας: in a state of κατάστασις, or satisfaction; a settled, quiescent state.—συνέστηκεν, *clash, differ*.
- (128.) 3. ἡδονὴ does not necessarily stand to ἀγαθόν as a γένεσις to the τέλος, which is the completion of it; for some sort of pleasure is simply an ἐνέργεια and a τέλος in itself, without anything beyond it.
- (129.) 3. οὐδέ γινόμενων κ.τ.λ. Nor do such pleasures arise when we are in the transition state of γένεσις, (γινόμενων,) but when we are in the possession and enjoyment of them, (χρωμένων).
- (130.) 3. καὶ τέλος κ.τ.λ. The τέλος of such pleasures (sight, for instance) is not distinct from the pleasure itself, but only of those which conduce to the supplement of some natural want, (ὑπολοίπου ἔξως, sect. 1).—δ:ό κ.τ.λ.: see ch. xi. 4.

- (131.) 3. ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, *the operation or energy of a state consonant to nature*. This is the definition of ἀπλῶς ἡδονή: the others, as we have seen above, are only κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδεῖαι—αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν, *a perceptible state of transition towards something*.
- (132.) 3. δοκεῖ δέ κτλ. It may be said that the very notion of pleasure being a γένεσις arises from its being in the most proper sense, (κυρίως) ἀγαθόν; for as that which is properly ἀγαθόν is an ἐνέργεια, and ἡδονή being properly such an ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, people confound it with a γένεσις, fancying that the two are identical. The way people got at the notion of its being a γένεσις was—ἡδονή must be an ἐνέργεια, because it is ἀγαθόν, and an ἐνέργεια must be a γένεσις. He brings forward the source of the error (that ἡδονή is a γένεσις) which he has just been confuting, in proof of his position that ἡδονή is in the proper sense an ἀγαθόν, (though not τἀγαθόν).
- (133.) 4. τὸ αὐτὸ καί, *the same as if* (you were to call) healthy things bad, because, &c.—πρὸς χρηματισμόν, *money-making, business*.—ταύτη. Viewed relatively, both ἡδία and ὑγεία are sometimes bad; but this does not prove them absolutely bad.
- (134.) 6. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλῃ κτλ. An art is that which sets out and regulates the productive powers of a δύναμις: that which sets out and regulates the operation of an ἐνέργεια is a law, not an art.—καίτοι: "and yet the objection does not seem to be founded in fact, for," &c.
- (135.) 7. τὸ δὲ τὸν σῶφρονα φεύγειν, *sc. τὴν ἡδονήν*.—τὸν δαυπον βίον, *sc. ἀλυσία in preference to ἡδονή*.

CHAPTER XIII.

- (136.) 1. ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική, *is an evil to particular persons*, (opposed to ἀπλῶς,) *as being in some way an hindrance to them*: αὐτῷ τῷ πῇ, opposing πῇ to ἀπλῶς.
- (137.) 1. ὥς γὰρ Ζεῦσιππος κτλ. The method devised to meet the foregoing argument (ἐξ ἐναντίων) was simply this: as the two extremes are not only opposed to the mean as good, but each to the other as an evil, so the opposition between λύπη and ἡδονή may be of this latter kind, and both be evils. Aristotle answers—if both were evils, both would be alike avoided. Cf. bk. i. 12.

- (138.) 2. τοῦτο, sc. ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος.—οὐδεμία γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The argument is, “ἐνέργεια τέλειος is ἡδονή, (as being ἀνεμπόδιστος,) εὐδαιμονία implies ἐνέργεια τέλειος, εὐδαιμονία implies ἡδονή.”
- (139.) 3. οἱ δέ κ.τ.λ.: see bk. i. ch. x. The essence of the εὐδαιμονία would remain, though the adjuncts perished; the εὐδαιμονία would remain, though the man would not be εὐδαίμων: see bk. i. note 175.—ἡ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες, whether they really mean it or not.
- (140.) 5. φήμη δ’ οὐ κ.τ.λ., Hes. Opp. 762.—λαοί, sc. φημίζουσιν, Hesiod.
- (141.) 6. οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, sc. πᾶσι.
- (142.) 6. ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν. In reality, there is a divine instinct within men, which prompts them to desire and seek after true pleasure, though in their views and practices they recognise and seek only the lower sort, because these are commonly received as the only pleasures. Reasonable self-love is at bottom a motive cause to every one.—παρεβάλλειν is neuter.—πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. These words give an important feature in Aristotle’s view of human nature.
- (143.) 7. ἡ ἐνέργεια, sc. τῆς ἡδονῆς.—ἐνδέχεται ζῆν, sc. τὸν εὐδαίμονα.

CHAPTER XIV.

- (144.) 2. οὐν, if then this is the case.
- (145.) 2. ἡ οὕτως. This is another opinion, which Aristotle, on the whole, adopts. He frequently introduces such opinions of his own by ἡ οὕτως.—τὸ μὴ κακόν, sc. the getting rid of the λύπη τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.—μέχρι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ: that is, as long as they are within proper limits.—τῷ διώκειν: modal dative.
- (146.) 2. οὐδέ τῆς ἡδονῆς, sc. ὑπερβολή ἐστι, i. e. where the energy or state is such as not to admit of its being indulged in too much, (such as sight, or thought,) there is no possibility of the pleasure arising from it being desired too much.—τὰς ἀναγκαίας, sc. ἡδονάς.—ἐναντίας δ’ ἐπὶ λύπης. In the case of ἡδονή a man is bad, not for pursuing pleasure at all, but its excess; in the case of λύπη a man is bad, not from avoiding the excess of pain, but pain altogether.—ὁλως, sc. ὁ φανῶς.
- (147.) 2. οὐ γὰρ ἐστι. This is an answer to the second ques-

tion proposed above, (διὰ τὶ οὖν κ.τ.λ.) "If some pleasures are bad, why are the pains opposed to them bad likewise?" Having first answered the difficulty, "how far bodily pleasures are good," (ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαί κ.τ.λ.), he then introduces his answer to the other, as if it were a deduction from it. We must supply the sentence to which γὰρ refers: "So that it is not absurd for one who holds excess of pleasure to be an evil, to say that λύπη is an evil also, for λύπη is not in itself the opposite of the bad sort of pleasure, but only accidentally, in the case of him to whom this bad sort of pleasure is good," (ἀλλ' ἡ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν). In itself this bad pleasure is an evil, and therefore cannot be opposed to λύπη, which is an evil also.

(148.) 3. τὸ διὰ τὶ φαίνεται ἀληθές is the nominative case to φανῇ.—ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ. The apodosis begins in sect. 4, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.: when a reasonable cause can be given for the origin of an error, it confirms the truth. Cf. Hooker, Ecc. Pol. I. viii. 3.

(149.) 4. ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, sc. τῆς ἡδονῆς.—σφοδραί. These remedies against violent pain are in themselves violent, hence the two are placed in strong contrast—διὸ καὶ διώκονται διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον (*by the side of the contrary*), φαίνεσθαι, sc. ἡδεῖαι. These false pleasures appear to be pleasures from their contrast to the pain to which they are opposed.—διὰ δύο ταῦτα may be either, the two reasons above do not prove these pleasures to be good, for the following reasons; or δύο ταῦτα may refer to the following reasons themselves.—ὅτι αὐτὸ μὲν κ.τ.λ. He is giving one reason for the view which some men, looking only at bodily pleasures, and these in excess, take of ἡδονή as an evil.

(150.) 4. αὐτὰ δὲ ἰατρείαι κ.τ.λ. This is another reason for the same. The full sentence is, αὐτὰ δὲ ἰατρείαι (οὐ σπουδαία εἶναι δοκοῦσι) ὅτι ἐνδεοὺς (εἰσὶ) καὶ (ὅτι) ἔχειν (τι) βέλτιον ἐστὶ, ἢ (τοῦτο) γίνεσθαι: "But the pleasures which are of the nature of remedies are held to be bad, because they imply a deficiency, and because it is better to be in possession of any thing, than that this thing should be in course of production," or ἔχειν may be rendered "an ἔξαι, and γίνεσθαι" and γένεσθαι towards that ἔξαι. It is better to be well than to have recourse to remedies for getting well: an ἰατρεία implies an evil, rather

than is itself a good. Such pleasures seem to be of the nature of evil, because they are merely remedies for a defect.

- (151.) 4. αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελειουμένων: "And other pleasures accidentally arise while the defect is in course of being supplied," (present participle, τελειουμένων,)—see below, sect. 7,—and therefore are only accidentally good, not in themselves, but in consequence of the previous defect.

- (152.) 5. ἔτι διώκονται: this is another reason why these pleasures appear to be the best.—ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, βλ. παρασκευάζωσι.—τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον, a passive, neutral state; with neither pleasure nor pain.

- (153.) 6. οἰνώμενοι. Their desires are more active and insatiable, as drunken men are more thirsty the more they drink.

- (154.) 7. αἱ δ' ἀνευ λυπῶν: such as the pleasures of thought, sight, &c.; and as these are never ἐν ὑπερβολῇ, they are σπουδαῖαι.—τοῦ ὑπομένουτος κ.τ.λ. Health is restored, not by the action of the medicine, but by the operation of the yet surviving principle of health. All that the antidote does is to check that which would prevent this principle working; and therefore, though it is for the time an object of desire, it is only accidentally so, as hindering a greater evil.—ἡ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως, which performs the actions suitable to such nature. In the Rhetoric this would be stated—ἡ ποιεῖ πρὸς ἡ φιλοτιμοῦτος, or τὰ καταστάνα εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν.

- (155.) 8. οὐκ ἀεί κ.τ.λ. St. James i. 8, "A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways." In proportion as the parts of our nature are harmonized so as to work together, our pleasures will be consistent and enduring.—καθὸ φθαρτά, as being destructible; since we are destructible.—ὅταν δ' ἰσάζη, when these balance each other.—διδὸς θεός κ.τ.λ. Here is a distinct recognition of a God, and of the divine nature.—ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκησίας. Sleep, for instance, is an ἐνέργεια ἀκησίας.

- (156.) It may be useful to subjoin a general view of ἀκρασία and ἐγκράτεια:—

ἀκρασία is twofold: α. improper pursuit of pleasure.

β. improper avoidance of pain.

ἐγκράτεια is twofold: α. avoidance of wrong pleasure.

β. endurance of right pain.

In both the will is supposed to be in a passive state, and two principles—one sensual, the other moral—existing passively in the mind. If the former were wanting, it would be *σωφροσύνη*; if the latter, it would be *ἀκρασία*.

ἀκρασία, α. pursuit of improper pleasure; sensual perception of particulars,—“*τουτὶ γλυκὺ* ;” *ἐπιθυμία*, of the senses roused,—the sensual principle called out; *πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ*: sensual syllogism: *φάσις* representing it as an object of rational desire; *τουτὶ ἡδύ*—*ἔρεξις*, of the will consequent thereon, apparently sanctioned by reason: slight but intellectual reaction of moral principle,—*ἢ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο*; *ἐπιθυμία ἄγει*, with the sanction of the *αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη*,—action as *ἡδύ*.

ἐγκράτεια, α. sensual perception of particular *τουτὶ γλυκὺ*; *ἐπιθυμία*; effective reaction of moral perception, *τουτὶ αἰσχρὸν*: moral principle called into being, *πᾶν αἰσχρὸν φεικτόν*,—*φάσις*; *τουτὶ φευκτόν*, action declined, though *ἡδύ*.

ἀκρασία, β. (*μαλακία*), avoidance of pain, *τουτὶ λυπηρόν*; sensual principle, *πᾶν λυπηρόν φεικτόν*; *φάσις*, *τουτὶ φευκτόν*: slight ineffective reaction of moral principle, *πᾶν καλὸν διωκτόν*,—action declined as painful.

ἐγκράτεια, β. (*καρτερία*), sensual perception, *τουτὶ λυπηρόν*; reaction of moral perception, *τουτὶ καλόν*; moral principle, *πᾶν καλὸν διωκτόν*.—*φάσις*: *τουτὶ διωκτόν*, action performed, though painful.

μὴ βουλευσάμενοι.

ἀκρασία διὰ ὀξύτητα: *τουτὶ γλυκὺ*, hasty decision,—*τουτὶ ἡδύ*, *τουτὶ διωκτόν*,—without giving time for the moral principle to make itself heard.

ἀκρασία διὰ σφοδρότητα (*μελαγχολικοί*): *τουτὶ γλυκὺ*, *τουτὶ διωκτόν*, violent impulse to escape pain,—obstinate *ἐπιθυμία*,—moral principle not allowed to speak.

ἀκρασία διὰ ἀσθένειαν: *βουλευσάμενοι*, taking counsel with right reason, but not having the moral principle in sufficient strength to be effectual;—given above.

ἀκρασία διὰ ἐθισμόν: where self-indulgence has given increase to the *ἐπιθυμία*, quickened sensual perception, and strengthened the sensual principle.

For *ἀκρασία ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας*, and *ἀκρασία ἀπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς*, see note 89.

BOOK VIII.

CHAPTER I.

- (1.) Aristotle in this book discusses the social instincts of man apart from any notion of social or political obligation, which he has treated of in the fourth (ch. vi.) and the fifth book. While going through the principles and the phenomena of *φιλία*, he shews that *ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ* secures the most perfect and enduring exercise of the social instincts, as he has shewn in the fifth book that it secures the due performance of social obligation.

The actual difficulties in this book are fewer than in any of the preceding, but it requires considerable attention and clearness to master and retain the details, and the relation in which the matters treated of stand to each other: such as the conditions of *φιλία* in general, and of true *φιλία* in particular,—the points of identity and difference between this true sort and the spurious imitations of it; and the relation between the several spheres of the social instincts,—domestic, social, political.

- (2.) 1. *ἀρετὴ τις*. For the proper development of one of the energies of the social instincts, the mean between *κολάκεια* and *ἀήδεια*, see bk. iv. 6. 4.—*τηρηθεῖν*, sc. *εὐημερία*.
- (3.) 2. *ἐν πενίᾳ τε*, al. *δέ*, as an emphatic reference to what goes before.—*βοηθεῖ*, sc. *ἡ φιλία*, al. *βοηθείας*, supported by a majority of MSS.: it must be taken as acc. plur. in apposition to *καταφυγὴν*. The plural is used in this way in (*Econ.* i. 8.—*σύν τε δ' ἐρχομένοι*: *Il.* x. 224.
- (4.) 4. *ἔοικε δὲ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία*. In the fifth book *χρεία* is spoken of as the bond of society. Mankind there are viewed in their artificial, as here in their natural, state. The earliest bond of society is *φιλία*, of which *χρεία* supplies the lack or the deficiency. *φιλία* is natural *δικαιοσύνη*, *δικαιοσύνη* is artificial *φιλία*: but where *φιλία* exists there is no need of its artificial substitute; where *δικαιοσύνη* supplies its place as the formal bond of union, there is still a necessity for *φιλία* in a greater or less degree,—at the very

least in its shape of *ὁμόνοια*—*ἔχθραν*, al. *ἐχθρὸν*.—*τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ*, the highest sort of *δίκαιον* seems to be founded on *φιλία*.

- (5.) 6. *διαμφισβητεῖται*: κτλ. These views of the nature of *φιλία* differ as it is supposed to be founded on *καλὸν*, ἡδύ, or *χρήσιμον*: if either of the two former, identity of feelings and interests is the principle of *φιλία*, (*ὁμοιοεπὶ ὁμοιον*); if the latter, diversity, (*κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ*). See ch. viii. 6.
- (6.) 6. *ὁθεν τὸν ὁμοιον*: Od. xvii. 218.—*κεραμεῖς*: Hes. Opp. 25, καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτίει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων.—*ἀνώτερον*, more deeply.—*φυσικώτερον*, on physical principles: *Εὐριπίδης*: Frag. ἀδελφῶν δραμάτων, iv.—*τὸ ἀντίξουν*, a surface with corresponding indentations.—*Ἡράκλειτος*: cf. Plato, Symp. 187, A—*ἔμιν*: Eth. Eud. vii. 1, Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποίησαντι “ὡς Ἔρις ἐκ τε θεῶν ἐκ τε ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλαιοιτο.”
- (7.) 7. This is the same practical principle on which he acts in his investigation of *ἀρετή*, where he says he does not discuss *τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή*.—καὶ τὰ ἕτερα: καὶ is even.—*ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται*. The meaning of this argument is, that those things which admit of change of degree do not differ in kind.—*ἔμπροσθεν*. Michelet approves of Zellius's reference to bk. ii. 8, where it is shewn that the extremes on either side of the mean do differ from the mean in kind, though they are also different degrees of the same *πάθος*.

CHAPTER II.

- (8.) The conditions of *φιλία* are:—1. *φιλητόν*. 2. *φίλησις*. 3. *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ* or *εὐνοία*. 4. *ἀντιφίλησις*. 5. *μὴ λατρεύουσα*. 6. *συζῆν*.
- (9.) 2. *ἀπλῶς*, in the abstract.

CHAPTER III.

- (10.) 2. οὐχ ᾧ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, not in respect of that which the person beloved is in himself; al. *φιλούμενος ἐστιν*, not, as in true friendship, where his mere existence, without

further results, is the object of friendship. ἡ εἰσίν, al. ἡ εἰσιν, as above: but εἰσίν is here evidently the copula.—ὅσπερ εἰσίν, whatever he may be, (e. g. good, ὁ ἀγαθός,) not for himself, but for what he is to them.

- (11.) 6. τελεία. φιλία is perfected by ἠθικὴ ἀρετή.—αἱ αὐταὶ ἡ ὅμοιαι, al. τοιαῦται ἡ ὅμοιαι, are of some particular sort, or like them; but the former reading is the better.
- (12.) 7. ταύτη δὲ ὑπάρχει κ.τ.λ., *herein exist all the above-mentioned requisites in the parties themselves*,—essentially, and not accidentally.—ταύτη ὅμοια, sc. τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας. The other sorts of friendship are merely resemblances and shadows of this: al. ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοια, in this they are similar, &c.
- (13.) 8. τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλλας. Michelet quotes Cic. de Amicitia, c. 19, *Verumque illud est quod dicitur multos modios salis simul dandos esse ut amicitiae munere expletum sit.* End. vii. 2: εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἄλων.
- (14.) 9. αὕτη, sc. φιλία κατ' ἀρετήν—κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, in regard of duration.—ταύτά, al. ταῦτα.

CHAPTER IV.

- (15.) 2. μηδέτερον, *he who is neither really good nor really bad* (neither ἐπιεικής nor φαῖλος) *can be a friend to any sort of man.*—οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ κ.τ.λ. Mark the analogy between φιλία and φιλαυτία, which is more fully drawn out hereafter.
- (16.) 3. οὐδενί, sc. διαβαλλοντι.—ἐν τούτοις, sc. τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.
- (17.) 5. συνάπτουσι, *combine.*
- (18.) 6. ταύτη, sc. τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλίᾳ: ὅμοιοι being used as ὁμοίωμα, in sect. 1: or ταύτη in this respect, sc. χρεία or ἡδονή.

CHAPTER V.

- (19.) 3. ἀποδεχόμενοι, *taking to one another.*—οἱ μακάριοι. The word expresses here both virtue and prosperity.
- (20.) 5. ἡδεῖ. The common reading is εἶδει, but it seems difficult to make any sense of this word; and the reading in

the text (ἡδεῖ) is not much better. βουλήσει is by some taken to mean τῷ ἀγαθῷ, in which case ἡδεῖ would do very well; but this seems doing violence to the word βουλήσει. I would suggest ἔργῳ, which is not a violent alteration.

CHAPTER VI.

- (21.) 4. μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλία κ.τ.λ., that friendship is most like friendship. I should be inclined to read φιλία.
- (22.) 6. εἰὰν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχῃται κ.τ.λ., *unless he (ὁ ὑπερέχων) be surpassed in virtue. If this be not the case, he does not, by being in his turn inferior, (ὑπερεχόμενος,) preserve an analogous equality. If the one who is superior in one point is inferior in another, there is, analogously, an equality between them.*
- (23.) 7. τοιοῦτοι, sc. ὑπερεχόμενοι. Those in power are not wont to look on themselves as ὑπερεχόμενοι τῇ ἀρετῇ.—αἱ εἰρημύναι, the three sorts of φιλίαι.—βούλονται, sc. τὰ αὐτά — καὶ μένουσιν, sc. καὶ ὅτι ἦττον μένουσιν.—κακείνῃ, sc. τῇ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλίᾳ.

CHAPTER VII.

- (24.) He now examines the nature and operation of the social instincts, where the parties are not on absolute, but only on a relative, footing of equality; where there is not an exact interchange of feelings, but such an interchange as answers to the relative position of the parties.
- (25.) 2. ἐπιεικὴς φιλία, *such as is seemly*; answering to ἐπιείκεια in justice,—not strictly φιλία, but such as suits the circumstances.
- (26.) 3. ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν κ.τ.λ. In φιλία each does not consider the exact rights of himself and the other; he does not think how much he is bound to give, but how far his abilities go. In δικαιοσύνη the main question is that of rights: he does not think how much he has power to give,

but how much the other has a right to claim. If *φιλία* and *δικαιοσύνη* were conceived to be at the opposite points of a line, then as *φιλία* degenerated into *δικαιοσύνη*, the *πόσον* would be exchanged for the *ἀξία*; as *δικαιοσύνη* was replaced by *φιλία*, the *ἀξία* would be lost sight of in the *πόσον*.

φιλία ——— *ἀξία* ——— *πόσον* ——— *δικαιοσύνη*.

In proportion as the question of *ἀξία* is forced upon us in the *φιλία ἐν ὑπεροχῇ*, the character of *φιλία* is lost.

- (27.) 5. *ἀφαιρουμένων*: many of the points of friendship being destroyed by inequality.—*μένει*, sc. *ὁ φίλος*, or *ἡ φιλία*.—*χωρισθέντος*, sc. *τοῦ φίλου*: al. *χωρισθέντες*, in which case we must supply *μένουσι*.
- (28.) 6. *ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι*, to him as a man. Whatever goods belong to humanity: hence not such as pertain to the gods.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (29.) 1. *ὑπερεχόμενος*, in an inferior condition.—*τοιοῦτος εἶναι*, al. om. *εἶναι*.
- (30.) 4. *ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν*. He is speaking of the *φιλία ἐν ὑπεροχῇ*.
- (31.) 5. *ὁμοιότης* (sc. *ἐστὶ*) *φιλότης*—*ἐπιτρέπειν*: the common reading has *ὑπηρετεῖν* after *ἐπιτρέπειν*, but the reading in the text is the better, supplying *ἀμαρτάνειν*.
- (32.) 6. *φιλητοὺς ὄντας*. This accusative depends on *δεῖ* in *ἀξιώτεον* = *δεῖ ἀξιοῦν*: Gr. Gr. 613, Obs. 5.

CHAPTER IX.

- (33.) He now discusses the nature and operation of the social instincts in domestic and political life.—*ἐν ἀρχῇ*, sc. ch. i. 4. Some persons have argued from this expression, here and elsewhere, (bk. viii. and ix.,) that these chapters do not properly belong to the Nicomachean Ethics: but there is no reason

why ἐν ἀρχῇ here may not mean "the beginning of this part of the subject;" and there are other passages in these books where the words ἐν ἀρχῇ, used somewhat differently, imply connection with the earlier parts of the Ethics.—φιλία δὲ: δὲ is emphatic; Gr. Gr. 761, 2.

- (34.) 1. καθ' ὅσον κτλ. As δίκαιον is the substitute for φιλία, it follows, that wherever there is φιλία there might be δικαιοσύνη; wherever there is δικαιοσύνη there might have been φιλία; so that either can be brought to prove the possible or actual existence of the other. Both depend on κοινωνία, wherefore, in whatever social relation there is δίκαιον, there must be a possibility of φιλία.
- (35.) 3. αὐξεσθαι κτλ. The nature of φιλία and δίκαιον is such that they vary in degree in a common ratio. Wherever the claims of φιλία are strongest, the claims of δίκαιον are so too. On the other hand, we must remember that where φιλία ought most to be, there δίκαιον ought least to be: but still, looking at it practically, as φιλία is so much set aside, the position in the text is perfectly true,—that where φιλία has most right to look for mutual good offices, there δίκαιον lays down the claims of each most authoritatively. For the use and progress of δίκαιον from a state of φιλία, see bk. v. ch. 8, note.
- (36.) 3. πᾶσαι, al. πᾶσι, wrongly.—τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ. So in the fifth book he speaks of χρεία as the bond of social union. The social instincts which bind man to man do generally assume their lower form of φιλία διὰ χρησμον, which differs but little from δικαιοσύνη, except that this latter is more definite. φιλία proper is a higher bond of union in the abstract, but practically does not work when the society grows from a family to a state. In the early Church we have an instance of an attempt to frame a society on the purer principle of φιλία, individual rights being for a time forgotten in the common interest,—the ἀξία merged in the πόσον; but individual rights soon made themselves heard, and complaints from individuals that their claims were neglected reintroduced δίκαιον into the Church: and surely, if there ever could be a society in which φιλία might have held her (abstractedly) natural place in society, it was a body of Christians who had received the especial grace of God. Yet

human nature refused to obey, and fell back on the artificial system of *δικαιοσύνη*. See note.—*δοκεῖ*. Michelet observes truly, that Aristotle does not mean to give this bond of social union as the best and truest, but only as the practical and historical view of it.

- (37.) 5. *θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες* at first sight seems to agree with the plural implied in *πολιτική*: but Michelet's observation is right, that *πολιτική* is an abstract noun, and therefore does not admit of this construction. See instances in Gr. Gr. 379, b. He refers *ποιοῦντες* to *φυλάται καὶ δημόται*, making from *ἔναι* down to *βίον* in a parenthesis, to mark that he is passing from the *σῖμπερον* to the *ἡδύ*, but that what he has advanced equally holds good. Grammatically speaking, *ποιοῦντες* might be viewed as the nominative to *πολιτεύονται χάριν*.—*τοῦ παρόντος κ.τ.λ.*, implied in *ἡ πολιτική ἐφίεται*,—see Gr. Gr. 708, 1; but Michelet's way seems the best.—*οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος κ.τ.λ.*: politics does not merely provide for the points of common weal as they from time to time arise, but for every part of life; not only for the actual *σῖμπερον*, but for the *ἡδύ* as far as it is *σῖμπερον*: hence all these associations which have *ἡδύ* in view come under politics, as well as those which look to *σῖμπερον*.—*περὶ ταύτας*, sc *θυσίας*.—*συνόδους* depends on *ποιοῦντες*, making *assemblies for these*, i. e. for sacrifices.

CHAPTER X.

- (38.) He now examines the social instincts as they are developed in the political or domestic life. The subject is discussed at length in the third and fourth books of the *Politics*.—*πολιτείας*. A constitution may be defined as a system or arrangement (*τάξις*: see Pol. iii. 1.) which embodies the rights and duties arising from the relations in which the various parties in the state stand, or are viewed as standing, to each other; and as the principle (*αἴτια*) on which these relations are estimated varies, the constitution varies likewise. It is to be distinguished from a government which takes care that these rights and duties are performed and exercised without let or hindrance. A good constitution is that which fitly embodies

the really existing relations. A constitution is bad when it embodies relations which do not exist, or does not embody relations which do exist.

- (39.) 2. ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης, *not independent*.—τὶς εἴη βασιλεύς, *al. ἡ βασιλεύς*. There is about equal authority for each. If ἡ is read, we must supply μᾶλλον before it: Gr. Gr. 579, Obs. 3. If ἡ is omitted, then κληρωτὸς βασιλεύς is the same notion as we find in Pol. iii. 10, p. 102.

- (40.) 3. περὶ πλείστου ποιοῦμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν. In oligarchy wealth is looked upon as an instrument of unconstitutional power. In timocracy it is a test of the relations in which the individuals of the state stand to each other; either of the amount of interest or stake which each person has in the common weal, or as a presumptive test of education and ability. Observe Aristotle's theory of revolutions.—βούλεται, *claims or pretends to be = is in theory*.

- (41.) 4. παραδείγματα, *models*.—πατρική, *patriarchal*.—αὕτη, *sc. ἡ δεσποτική*. It is right, because it truly embodies the relations which really exist between a master and a slave: the slave, viewed in the relation of a κτῆμα, has no rights or duties properly so called. The patriarchal authority, as set forth in Asia, is wrong, because the supposed relation between father and son, on which it is founded, as if they stood in the relation of master and slave, is not the true or real one.—διάφοροι: not merely different in species, but have a different character; are to be differently thought of; as in the cases just quoted.

- (42.) 5. ἀνδρός κ.τ.λ. Supply κοινωνία.

CHAPTER XI.

- (43.) 1. ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον: see note 34.

- (44.) 2. ἡ πατρική, *sc. φιλία*.—διαφέρει, *sc. τῆς βασιλείας*.—ἀπονέμεται, *attributes*.

- (45.) 6. ἐν οἷς μηδὲν κοινόν: where there is no common interest the slave has no interest in what his master does,—no mutual relations.

- (46.) 6. οἱ δὲ γὰρ δίκαιον. The argument here is, "If there is *φιλία* there would be *δίκαιον*; there is no *δίκαιον*, therefore no *φιλία*." The absence of *δίκαιον* is a token, not a cause, of the absence of *φιλία*; the lack of *φιλία*, on the other hand, is a cause of the absence of *δίκαιον*.—ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. There is an *ὠφέλεια* between the parties, but still no *κοινόν*, therefore neither *φιλία* nor *δίκαιον*.—μὲν γάρ: there is no *δίκαιον*, "for these indeed are benefited:" it is almost equivalent to "for though."
- (47.) 6. ἢ δοῦλος. Aristotle seems never to have been able to get rid of the fact that every man had *some* claim upon his fellow-men, by virtue of his humanity: he was obliged to recall to his mind the artificial view of individuals as slaves, in order to justify what he says as to their position.
- (48.) 7. δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι κ.τ.λ. This is the ἐπὶ πᾶσι *δίκαιον* of the fifth book.
- (49.) 7. καὶ φιλίας δὲ. καὶ δὲ (*φιλία*) πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι *φιλίας*:—unless the proper reading be καὶ *φιλία* δὲ. Michelet suggests that *φιλίας* depends on τί, supplied from *τι δίκαιον*.

CHAPTER XII.

- (50.) 1. πᾶσα *φιλία*. He is here speaking of *πολιτικαὶ φιλίαι*, or *φιλίαι κατ' ἀξίαν*.—ἀφορίσεις δ' αὖτις κ.τ.λ. One might perhaps eliminate or exclude from this definition the friendship of relationship and companionship, which might be viewed as arising from the *φυσικὴ φιλία* mentioned in chap. xiv. 4, from a similarity of feelings (*ὁμοπαθεῖς*), or of character (*ὁμοήθεις*), rather than from any community of interest between the parties. Eudem. vii. 10, λέγονται δὲ *φιλίαι*, *συγγενική, ἐταιρική, κοινωνική, ἢ λεγομένη πολιτική*.
- (51.) 2. ἐκείνῳ, al. ἐκείνων δὲ οὐδενί, sc. to none of these is the possessor an object of interest; but the new reading is by far the better.
- (52.) 3. τῷ ἐξ αὐτῶν πεφυκεναί. Cf. 1 Ep. St. John 5.—ταῦτον αἶμα: II. ζ. 211. *ρίζαν*: Eur. Ion. ix. 76.—καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις, in the separate branches.—εἰσὶ, sc. αἶμα καὶ *ρίζα*.

- (53.) 4. ἡλὶξ γὰρ ἡλικα, sc. τέρπει.—συννοικεῖνται, *are connected*.
- (54.) 5. ὡς πρὸς θεούς. Observe his notion of the care of the Divine Being for man.
- (55.) 6. ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία, sc. ἡ συγγενική.—τῶν ὁθνείων, sc. τῆς φιλίας.—ὁ βίος κ.τ.λ., *their daily lives have more in common*.—μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπισεικίσι; that is, where there is ἀρετή.—ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες. Supply εἰσι before οἰκειότεροι; ul. ὑπάρχοντες στέργουσι.
- (56.) 7. ὅσῳ πρότερον κτλ. In the Politics he speaks of the πολις as πρότερον τῇ φύσει: in that passage he is speaking *naturæ intendētis*,—πόλις, οἰκία, ἄνθρωπος; the ἄνθρωπος being formed with a view to the family, the family with a view to the state: in this passage he is speaking *naturæ operantis*, (ἄνθρωπος, οἰκία, πόλις.) as in order of development the individuals form themselves into families, and families become states.
- (57.) 7. ἡ πῶς δίκαιον, sc. συμβιώναι. The requirements of φιλία are the same as those of δίκαιον, though on different principles: as the relations differ, so will the δίκαιον; and hence also the φιλία must be different.—ταῦτόν, sc. δίκαιον.

CHAPTER XIII.

- (58.) 2. ἀμύνεται, ul. ἀμείβεται.
- (59.) 6. συναλλάξωσι: neuter. See Lidd. and Scott ad v.
- (60.) 6. φιλικὴν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει, *but it admits of a friendly delay*: φιλῶν, Bekker; *but friendship admits of delays*. cf. Plat. Legg. 915. But the former reading is the better, as the neuter adjective for the abstract noun requires the article τό: see Gr. Gr. 436, γ.
- (61.) 7. ὅτι δὴ ποτε ἄλλο, *for whatever other services he does to the other, are as to a friend*: ul. ἄλλῳ, sc. παρέχει. This is the old reading, but ἄλλο has MS. authority, and is better.
- (62.) 7. δυναμῶν. *If he is able, he must repay the debt*—καὶ ἐκόντι, *and with good-will*.—ἀκοντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., *for we must not make a man a friend against his will, as we should be doing if we were to suppose that as friendship is not ἐπι*

ῥητοῖς, therefore we need not repay it, that it was no debt. From *κομίζεσθαι* down to *ἐνεργετῆσθαι* we have the expectation of the benefactor, that though it is not a matter of debt, yet he expects to receive something in return; so that *δυναμένῳ* κτλ. refers to the clause *ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ οἶκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς*,—he is not to make a return unless he is able; and at the same time to the expectation of the donor,—he is to make a return if he is able. *διαλυτόντα* may either refer to the act of repaying, (*ἀποδοτέον*), the case being changed after *ὥς*, (see Gr. Gr. 703,) or may better depend on *διαλυτέον* below, (Gr. Gr. 613, obs. 5;) the clause *οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου* being evidently a parenthetical explanation of *ἐξ παθόντα ἰφ' οὗ οἶκ ἔδει*. In this interpretation *ἐκόντι* and *ἄκοντα* refer to different persons, one the agent, the other the recipient of the apodosis; and *καὶ ἐκόντι* has not the emphasis which it evidently is meant to have. It is better to take both for the same person, making *ἐκόντι* to refer to the will of the recipient, as *δυναμένῳ* does to the power of the agent, and making it depend on *ἀποδοῖναι* in *ἀποδοτέον*, (Gr. Gr. 613, 3,) and not on the passive verbal notion. “A return is to be made to him who did the benefit, if the person benefited is able to do it, and if he is willing to receive it; for one must not make a man a friend against his will,” which would be the case if you were to treat a man as if he had done you a service as a friend, while he declares he did not do it as your friend, that he has no such claim upon you: as where a person had accidentally benefited another, without the least notion of doing him a service, or done it from friendship to some one else. In such a case the person benefited ought not to have received the benefit, and all he has to do now is to allow the matter to be settled, (*διαλυτέον*), as if it had been *ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς*; in which case, as no mention of return was made beforehand, no return would be expected afterwards. This gives *καὶ ἐκόντι* its emphatic force, and gives the two conditions of the *ἀνταπόδοσις*, viz. the ability of one party and the willingness of the other; and moreover describes a case which is perpetually happening in every-day life. A man refuses to accept a return for a benefit conferred, because such acceptance would imply a friendship which does not exist, and was not implied in the original act.

- (63.) 9. *ὁμολογήσαι* ἄν; κτλ. As the words *καὶ ἐκόντι* are explained by *ἄκοντα γάρ* κτλ., so here we have an explanation of

the condition *δυναμίνῳ* :—"Any one would allow that he ought to repay it, if he is able; if not, no one would expect it;"—*al. ὁμολογήσαι*, which is not right; *al. ὁμολόγησε δ' αὖ*, which would favour the former of the two interpretations, by shewing that the *ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς* refers to the *ἀπόδοσις* to which he would have agreed beforehand, and not, as suggested in the second interpretation, to there being no bargain for an *ἀπόδοσις*, and therefore no case for it.

(64.) 11. *ἑπαρκεῖ*, *sc. ἕτερος*.

CHAPTER XIV.

(65.) 3. *εἰς χρήματα κ.τ.λ.*, by him who is on the debtor side with respect to money or to excellence.—*ἀνταποδιδόντα* depends on *δεῖ* in *ἀνταποδοτέον* = *δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποδοῦναι*.

(66.) 4. *οὐδεὶς γάρ κ.τ.λ.* Observe here again his notions of the gods.—*ὁ φείλοντα*, same construction as *ἀνταποδοτέον* above.—*ὑπερβάλλοντος*. *sc. υἱοῦ*.—*τῷ δὲ φευκτόν*, *sc. υἱῷ μ.χθερῷ ὄντι*.—*οὐ πάσχειν*, the father cannot hope for any benefit from a very bad son, and men do not usually benefit those for whom they cannot hope for some return.

BOOK IX.

CHAPTER I.

(1.) ARISTOTLE in this book considers certain questions connected with our social instincts, their development and operation.—*καθάπερ εἰρηται* *sc. viii. 14. 4*.

(2.) 2. *ὁ ἐρώμενος*, *sc. ἐγκαλεῖ*.—*ἐπαγγελλόμενος*, *sc. ὁ ἐραστής*.

(3.) 3. *ἡ τῶν ἡθικῶν*, *sc. ἡ ἠθική*.

(4.) 4. *κισαρωδῶ*, *Plut. Fort. Alex. c. i*. Dionysius is said to have answered a poet who claimed a promised reward, that he had repaid him by the pleasures of hope which his promise had given him.

- (5.) 5. ταῦτα, sc. ἃ ἔχει, al. ταῦτά, sc. *of the same value*.—
 νου χάριν, sc. ὃν δεόμενος τυγχάνει.—προλαβόντος, *who was the first recipient*, as προέχοντα below.—Πρωταγ.
 Plat. Prot. 328, B.
- (6.) 6. μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω,
 Opp. 368.
- (7.) 7. δι' αὐτούς, *those who benefit their friends for their sake*, i. e. δι' ἀρετήν.
- (8.) 8. τὸν προέχοντα, *he who first received the benefit*.—ἀ
 λαβών, sc. ὁ ἕτερος.
- (9.) 8. ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις, *in shops*. The buyer fixes the price
 will give according to the benefit or pleasure he thinks
 article will give him, and will not give more; whereas
 seller tries to get as much as he can. The need of the buyer
 gives the article its marketable value; and the person
 has been benefited in the same way ought to fix the value
 as it was his need which determined it.
- (10.) 9. ἐκουσίῳ συμβολαίῳ: see v. 2. 13.

CHAPTER II.

- (11.) He now considers some questions of casuistry. The logic
 description of casuistry would be, where the particular minor
 or fact being realized, a deliberation arises as to what major
 premiss or principle we should refer that known particular
 Honest casuistry is where the doubt implied in such delib-
 ration is real. Dishonest, or casuistry in its usual accep-
 tion, is where the proper major is really known, but it is
 tempted to refer the minor to some more palatable principle,
 and thus escape from an inconvenient conclusion or from
 agreeable duty.—ὁμοίως, sc. πότερον.
- (12.) 5. ἐαυτοῦ, *than himself*. He ought rather to ransom
 father, than procure his own liberty.—τὴν προὔπαρχον
 al. ἐτέρου προὔπαρχήν, al. ἐταίρου.—τῷ δέ refers to the same
 person as ὁ μὲν, while the nominative to οἶται is supplied
 from σπουδαῖον.—οἶονταί δέ, but they suppose it so.
- (13.) 8. τροφῆς ἐπαρκεῖν. For gen. see Gr. Gr. 535.

CHAPTER III.

- (14.) 1. ἐν ἀρχῇ, ch. i. 4. These words seem frequently to have the sense of "before," unless we choose to adopt the notion of their denoting that the Ethics are made up of a number of separate treatises, so that the beginning of each one may be referred to as the ἀρχή.
- (15.) 3. γίνηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, al. ἢ καὶ δοκῇ. — αὐτὸ δὲ, om. al.

CHAPTER IV.

- (16.) He here commences an analysis of our social nature, and its connection with self-love.
- (17.) 1. προσκεκρουκότες, *those who have met with some offence*,—they continue friends, even though they look for no return.
- (18.) 2. τοιοῦτοι, sc. ἐπαιεῖς.—μέτρον, the standard whereby the perfection or right operation in human affairs is estimated; so that in the case of φιλαντία he is most perfectly φιλαντος who is σπουδαιότατος.
- (19.) 3. τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ. It is the property of the good man, that he aims and works out his highest good, and for the sake of that which is most properly himself,—his reason: he aims at a rational existence; and hence, as this is the highest good of man, he is most truly φιλαντος who develops it.—τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα: these coincide. *The good presents itself as good to him.* There is no double-mindedness in him, no difference between his abstract idea of good, and his practical appreciation of it.—τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, sc. ἀνθρώπου.
- (20.) 3. τοῦ διανοητικοῦ χάριν. The good man lives a life of reason, not of sense, according to the κυρίως, not the αἰσθητική, ἐπιστήμη: even those parts of his sensual nature which enter into his life are governed by, or rather leavened by, reason. Cf. ch. 8. 6, sqq., whence it is clear that by διανοητικοῦ here he means the practical, not only the scientific, intellect.
- (21.) 4. ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται κτ.λ. The point he wishes to prove is, that the good man, as most completely

realizing his nature, or personality (*ἐκαστότης*), i. e. that which we properly call ourselves,—is most truly fond of himself, and most truly wishes good to himself, and hence is most truly *φίλωνος*.

The good of every creature depends on its personality (*ἐκαστότης*), i. e. must be suitable to, and be the development, or energy of, that living being which each man calls himself. He proves this—

1. By the fact that when a living being, (man, for instance,) having a distinct personality and nature, by virtue of which he wishes himself a particular sort of good, partially throws off this personality, and assumes a fresh one, (*γενόμενος ἄλλος*), as if he were to become an animal, as Circe's swine, or to live a mere animal life, he would not be content that his new nature (*ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον*) should be his all in all, (*πάντ' ἔχειν*); retaining an instinctive consciousness of his former nature and personality, he has desires suitable to it: so that hence we see that a man's notion of his proper good, and his possession of it, depends on his proper personality.

2. The Divine Being has some good; but even this is by virtue of some nature or personality unknown to us, (*ὧν ὁ τὸ ποτ' ἔστι*), to which this good is suitable.

So that, if in proportion as any one realizes and develops his personality or true nature he wishes the truest good to himself, it follows that a good man, leading a life of reason, (which is the *ἐκαστότης* of man,) wishes most truly good to himself.

(22.) 5. τῷ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτόν—*ἰπάρχειν*. Dative of proof: see Gr. Gr. 609, 5.

(23.) 5. εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, seems to be something real: *τι* is emphatic. So Plato, *Phædr.* 242 E, *σεμνόνεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντε*.

(24.) 6. ταύτη, *here*.—τὰ εἰρημένα, the above-named conditions of friendship, viz. *ἑαυτοῖς συνδιαγεῖν βούλεσθαι; συνιλεγεῖν* and *συνήδεσθαι*: or some take them to be those named in the beginning of the chapter, but not so well; others (and among them the author of the *Eudemian Ethics*, (vii. 6,) and the *Paraphrast*) interpret it, "Friendship towards a man's self can exist in the degree in which a man has in himself two parts or principles, viz. the *ἄλογον* and *λόγον ἔχον*." In the *Magna Moralia*, p. 18, we find both interpretations.

- (25.) 8. *ἐτέρων μὲν κ.τ.λ. ἐπιθυμοῦσιν* (the sensual desire); *ἀλλὰ δὲ βούλονται* (the rational desire); so that their senses and their reason differ.—*δοκοῦντων*. This word here implies *δοξα*, a definite act of the reason. *μισοῦσιν τε καί*, al. *μισοῦνται* without *τε καί*; both have about equal MSS. authority. The Paraphrast evidently read *μισοῦνται*—*μὴ χθρῖαν* may refer to what goes before, as in the text, or to what follows.
- (26.) 9. *διασπῶντα* agrees with *τὸ μὲν*—*τὸ δέ*.
- (27.) 10. *εἰ δὲ μὴ οἶόν τε κ.τ.λ.* If the pleasure and pain cannot be coincident, at all events (*ἀλλά γε*) pain follows very quickly on the pleasure.—*οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο—γίνεσθαι*, and he would not wish that these pleasures should (*again*) be his.

CHAPTER V.

- (28.) 1. *πρότερον*, viii. 2.—*διάτασιν*, *intentness, earnestness*.
- (29.) 3. *οὐδὲν μᾶλλον*, *not a whit the more for that reason*.—*ἀλλ' ὅταν*, *except when*.—*οὐκ ἔοικεν εἶνους εἶναι*. The object of *εἶνους* is another; when the *χρήσιμον* or *ἡδὺ* of oneself comes in, it is rather spurious *φιλαντία*.

CHAPTER VI.

- (30.) 1. *ὁμόνοια*, *harmony of feeling, sympathy*.
- (31.) 2. *πᾶσι δοκῇ*, *when by common consent it is agreed*.—*ἀρχεῖν Πίττακον κ.τ.λ.* Pittacus, leader of the Mityleneans, is related by Diogenes Laertius (i. 75) to have had this privilege granted him, and to have exercised it for ten years, on account of certain victories gained by him.—*οὐ γὰρ ἴστιν κ.τ.λ.* *ὁμόνοια* does not consist in identity of feeling, but identity of feeling for the same object, and in the same circumstances.
- (32.) 3. *ἐπὶ τῶν αἰτῶν ὄντες*, "*being, so to say, in the same ship*,"—*ὥσπερ Εὐριπός*. The tides of the Euripus, the *παλῖρμθοι Ἀἰλίδος τόποι*, are used as emblems of inconstancy both in Greek and Latin writers.
- (33.) 4. *ἐξετάζει*, "*watches*," *enquires into*.

CHAPTER VII.

- (34.) 1. οἱ δ' ἐϋεργέται. This is an unusual introduction of an ἀπορία by stating it as a fact.—There is a conjunction wanting here. γινόμενον is in apposition to the sentence: *and this being so, &c.*
- (35.) 1. Ἐπίχαρμος. These words may be an actual quotation of the end of an iambic from Epicharmus, or may only represent his meaning.—ἐκ πανηροῦ: either “*from the bad part of human nature,*” or *from a bad point of view.*
- (36.) 2. φυσικώτερον, to be more founded on the nature of the thing.—φυσικώτερόν τε, al. τῷ.—περὶ, *in the case of.*—καὶ μὴδεν ὅσι—γένοιντο. The conjunctive points to the present, the opt. to the future. (Cardwell.)
- (37.) 4. ἐσμὶν δ' ἐνεργεῖα. This observation is founded on a profound knowledge of the human mind. It is the principle which stirs men up to activity and toil where no definite advantage is to be gained by it.
- (38.) 4. ἐνεργεῖα δὴ—ἔστι πως, exists as it were in his energy. Michelet takes τὸ ἔργον as the nominative, and reads ἐστὶ πως; and this interpretation is recognized by the Paraphrast. The argument is, that the act of benefiting another is an act of existence, is a realization to us of our existence, and therefore pleasant; while the act of being benefited is something passive, and does not realize to us our existence, as we do not co-operate in it, but we are simply recipients of the act of the agent.—ὃ γὰρ ἐστὶ δυνάμει: that which has a virtual, in posse (δυνάμει) existence, is set forth actually in esse (ἐνεργείᾳ) by its act or result.
- (39.) 5. χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, so that he to whom this pertains feels pleasure.—οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι. The words καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι must be taken together: *the feeling of καλὸν which exists in the agent.*
- (40.) 6. ἀνάπαλιν. In the benefactor the memory of the καλόν is sweet, and he therefore dwells with pleasure on his act and its object. In the person benefited the remembrance of the σίμπερον is less vivid; and he rather looks forward to some new benefit, than backwards to what he has received. It is in this sense that gratitude has been defined

as a lively sense of favours to come — ποιήσει, a productive act. τῷ πάσχειν, a passive act: the former produces feelings of στίργειν ὥσπερ τέκνα: εὐεργετῆν gives a notion of ὑπεροχή,—εὐεργετῆσθαι a notion of ὑπερίχουσθαι; hence also the benefactor loves his act for the feeling of superiority which it gives him.

- (41.) 7. τῶν παραλαβόντων, than those who inherit it.—μᾶλλον ἴσασι, i. e. more than the children know them as the authors of their being, or than the fathers know the children to be theirs.

CHAPTER VIII.

- (42.) 1. ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, losing sight of himself and his own interests.
- (43.) 2. οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται, which are the characteristics of friendship.
- (44.) 4. προσηγορία, "appellation."
- (45.) 5. σπουδάσοι, al. σπουδαζει, which is quite as good. The indicative signifies the every-day fact of a good man's zeal for right; the optative denotes that he may be viewed as greedy of right action.
- (46.) 6. ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, his most essential part.—πόλις, the state (—the citizens in their corporate, not their individual, capacity,) is the most essential, and most to be considered in the commonwealth, as every other compound body (πάν ἄλλο σῶστημα) is most to be considered when taken as a whole, and not in its several parts: so in human nature, the whole of the parts together is the most proper essence of man, and more to be considered than each or all of the parts separately.
- (47.) 6. τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν, sc. ἑαυτοῦ τὸ κυριώτατον.—ὀρέγασθαι, al. ὀρέγεσθαι ἤ.
- (48.) 7. ἀποδέχονται, welcome.—πάντων δ' ἀμιλλωμένων. This brings to mind what Butler says of the tendencies of virtue, part i. ch. 3. The public as well as the individual good would be secured by true φιλαντία.
- (49.) 8. πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς. The reason, when not perverted and

overwhelmed by the passions, as in the case of the ἀκόλαστος or πεπηρωμένος, chooses the highest good: perhaps even in these desperate cases the good is occasionally perceived by the reason, though not even in wish acted upon.

- (50.) 9. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ σπουδαίου, al. τὸ περὶ σπουδαίου, *what is said of the good man*.—ὑπεροποθνήσκουσι, *those who die for their country or friends*.—ἐφ' ᾧ λήγονται. See Grammar, 836, 5, c.

CHAPTER IX.

- (51.) 1. ὁθεν τό κ.τ.λ.: Eur. Orest. 667.
- (52.) 2. εἰτυχούντων οὖς, sc. δεομένων. οὖς in attraction to ποιήσοισιν.
- (53.) 4. ἐπεισακτοῦ ἡδονῆς, *adventitious*.
- (54.) 5. ὅτι γίνεται. If the word ἐνέργεια had not preceded, this passage might have been correctly translated, *is an energy* (γίνεται), and not a state, (ὑπάρχει): it is an active process, not a passive state, and therefore requires to be, as it were, in perpetual motion; and this is attained, even though we are unable to energize continuously in ourselves, by the cognate energies of our friends, which are, as it were, our own feelings and actions reproduced in others.—ἔστι δὲ τὸ οἰκεῖον, and that which belongs to ourselves is classed among things pleasant.—ἐαυτούς, ourselves: Gr. Gr. 654, 2, b.
- (55.) 5. ἀμφω, sc. τὴν ἐνέργειαν, and τὸ οἰκεῖον.
- (56.) 7. ἀσκησις, *discipline*.—Θέογνις. Ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλὰ διδασκεί. Ἦν δὲ κακοῖσι συμμίσγης ἀπολείς καὶ τὸν ἔοντα νόον. —Φυσικώτερον: looking more into the principles and reason of the matter,—psychologically.
- (57.) The argument here used seems to be simply this:—To live is pleasant to the good man above all others. This life consists in the energies of Perception and Intellect, and the pleasure arises from the consciousness, whether perceptive or intellectual, of such energies: in proportion, then, as this consciousness is increased, the pleasure of the good man is increased likewise; and the good man so deeply sympathizes

with the energies of his friend's life, his acts of perception and consciousness, that he feels his own life, as it were, in his ; and therefore, if he had no friends, he would be deprived of no small part of his pleasure in living.

- (58.) 7. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται. Life is defined (by calling it), in the case of animals, the power, &c. ὀρίζεσθαι is to give its definition, i.e. to state the difference or essence. That the acts of αἰσθesis and νόσις, not the mere power thereof, constitute human life, is proved in what follows.

- (59.) 7. ἡ δὲ δύναμις—ἀνάγεται. The power is referred to its operation, i.e. the power has no value or real existence except when viewed in its development; therefore the real value of the human δύναμις τῆς αἰσθήσεως and νοήσεως depends on the acts of perception and thought. A man is not man by virtue of possessing the power, but by having further the power and opportunity of exercising it—τὸ δὲ κύριον, and essence of the human ζωή is in the acts of αἰσθesis and νόσις.—τοῖς κ.τ.λ. τὸ ζῆν, then, seems to consist not merely in the power, but in the acts, of αἰσθesis and νόσις,—the same conclusion as before, but arrived at differently.—ὥρισμένον γάρ, for there is something settled and defined in it, which is of the nature (and therefore one of the tests) of good; while that which is ἀόριστος is made up of a variety of unsettled, shifting particulars,—καὶ τῷ ἐπισκεῖ, sc. ἐστὶ ἀγαθόν.

- (60.) 8. οἱ δ' ἐν λύπαις, nor one overwhelmed with sorrow.—τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, its circumstances and details.

- (61.) 9. εἰ δ' αὐτό κ.τ.λ. The apodosis is difficult to see. Some make καὶ ἡδύ the apodosis, supplying ἐστὶ; but that would be only a repetition of what is said above. Michelet better places it at καθάπερ οὖν, taking the clauses between as a series of parentheses; but this is a long way off: and it may be placed at τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῆ, which would make very good sense, as this is a consequence from the εἰ δ' αὐτό κ.τ.λ., and δέ is used to take up the sense interrupted by a parenthesis, (see Gr. Gr. 767, 4); and the words φρεσὶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή is a repetition of the protasis, in consequence of the long parenthesis—βίος, life; ζωή, existence. Mark the difference between these two,—βίος referring rather to external circumstances, ζωή to internal constitution and state.—ν ο ο υ-

μεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν: Met. xi. 9, p. 255, νόησις ἐστὶν νοήσεως νόησις: i. e. thought consists in the intellectual perception of thought.—τὸ δὲ ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν ὅτι ἐσμέν. This perception, (τὸ δὲ) ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, is really a perception ὅτι ἐσμέν, and therefore every such consciousness is a consciousness of our being living beings, and therefore brings pleasure.

- (62) 10. ὥς δέ κτλ. The rest of the argument is clear enough, that a man receives these impressions of his own existence from seeing them in his friends.

CHAPTER X.

- (63.) 1. μήτε πολύξεινος: Hes. Op. et Dier. 713.
- (64) 3. οὔτε γάρ κτλ. This is a curious dogma, when illustrated by modern history; but the real fact is, that except where the representative principle is admitted, which it was not in antiquity, it seems to be true.—τὸ δὲ πῶσον. The exact quantity is not one point in all, but varies, according to circumstances, between two given points, which mark the too much or the too little.
- (65.) 5. σύμπτειν, *happen coincidently*.
- (66) 6. ἐν δυοῖν λέγονται: Pylades and Orestes, &c.—πλήν πολιτικῶς. *except politically*, i. e. as members of the same state, or belonging to the same party.

CHAPTER XI.

- (67.) 2. τὸ λεχθέν, so. κουφίζονται οἱ λυπούμενοι.
- (68.) 3. αὐτὸ—τὸ ὁρᾶν, *the very sight of one's friends, &c.*
- (69.) 4. συλλυπεῖν, al. συλλυπεῖσθαι.—ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ. *ὑπερτείνῃ* depends on ἀνδρωδῇ, implied in ἀνδρωδεις: Gr. Gr. 390, 1, b. The meaning of this is, that if he is not excessively callous to painful impressions, he cannot bear the sight of his friends grieving for him. The Paraphrast and Thomas Aquinas give another interpretation: "Unless the friend out-

weighs their grief by his own ἀλυπία, they do not bear to communicate their grief to him;" but this is very forced.

(70) 5. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν. Cf. Eur. Orest. 239; Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1061.

(71.) 6. τὸ μὴ ἀξιῶσάνας. The common reading is τοῖς. τὸ here equals τοῦτο, (Gr. Gr. 444. 5,) and refers to τὸ ποιεῖν: "and those who do claim it."—δόξαν ἀηδίας. We must take care, when we decline the sympathy of a friend from a reluctance to give him pain, that we do not give him an impression that we are acting from a dislike to his company.

CHAPTER XII.

(72) 1. ἀρα. He sums up what he has said:—*Is not then, &c.?*

(73.) 1. ἡ αἰσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν, *the perception of existence.*

(74.) 2. τούτων κοινωνοῦσι κτλ., *share (with them) these things whereby they think to live.*

(75.) 3. ἀπομάττονται, *they take impressions from one another.*
See Lidd. and Scott ad v.

BOOK X.

CHAPTER I.

(1.) As Aristotle had, in the end of the seventh book, treated of pleasure and pain as the motive causes of human action, as the subject-matter, in the regulation of which consisted the several habits of σωφροσύνη, ἔγκρατος, ἀκρασία,—how far it was an admissible motive, how far to be suppressed and eradicated,—so here he considers pleasure in its immediate connection with the Good, or Happiness; how far it differs from, how far it agrees with it: and he shews that, while pleasure is an universal object to

man, the highest pleasure results from the best energies, and that, therefore, the highest pleasure generally attainable by the *compound* being man arises from the ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν: and hence pleasure itself, as a simple tendency of our nature, bears witness to the happiness of man, *as man*, being developed by ἠθικὴ ἀρετή.

- (2.) 1. πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἠθους ἀρχήν. Either the starting-point in the formation of the moral character, or the first step in moral action, viz. the choice of the particular act, of the τὸ πρακτόν. It is equally true, whether it be taken of the one or the other. ἀρετήν is the common reading.
- (3.) 3. μὴ ποτε—λέγεσθαι. See Grammar, 873. 4; 814. a.—τοιαύτην οὖσαν ἀπασαν: as if it were all αἰρετόν.
- (4.) 4. διό, *because they are believed*.—τοὺς συνιέντας, *those who comprehend them*.

CHAPTER II.

- (5.) 1. Εὐδοξος represents the doctrines afterwards held by Epicurus. He lived about B.C. 366.—The arguments in favour of pleasure, as stated here, are—
1. Its being the common desire and end of human nature.
 2. From contraries.
 3. From its being a final and complete end.
 4. From its increasing all other goods in degree, when added to them.
- (6.) 1. ἐπιεικής: here simply *good*.—καὶ τὸ μάλιστα, *and that which is most so*.—κράτιστον, *the best, or bravest*, as our old authors use the word.
- (7.) 2. αὐξέσθαι αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ, *change of degree, not of kind*. This is necessary to the argument. If it were a change in kind, it might be argued that the thing added to was good, while that which changed it was less so; but if the universal characteristic of pleasure is that it enhances every good, however different in kind, it would seem to have the *good* in itself.
- (8.) 3. τῶν ἀγαθῶν, *of the number of goods*.—Πλάτων: in the *Philebus*, 20, E, sqq.—ἀναίρει, *argues destructively*.—οὐ-

δενὸς προστεθέντος κτ.λ., *by no addition is good made better*.—δῆλον δέ κτ.λ. This is not Aristotle's own argument, but from Plato, *Phileb.* 20, E. Aristotle, in bk. i. 7, 8, contemplates the possibility of εὐδαιμονία being increased in degree. See also i. 11, 12.

- (9) 4. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον. οὖν, as Michelet rightly observes, has here an adversative sense, (*Gr. Gr.* 737, 4,) marking an objection to Plato's doctrine; not, however, as he would have it, a direct objection to his *ιδέα*: it is rather, against his notion, that any good which is capable of increase in degree by the addition of other good things, cannot be *the good*. *What is there such?* It can only be an abstract idea, not anything οὐ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν: and this is a further requisite (ἐπιζητεῖται) to what we are looking for, that, in addition to the other characteristics of good, it should be κτητὸν καὶ πρακτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ—ἐνιστάμενοι, *objecting*; by the logical form ἔνστασις.—μὴ λέγωσιν. See *Grammar*, 873, 4; 814, b. λέγουσιν, Michelet.

- (10.) 4. δὲ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι φάμεν. Remark the epigrammatic brevity of this great principle of his philosophy.—ταύτην τὴν πίστιν, sc. δὲ πᾶσι δοκεῖ κτ.λ.—εἰ γάρ: Michelet, ἢ γάρ.—ὠρέγεται, al. ὀρέγεται.—τὶ φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν: the dictates and reproofs of conscience; the shadowy sense of καλόν, which is perhaps never wholly obliterated.—κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, *above and better than their evil state*. It may be said that the wholly bad desire ἡδύ as ἡδύ, not as ἀγαθόν. The answer is, that even these people have unconsciously instincts towards ἀγαθόν, which are really their motive causes, though apparently ἡδύ alone animates them. See vii. 13. 6.

- (11.) 5. οὐκ ἔοικε. See vii. 13. 2.—οἱ γὰρ φασιν, *they deny*.—ἀμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ, *both these two evils are opposed to that which is neither*, i. e. to the μέσον. The argument here, as in bk. vii., is, that as each of the extremes is opposed, not only to the mean, but to the other extreme, it cannot be argued ἐξ ἐναντίων, that if one thing is evil, that which is opposed to it is good, for it may be the other opposed extreme, which is evil. There are two sorts of opposition,—good and evil, and evil and evil,—and the opposition between pleasure and pain

may be of the better sort. Aristotle answers this by saying, if both were evil, both would be *φευκτά*.

- (12.) 5. *μηδετέρων δέ*, sc. *δύτων κακῶν*.—*μηδέτερον*, sc. *εἶναι φευκτόν*,—*ἢ ὁμοίως*; or, at all events, whether they were avoided or not, both must be either avoided or pursued alike.

CHAPTER III.

- (13.) 1. A *ποιότης* is that whereby a thing can be defined, its nature and essence set forth, (*Cat. vi.*, τὰ γὰρ διδεγμένα αὐτὰς ποῖα λέγεται κατ' αὐτάς. cf. *Met. v. 2*, p. 112); and the notion advanced in the major premiss is, that every thing which is a good defines and sets forth the nature and essence of that to which it is attached; while, to say that a thing is pleasant, or the contrary, defines nothing of its real nature, for it may be applied indifferently to various things differing in nature. The major premiss is clearly a dogmatic assumption, which Aristotle quickly destroys by giving instances to the contrary, as a being or thing would be not defined by saying its operations were right, or that it was happy; and yet both these are confessedly goods.

- (14.) 1. The arguments against *ἡδονή* being an *ἀγαθόν*, are :—

All *ἀγαθόν* is *ποιότης* :

ἡδονή is not a *ποιότης* :

ἡδονή is not an *ἀγαθόν*.

To the major premiss of which Aristotle brings an *ἐνστάσις*, using *ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια* and *εὐδαιμονία* as the middle terms.

- (15.) 2. Nothing which admits of degrees is a good, for the *ἀγαθόν* is something definite and fixed, (*ὠρισμένον*); while every thing which admits of degrees is indefinite and shifting. (*ἀόριστον*).

ἡδονή admits of degrees :

ἡδονή is not a good.

- (16.) 2. *ἀγαθόν ὠρισθαί*. The moral fact that good, viewed *absolutely*, does not really admit of degrees, is curiously embodied in the grammatical fact, that the comparative of good, in most, if not in all languages, is irregular. A thing, to be good, must be perfect. "*Why callest thou Me good? there*

is more good but one, that is, God." (St Matt xix 17.) When we speak of things being more or less good, we mean that they approach more or less nearly to the absolute standard.

- (17.) 2. ἡδυσθαι, middle verb: *the (being in a) state of pleasure; pleasure in the concrete, viewed as residing in a subject.*
- (18.) 2. καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κτλ. If pleasure is viewed in the concrete, so that it may properly be said that a man is more or less pleased, it may so be said of justice and the other virtues, that a man is more or less just, &c.; and yet this does not exclude justice, &c. from the category of Good.—κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, *in respect of the several virtues.*
- (19.) 2. εἰ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, *if (they judge this indefiniteness to exist) in pleasures in the abstract: it is true that they, too, in a certain fashion and in a certain sense, admit of degrees, even as health does. Pleasure, viewed by itself, and not in combination with any object in which it might reside and work, (ἀμυγής,) may be something absolute and definite, not admitting of degrees; so that any degree short of this abstract point is not pleasure, but only an approach to it; though, at the same time, when residing in a subject and combined with other elements, (μικταί) it may, in regard of the state of that subject, be said to be a greater or less degree of pleasure: so that, being in its own nature a single definite point, it is in this way capable of degrees; just as health, being in itself an absolute and perfect freedom from disease, and the perfect well-being of the body, yet is said to exist more or less in individuals,—individuals are said to be in a greater or less state of health. So likewise, though pleasure in the concrete does admit of degrees, pleasure in the abstract, the simple idea of pleasure, does not; and therefore the argument, whatever be its value, is answered.*
- (20.) 3. ὁρισμένη οὐσα: *being a fixed absolute point, not admitting of degrees.—συμμετρεῖα, the same common measure; the same degree in all the subjects in which it may reside.—ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη κτλ., but falling short of its abstract perfection, it still exists up to a certain point,—differing in different subjects. A man may not be in absolutely perfect health, and yet one would say he was in good health.—δια-*

φέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. The measure of it differs in coming more or less near to the abstracted perfect health.—τὸ περὶ ἡδονῆν, the case with pleasure.

(21.) 4. τέλειόν τε κ.τ.λ.

ἀγαθόν is τέλειον:

ἡδονή is not τέλειον, for it is a κίνησις or γένεσις:

ἡδονή is not ἀγαθόν.

τέλειον, perfect in itself.—ἀτελεῖς, not ending in them-

—πάσῃ γάρ κ.τ.λ. Every κίνησις has τάχος or βραδυτή-

ἡδονή has not:

ἡδονή is not κίνησις.

πρὸς ἄλλο: if not absolutely, at least relatively.

(22.) 4. ἡσθῆναι, passive: to be put into a state of πῆ-

(μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως).—ἡδε-

middle: to be in a state of pleasure, (ἐνεργεῖν κατ'

A person may receive impressions of pleasure more or less rapidly, but the pleasure itself has no notion of quickness or slowness.

(23.) 5. γένεσις, a transition state.—δοκεῖ γάρ κ.τ.λ. T-

one of the formal, abstract arguments of the school

rather porticos, of Athens, which Plato delighted to use

which carried great weight in the philosophy of the time

though to us it may seem to be scarcely worthy of the notice

of such a mind as Aristotle's. The argument, however,

as it is, stands thus:—Any γένεσις, which we may take

not arise from any chance subject-matter, (οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυ-

τὸ τυχόν γενέσθαι), but that from whence it rises is the

same as that into which it is resolved when it ceases, (ἐ-

γίνεται εἰς τοῦτο διαλύσθαι,) so that if ἡδονή is a γένεσις,

there would be ἡδύ, (ἐξ οὗ γίνεται,) ἡδονή. (γένεσις,

again, (εἰς ὃ διαλύεται); whereas the real order is—

ἡδονή, λυπηρόν, λείπη, (οὐ γένεσις ἢ ἡδονή τοῦτου ἢ

φθορά).

(24.) 6. ἐνδεῖαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, the lack or want of

which nature requires, and pleasure the supplying thereof

so that ἡδονή, if thus viewed, is a γένεσις.—οὐ δοκεῖ

mind, and not the body, is the seat of pleasure; for

pleasures are mental sensations arising from the body

ἀλλὰ γινομένης κ.τ.λ. The ἀναπλήρωσις is the γένεσις

which *ἡδονή* is the coincident result.—*ἡ δὲ δόξα κτλ.* From the accidental connection of *ἡδονή* and *ἀναπλήρωσις* in bodily pleasures, they argue their identity; whereas there are many pleasures, not bodily, which are in no ways connected with *ἀναπλήρωσις*.

- (25.) 10. *ἡ τῷ εἶδει*, or, admitting that the above mentioned really are *ἡδοναί*, must we divide *ἡδοναί* into right and wrong, and denying good of the latter, assert it of the former?
- (26.) 11. *ἡ διαφόρου εἶδει*, *sc. τὰς ἡδονάς.*
- (27.) 12. *οὐδεὶς κτλ.* There is a manifest difference between the pleasure of the child and of the man.—*οὐδὲ χαίρειν*, the pleasure arising from bad sources is evidently not *αἰσιν*, but the contrary.—*μηδέποτε μέλλον λυπηθῆναι*, though he were never likely to smart for it. See Bishop Butler, *Tendencies of Virtue*.
- (28.) 12. *περὶ πολλὰ κτλ.* In some things pleasure is the final cause, while in others it is not; as the pleasure of seeing, &c.: hence, too, pleasures differ from each other.

CHAPTER IV.

- (29.) 1. *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσι*: having considered the common opinions on the subject, and their difficulties and solutions, retracing our steps, and beginning the subject afresh. He shews—
1. *What it is not*:—it is not a *κίνησις*.
 2. *What it is.*
- (30.) 1. *τελεία εἶναι*. Take any point in any prolonged energy of sight, the act of sight so taken is perfect in itself, though no other act of sight had preceded it, and none were to follow.—*ἄλογον τε*, *indivisible*.
- (31.) 2. *ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις*. A *κίνησις* is a progression from one state to another,—from that which is *ἐν δυνάμει* to that which is in *ἐντελέχεια*, (see *Phys.* iii. 1;) and therefore involves not merely a *point of time*, but a *space of time*: when that space of time is ended the *κίνησις* ceases, the *τέλος* towards which it was a *κίνησις* being arrived at: wherefore *ἐν χρόνῳ πᾶσα κίνησις*.

(32.) 2. ἡ ἐν ᾧ παντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ ἐν τούτῳ. This is the major premiss of a disjunctive syllogism, one alternative of which has to be supplied. If a κίνησις is τελεία, it is so ἐν ᾧ παντὶ χρόνῳ ἢ ἐν τούτῳ, or not at all. The first step is to show the characteristics of κινήσεις ἐν μέρει, viz. that they are τῷ εἶδει and ἀτελείς. This latter disposes of the claim that κινήσεις ἐν μέρει to be τέλει, and he then goes on to show that upon the point of their specific difference, with a view to prove that the whole κίνησις thus made of specifically different portions is not τελεία. You must view κίνησις either in its totality, extending from the δύναμις to the ἐντελέχεια, or then it is ἐν ᾧ παντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ in its whole duration,—or in its parts, the various parts of the whole, and then it will be ἐν τούτῳ that particular space of its duration. Michelet reads ἡ ἐν τούτῳ δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, confining the view of κίνησις to its duration; but this destroys the argument given above.

(33.) 2. καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει κ.τ.λ. As the several κινήσεις are taken from one another, and from the whole which they together constitute, it is clear that they are several independent motions rather than one whole: though they result in one εἶδος, yet they are not continuations of one another, but are ἕτεραι εἶδει; and therefore the whole κίνησις cannot be viewed as τελεία, for each of the independent parts has passed before the whole is complete. That this is what he has in view in shewing the several κινήσεις to be ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει is clear from the end of section 3.

(34.) 2. ῥα β δ ὥ σ κ ω ς, fluting: Lidd. and Scott.—κ ρ η π ι δ ο ς ε ἰ ς, ornament.—τ ρ ι γ λ ὺ φ ο υ, a three-grooved tablet, placed at equal distances along the frieze. Id.

(35.) 2. καὶ οὐκ ἔστι κ.τ.λ. If a κίνησις be taken at a single point of its duration, it is imperfect, inasmuch as it has no relation to what has preceded and what is to follow, and without these it has no real existence: if perfection can be predicated at all of a κίνησις (ἀλλ' εἴπερ τελείαν δεῖ λέγειν), it must be viewed in its whole duration, from the moment when it begins to the moment when it ceases (ἐν τῷ ᾧ παντὶ, sc. χρόνῳ). This is another way of stating the disjunctive premiss of the syllogism (note 32,) one of the alternatives (the ἐν τούτῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἐν ᾧ παντὶ) having been eliminated.—καὶ ταύτης: particular κινήσεις are also specifically different.

- (36.) 3. οὐ μόνον γάρ κ.τ.λ. The act is not merely a motion across a point, but across a point with the accident of locality attached to it, which is sufficient to make one such act differ from the other, (ἐν ἑτέρῳ, sc. τόπῳ αὐτῇ ἐκείνης).—δι' ἀκριβοίας: Phys. iii. 1.
- (37.) 3. ἐν ᾧ παντὶ χρόνῳ, in its whole duration. A κίνησις is not really perfect and complete in its whole duration, for the very same moment that it is completed it ceases to exist as a κίνησις: when viewed as a whole it is merely a succession, or series of imperfect κινήσεις, specifically differing from each other, (ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ καὶ διαφέρουσιν τῷ εἶδει,) inasmuch as each starts from a specific point, and tends to a specific and special end, (εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν). We must supply the conclusion of the disjunctive syllogism: "therefore a κίνησις is not τελεία."
- (38.) 4. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁμοῦν τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. Each sort of pleasure, and each several one of a succession of pleasurable emotions, (i. e. of a state of pleasure,) is perfect and complete in itself; each several emotion is not a step in an imperfect process, as in the case of κίνησις, but in itself, and by itself, realizes a definite notion: so that if there was nothing either before or after, yet its notion and definition (εἶδος) would be complete.—τῶν ὁλοῶν καὶ τελείων, belongs to the indivisible and perfect.
- (39.) 4. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. A κίνησις does not exist merely in present time; it has a before and an after, without which it has no meaning; whereas an emotion of pleasure implies no notion of time, except just so much as is implied in present existence: and that which can exist perfectly in the minutest portion of time, to the notion and perfection of which time is not necessary, is of the nature of things whole and indivisible.
- (40.) 4. τῶν μεριστῶν: such things as are made up of parts imperfect in themselves, none of which has separately an existence independent of the whole of which it is a part. It is true that a state of pleasure may be divided into its successive pleasing emotions, but each of these is in itself a whole, and capable of existing independently of the whole state of pleasure, just as the portions of a divided crystal are in themselves perfect crystals.

- (41.) 4. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεως κ.τ.λ. ὅρασις ἵς ἔλόν τι; for if a being were only to enjoy his sight for a single moment of time, the act of sight would for that moment be as perfect an act of vision as if it were continued for an hundred years: it cannot be divided into energies so minute, but that each is in itself perfect and complete.
- (42.) 5. αἰσθήσεως κ.τ.λ. Having now shewn what ἡδονή is not, he now proceeds to say what it is. To every act of the senses, or of the active or contemplative intellect, there is an ἡδονή attached, (κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἰσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν,) arising from and upon the realization and attainment of the object of sense or intellect; i. e. pleasure follows on the sensual reception of the object of sight, or on the intellectual conception of whatever object in the world of thought the intellect is for the time employed. The higher and more perfect the being, and the object on which it is employed, the higher and more perfect will the energy be, and the higher and better the pleasure; and therefore the highest pleasure will result coincidentally on the realization and completion of the highest energy of the highest being. See Butler, Sermon on "Love of our Neighbour."
- (43.) 5. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης κ.τ.λ. Every sense is directed towards some object as its end, in which it rests; and every act of sense is an energy towards such an object. The most perfect energy is that of the most perfect sense, or of the sense in the most perfect state, working towards the best object which falls under its powers.
- (44.) 5. αὐτὴν δὲ κ.τ.λ. The psychological question whether the sense itself works and energizes towards its object, or the being in whom the sense resides, is foreign to the present question.
- (45.) 5. αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ. He here anticipates a conclusion which properly can only be drawn after the next clause. (κατὰ πᾶσαν αἰσθησίν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή,) and lays it down that that energy which is most perfect would also bring with it the highest pleasure, as every act of sense or intellect has its pleasure; and that pleasure will be the highest which results from the highest and most perfect energy, as before defined; i. e. the energy which works towards its highest and best object.

(46.) 6. τελετοῖ δὲ ἐνέργειαν κ.τ.λ. Pleasure crowns and perfects the energy, not as a producing or instrumental cause, but as a result; as health is the perfection of, or perfects, the body, but not in the same way in which the instrumental causes, such as the physician or medicine, perfect it. The αἰσθητὸν is an ingredient in the completion of the energy, as being the object on which it works; the αἴσθησις perfects it as being its instrument; the ἡδονή perfects it as being its result, —just as beauty is the perfection of the prime of youth, without being necessary to its existence, or in any way producing it.

(47.) 7. τοιοῦτων δὲ ὄντων κ.τ.λ. If the αἴσθησις and αἰσθητὸν are good of their sort (τοιοῦτων), ἡδονή will always follow, as being the result of the realized correspondence between the αἴσθησις and the αἰσθητὸν: if the energy is incomplete, so that the αἴσθησις fails to realize the object, ἡδονή will not follow; but when they are adapted one to the other, and the αἴσθησις works towards the αἰσθητὸν on the one hand, and the αἰσθητὸν satisfies the αἴσθησις on the other, then pleasure is the result. — αἰσθανόμενον is here “*that which is to receive the impression,*” = αἴσθησις.

(48.) 7. ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσαντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. The generic sense of ποιεῖν and πάσχειν when thus opposed, is of things or persons standing in the relation of agent and patient, subject and object, active and passive: their specific or particular signification varies according to the subject-matter of the context. Thus in the fifth book the former signifies *the producer*, the latter *the consumer*, (see bk. v. note 61;) and in this passage, as the context relates to the mental energies or acts, these words would relate—the one, to some active energy of the mind, the other, some passive impression. Hence the sense seems to be, “It naturally is a condition of pleasure arising from the correspondence between the αἴσθησις and the αἰσθητὸν, that there should be some being who has a capability of the active energies of αἴσθησις, (τοῦ ποιήσαντος = μέλλοντος ποιεῖν,) and a capacity for receiving the passive impressions of sense, (τοῦ πεισομένου = μέλλοντος παθεῖν).” The αἰσθητὸν might clearly exist without producing any pleasure, if the active αἴσθησις were wanting, and the αἴσθησις would produce no pleasure if the αἰσθητὸν

were lacking; but even where they both exist, that in which they exist must be in such a state, both actively and passively, as to allow of their being called into being. Thus the αἴσθησις exists in sleep, and the αἰσθητόν likewise; but as the capacity of active energies of αἴσθησις, and the passive impressions receivable from αἰσθητόν are suspended, no pleasure is produced.

- (19) 8. οὐχ ὡς ἔξις κ.τ.λ., *not as an ingredient*, but as a result and crown. This is the practical difference between Eudoxus and Aristotle. The former would say happiness is a result of the highest pleasure; pleasure is an essential ingredient of happiness: Aristotle, that pleasure was the result of happiness; happiness could exist without it.
- (50.) 8. ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων. Being similar, and there being the same correspondence and adaptation (πρὸς ἀλλήλα τον αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχόντων) between the active energies, (the κρίνον or θεωροῖν,) τοῦ ποιητικοῦ and the qualities of the object thereof, (the νοητόν or αἰσθητόν), τοῦ παθητικοῦ, the same result, viz., ἡδονή, follows, as in the case of the simple αἴσθησις, (ταῦτὸ πέφυκε γενέσθαι); τὸ κρίνον is here the active energy, which has νοητόν for its subject-matter; and αἰσθητόν is here the subject-matter of θεωρία, which is a highly intellectual αἴσθησις,—the perception of things, their qualities, laws, &c. It is possible that ποιητικοῦ may mean the αἰσθητόν which produces (ποίει) the impression, and παθητικοῦ the faculty which receives it, (πάσχει); but on the whole it seems better to adopt the sense given above.—διὰ ταῦτό, *for the same reason*, sc. because we are weary of it.—διὰ ταῦτα, *nl. for these reasons*, sc. which have just been mentioned.—παρακίκληται, *is excited*.
- (51) 9. ἡ κάμνει. Michelet follows the old interpretation, by taking this as an answer to the preceding question, πῶς οὖν κ.τ.λ., *is it that he is weary of it?*
- (52) 10. τελειοῖ is the τέλος of—the perfection—crown; it is a necessary result.—τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν, in which life consists; and therefore of life itself.

CHAPTER V.

- (53.) 1. *ᾧ θεῷ*, sc. from its connection with *ἐνέργεια*: as the *ἐνέργεια* are different, so must the pleasures which result from and crown them be different. The contradictory opinions about pleasure being or not being a good, arise from there being different sorts of pleasure, and one party looking at one sort, the other at another sort. And again, if there are different sorts of pleasure, true pleasure may arise from the pure intellect, and the moral nature, and even from the mere senses; each being a true pleasure in its kind and degree.
- (54.) 2. *ἐπιδιδόασιν*, gain ground and are improved. This is one of the final causes of pleasure.
- (55.) 5. *ἐξακριβοῖ*, perfects.
- (56.) 6. *καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι*, the desires which arise from definite feelings and passions, and whence spring definite emotions of desire, (*ὄρεξις*;) while *ἡδονή* is the more general, indefinite love of enjoyment,—the general tone of mind, which, up to a certain point, regulates and directs the *ἐπιθυμίαι*.—*ἡ δὲ οὐαί*, the emotions of pleasure which are the result of the *ἐνέργεια*, of sense or reason. We must distinguish between *ἡδονή* as a motive cause preceding, and as a result following on, the action.—*ἡ γὰρ κατὰ κ.τ.λ.*, sc. *ἐστὶν οἰκεία*.
- (57.) 6. *αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμένα κ.τ.λ.* The *ὄρεξις* may precede the *ἐνέργεια* by a long time. It differs from it in its nature as much as the act *in posse* differs from the act *in esse*, while the pleasure arising from any energy is so closely connected with it as to be almost identical.—*σύνεγγυς*, co-incident.
- (58.) 8. *ἡ γὰρ κατὰ κ.τ.λ.*, sc. *ἐστὶν οἰκεία*.
- (59.) 10. *εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον*, sc. *τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ εἶναι κυρίως ἡδύ*.—*εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται*. If pleasures then differ in excellence according to the *ἐνέργεια* whence they arise, and the good man is the true standard, then the *ἡδονή* of *ἀρετή* is the highest *ἡδονή* of man.—*ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἢ τοιοῦτος*, i. e. in respect of his *ἀρετή*, as far as he has *ἀρετή* he is the standard of excellence.

- (60.) 11. ἀλλὰ τοῦτοις, *except to individuals*.—εἴτ' οὖν μία κτλ, the energy or energies of the man who has arrived at the highest happiness, the greatest perfection of which he is capable, have the highest and most perfect pleasures attached to them.

CHAPTER VI.

- (61.) He now proceeds to sum up his book by stating that towards which he has been throughout working,—the nature of human happiness;—and first, happiness being an energy and τῶν καθ' αἶρά αἰρετῶν, what energies apparently of this class are nevertheless not εὐδαιμονία.
- (62.) 2. οἷκ ἐστὶν ἑξίς: bk. i. 7.—ἀναγκαῖαι, *necessary as means*.—αἰτάρκης, *self-contained*. It needs not pleasure nor anything else to complete or perfect it. It would be what it is if nothing were to be joined with it. Of course, if other good things are added to it, it is increased in degree, just as youth is rendered more desirable by the beauty which accompanies it; but it is youth still, even though there be no beauty superadded. So pleasure is not essential to it, though necessarily joined to it as a coincident result. It is in its essence always αἰρεωτέρη, compared with everything else; but if it has other goods, as accidents and results, it is αἰρεωτέρα αὐτῇ ἐαυτῆς. See bk. i. ch. vii. note 112.
- (63.) 3. εὐδαιμονιζομένων, *of those who are thought happy*.
- (64.) 7. ἡδῆ, *ipso facto*.
- (65.) 8. εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον, *external life; social life*:—they have ζῶν, but not βίος. The slave has no existence of his own: his daily life, and all in which it consists, is his master's.

CHAPTER VII.

- (66.) In this chapter he lays down the conclusion of his whole treatise, that εὐδαιμονία is the energy of the highest excellence of man; that in itself the ἐνέργεια and ἀρετὴ κατὰ νοῦν is the

highest energy, looking upon man merely in respect of his intellect as an intellectual being; but looking upon man as a compound being, his highest good, being what he is—a moral being,—is a life according to moral virtue.

- (67.) 1. κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, *according to its proper perfection.*
- (68.) 2. καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς (κράτιστος) τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν (ἄριστα) περὶ ᾧ ὁ νοῦς. Of subjects of knowledge, the subjects of νοῦς are the best.
- (69.) 3. εὐλογον διὰ τοῖς εἰδόσι κ.τ.λ. It is reasonable that life should be more agreeable to those who are in possession of knowledge than to those who are only seeking after it. It is assumed that all men are either searching after knowledge or in possession of it.
- (70.) 6. παρ' αὐτὰ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι, *besides and beyond the mere energies of political life.*
- (71.) 7. ἡ τελεία δὲ εὐδαιμονία. In itself, and looked upon as the highest energy which the nature of man admits of, the energy of the pure intellect is εὐδαιμονία,—of which it in every respect realizes the idea, and fulfils the condition; but as man is a compound being, such an energy would not be the energy of man, but as partaker of a nature above humanity. It is a perfection which every one ought to aim at and realize as far as possible, but it is the perfection of ἀθάνατος rather than the θνητός.
- (72.) 8. κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν, moral virtue; ἐνέργεια (τοῦ θείου διαφέρει) ἐνεργείας τῆς κ.τ.λ.—κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας, *according to moralists.* Either Theognis, or Solon, or Epicharmus. Cf. Rhet. ii. 21.
- (73.) 9. δόξεις κ.τ.λ. The essence of the life of the rational creature, man, is reason, wherefore it is but reasonable that he should try to develope and realize this wherein his life essentially consists.
- (74.) 9. τὸ λεχθῆν πρότερον, *sc. about ἀρετὴ and ἡδονή.*

CHAPTER VIII.

- (75.) 1. δευτέρως. Secondly, and viewed as the proper energy of the compound being, man, εὐδαιμονία consists in ἠθικὴ ἀρετή.
- (76.) 3. εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαί. ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, supposing it to be formed, τὸν σκόπον ὀρθὸν ποιεῖ, (see bk. vi. 12), and thus supplies the ἀρχαί of action to φρόνησις as the deliberative faculty in moral action. See bk. vi. note 133.—τὰ δὲ ὀρθόν, and the direction of moral actions is the function of φρόνησις.
- (77.) 3. τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον, with the passions in the compound being.—αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθετοῦ ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαὶ κτλ. He thus reconciles the Platonic theory, which is founded on the abstract excellence of θεωρία, with his own, which is founded on the actual practical nature and position of man.—ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη, sc. from the passions.
- (78.) 4. ἐξουσίας, liberty, opportunity.
- (79.) 7. ἀνθρωπεύεισθαι, to play his part as a man—τοῖς θεοῖς. This is not the language of a man who disbelieved in a Divine Being—αἱ δὲ σώφρονες, sc. πράξεις. εἰ δὲ σωφρονες, al.
- 80.) 8. οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, not in its accidental results.
- 81.) 9. δεήσει κτλ. A being such as man requires external goods for perfect happiness, for even θεωρία looks for some of these as conditions and pre-requisites.—οὐ μὲν κτλ. Here is the same distinction drawn between μακάριον and εὐδαιμονία as in bk. i.—οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ. He here passes away almost insensibly from the abstract happiness of θεωρία to the political happiness of πράξεις.—τὸ ἀτταρκες, the sort and degree of external goods necessary to θεωρία.—ἡ πράξις, the action of moral virtue which requires external things as its subject matter. Hence the real meaning of the passage, "Neither θεωρία nor ἠθικὴ ἀρετή require an excessive amount of external goods."
- (82.) 12. πίστιν μὲν οὖν κτλ. Observe the practical character of Aristotle's mind.
- (83.) 13. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια κτλ. Here again is a distinct recognition of Divine Providence.

CHAPTER IX.

- (84.) 1. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς πρακτοῖς. Here he is speaking of the result of the whole of the preceding treatise, as τὸ θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνῶναι. He has been giving, not merely practical directions for virtue, but laying down and proving a theory of virtue and happiness; not an abstract theory with no further result, (οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκα, bk. ii. 2.) but a practical theory, with a view to right action, and to the system of politics which has human good for its end. His theory of virtue so far agrees with Plato's, that he holds intellectual energies to be in themselves the highest excellence of a being possessing intellect; but he has *proved* that the ἔργον, and hence the excellence of man as a compound being, is realized by ἠθικὴ ἀρετή. Though his Ethics necessarily have a practical bearing, yet their object is mainly γνῶσις τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; but the τέλος of this γνῶσις is πρῆξις. See bk. i., note 46.
- (85.) 3. Θείον γινιν. Theognis, 532.—ποιῆσαι ἄν, *might or would make*. Gr. Gr. 429, 1.—κατακώχμιον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, *possessed, occupied by*; al. κατακώχμιον. Il. β. 669, ἐφίληθεν ἐκ Δίος.
- (86.) 5. κατελεημμένα, *possessed by*; much the same as κατακώχμιον above.
- (87.) 6. μή ποτ' οὐκ ἰσχύη: Gr. Gr. 814.—προδιδειργάσθαι, *to be cultivated beforehand*.
- (88.) 7. συνείη, *take it in*.
- (89.) 8. στέργον τὸ καλόν κ.τ.λ. This is φυσικὴ ἀρετή.
- (90.) 9. ἐπιτηδεύειν αἰτά, sc. τροφήν καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν ἁρτίην.
- (91.) 9. λόγος ὦν κ.τ.λ. Observe this definition of law.—ἀπὸ τινος φρονήσεως, proceeding from a particular sort of φρόνησις; that which takes cognizance of human good in general: bk. vi. 5, 5, 8, 1.
- (92.) 13. μετ' ὀλίγων, with a few others. See i. 13. 3 —κυκλωπικῶς: Od. ix. 114.
- (93.) 17. ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν; *quemvis; any one*.—προτεθίγναι, *committed to one's care*. Some refer it to νόμον.

- (94.) 18. *παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν*; i. e. “Is it a matter of *διδασχῆ*?” — *δυνάμεων*: properly, organic sciences or art; here, opposed to *ἐπιστῆμαι*, *arts*: see bk. i. note 22.—*οὐ πολιτικοὺς πεποιηκότας*: see Plat. Protag. 166, sqq.
- (95.) 19. *οὐ μὲν μικρόν γε κ.τ.λ.* This formula, *οὐ μὲν γε*, refers to the question stated above,—“Is it matter of *διδασχῆ*?” (*ἡ παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν*;) and when this has been discussed by stating and examining the opposite question, (*ἡ οὐχ ὁμοιον κ.τ.λ. —φιλάτοις*;) he resumes the subject by *οὐ μὲν γε*: “But truly, at all events, (*γέ*, however this may be,) experience seems to contribute not a little, otherwise (*οὐ γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ.*) men would not have become politicians from political practice.”
- (96.) 20. *τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ Ῥητορικῇ*: see Rhet. i. 2.—*ὥσπερ οὐδέ κ.τ.λ.* *ὥσπερ* = *δοκοῦντες*: Gr. Gr. 703.
- (97.) 21. *λαθεῖεν*, sc. *ἕκαστοι*.—*ἐκάστους*. *ἐκάστου*, Michelet; sc. *θεραπεύματα*.
- (98.) 22. *παραλιπόντων*. This is interpreted to mean that no one had treated of it with sufficient accuracy.—*αὐτοὺς*, *ourselves*.
- (99.) 23. *πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ.* Michelet observes that *πρῶτον μὲν* refers to the Politics i. 11; *εἶτα*, to iii.—vi.; *θεωρηθέντων*, to vii., viii.
- (100.) 23. *ἀρξάμενοι*: having made this *ἀρχή* or introduction. The true view of the Ethics is, that it is the introduction or grammar of the Politics.

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
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